JUDGMENT A. Banerji, J. - British India Corporation, Ltd., Kanpur, hereinafter referred to as the petitioner, has filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for quashing the award, dated 17 June 1981, made by the Fourth Labour Court, Kanpur. By this award the petitioner was directed to treat respondent 2, Maiku Lal, to be a Technical Supervisor with effect from 24 July 1980 and to pay him the emoluments the said post carried along with arrears within a month from the date of the award. A sum of Rs. 190 was also awarded as costs to the workman. 2. Maiku Lal, respondent 2, claimed that he was the Head Mistri but was working as Technical Supervisor in the petitioner's mills in a permanent vacancy and was entitled to the said post and the emoluments that the post carried. 3. The State Government made a reference under S. 4K of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act, to the Fourth Labour Court at Kanpur. In the proceeding before the Labour Court, parties filed their written statements and led evidence. On behalf of the petitioner one Jayant Kumar Mukherjee, a Technical Supervisor, was examined. Maiku Lal appeared and gave his statement. The Presiding Officer in his award held that Maiku Lal has been working as a Technical Supervisor in the dyeing department and was as such entitled to the post and the emolument of the said post including the arrears from 24 July 1980, the date when the reference was made. 4. Sri Vijai Bahugna, learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that the impugned award was manifestly erroneous in law and was liable to be quashed. A perusal of the award showed non-application of mind, inasmuch as the evidence tendered by the parties had not been appreciated and reasons had not been given for the findings. Further, the Presiding Officer failed to deal with the preliminary point about the maintainability of the reference although he had mentioned the same in the award. The post of a Technical Supervisor was not that of a workman as defined under the Act. Consequently, the dispute that Maiku Lal was entitled to be declared as a Technical Supervisor was beyond the jurisdiction of the Labour Court and as such the workman concerned was not entitled to any relief. The post of a Technical Supervisor was not that of a workman as defined under the Act. Consequently, the dispute that Maiku Lal was entitled to be declared as a Technical Supervisor was beyond the jurisdiction of the Labour Court and as such the workman concerned was not entitled to any relief. I have heard Sri K. P. Agarwal, learned counsel for respondent-workman also. 5. It is true that the objection taken by the petitioner and which finds place in Para. 3 of the award has not at all been dealt with by the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court. A perusal of the award shows that the Presiding Officer has not paid sufficient attention to the above matter. This Court has time and again pointed out that the quasi judicial Tribunals must clearly indicate in their orders the respective case of the parties, the conclusion ' arrived at and the reasons for the same. Giving of reasons is imperative. It is not enough that the authority entrusted with quasi-judicial functions has reached a conclusion on the question before it ; the order must show that the authority in reaching the conclusion has applied its mind and given reasons. A decision in a case of disputed claim can be reached only if it is supported by cogent reasons. Consequently, the recording of reasons in support of a decision of a disputed claim by quasi-judicial authority ensures that the decision is reached according to law and is not the result of caprice, whim or fancy or on account of some policy or expediency. A party in dispute is entitled to know the ground on which the authority has rejected his claim. This Court has also upheld that not only reasons have to be given but they must be proper and adequate reasons. It has come to our notice often that Presiding Officers of Labour Courts write down the case or the evidence of one party first and the other party then and ultimately in a separate paragraph give its findings on the disputed questions without adequate reasons. This is not proper way of writing an order or an award by a quasi judicial authority. If a party has led evidence, it is the bounden duty of the quasi-judicial authority to consider whether it is worthy of belief or adequate to sustain or refuse the claim. 6. This is not proper way of writing an order or an award by a quasi judicial authority. If a party has led evidence, it is the bounden duty of the quasi-judicial authority to consider whether it is worthy of belief or adequate to sustain or refuse the claim. 6. In the present case, the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court has after mentioning the terms of the reference and the preliminary objection raised referred to the evidence led by the petitioner and the evidence led by the workman and in the last paragraph has given his conclusion and reasons. Learned counsel for the petitioner assailed the reasons as to he no reasons in the eye of law. He urged that the evidence of a Technical Supervisor in the dyeing department of the petitioner was rejected on the ground that no other witness was examined by the petitioner and his statement was not categorical but prefaced by the words "as far as he knew." Learned counsel urged that this was not sufficient ground to reject his evidence. He further urged that the evidence of the workman that he had worked as a Technical Supervisor was not convincing and that he was only a Head Mistri In charge of transportation of the dyes and colours. In other words, learned counsel sought this Court to reappraise the evidence led by the parties to come to a conclusion that the finding was perverse. It is not the function of a Court hearing the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution to reappraise evidence and come to a different conclusion of the disputed questions of fact. This Court may interfere in an appropriate case where it finds that there is a manifest error of law in the finding arrived at by a quasi-judicial authority, viz., failure to consider relevant evidence and the like. Merely because the finding arrived at by such an authority appears to be erroneous is not a ground for interference, under Article 226 of the Constitution. 7. The question before the Labour Court was whether the workman Maiku Lal had worked as a Technical Supervisor. This was necessary to find out whether he was suitable or competent to be appointed as a Technical Supervisor. 7. The question before the Labour Court was whether the workman Maiku Lal had worked as a Technical Supervisor. This was necessary to find out whether he was suitable or competent to be appointed as a Technical Supervisor. The evidence led on behalf of the petitioner only showed that the workman Maiku Lal had not worked as Technical Supervisor, as far as the witness for the petitioner knew. The Labour Court has based this as one of the reasons for not accepting this evidence. This reason cannot be said to be perverse. Another reason given in the award is that no other witness was examined on behalf of the petitioner. This becomes significant in view of the statement of the witness for the petitioner to the effect "as far as he knew." If the petitioner had examined another officer or Technical Supervisor who could have given testimony and stated categorically that the workman Maiku Lal had not worked as a Technical Supervisor, the position would have been different. What is further significant is that there is not a single question addressed to the workman that he was not competent or qualified to hold the post of Technical Supervisor. No question was raised nor the point taken in the written statement. The statement of the workman Maiku Lal that he had worked as a Technical Supervisor in the vacancy of Sri Sachan remained undisputed. This has been noticed in the award. Consequently, it cannot be said that there are no reasons in the impugned award. Although the manner of writing out the award was not very satisfactory, yet it must be held that the findings arrived at by the Labour Court are not such as to be interfered with, for the reason that the findings of fact do not appear to be manifest erroneous. 8. On the question whether the post of a Technical Supervisor was not that of a workman as defined in the Act and whether the cause of such a person could he made the subject-matter of a reference was certainly not dealt with by the Labour Court. This is unfortunate. Since the learned counsel for the parties have addressed this point, I do not think it necessary to remand the case or this ground, for I am of the view that the point raised has no merit. 9. This is unfortunate. Since the learned counsel for the parties have addressed this point, I do not think it necessary to remand the case or this ground, for I am of the view that the point raised has no merit. 9. A Technical Supervisor may not be a workman if he draws a salary of more than Rs. 500 a month, for he has some amount of supervisory work to do in the nature of managerial duty, but than the definition of the words "industrial dispute" as contained in S. 2(1) of the Act permits the workman to raise a dispute not only on a difference between the employer and the workman but also who is connected with the employment or non-employment or terms of employment or condition of labour of any person. In other words, even if the person about whose service or condition of service or employment a dispute directly affecting the workman arises even though he did not come within the definition of workman as defined in S. 2(z) of the Act, the matter could be referred to as an industrial dispute. 10. Reference may be made to the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Workmen of Dahingeapar Tea Estate v. Dahingeapar Tea Estate, AIR 1958 SC 353 . Their Lordships examined the scope of expression "any person" in S. 2 (k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, hereinafter referred to as the Central Act. At the relevant time the provision of S. 2(k) was more or less the same as in S. 2(1) of the Act. Their Lordships held : Where the workmen raise a dispute as against their employer, the person regarding whose employment, non-employment, terms of employment or conditions of labour the dispute is raised need not be, strictly speaking, a `workman' within the meaning of the Act but must be one in whose employment, non-employment, terms of employment or conditions of labour the workmen as a class have a direct or substantial interest ." Similar view has been taken in the case of Workmen of G.C. and Company v. G.C. and Company, AIR 1972 SC 319 . It was observed therein : " It would, therefore, appear that the consistent view of this Court is that non workmen as well as workmen can raise a dispute in respect of matters affecting their employment, conditions of service, etc., where they have a community of interests, provided they are direct and are not remote." Even if it be assumed that Maiku Lal was not a workman within the meaning of S. 2(z) of the Act (as he was drawing a salary of over Rs.500 per month), his cause could be espoused by fellow workmen and that would squarely come within the definition of "industrial dispute" as mentioned in S. 2(l) of the Act. The contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner that since Maiku Lal was not a workman his case could not be referred to under S. 4K of the Act is misconceived and must be rejected. I, therefore, find no merits in the objections raised by the petitioner as regards the reference. 11. For the reasons given above, the writ petition has no merits and must fail and is accordingly dismissed with costs.