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1984 DIGILAW 520 (ALL)

Triveni Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh

1984-07-25

K.C.AGRAWAL

body1984
JUDGMENT K.C. Agrawal, J. - This writ petition has been filed against the judgments of the III Addl. District Judge dated 6th of November, 1981 and of the Prescribed Authority dated 14-3-1978, declaring 39 Bighas 1 Biswa 15 Biswansi land of Smt. Daula as surplus. 2. Smt. Daula was served with a notice under Section 10 (2) of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act. The tenure holder Smt. Daula filed her objections on various grounds. After hearing the parties, the prescribed authority declared 39 Bighas 1 Biswa 15 Biswansi of the land of Smt. Daula as surplus by his judgment dated 14-3-1978. Before the prescribed authority, the tenure holder Smt. Daula gave a list of plots in her objection which she wanted to be declared as surplus. The most of these plots were claimed to be in possession of the objectors, who filed their objections before the prescribed authority. Samar Bahadur Singh claimed his possession over 8 Bighas 12 Biswas of land by virtue of sale-deed executed by Smt. Daula. The other objector Awadhesh Pratap Singh claimed plot no. 181 in his adverse possession. Deena Nath and Nirbhaya Singh also claimed their possession by virtue of a sale-deed dated 10th of December, 1975 over an area of 7 Bighas 12 Biswas. These objectors also had filed evidence in support of their respective cases, which included khasras and copies of sale-deed. 3. The prescribed authority did not accept the choice given by the petitioner by holding that possession of the objectors aforesaid being established, the choice offered by Smt. Daula was liable to be rejected. 4. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment, Smt. Daula filed Civil Appeal (Ceiling No. 890 of 1978) before the Addl. District Judge. No argument with respect to Section 12-A was made. On merits the Addl. District Judge found no substance and dismissed the same by the impugned judgment dated 6-11-1981. Against this judgment, the present writ petition was filed by the petitioners, as Judgment Smt. Daula had died during the pendency of the appeal before the Addl. District Judge. 5. The only point pressed before me by the learned counsel was about the benefit of Section 12-A. It has been mentioned by me above that the petitioners did not raise this point before the Addl. District Judge. After dealing with the arguments on merits, the learned Addl. District Judge. 5. The only point pressed before me by the learned counsel was about the benefit of Section 12-A. It has been mentioned by me above that the petitioners did not raise this point before the Addl. District Judge. After dealing with the arguments on merits, the learned Addl. District Judge remarked as stated below :- "No other point has been pressed in this appeal." These remarks of the learned Addl. District Judge conclusively establish that the petitioners are trying to raise a point which they had not argued before him. In case the petitioner wanted to establish that these observations of the Addl. District Judge were wrong, it was necessary for them to have filed an affidavit of the counsel, who argued the appeal before him. In the absence of any evidence on record, the conclusion possible only is that the petitioner had given up the point relating to Section 12-A of the aforesaid Act. In the writ petition the petitioners cannot be permitted to argue the point, the decision of which would require going into evidence and other circumstances. Even on merits, I find myself in agreement with the view of the Prescribed Authority. In respect of a major portion which had been given in the list of choice, the sale-deeds had been executed by Smt. Daula. These persons had paid consideration for the transfer. Having accepted money Smt. Daula could not be permitted to get the same declared as surplus. On other remaining area adverse rights had also been acquired. Accordingly the view taken by the Prescribed Authority rejecting the choice offered by the petitioner cannot be considered as illegal. It is wrong to argue that choice given by the tenure-holder must necessarily be accepted by the Prescribed Authority irrespective of the facts and circumstances of the case. The phrase "As far as possible" confers discretion on the authority. In exercise of the discretion if justice does not require the authority to accept the choice given by the tenure-holder, he can refuse to act upon it. 6. Furthermore in the present case the petitioners have not impleaded those persons who had filed objections against the choice given by the petitioners in the present writ petition. In the absence of those persons it will not be possible to set aside the judgment of the prescribed authority decided in their favour. 7. 6. Furthermore in the present case the petitioners have not impleaded those persons who had filed objections against the choice given by the petitioners in the present writ petition. In the absence of those persons it will not be possible to set aside the judgment of the prescribed authority decided in their favour. 7. The writ petition is consequently rejected with costs to the State Government.