Judgment Ramanujam, J.: 1. This appeal is directed against the decision of Mohan, J. in Writ Petition No.2699 of 1975. The first respondent was employed as Charge-man, Grade I, in the Tamil Nadu Khadi and Village Industries Board, the appellant herein. His services were terminated by an order dated 23.9.1984 on the ground of his alleged failure to keep alive the security policy. The first respondent thereupon filed a Writ Petition No.3627 of 1965 in this Court and the order of termination of his services stood quashed in the said writ petition. Thereafter, the first respondent filed an application under section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, claiming arrears of salary from 23.9.1964 till 18.10.1970 when he was reinstated as a result of the order passed by this Court in Writ Petition No.3627 of 1965. In the claim petition filed before the Labour Court the total arrears of salary for the period from 23.9.1964 to 18.10.1970 was Rs.23,160/-. One of the defences taken in the said petition by the appellant herein was that the first respondent was not entitled to claim the entire amount of salary for the period in question as he was employed during a portion of the period in the Khadi Department of Ghadhi Gram between 22.10.1984 and 31.8.1969, and therefore, the appellant will not, in any event, be liable to pay arrears of salary for the said period when the first respondent was working in the Khadi Department at Gandhi Gram and receiving remuneration. On this point, the appellant wanted to adduce evidence, but the Labour Court has not chosen to give an opportunity to the appellant to produce evidence relating to the employment of the first respondent during a portion of the period for which the first respondent had claimed arrears of salary. The Labour Court has however, chosen to direct the appellant to pay the said sum of Rs.23,160/- claimed by the first respondent. Aggrieved against the said order the appellant filed a Writ Petition No.2699 of 1975, wherein it prayed for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the Labour Court. The Labour Court has however, chosen to direct the appellant to pay the said sum of Rs.23,160/- claimed by the first respondent. Aggrieved against the said order the appellant filed a Writ Petition No.2699 of 1975, wherein it prayed for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the Labour Court. The learned single Judge has chosen to dismiss the writ petition with the following observation: “The only ground of attack against the impugned order is that the petitioner was prevented from letting in evidence to the effect that the employee was under the employment of Khadi Department Gandhi Gram between 22.10.1964 and 31.8.1969 and the Labour Court refused an adjournment. In the result the petitioner was disabled from placing this valuable evidence. If the same was admitted, that would have gone towards reduction of the petitioner's liability. The learned counsel for the respondent would urge that this statement is made only for the purpose of the case and if the petitioner was earnest, it ought to have filed an application for adjournment. I am in agreement with what is submitted by the respondent. There is nothing on record to show that the Labour Court was moved for an adjournment for the purpose of letting in evidence and the same was refused. Therefore, this plea of the petitioner cannot be entertained at this stage.” (1985) 1 MLJ 440 at 442 It will be seen from the above order that since the appellant had not filed an application for adjournment for producing the necessary evidence, the learned Judge was of the view that it cannot now seek an opportunity for letting in the necessary evidence before the Labour Court. As a matter of fact, the learned counsel for the appellant has produced before us the letters received from Gandhi Gram showing that the first respondent was employed during a certain period and he was in receipt of certain remuneration. It is only to adduce evidence in respect of the first respondent's employment during a certain period, opportunity was asked, but the opportunity was not given by the Labour Court and the appellant came with the grievance that it was not given enough opportunity to produce evidence, by filing this writ petition. 2. It is not in dispute that the employment of the first respondent during the period for which claim was made, will be a relevant matter. 2. It is not in dispute that the employment of the first respondent during the period for which claim was made, will be a relevant matter. It may be that the appellant was not in a position to adduce evidence at the time when the Labour Court took up the matter for consideration and, even though an opportunity was asked for by the appellant, the Labour Court did not choose to adjourn the matter for the purpose. But, merely because the appellant had not filed an application for adjournment before the Labour Court, its request for an opportunity for producing the necessary documents cannot be said to be unreasonable or irrelevant. If really, as contended by the appellant, the first respondent was employed during a portion of the period for which claim has been made in the claim petition under section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, he will not be entitled to claim back-wages for the said period. In this case, since there is a prima facie material produced before this Court showing that the first respondent was employed elsewhere during a portion of the period, the matter calls for a further enquiry by the Labour Court, and therefore, in the interests of justice, we feel that the labour Court should be directed to go into the question as to whether the first respondent was employed elsewhere and was in receipt of salary during the said period of employment. If the first respondent was employed during a portion of the period for which claim has been made and was in receipt of income, that would go towards reduction of the appellant's liability. Though the Labour Court, relying on a decision in Sambandham v. Central Government Labour Court and another Sambandham v. Central Government Labour Court and another (1969)2 L.L.J.442:(1969) Lab.I.C.591=35 F.I.R.145 =A.I.R.1969 Mysore 196 has stated that it had no jurisdiction to find out whether, during the period for which the employee was entitled to back-wages, he got himself employed in another profit earning activity, we are of the view that it is by now well established that if, during the period for which claim under section 33-C(2) has been made, the claimant has been in receipt of salary or wages in another occupation, that should go to reduce the liability of the employer against whom the claim has been made. In this view of the matter, we allow the appeal and set aside the order of the Labour Court, with a direction that the Labour Court shall pass final orders after giving an opportunity to the appellant to put forward its case relating to the employment of the first respondent elsewhere during any portion of the period for which claim has been made. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.