JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS is the appeal of the accused Dindayal who has been convicted by the Special Court under section 3/7 (1) (a) (ii) of the essential Commodities Act, 1955 for contravention of clause 3 (1) of the m. P. Foodgrains Dealers Licensing Order, 1965 and has been sentenced to three months R. I. and also to pay the fine of Rs. 500 and in default of fine, to a further term of one months R. I. ( 2. ) THE case of the prosecution, initiated on police charge-sheet consequent to the written report submitted by the Food Inspector P. W. 6 s. N. Pandey, was that on 13-11-1983 it was a weekly market-day in village madai. The said Food Inspector, on surprise check in the market, had noticed the appellant-accused in front of his house, engaged in the business of purchase of dhan-the whole quantity being stacked in bags, partly in the front courtyard of the house, and partly in the verandah (chhapri) of the house. The appellant-accused had no licence for such business as enjoined by the provisions of the M. P. Foodgrains Licensing Order, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as the licensing Order ). Hence, 20 full bags and one small bag of dhan, which, on weighment, were found to be 14 quintals and 53 Kgs. in total (Ex. P-4), were seized together with one rough account book of certain transactions (Ex. P-3), which the appellant-accused had with him at the relevant time, vide seizure memo Ex. P-2. Panchnama of the proceedings was duly prepared (Ex. P-1); and the statement of the appellant-accused was also recorded at about the same time (Ex. P-9 ). ( 3. ) STATION Officer of the P. S. Birsa, on receipt of the written report and other connected papers, recorded certain statements of the witnesses during investigation; and then put up the charge-sheet against the appellant-accused. The appellant-accused abjured the guilt. It was contended in the course of his defence that although 20 bags of the dhan bad been seized from his bouse, but his signatures on all papers, wherever they appear, had been obtained by the Food Inspector just on blank papers. According to him, the exercise-book Ex. P-3 was not the account-book of his business but was the account relating to his payment in kind i. e. in grain or dhan to his agricultural servants. According to him, the exercise-book Ex. P-3 was not the account-book of his business but was the account relating to his payment in kind i. e. in grain or dhan to his agricultural servants. It was contended that he and his brothers had jointly owned about 63 acres of agricultural land and the bags of dhan seized were only the produce of the said agricultural land. It was vehemently denied that he was engaged in the business of sale or purchase of any foodgrains. One witness was also examined in defence. ( 4. ) THE learned Special Court negatived the defence stand and the defence evidence as unreliable. Relying on the Food-Inspectors oral testimony, coupled with the appellant-accuseds own admission in the statement Ex. P-9 recorded by P. W. 6 Pandey, and further supported by the Panchnama and the other documents which bore the signatures of the appellant-accused, held the appellant-accused guilty of the offence in question for contravention of clause 3 (1) of the Licensing Order; and accordingly, convicted and sentenced him to the extent as stated at the outset. Hence, now, the present appeal. ( 5. ) THE learned counsel for the appellant-accused, relying on Jethalal nemichand and Sons and others v. State of M. P. , 1984 MPLJ 204 . and K. L. Subhaiyya v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1979 SC 711 . has vehemently argued, in the first place, that the trial is vitiated and deserves to be quashed due to Food Inspectors failure to rigidly comply clause 11 of the Licensing Order which relates to his "powers of entry, search, seizure etc. " It is canvassed in this connection that as per sub-clauses (a) and (b) of clause 11 ibid, entry, inspection and search can only be made when the competent authority proposing to make the entry, search or inspection, "has reason to believe" that any provisions of the Licensing Order appear to be contravened by any person; and this reason of belief, as per the rulings cited, has to be set out in the memorandum or panchnama before entry or inspection. Since this has not been done by the Food Inspector, the appellant-accuseds prosecution is stated to be untenable. Since this has not been done by the Food Inspector, the appellant-accuseds prosecution is stated to be untenable. It is, next, argued that the learned Special Court was wrong in holding that the seized bags of dhan were of the appellant-accuseds business of purchase despite clear evidence that the seized dhan in question was the produce of the agricultural lands jointly owned by the appellant-accused and his three brothers. It is urged in this connection that the Special court had acted erroneously in placing reliance on the solitary incriminating evidence of the Food Inspector Pandey and giving undue weight to the appellant-accuseds admission as recorded by the Food Inspector, in his own statement Ex. P-9. The appellants learned counsel has also filed an application in this Court for affording further opportunity to the appellant-accused to adduce more evidence, to substantiate his defence. ( 6. ) TAKING up, at first, the principal argument regarding the Food inspectors alleged non-compliance of the provisions of clause 11 of the licensing Order, 1965, it may be stated that considering the circumstances in which the Food Inspector had made the seizure, he was not required to record his reasons for belief in any memorandum which, as per the ruling cited, is urged to be necessary before making any entry, search and inspection. K. L. Subhaiyya v. State of Karnataka (supra) relates to the provisions of the State Excise Act where also, it has been provided that "reason of belief" should be recorded, before search in any particular place. In that particular case, it was a question for search of the car for contraband articles. Jethalal Nemichand and Sons and others v. State of P. (supra), no doubt, relates to a case of Essential Commodities Act; but in this case also, the Food Inspector had entered the godowns of the dealer and had seized the particular essential commodities after entry and search of the premises viz. the Godowns. It was in view of such entry and search in the godowns that this Court is found to have held that the "reasons to believe" have to be spelt out in the nature of a memorandum before making entry or inspection of the premises. ( 7. ) BOTH these rulings have no application to the present case, since the circumstances here, are altogether different; and are not of any "entry or search". ( 7. ) BOTH these rulings have no application to the present case, since the circumstances here, are altogether different; and are not of any "entry or search". On perusal of the complainants report, submitted to the collector (Ex. P-11) and the Food Inspectors Panchnama Ex. P-1 prepared at the time of making the seizure of the bags of dhan and the Food Inspector pandeys own evidence as P. W. 6 (Paras 1 to 5), it is clear that on the weekly market day, i. e. on 15-11-1983, he had found the appellant-accused sitting m front of his house with dhan, spread out in front of him, which he was getting filled and stitched in bags and he had equally seen him engaged in the business of the purchase of the dhan at the relevant time. His evidence equally shows that at that very time, he could equally see some bags kept in the front chhapri of the house and some bags had been kept in the front-courtyard of his house. Since he had openly seen all this, before his very eyes, there was no question of his any "reason to believe" so as to record the same in his any memorandum before making search. All these bags of dhan were just before him, and so was the appellant-accused; and naturally what he had found on the spot, he had seized the same since the appellant-accused, on enquiry, was not found to have any licence. In such a situation, there was no propriety, justification or any necessity for preparing any memorandum mentioning therein the "reason to believe" before making the seizure. Thus, the argument advanced by the appellants learned counsel in this regard, is devoid of merit. ( 8. ) ANYWAY, despite the fact there was no necessity in the circumstances of the present case, to record the "reason to believe" as enjoined by clause 11 of the Licensing Order, 1965, even then, it is obvious on perusal of the first para of Panchnama (Ex. P-1) that the Food Inspector had mentioned therein by way of background, the particular circumstances, which had led him to make the seizure of the foodgrains viz. the dhan, although he had not specifically mentioned the particular words regarding his "reason to believe. " ( 9. P-1) that the Food Inspector had mentioned therein by way of background, the particular circumstances, which had led him to make the seizure of the foodgrains viz. the dhan, although he had not specifically mentioned the particular words regarding his "reason to believe. " ( 9. ) CONSIDERING the applicants application dated 16-8-1984 under section 391 of the Code for remand of the case to the trial Court for fresh opportunity to adduce additional evidence in defence, the same being devoid of merit, is rejected; because the appellant-accused had already been given two clear dates, one after the other, for adducing the evidence on his side, and the appellant-accused, finally on 29 5-1984, had closed his case of defence after examining one witness Saligram; and now the appellant-accused, in view of full opportunity, having already been given by the trial court, cannot be allowed to fill in the lacuna in his defence, just to set at naught the arguments advanced against him in the trial Courts Judgment. ( 10. ) NOW, coming to merits of the case, it may, at first, be stated that the appellant-accused, in his examination under section 313 of the Code, has admitted the seizure of 20 bags of dhan by the Food Inspector Pandey in his presence, from his verandah and the house. Panchnama Ex. P-1, seizure memo Ex. P-2 and the weighment memo Ex. P-4 are, all found to have been signed by him and so also by the attesting witnesses. There is no substance in the contention that he had signed these exhibits when they were all blank, suggesting thereby that writing on the documents had been made subsequently, after his signatures. Even the Panch witnesses PW 1 panchamlal and PW 2 Shyamlal do not say that they had signed the blank papers. On the contrary, what they do say is, that they had appended their signatures/thumb marks on these papers Ex. P-1 and Ex. P-2 without understanding the contents thereof, suggesting thereby clearly, (hat these exhibits P-1 and P-2 were fully written when they had signed them. ( 11. ) THE appellant-accused cannot be said to be a thoroughly illiterate person since he is found to have maintained some account, as is found noted in his exercise-book Ex. P-3. P-1 and Ex. P-2 without understanding the contents thereof, suggesting thereby clearly, (hat these exhibits P-1 and P-2 were fully written when they had signed them. ( 11. ) THE appellant-accused cannot be said to be a thoroughly illiterate person since he is found to have maintained some account, as is found noted in his exercise-book Ex. P-3. It is impossible to believe that any moderately educated person would sign blank papers or would sign them without reading the contents thereof Experience shows that unhealthy practice has come to grow in this country for hostile panch witnesses and the accused persons to rake up the fake contention that they had been required to sign blank papers or that they had signed the papers without reading and understanding the same. There is absolutely no basis or foundation that the material Panch witnesses or the appellant-accused had signed the material documents in the present case, blindly, without reading them or at a stage when these papers were, all, blank. In view of such a situation, the evidence of Food Inspector Pandey, in the matter of the authenticity of the Panchnama (Ex. P-1) and the seizure memo (Ex. P-2)deserve to be fully relied on, and there is absolutely no reason why he should not be relied. ( 12. ) FOOD Inspector Pandey has clearly deposed that he had seen the appellant-accused getting the dhan filled and stitched in the bags and that he had seen the bags of dhan kept in the verandah of the house at the time, when he had come face to face before the appellant-accused. At that very time, the appellant-accused was found in possession of the exercise-book (Ex. P-3 ). It is not denied by the appellant-accused that this exercise-book ex. P-3 does not belong to him or that the entries therein are not made by him. His only contention is that the entries in this exercise-book show, only the payment by him to his agricultural labourers from time to time. This contention is obviously ingenious and fictitious, to the core. Scrutiny of the exercise-book shows various columns for particular days or dates. The last entry is of Tuesday which comes to be the relevant date i. e. 15-11-1983. This contention is obviously ingenious and fictitious, to the core. Scrutiny of the exercise-book shows various columns for particular days or dates. The last entry is of Tuesday which comes to be the relevant date i. e. 15-11-1983. In the first column, names of persons have been found mentioned; and then, in the second column, the name of the particular grain is mentioned, and in the third column, quantity of the grain is mentioned; and in the last column, the money value of the quantity is mentioned. The quantity and the money value, in case of each person, is found to be different. Obviously, these entries could not relate to servants, for, in that case, there would have been no necessity to mention the money value against the quantity of grain and, furthermore, wages could not be in such high figures as shown in these entries. ( 13. ) P. W. 3 Buddhu alias Santram, P. W. 4 Deenadas and P. W. 5 Bisramsingh, whose police statements had earlier been recorded for showing that they had sold some dhan to the appellant-accused from time to time, are found to have turned hostile and to have resiled from their earlier police statements in this regard, when confronted specifically with the same. It is pertinent to note that names of these witnesses viz. Santram, Deenadas and Bisramsingh are found to be mentioned in the exercise-book Ex. P-3 for the particular day Tuesday i. e. 15 11-1983, showing certain quantity of dhan and the particulars thereof against their respective names. From the statements of these witnesses and their earlier police statements, when judged in the light of the entries of Tuesday the 15th November, 1983 in exercise-book Ex. P-3, it is apparent that the names of these witnesses have been mentioned in this exercise-book/note-book as persons who had sold the particular quantity of dhan to the appellant-accused. Had these witnesses been the servants of the appellant-accused and had their names been noted in the exercise-book in that capacity, these witnesses would have said so in their evidence, and in any case, the appellant accused would not have missed to cross-examine these witnesses on this material point regarding mention of their names in exercise-book as agricultural servants, to whom certain dhan had been given by him by way of wages or otherwise. Thus, this circumstance completely negatives the appellant-accuseds contention that the exercise-book Ex P-3 simply contains the entries of payment of wages to his agricultural labourers employed in connection with the cultivation of the family fields. ( 14. ) THEN again, even the evidence of the hostile witness P. W. 3 buddhu alias Santram irrefutably shows that he used to deliver his dhan to the appellant-accused from time to time and used to receive the price thereof from him. It is immaterial whether the appellant-accused did this, for and on behalf of his brother Asharam who admittedly was a licensed dealer at village Sarghat. Apart from all this incriminating evidence, which is of quite a clinching nature, the appellant-accuseds own statement Ex. P-9 to the Food Inspector Pandey, which is fully admissible in evidence, indubitably shows that the appellant-accused was a dealer in foodgrains, without any licence, and that he used to carry out his such business of purchase and sale on the weekly-market-days. This admission equally shows that on the relevant day i e. on 15-1 1-1983 also, he had purchased various quantities of dhan from different persons at the rate of Rs 115 per quintal. His such statement is approximately in conformity with the particular entries of tuesday, the 15th November, 1983 in the exercise-book Ex. P-3 at pages 18 and 19. No less important is the appellant-accuseds plea which is found to be recorded by the learned Special Court in the summary-sheet (Page 18 of the trial Courts record ). Particulars of the offence which were stated and explained to the appellant-accused, are found to be on a separate sheet (Page 19 of the trial Courts record), and the plea is found to be recorded on the earlier summary-sheet (Page 18 of the trial Courts record), and in this plea, the appellant-accused is found to have stated that he had not committed any offence, and that, he had a retail dealers licence. What he actually meant by such a plea, cannot be appreciated; but one thing which clearly emerges from his own plea is that he had been engaged in business of grains. That is why he had spoken of a licence in his name for retail purchase or sale. What he actually meant by such a plea, cannot be appreciated; but one thing which clearly emerges from his own plea is that he had been engaged in business of grains. That is why he had spoken of a licence in his name for retail purchase or sale. Thus, the evidence on the prosecution side leaves no room for doubt that the appellant-accused had been engaged in the business of purchase and sale and storage for purchase and sale, of the foodgrains viz. the dhan, and that, it was this stored dhan, purchased by him, which had been seized from his possession on the market-day by the Food Inspector Pandey. The defence contention that the dhan stored by the appellant-accused, as seized by the Food Inspector Pandey, was the produce of cultivation of agricultural lands jointly owned by him and his brothers, is apparently without foundation, much less, without any proof. ( 15. ) THE person exempted from the definition of "dealer" as per the definition in clause 2 (a) of the Licensing Order, 1965, is found to be one who (i) stores any foodgrains produced by him by personal cultivation; and (ii) does not engage himself in the business of purchase or sale of the food-grains. This definition clearly connotes that even if a person who produces foodgrains by personal cultivation, would not be exempted from the definition of "dealer" if he engages also, in the business of purchase or sale of foodgrains. Clause 3 (1) of the Licensing Order, 1965 prohibits the carrying of business by a dealer without the prescribed licence. Sub-clause (2)of clause (3) is a deeming provision whereby a person storing any quantity of the prescribed foodgrains beyond the prescribed limit, is deemed to be a person carrying on business as a dealer unless the contrary is proved, vide state Notification No. 9320-5815-XXM-81 dated 5th November, 1981 (see volume XXIII of M. P. Law Times, 1981, Part II, page 231), the limit for storage of any one foodgrain, is prescribed to be 4 quintals only, storage beyond which, attracts the deeming provision as per sub-clause (2) of clause 3 of the Licensing Order. The appellant-accused is not found to have discharged his burden of proof; and as such, the deeming provision of sub-clause (2) of clause 3 of the Licensing Order and the presumption so raised, makes the appellant-accused a dealer as per the definition in clause 2 (a) of the Licensing Order; and this presumption, as earlier discussed, is further strengthened by the evidence on the prosecution side in the absence of any proof to the contrary on the other side. Conviction of the appellant-accused is, thus, found to be proper. Sentence of imprisonment is mandatory; and, therefore, the sentence of minimum imprisonment, coupled with fine, as awarded, being quite just and proper in the circumstances, does not call for any interference. ( 16. ) IN the result, thus, the accuseds appeal, being without any merit, is dismissed; and the order of conviction and sentence as passed by the learned Special Court, is maintained in toto. The appellant-accused who is on bail, do surrender in Special Court on or by 17-9-1984 failing which, he be got arrested and remanded to judicial custody to undergo the sentence of imprisonment and also the imprisonment in default of fine, in case the fine amount is not paid. Appeal dismissed.