D.L. MEHTA, J.— All the three wings of the State viz., Executive, Judiciary and Legislature are on trial, Judges are on trial. It is expected from the Courts that status quo time bound beurocrate approach should be given a good way People expects that Judges should have activist approach while interpreting the law and applying the law. If we apply the law in a way which may frustrate the object laid down in our Constitution then we are failing the discharge of our duties. Judiciary should always be non-committed. We cannot have . commitment towards the ideology of any political and social groups of parties. We are committed that the law should be applied in a way which is in conformity with the directives given in our Constitution. The preamble of the Constitution reads as under :- "WE THE PEOPLE OF INDIA, having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a SOVEREIGN SOCIALIST SECULAR DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC AND to secure to all its citizens: JUSTICE, social, economic and political; LIBERTY of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship; EQUALITY of status and of opportunity; and to promote among them all FRATERNITY assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity of the nation; IN OUR CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY THIS TWENTY SIXTH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 1949 DO HEREBY ADOPT, ENACT AND GIVE TO OURSELVES THIS CONSTITUTION. Justice, social and economic can only be achieved, if we give good bye to the doctrine of status quo in the matter of implementation of the development schemes. If we adhere to the status quo, we cannot give justice to the teeming millions who are down trodden and starved. We have inherited a feudal system. There were big landlords who were exploiting the labour of the landless labourers. Agrarian reforms were introduced to strive towards providing social economic equality as far as practicable. Jagirs were resumed in the year 1954 and the present Tenancy Act came into force in the year 1955. The persons who were tilling land and were sub tenants were given Khatedari rights and to meet just demand of the landless labourers, provision relating to the Ceiling were introduced at a later stage by inserting Chapter III-B in the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. Chapter III-B has been introduced to resume the land of those persons who were having surplus land at their disposal and who were not capable of cultivating the land themselves. Chapter III-B has been introduced to resume the land of those persons who were having surplus land at their disposal and who were not capable of cultivating the land themselves. Agranan reforms were introduced so that the land may be resumed and the land can be distributed among the needy landless labourers and others who were really in the need of the land for the purpose of agriculture. With this in mind, the legislature introduced Chapter III-B in the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. To keep the balance and to avoid the hardship, subsequent amendments were made by introducing ss. 30-D & 30-DD. On January 1, 1973, the imposition of Ceiling on Agriculture Holdings Act came into force. Thus, the procedure which was provided under the Tenancy Act has now been provided altogether in a different enactment. The imposition of Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1973 has been enacted to over come the difficulties which the State was facing in the implementation of the agrarian reforms. Protagonists of property rights have always placed impediments in the implementation of the ceiling law. 2. Courts are meant to impart justice, as intended in our Constitutions preamble. Justice does not mean a justice of status quo for the benefit of an individual but justice means justice to the nation, justice to the unemployed justice to the economy of nation, justice to the society and so on Whenever there is a conflict between the cause of an individual and the cause of the nation or the society as a whole, then the justice to the society, to the economy and to the unemployed persons should prevail. We are neither to correct every irregularity or illegality in exercise of the discretionary powers vested under Art. 226 of the Constitution. When we feel that there is a just case and the development schemes have to be projected in a way which may provide the avenues of employment to the unemployed, which may lead to the production which is the backbone of the national economy then, in my opinion, we should refrain ourselves even in issuing directions or writs which may lead to increase the problems of unemployment and which may curtail the avenues of employment or which adversely affects the production. 3. 3. It is a matter of agony of the fate of the teeming millions of the down trodden people that the beneficial agrarian reforms enacted in early sixties for their benefit could not be implemented in toto so far. Protagonists of property rights have always put the impediments in the implementation of the programme but they alone cannot be blamed. The State is not active in putting the case to the Court. Hundreds of writ petitions are pending before this Court, may be of the year 1976 or earlier. Stay orders have been granted years long back. Protagonists of the property rights are enjoying the stay orders and we have shut our eyes to the reality and the fact is that we are not deciding ceiling cases. The beneficial legislation enacted for the benefits of the millions of teeming down trodden people should be given priority in the matter of decision but we do not think of the reformative law and we do not take in hand the case which needs top most priority. People have a right to ask us why writ petitions are pending since 1976. If writ petitions fail, what the courts will do for those who have been deprived of their valuable rights of allotment of land. The people who are starving, who are agricultural labourers, who are deaf and dumb needs the real assistance of the Court. 4. The question of interpretation of the law and applying the law was considered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Mobarik Ali Ahmed V. State of Bombay (1). It was observed therein as under. "It is not necessary and indeed not permissible to construe the Indian Penal Code at the present day in accordance with the notions of criminal jurisprudence prevailing at the time when the Code was enacted. The notions relating to this matter have very considerably changed between then and now during nearly a century that has elapsed. It is legitimate to construe the Code with reference to the moderns needs, where this is permissible unless there is anything in the Code or in any particular section to indicate the contrary." In State of Haryana V. Sampuran Singh (2) their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed. It is legitimate to construe the Code with reference to the moderns needs, where this is permissible unless there is anything in the Code or in any particular section to indicate the contrary." In State of Haryana V. Sampuran Singh (2) their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed. "The key though that pervades our approach is that if the constitutionally envisioned socio-economic revolution is not to be a paper tiger agrarian laws have to be meaningfully enacted, interpreted and executed and the court is not the anti hero in the drama of limping land reform. Much to the same, effect this court observed in Amarsinghs case (AIR 1974 SC-994) "We have to bear in mind the activity though inarticulate, major premise of statutory construction that the rule of law must run close to the rule of life and the Court must read into an enactment, language permitting that meaning which promotes the benignant intent of the legislation in preference to the one which overts the scheme of the statute on imputed legislative presumptions and assumed social values valid in a prior era. An aware Court, informed of this adaptation in the rules of forensic interpretation, hesitates to nullify the plain object of a land reforms law unless compelled by its language and the crux of this case is just that accent when double possibilities in the chemistry of construction crop up." "The agrarian policy is equitable ownership on the reform philosophy is re-distributive justice the rural goal being small peasant proprietor ship. What difference does it make as to how you came by a large holding, from the stand point above outlined? The thrust of S. 19-B is that even if the source of the excess area is inheritance, bequest or gift the capacity to own is conditioned by the permissible limit. S. 10-A does not militate against this mandate of S. 19-B. Indeed, S. 19-B had to be enacted because the High Court took the view that area which became surplus subsequent to April 15,1983 was not hit by the ceiling set and land acquired by an heir by inheritance is saved from utilisation by the State. S. 10-A (a) is wide in its terms and encompasses all surplus area, howsoever obtained. Even S. 10A(a) strikes no discordant note. S. 10-A (a) is wide in its terms and encompasses all surplus area, howsoever obtained. Even S. 10A(a) strikes no discordant note. All that it says and means is that lands acquired by an heir by inheritance are saved in so far as dispositions of such lands are concerned." Keeping this in mind, I will like to deal with the case in hand. 5. Petitioner No. 2 is the son of petitioner No. 1. Petitioner No. ls father late Shri RamKishan gifted the agricultural land measuring 123 bighas 8 Biswas situated in village Patonda in the year 1944 to petitioner No. 2. After the property had been gifted to petitioner No. 1, petitioner No. 1 was recorded in Revenue Records as Khatedar thereof. Proceedings were initiated against petitioner No. 2 under the Ceiling laws. Mr. C.K. Garg, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that notice Annexure-1 was issued by the S.D.O. Baran under sub-s. 1 of s. 11 of the Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1973 (For short the Act herein). He submits that after the issuance of the notice, the S.D.O. decided the matter vide Annexure-2. He submits that notice was served under the new Ceiling Act and the S.D.O. was not competent to decide the Ceiling matter under the old Act of 1963. Being aggrieved with the order passed by the S. D. O. dated 26.7.1975, an appeal was preferred. Memo of that appeal has not been placed on record by any of the parties. The Revenue Appellate Authority rejected the appeal vide its judgment dated 14.1.1976. A revision petition was preferred before the Board of Revenue, the copy of that revision has been placed on record marked as Annexure 4. The Revenue Board vide its Judgment dated 28.4.1976 rejected the revision. Hence this writ petition by the petitioners. 6. I have heard Mr. C.K. Garg, learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr. M.I. Khan, learned Govt. Advocate and Mr. D.L. Badhadra for the Intervenor. Mr. The Revenue Board vide its Judgment dated 28.4.1976 rejected the revision. Hence this writ petition by the petitioners. 6. I have heard Mr. C.K. Garg, learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr. M.I. Khan, learned Govt. Advocate and Mr. D.L. Badhadra for the Intervenor. Mr. C K. Garg, learned counsel for the petitioners has only raised two contentions before me; (1) That Annexure- 1 notice was given under the Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1973 (for short the Act of 1973 herein) and as such, the S.D.O. was not competent to decide the case of ceiling under the old law and that the principles of natural justice have been violated and the order of the S.D.O. is without jurisdiction and it is bad in law. (2) That the land belongs to a Hindu Joint Family and the courts below have committed an error of law and fact in holding that the land in dispute was a personal land of petitioner No. 2. During the course of arguments, Mr. M.I. Khan, learned Government Advocate produced before me the file of the lower court to reverse the arguments made by the learned counsel for the petitioners. During the course of arguments, Mr. M.I. Khan, learned Government Advocate produced before me the file of the lower court to reverse the arguments made by the learned counsel for the petitioners. The material part of the proceedings of the lower court file is as under : 4-1-66 mi ftyk vf/kdkjh ckjka rglhy eaxksy ls 30 ,dM+ ls vf/kd Hkwfe /kkj.k djus okys dkr dkjku dh tks fyLVsa izkIr gqbZ gSa mudks voyksdu djus ls ik;k tkrk gS fd Jh ekaxhyky oYn nsohfdku uUnokuk fuoklh ekrsank rglhy eaxksy dh vksj ls fu/kkZfjr vof/k 6 ekg esa vf/kdre {kS= lkPN/kh izi= 4 jktLFkku VhusUlh ¼Hkwfe dk vf/kdre {kS= fu/kkZj.k½ ¼ljdkjh½] fu;e 1963 ds fu;e 9 ds rgr isk ugha fd;k gS vr% vof/k 30 ;kSe dk mDr ,DV dh /kkjk 90 ds rgr uksfVl tkjh gksaA ,l-Mh- mi ftykf/kdkjh] ckjka 29-3-71- i=koyh rg- ekxkSy ls vc izkIr gqbS gS& vkokt fnykbZ xbZ& odhy vizkFkhZ mi- tokc o cgl dk le; pkgrs gS vr% fely okLrs tokc o cgl dks rk- 17-4-71 dks isk gksA 1-5-74- 1-6-73- dks tks vknsk fn;k x;k og tqfMfk;y rkjhQ esa ugha vkrk vr% bldk dksbZ egRo ughaA i=koyh rc ls tjsdkj ekuh tkosaxhA bldk fu.kZ; iqjkus ,DV vuqlkj gksxkA i=koyh dks iqu% uacj ij ysdj vizkFkhZ dks uksfVl fn;kA g- 7-5-75- i=koyh isk gqbZA odhy vizkFkhZ mi- gSA vkt mUgksaus fjVZu isk fd;s tks kkfey fely fd;sA ,d izfr rglhy esa Hkstdj tkap fjiksVZ ryok dj fnukad 19-7-75- dks isk gksA gqDr lquk;k x;kA g- 26-5-75- i=koyh isk gqbZA odhy vizkFkhZ vc og tokc isk ugha djuk pkgrs gSA vr% i=koyh okLrs cgl fnukad 5-6-75- dks isk gksA gqDr lquk;kA g- The petitioner Mangilal submitted a declaration under r. 9 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act on February 2, 1966, in which, he has stated that he is the Khatedar tenant and Vijay Kumar, Narendra Kumar, Kanta Bai, Krishna Kumari, Urmila Bai are his dependants and he is the son of Devi Shankar. The report was obtained on 22.9.1976. The second application was also submitted by Mangilal on 28.1.1978 wherein he has stated that his father Devi Shankar and his mother are his dependants. He has also added the names of his three issues Miss Sangeeta, Miss Kavita and Miss Neesha-who were not born at the time of filing of the earlier declaration. The report was obtained on 22.9.1976. The second application was also submitted by Mangilal on 28.1.1978 wherein he has stated that his father Devi Shankar and his mother are his dependants. He has also added the names of his three issues Miss Sangeeta, Miss Kavita and Miss Neesha-who were not born at the time of filing of the earlier declaration. The age of Kumari has been shown as six years and the age of Kumari Kavita and Neesha has been shown as 3 years and 8 months respectively. Learned counsel for the petitioner after perusing the file of the lower court admits that the submission made by the petitioner in the writ petition that no proceedings under s. 36-B were initiated is not correct and he wants to submits that it is a case of over-sight and ignorance. The wrong facts have been mentioned in the writ petition. 7. Mr. M.I. Khan, learned Govt. Advocate submits that in para 10 of the writ petition (in ground N. 2), it was stated that petitioner No. 2 has never submitted any return in the year 1966 or before the receipt of Annexure-1. Annexure-1 was issued on 283.1975 and it was received by petitioner Mangilal on 19.3.85. Thus, the submission made by the petitioner in ground No. 2 of para 10 of the writ petition is not correct and have been falsified from the record of the lower court. In ground No. (iii) of para 10 of the writ petition, the petitioner has submitted that ceiling proceedings were initiated against the petitioner No. 2 only after the New Act had come in force. The submission made by the petitioner is also totally false and is against the record of the lower court. Learned Govt. Advocate submits that the petitioner by stating wrong facts before the court got the writ petition admitted and obtained the stay order from the Court and as such, the petitioner has made a false case before the court and he is not entitled to get any relief from this Court on the ground that material facts have been suppressed and wrong facts have been stated. It was obligatory on the part of the petitioner to state that after the issuance of the notice Annx.-I the Court directed that the proceedings taken under the old Act will continue. Thus, learned Govt. It was obligatory on the part of the petitioner to state that after the issuance of the notice Annx.-I the Court directed that the proceedings taken under the old Act will continue. Thus, learned Govt. Advocate wants to submit that it is a case of suppression of material facts as well as placing wrong facts before the Court. Mr. Garg submits that it is a case of inadvertance and illiteracy and as such, the correct picture could not be brought before the Court. He expressed regret for the same. The material facts have been suppressed and wrong facts have been placed before the Court. As the petitioner was a successful in getting the writ petition admitted and obtaining the stay order from the Court, in such circumstances, I think that the petitioner is not entitled to get any relief from this Court in exercise of the discretionary powers vested in the Court. The writ petition is liable to be rejected only on this ground. It may be mentioned here that Mr. M.I. Khan, learned Govt. Advocate put his best ability and with all force at his command and has pleaded the case of the State, very vehemently. 8. Learned Govt. Advocate further submits that the question about the applicability of the provisions of second proviso to s. 4 and the provisions of Ss. 40 and 41 of the Act of 1973 has not been discussed in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 113 of 1976. He submits that the case of Banshidhar V. State (3) was not brought to the notice of the Court. He invited my attention to the case of Veshbai V. Ganpat (4 , wherein, it was observed as under : "Now, a precedent is not binding if it was rendered in ignorance of statute or a rule having the force of statute. The rule apparently applies even though the earlier court knew of the statute in question, if it did not refer to, and had not present to its mind, the precise terms of the statute. Similarly, a court may know of the existence of a statute and yet not appreciate its relevance to the matter in hand; such a mistake is again such incuria as to vitiate the decision. These are the commonest illustrations of decision, being given per incuriam. Similarly, a court may know of the existence of a statute and yet not appreciate its relevance to the matter in hand; such a mistake is again such incuria as to vitiate the decision. These are the commonest illustrations of decision, being given per incuriam. In order that a case can be decided per incuriam, it is not enough that it was inadequately argued. It must have been decided in ignorance of a rule of law binding on the court, such as a statute. (See the observation in Salmond on Jurisprudence" Twelth Edition, pages 150 and 169)". It appears that the provisions of law referred by Mr. Khan were not considered by the Bench and no other arguments were advanced. It is true that where the case was decided on the position of law which was assumed by the Court, the decision is not an authority for what was assumed. Therefore, decisions given sub silentio that is on assumed position of law and not on arguments will not be binding precedents. Mr. Garg is not in a position to dispute the facts that if the arguments have not been advanced in the earlier decision the decision has been given on the basis of assumption and it will not be a precedent. Mr. Garg has invited my attention to the case of Pala Singh v. State of Rajasthan (5), wherein, it was held that as the notice was invalid on account of the facts that it was issued under the provisions of a repealed law and further as the writ petition has been entertained by this Court, it would not be proper to dismiss the writ petition at this stage, merely on ground that the objection about validity of notice should have been raised before the S.D.O. The notice ex facie is invalid and deserves to be quashed. In the case in hand also, the question about the applicability of the second proviso to S. 4 and Ss. 40 and 41 have not been considered. Mr. Khan submits that for this reason, this judgment cannot be considered as a precedent as the question about the applicability of the second proviso to S. 4 and Ss. 40 and 41 needs the decision and no decision has been given in the judgment in S.B.C.W. 113 of 1976. 9. Mr. M.I. Khan, learned Govt. Advocate has referred the case of Chhaganlal v. State (6). 40 and 41 needs the decision and no decision has been given in the judgment in S.B.C.W. 113 of 1976. 9. Mr. M.I. Khan, learned Govt. Advocate has referred the case of Chhaganlal v. State (6). The controversy in this case was about the applicability of SS. 207 and 239 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. The question was whether the question relating to adoption relevant for determination of ceiling area of the tenant can be determined by the revenue court or not ? The provisions of s. 239 was considered and so far s. 239 is concerned, that also related to the suits and applications arising under the Tenancy Act. It was contended in this regard by the learned counsel for the petitioners that before coming into force of the Rajasthan imposition of Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1973, the provisions relating to ceiling matters were incorporated in Chapter III-B under the Rajasthan Tenancy Act itself. It was contended that in view of the facts that Chapter III-B of the ceiling law being part of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act all the provisions of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act should be made applicable to the proceedings relating to ceiling matters. In these facts and circumstances, it was observed as under : "In our opinion, there is no force in this contention as well. The Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling of Agricultural Holdings Act, 1973 which came into force on the first day of January, 1973 repealed the provisions contained in Chapter III-B under the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. The matter has been decided after the remand by the Assistant Collector, Baran on 27.4.79 and obviously on this date the provisions of Chapter III-B cannot be applied. The matter would be governed by the provisions of the Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1973". In that case, their Lordships were not considering the provisions of Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1973 and specially, the provisions provided under second proviso to s. 4 and ss. 40 and 41 of the Act of 1973. This case will not help to the learned counsel for the petitioner. 10. In that case, their Lordships were not considering the provisions of Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1973 and specially, the provisions provided under second proviso to s. 4 and ss. 40 and 41 of the Act of 1973. This case will not help to the learned counsel for the petitioner. 10. Appearing on behalf of the intervenor Shri Badhadra has already argued at length about the history of the agrarian reforms and has submitted that in the integral state, the agrarian reforms were introduced by different units in their own way to consolidate the Tenancy Law and to apply the agrarian reforms. To achieve the objects laid down in the preamble of the Constitution and Chapter IV of the Constitution, the Rajasthan Tenancy Act was enacted in the year 1955. He has invited my attention to the provisions of s. 4, 15 to 19 A relating to Khatedari rights which were given to the subtenants He has also pointed out that Chapter III-B was inserted in the Rajasthan Tenancy Act to make available the surplus land to the landless and downtrodden people of the society. 11. Equality has been enshrined in the history of our country from the very inception. I will like to recite the Richas of the Rig Ved, in which the doctrine of equality has been recited. Richas reads as under : vT;s:<+k vou fu"Bk ls ,sls laHkzkUrjksa _.k 5@60@5 euq";ksa esa dksbZ uhp ÅWp ugha] lc HkkbZ HkkbZ gSA tkfr&ikfr ds vk/kkj ij fdlh dks ÅWp uhp u le>ksA ^^O;oj—r ro tkx;kso;eA _x 1&31&7&10 ,d gh ije firk ds iq= ge lc HkkbZ HkkbZ gSaA vkil esa ,sls cjrks tSls HkkbZ ls HkkbZ cjrrs gSA Thus, the doctrine of equality is not a new concept to the people of India It is a concept which has been exported by our philosopher to the world and that concept has been enshrined in our Constitution in Articles 14, 15 and 16. The world is facing the problem. The humanity is also facing the problem. One nation wants to dominate the other. Everyone talks about the equality but wherever the question of application of equality arises, everyone tries to shirk his responsibility Social economic condition of the country requires that the preamble of the Constitution which is the basic structures of the Constitution should be implemented and given due heritage. One nation wants to dominate the other. Everyone talks about the equality but wherever the question of application of equality arises, everyone tries to shirk his responsibility Social economic condition of the country requires that the preamble of the Constitution which is the basic structures of the Constitution should be implemented and given due heritage. We cannot forget the directions given in Chapter IV of the Constitution. Social economic justice and equality is the backbone of our Constitution. 12. A Judge should always be non-committed to any political ideology and should not dance at the whims of the political parties. But at the same time the Judge should be committed to the oath of his Office which he has taken to preserve the Constitution. The commitment of social justice and equality is a must for a Judge while interpreting the law enacted by the legislature We are here not to impart the blind Justice. We will have to see the writings on the wall looking to the necessity of the society. The writings of the wall requires that there should be socio-economic justice which has been enshrined in the preamble of our Constitution Socio economic justice requires that the law should be applied for the benefit of the down trodden people for whose benefit it has been enacted. The courts are blamed now and then that they are the impediments in the implementation of the law. The Government must realise that it is their duty to see that the law is enacted in a way that there should not be any impediment in its implementation. It should not also silent spectator in amending the law when there are number of objections in the matter of its interpretation. Writs are pending since 1976 or earlier. In number of cases, the stay orders have already been granted by this Court. It had already stated that we the Judges are on trial and the people have asked us whether we are implementing the law for the benefit of those for whom it has been enacted. But at the same time, the Govt. should not sit idle in the implementation of the law. When the Govt. is in the know of the fact that for the last number of years, writ petitions have been filed and stay orders have been granted. It is surprising that the Govt. But at the same time, the Govt. should not sit idle in the implementation of the law. When the Govt. is in the know of the fact that for the last number of years, writ petitions have been filed and stay orders have been granted. It is surprising that the Govt. is keeping silent and is not taking steps in the disposal of the writ petitions or for the amendments of the law, if necessary. It goes to show that the Govt. wants to shift its burden on the court and will allow the people to say that the courts are putting the impediments in the development schemes or in the implementation of the agrarian reforms. Courts are not in a position to put up their case. Courts are dumb in the matter and so, their case remains always unrepresented before the people who are trying the courts and Judges. Courts can only express their views in the judgment which may not reach to the down trodden people as they are illiterate. It is expected that the Govt. should realise that the implementation of the agrarian reforms is a must and they should take immediate steps in the implementation of the reform and to move to the courts for the disposal and they should also be ready to clarify the law with suitable amendments if necessary. I think that the Officers of the State might be reading the writ petitions. I cannot presume that the writ petitions are not read. The resumption must be in favour of the officers that they are reading the writ petitions. If they find that there is any point which needs the clarification or the amendments, then the Govt should come forward for the clarification and amend-ments so that the litigations in such matters may be decreased. With this back ground in mind, I will deal with the arguments advanced by Mr. M.I. Khan, learned Govt. Advocate with the best of his ability. 13. Mr. Khan has invited my attention to S. 40 of the Act of 1973 which reads as under:- "40. With this back ground in mind, I will deal with the arguments advanced by Mr. M.I. Khan, learned Govt. Advocate with the best of his ability. 13. Mr. Khan has invited my attention to S. 40 of the Act of 1973 which reads as under:- "40. Repeal and savings-(I) Except as provided in second proviso to sub section (1) of S. 4 and in sub Section (2) of S. 15 of this Act, the provisions of clause (6 A) of s. 5 and Chapter III-B of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (Rajasthan Act 3 of 1955) are hereby repealed except in the Rajasthan Canal Project area wherein such provisions shall stand repealed on the date on which this Act comes into force in that area. (2) The Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Ordinance, 1973 (Rajasthan Ordinance 1 of 1973) is hereby repealed). (3) Notwithstanding the repeal of the said Ordinance under sub-s. (2), anything done or any action taken or any rules made under the said Ordinance shall be deemed to have been done, taken or made under this Act, 1955 (Rajasthan Act 8 of 1955) shall apply to such repeal and re-enactment." Mr. Khan has invited my attention to Banshidhars case (supra), wherein it was observed as under : "After the new Law came into force as many as 9494 cases were initiated under Chapter III-B of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, and they were also decided during the period commencing from 1-1-1973 to 30-6-1976. An area measuring 2, 95, 812 acres was declared as a surplus area upto 31.12.1972. The possession of the surplus land except the land covered by 166 cases, according to the affidavit to the officer-in-charge, was taken possession of by the State Govt. and distributed among the landless tenants." "In our opinion the right under s 30-E (i)(a) and 30E(2) vest in the State when the period prescribed under sub-section (2) of s. 30-E to surrender the surplus land is over because it is a statutory obligation for the land holder to surrender the surplus land to the State. If the land holder like an honest citizen acts in the manner prescribed by the law then there is no difficulty for him to find out the surplus land in his hand and to surrender land in his hand and to surrender the same to the Tehsildar. If the land holder like an honest citizen acts in the manner prescribed by the law then there is no difficulty for him to find out the surplus land in his hand and to surrender land in his hand and to surrender the same to the Tehsildar. However, if it is not done by the land holder then the competent authority has a power under the statute to determine the excess land possesses by the land holder after the declaration made by him under r. 9 of the old Rules. The theory of relating back would undoubtedly be attracted when the question of the right of the State in the surplus land is to be determined". It was further observed as under:- "In this view of the matter, we are of opinion that the obligation not to retain land in excess of the ceiling area arises from the time prescribed under sub-s. (2) of s. 30-E of the old Act and from that date the rights of the State are perfected and cannot therefore be called inchoate right. The landholder also incurs a liability to part with the land and to surrender it to the Tehsildar under the provisions of the law on the expiry of the period mentioned in sub-s. (2) of s. 30E. Such rights of the State which have accrued to it and the liability of the land holder incurred under the Statute shall be governed by the provisions of clauses (c) and (e) of s. 6 of the General Clauses Act." "The law, as has been clearly laid down by the Supreme Court in Hohar Singss case AIR 1955 SC 84 and consistently followed in the later judgements, clearly establish that the repeal of an Act followed by re-enactment does not automatically wash away the right accrued and liabilities incurred under the repealed law unless a contrary intention appears in the repealing law. We have therefore, to examine whether the new law expressly or otherwise manifests an intention to wipe out or sweep away those rights and liabilities which had accrued and incurred under the old law". We have therefore, to examine whether the new law expressly or otherwise manifests an intention to wipe out or sweep away those rights and liabilities which had accrued and incurred under the old law". "The only purpose for incorporating this provision was to see that if under the scheme of the new Act the land holder gets larger ceiling area than what he could have otherwise got if his ceiling area than what he could have otherwise got if has ceiling area had been determined under the old Law then in that event the legislature wanted to reduce that ceiling areas and it is only for this purpose that the first portion of s. 40(1) was introduced in the enactment. From this provision of the law, it is difficult to infer that by introducing this provision in the new law the legislature intended that old law cannot be used for any other purpose except the one mentioned in s. 40(1) of the 1973 Act." "Dr. Laxmi Mal Singhvi, on the other hand urged that the expression law for the time being in force does not include within its ambit the law, deemed be in force and, therefore, the non obstante clause of s. 3 will not have an overriding effect on the old law, which under the circumstances of this case was not factually in force on the day the new law came into force, but on account of fiction of law the old law shall be deemed to be in force and, therefore, the application of old law for the determination of the ceiling area cannot be ruled out because of the language of s. 3 of the new law." "From the discussion referred to above, we have come to the conclusion that the rights and liabilities created under s. 30-E of the repealed ceiling law have not, in any manner, been affected by the enactment of the new law. Therefore, all the cases initiated under the old law and pending before the competent authorities shall be disposed of in the manner and under the provision of the old law. Therefore, all the cases initiated under the old law and pending before the competent authorities shall be disposed of in the manner and under the provision of the old law. As is clear from the affidavit filed by the Officer-in-charge, only 166 old cases are pending decisions and the rest of the cases namely 8494 cases were decided after 1.1.1973 in accordance with the provisions of the old law and surplus land to the extent of 2,95,812 acres has been taken from the land holders and distributed among the landless tenants including the Harijans and Scheduled Tribes people. Learned Advocate General is correct in his submission that if on a technical ground a different view is taken in respect of the pending 166 cases then it will create an upheaval in the State and the rights created in favour of the new allottees in the surplus land, shall have to be disturbed and thousands of the Landless tenants will be affected, if the technical argument of Mr. Hastimal is accepted. We see force in this argument. Though we may make it clear that this ground of learned Advocate General has weighted with us the least but at the same time this practical aspect could not altogether be ignored by us." "For the reasons given above, we do not find any life in these appeals. They are, therefore, dismissed. Looking to the circumstances of these cases we leave the parties to bear their own costs". 14. Thus, is clear that from the decision in Banshidhars case (Supra) that the rights and liabilities created under Chapter III-B of the repealed ceiling law have not been in any way effected by the enactment of the new law. Therefore, all the cases initiated under the old law and pending before the competent Court shall be disposed of in the manner prescribed in the provisions of the old law. The main object of the ceiling law is not to acquire any property to dispose it of for profit for the State is paying the amount of compensation to the person dispossessed. The main object of the ceiling law is not to acquire any property to dispose it of for profit for the State is paying the amount of compensation to the person dispossessed. The provisions in the Act for acquisition of land from the person in whose hand the land has concentrated for payment of the amount of compensation to them and have effected distribution of land to landless agriculturist and other deserving persons with a view to remove disparity in holding the agricultural land to increase agricultural production are necessary to achieve objective which the ceiling law is intending in its view. The law relating to fixation of ceiling on agricultural holding was first introduced in the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1969. Act. No. 4 of 1960 came into force on 15th December, 1960. Notification under Sec. 30E of the Act of 1960 was issued specifically and date was fixed as 1st April, 1966 by the State Government vide its Notification dated 11th February, 1966. The date so notified for the purpose of sec. 30E was in respect of all areas except the Rajasthan Canal Area. The old law of ceiling was further amended by Rajasthan Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1968 (Act No. 2 of 1968) and the Rajasthan Tenancy (Second Amendment) Act, 1970 (Act No. 15 of 1970) Thereafter the law as contained in Chapter III-B and Sec. (6A) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 was repealed by the Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1973 except as provided in second proviso to sub section (1) of section 4 and in sub-section (2) of section 15 of this Act. Under Chapter 1JI-B of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 and Sec. 30E a provision has been made that notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force, no personal shall be, as from a date notified by the State Government (1/4/1966) in this behalf continue to hold or retain in his possession in any capacity and under any tenure whatsoever land in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him, or under clause (2) of Sec. 30E it was further provided that every person, who, on such date, is in possession of land in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him or who thereafter comes into possession of any land by acquisition under clause(l) of sub-section( 1), shall, within six months of such date or within three months of such acquisition as the case may be, make a report of such possession or acquisition to, and shall surrender such excess land to the State Government and place it at the disposal of, the Tehsildar within the local limits of whose jurisdiction such land is situate. Sec. 30E (5) further provides that all lands coming to the State Government by surrender under sub-section (2) or by ejectment under sub-section (4) shall vest in it free from all encumbrances. From a reading of Sec. 30-E it is clear that under the law no person shall possesses the land in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him, and any land which is in excess of the land prescribed under the ceiling law shall vest in the State as provided under Clause (5) of Sec. 30E. The Rajasthan Tenancy (Fixation of Ceiling of Land) Government Rules, 1963 further provides about the mode of determination about the surplus land. Under Rules 9 a declaration has to be filed by the land holders and tenants and without prejudice to the provisions of Rule 9 it was made directory to the Sub-Divisional Officer to issue notice under Rule 10. 15. Sec. 4 (2) provides about the ceiling area under the Act of 1973. It provides that in the case of every person not being a family and in the case of every family consisting of the ceiling area applicable to such person or such family shall be in respect of such member or such family as has been specifically provided under Sec 4. It provides that in the case of every person not being a family and in the case of every family consisting of the ceiling area applicable to such person or such family shall be in respect of such member or such family as has been specifically provided under Sec 4. Sec. 15 of the Act of 1973 provides that notwithstanding anything contained in Section 40, if the State Government, at any time within three years of the commencement, of this Act is satisfied that the ceiling area in relation to a person as fixed under the law repealed by the said section has been determined in contravention of the provisions of such repealed law, it may direct any officer subordinate to it, to re-open a decided case and enquire into it and to determine the ceiling area and the surplus area afresh in accordance with the provisions of such repealed law. The period of three years has been extended from time to time. Clause <2) of Sec. 15, thus, provides that even in decided cases, the cases may be re-opened and shall be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of Chapter III-B of the Act of 1955. If the provision of Sec. 15 (2) are considered then it is clear that the Legislature never intended to repeal the Act that the old proceedings should be dropped altogether and the rights and liabilities which have accrued in favour or against the parties should not be considered at all. The intention of the Legislature by repealing the Act which provides that the old cases shall be decided in accordance with the provisions of old law i. e. Chapter III-B of the Act of 1955 and thereafter if necessary fresh proceedings shall be initiated under the provisions of the Act of 1973. Sec. 40 of the Act of 1973 provides that under clause (3), notwithstanding the repeal of the said ordinance under sub-section (2), anything done or any action taken or any rules made under the said Ordinance shall be deemed to have been done, taken or made under this Act and Section 27 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act, 1955 (Rajasthan Act 8 of 1955) shall apply to such repeal and re-enactment. Under Sec. 41 it has been declared that the Imposition on Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1973 is for giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in clauses (b) and (c) of Article 39 of the Constitution of India. Art. 39 (b) provides that the ownership and control of the material sources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good. Clause (c) of Art. 39 provides that the operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment. This object of the Legislature has been enshrined under Sec. 41 and the object is that the material resources of the community should be distributed to the best to subserve the common good. It was also expected while applying the law that the operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment. Thus, the intention of the Legislature is (hat the provision of this law should be applied prospectively and the proceedings under the old law, i e. Chapter III-B of the Act of 1955 should be allowed to be continued after the completion of such proceedings the new proceedings under this Act should be initiated. If under the old law no proceedings were initiated, then the provisions of the Act of 1973 should be applied prospectively. During the course of arguments, it was pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Honble Chief Justice has dictated the Judgment in the case of Prithvi Singh Vs. State, in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No, 1274/1975, it was considered proper to await for the judgment so that there should not be any inconsistency between the law laid down by My Lord, the Chief Justice and my view. 16. Honble the Chief Justice has held in that case that, "In that view of the matter, in my opinion, after the old Act having been repealed by Section 40 of the Act of 1973, notice under the Old Act after repeal is patently illegal and cannot be sustained, whether the respondents can give notice under the new Act and decide the matter under the Old Act is not for me to decide, because it has been already decided by Division Bench of this Court in Sumitra Kaur Vs. Authorised Officer (Sub-Divisional Officer) Shri Ganganagar (7). 17. In the instant case, the position is altogether different. Notice was served on the petitioner under the old Act. The Petitioner submitted the declaration or and the proceedings were initiated and the enquiry was conducted under the old law. The proceedings were dropped after coming into force of the Act of the 1973. On 1st May, 1974, the proceedings were revived on the ground that the proceedings did not come to an end after coming into force of the New Act, 1973. Thereafter the notice was given to the petitioner about the revival and the proceedings continued from 1st May, 1974. 18. On 1st May, 1974, an order was passed by the concerned authority that the proceedings will be continued under the old law even after the coming into force of the new law. The matter has been decided under the old law by the Sub Divisional Officer, Baran vide his order dated 25th July, 1975 acquiring 15 standard acres out of the holdings of the applicant No 1 after conceding his entitlement as 30 standard acres of land under the old ceiling law. The Revenue Appellate Authority vide its judgment dated 14th January. 1976. dismissed the appeal. A revision petition was preferred under Sec. 230 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act against the order passed by the Revenue Appellate Authority, Kota dt. 14th January, 1976, in appeal against the earlier order of the Sub Divisional Officer dated 25th July 1975. The revision petition has been rejected by the Revenue Appellate Authority. The Revenue Board and the Tribunals have considered the matter in detail and I do not want to discuss the same as no infirmity has been pointed out by the present petitioner. The petitioner has intentionally given wrong facts in his writ petition and hence, he is guilty of suppressing of material facts. On this count, the writ petition is rejected. The Tribunals have rightly held that the land was the personal land of the petitioner and I will not like to interfere with the finding of fact given by the Court below. This is a disputed question of facts and it cannot be interfered at this stage. 19. Apart from that on merits also, as discussed earlier, I do not find any force and the writ petition is dismissed. The petitioner shall pay costs to the non-petitioners as per rules.