Judgment This is an revision petition against conviction and sentence. The matter arose out of a private complaint. The complainant is the brother-in-law of the accused person. Both the complainant and the accused person are estate owners. In a particular estate, namely, Stanmore Estate, the complainant is having 9 shares and the accused person one share. On account of the disputes arising out of the partition between the parties, there have been several litigations between them. In this context, a letter was sent to the Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Salem and copies to some 6ther authorities and that letter was bearing the signature of the accused person. The complaint was filed to the effect that the contents of the letter have put the complaint to serious shame and lowered his prestige. 2. In the trial Court, the case of the accused was that the letter was not sent by her. The trial Court found that the letter was sent by the accused person, that it was of such a nature as to cause harm to the reputation of the complainant and that it was done with the intention of doing such harm. Accordingly the trial Court convicted the accused for an offence punishable under section 500 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced her to a fine of Rs.500/-. 3. The main ground urged before the Appellate Court was that the letter was not signed by the accused but the Appellate Court was not prepared to accept this contention. It concurred with the finding of the trial Court that the letter was signed by the accused person. Accordingly that Court confirmed the conviction and the sentence. It is against that judgment the present revision petition has been filed. 4. The two main grounds urged before this Court are: first, that it is not adequately proved that the letter, Ext.P-2, was signed and sent by the accused and secondly, the statement having been made to official authorities, it does not amount to defamation. 5. As far as the first ground is concerned, both the Courts below, after comparing the signature found in Ext.P-2 and the signature of the accused person admitted by her and taking into account the circumstances of the case, have come to the conclusion that the signature found in Ext.P-2 is that of the accused. 5. As far as the first ground is concerned, both the Courts below, after comparing the signature found in Ext.P-2 and the signature of the accused person admitted by her and taking into account the circumstances of the case, have come to the conclusion that the signature found in Ext.P-2 is that of the accused. Both the Courts have relied on section 73 of the Evidence Act which gives to the Court the power to proceed with such comparison. Counsel appearing for both sides have relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Muralilal v. State of M.P., (1980) 1 S.C.C. 704 : (1980) S.C.C. (Crl.) 330: (1980) L.W. (Crl.) 88: (1980) Crl.L.J. 396: (1980) 2 S.C.R. 249 : A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 531. The relevant portion of the judgment reads as follows: "The argument that the Court should not venture to compare writings itself, as it would thereby assume to itself the role of an expert is entirely without force, section 73 of the Evidence Act expressly enables the Court to compare disputed writings with admitted or proved writings to ascertain whether a writing is that of the person by whom it purports to have been written. If it is hazardous to do so as sometimes said, we are afraid it is one of the hazards to which judgment litigants must expose themselves whenever it becomes necessary. There may be cases where both sides call experts and the voices of science are heard. There may be cases where neither side calls an expert, being ill able to afford him. In all such cases, it becomes the plain duty of the Court to compare the writings and come to its own conclusion. The duty cannot be avoided by recourse to the statement that the Court is no expert. Where there are expert opinions, they will aid the Court. Where there is none, the Court will have to seek guidance from some authoritative text book and the Court’s own experience and knowledge. But discharge it must, its plain duty, with or without expert, with or without other evidence. We may mention that Shashi Kumar v. Subodh Kumar, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 529 and Fakhruddin v. State of M.P., (1967) 2 S.C.J. 885: (1967) M.L.J. (Crl.) 925: A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1326, were cases where the Court itself compared the writings." 6. But discharge it must, its plain duty, with or without expert, with or without other evidence. We may mention that Shashi Kumar v. Subodh Kumar, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 529 and Fakhruddin v. State of M.P., (1967) 2 S.C.J. 885: (1967) M.L.J. (Crl.) 925: A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1326, were cases where the Court itself compared the writings." 6. In the present case, no expert was examined and, therefore, it is for the Court itself to come to its own conclusion. But, the learned Counsel for the revision petitioner would contend that in such a case the Court will have to seek guidance from some authoritative text books as prescribed by the Supreme Court and that in the present case the judgments of the Courts below did not disclose that the Courts have taken guidance from any such textbook? He would argue that the word ‘and’ found in the phrase "the Court will have to seek guidance from the authoritative text book and the Court’s own experience and knowledge" would require the Court to quote the text book it relied upon and that the absence of such quotation would vitiate the finding. I am unable to agree. The above phrase should not be construed in such a rigorous manner. What is required from the Court is knowledge. Such knowledge is acquired through the reading of text books and through experience, viz., examining documents. The continuous combination of both would show that actual examination would start even before full knowledge is acquired. So the higher the Court, the higher the knowledge. A Court while dealing with a comparison of handwriting may refresh its memory on going through a text book or satisfy itself with the knowledge previously acquired, if it considers it is sufficient to deal with the case on hand. While giving its decision after comparison, the Court is not compelled as an expert to give its reasons as to on what aspect or on what specific feature of the handwriting it places reliance to come to the conclusion whether the two documents differ or are similar. Therefore, one cannot expect the Court to quote necessarily any passage from a text book to justify its decision. The decision of the Court after comparison under the power given to it under section 73 of the Evidence Act would necessarily be a global decision. Therefore, one cannot expect the Court to quote necessarily any passage from a text book to justify its decision. The decision of the Court after comparison under the power given to it under section 73 of the Evidence Act would necessarily be a global decision. When such a decision cannot be arrived at safely, the Court would normally seek the opinion of the expert. It is also open to the parties to pray the Court for ordering the consultation of an expert. 7. In the present case, both the Courts below have come to the conclusion that the signatures are of the same persons after making their comparison. Had the comparison presented any special difficulty or had it been difficult for the Courts to decide with the knowledge they possessed they would have necessarily asked for the guidance from an expert. In the present case, they both found the similarity so striking that they did not find it necessary to resort to such a course I, therefore, do not find anything wrong in the decision of the Courts below in this matter. This ground of revision fails. 8. The second ground of revision is that the accused has only made a representation to the authorities and that her purpose was not to denigrate or to defame the complainant. In support of this ground, the learned Counsel for the accused places reliance on several decisions. Namely, M. Ramachandran v. P.S. Mehra, (1966) L.W. (Crl.) 78, K.P.S. Ponpandian v. C. Chinnasamy, (1984) T.L.N.J. 435, M. Ponnachamy Pillai v. Kandasamy, (1983) L.W. (Crl.) 26 and unreported decision in N.S. Radhakrishnan v. N.K. Kuppayyan, Crl.R.C. No.716 of 1980. All the above decisions are illustrations of Exceptions 8 and 9 under sections 499 defining defamation. When a person makes a statement about another, normally it will be either to the advantage or to the disadvantage of the other person. When it is to his disadvantage, it would be defamatory if the intention is to cause harm to the reputation of the others. But even if the statement is such as in the ordinary course it will cause harm to the reputation of a person, such a statement could be made safely, if it is necessary for the protection of the interest of the person making it or of any other person or for the public good. But even if the statement is such as in the ordinary course it will cause harm to the reputation of a person, such a statement could be made safely, if it is necessary for the protection of the interest of the person making it or of any other person or for the public good. It may not be defamation even if no interest is intended to be preserved, if the accusation is made to any of those who have lawful authority over that person with respect to the subject of accusation as provided in the Exception No. 8. Indeed, in the present case, Exhibit P-2 reads as follows: “In support of my petition objecting Sri M.S.P. Rajesh alone to sign the TP3’ of Stanmore Estate, I add the following facts to your consideration.” “The Stanmore Estate is the only Estate in the whole of Shevaroys which gets best yield of coffee and it is easily the best administered estate in the Hills’, as per the counter filed by Sri M.S.P. Rajesh for my petition filed in the Court of the Principal Subordinate Judge of Salem. On this basis when the crop was compared for the season 1979-80 it is only 167 tonnes for about’ 335 acres. This works out to 1/2 ton per acre which is an average production in Shevaroys. For Stanmore Estate it should not be not less than 251 tons on an average of 3/4 ton per acre. It is given to understand that some of Stanmore Coffee are pooled with Santhavally and Shevaroyan Estate Coffee. In some of the Estate the E.B. Forms are written by the end of the season by manipulating the figures and while transporting also the coffee loads are not checked on the way to Salem by any officials. Taking this opportunity in Stanmore Estate two or three loads of coffee are transported with single TP 3 upto Kannankuruchi and disposed of locally for face value than pooling to Coffee Board and waiting for payments in piecemeal. Mr. Rajesh has acquired half share of Cauvery Peak Estate from 15th July, 1980 by partition suit filed by me in the High Court. He has no pulping house at Cauvery Peak Estate coffee also to Stanmore for pulping. This will be an additional advantage for Mr. Rajesh to mix up Stanmore Estate Coffee with his Cauvery Peak Crop and pool it separately. He has no pulping house at Cauvery Peak Estate coffee also to Stanmore for pulping. This will be an additional advantage for Mr. Rajesh to mix up Stanmore Estate Coffee with his Cauvery Peak Crop and pool it separately. I have 1/10th share in Stanmore Estate and I am deprived of signing the T.P.3’s jointly with Sri M.S.P. Rajesh thereby I am unable to know the exact crop harvested and I am deprived of my actual profit from the Estate. I request the department to keep a check on the Stanmore Estate, M.S.P. Cauvery Peak Estate M.S.P. Belvidere Estate, M.S.P. Clenfell Estate, Shanthavally Estate and Shevarayan Estate all under the control of M.S.P. Rajesh.” The interest, if any of the accused in this case is in respect of her l/10th share and her avowed purpose of writing the letter is obviously to get fully and exactly informed about the output of the estate and the real income derived therefrom. For that purpose, it is not necessary for her to make the other allegations which are contained in the letter which are certainly susceptible of impairing the reputation of an estate owner. A disparaging statement could be made when it is essential and necessary to protect the interest of the person making the representation but in the present case, most of the statements were made without any such interest in mind, but with malice. The revision petitioner has not shown at any point of time that it was necessary for her to make such statements in order to promote her interest. 9. If the statements were made only to the authorities having lawful authority over that person with respect to the subject of accusation, the revision petitioner would have the benefit of the Exception No.8. But this letter was sent not only to the Collector of Central Excise, Salem, but to five other authorities. It is difficult to understand what authority the Income-tax authorities have in respect of the subject of accusation. Therefore, it is not possible to give the accused the benefit of the eighth Exception. This ground of revision is also found not to be acceptable. 10. In the result, the revision petition fails and is dismissed.