JUDGMENT : M.B. Shah, J. This Civil Application for interim relief pending hearing and final disposal of the appeal was hotly contested by the parties. Therefore, it would be desirable to state few facts. 2. Applicant No. 1 which is a Gram Panchayat, Umbergaon, District Valsad, bad filed Civil Suit No. 90/82 in the Court of Civil Judge (S.D.) Valsad for possession of the property bearing Survey No. 262/A-1/1-A/1-A/1-A/1/1 ad-measuring 2 acres of land situated on the north-east corner in the said survey number and for mesne profits till the date of handing over possession of the suit property to the plaintiff. An injunction restraining the defendant No. 1 from making any further construction over the suit property was also prayed for during the pendency of the suit. 3. After considering the merits of the case, the learned Civil Judge (S.D.) Valsad by his judgment and decree dated 30th November, 1983 dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff, The Court came to the conclusion inter alia that the plaintiff Gram Panchayat had failed to prove its ownership over the suit property. Against the said judgment and decree the appeal is admitted. 4. The learned advocate appearing for the applicants submitted that as the appeal is admitted, and there is prima facie case or serious questions of facts and law are required to be decided by this Court, it would be in the interest of justice to grant the injunction restraining opponent No. 1 from putting up any construction on the land in dispute. He further submitted that even looking to the affidavit-in-reply filed by opponent No. 1, it is clear that by his order dated 16-7-1973 the Collector, Valsad, has resumed the land in dispute under Section 96 (4) of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1961, for the public purpose. As the land was resumed for public purpose of allotting it to Gujarat Housing Board, it cannot be granted to opponent No. 1. It was further contended by him that assuming that the Collector was competent to grant land to opponent No. 1, yet as he has not followed Rule 42 of the Bombay Land Revenue Rules before granting the land in dispute to opponent No. 1, therefore, also the grant is illegal. Rule 42 provides that ordinarily the land should be disposed of by a public auction. Rule 42 provides that ordinarily the land should be disposed of by a public auction. He contended that even the grant which is produced by opponent No. 1 at page 13 shows that the land was granted subject to certain conditions. Condition No. 6 provides that construction over the and would be done after obtaining necessary permission from the competent authority and as the Gram Panchayat has not granted permission, opponent No. 1 is not entitled to construct over the land. Condition No. 10 provides that the Society was required to be registered within one month from the date of the order and till today, according to his submission, the Society was not registered. 5. As against this, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of opponent No. 1, submitted that at present there is prima facie decision in his favour by the competent Court holding that the grant in favour of opponent No. 1 was valid and legal. In any case the competent Court has decided the right, title and interest of the parties after recording necessary evidence and after considering the contentions of the parties elaborately. Therefore, prima facie case was in favour of opponent No. 1. It was his contention that once the land was resumed by the Government for public purpose in 1973 and if for certain reason the land was not allotted to the Gujarat Housing Board, it was competent for the Government to grant the land to opponent No. 1 who is organiser of the Co-operative Housing Society. He further submitted' that assuming everything against him, if opponent No. 1 is permitted to construct over the land in dispute, the applicants would not suffer any loss or injury as his client was ready and willing to give an undertaking to remove the construction over the disputed land at his cost and risk if ultimately the decree is passed against him. He further submits that he will not claim any equities before the Court at any time in future on the ground that opponent No. 1 has already constructed over the disputed property, nor would he urge before the Court that the said construction should not be ordered to be pulled down or he should be relieved from the undertaking to pull down the construction. 6. In appeal from order No. 94/83 decided on 22-8-1983 I had an occasion to deal with similar contentions in detail. 6. In appeal from order No. 94/83 decided on 22-8-1983 I had an occasion to deal with similar contentions in detail. The following observations in the said judgment would also be equally applicable to the facts of the present case : "The learned advocate for the appellant submitted that even if the respondents Nos. 2 to 4 give an undertaking before the trial Court as stated above, yet injunction should be granted restraining the respondents Nos. 2 to 4 from making construction over the suit plots because if the respondents Nos. 2 to 4 make construction over the suit plots, it would weigh, with the Court at the time of passing the final decree and the Court may not grant relief of handing over vacant possession of the suit plots only on the ground that respondents Nos. 2 to 4 have constructed factory sheds in which a number of persons might be working. He relied upon the following passage from the Law of Injunctions by Nelson, Second Edition: "In Aynsley v. Glover Jessel, M.R., said: At all events, this being an interlocutory application let me continue my building, and I will undertake to pull down if the Court shall so think fit. That is a very specious argument to address to the Court, but one must have regard to the effect of allowing such a proceeding. Supposing a defendant erects a building at great cost, when he comes the hearing he will say to this Court. ‘Compare the injury to me, in pulling down the building, with the injury to the plaintiff in allowing the building to remain.’ Ought or ought not the Court to give weight to such a representation ? I think upon this point the observations of Vice-Chancellor Kindersley, in the case of the Carriers Co. v. Gorbett are very important. The Vice-Chancellor says: If the defendants’ buildings had not been completed, there would have been ground for interference by injunction; but as they have been completed, the question is, whether the Court ought to or would order the pulling down of the buildings, or give compensation in damages. v. Gorbett are very important. The Vice-Chancellor says: If the defendants’ buildings had not been completed, there would have been ground for interference by injunction; but as they have been completed, the question is, whether the Court ought to or would order the pulling down of the buildings, or give compensation in damages. The defendant’s new buildings are of considerable magnitude and importance, while the two houses of the plaintiff’s are comparatively of small value and importance; and it has been decided that in such a case the Court will not as a matter of course order the defendant to pull down his new buildings, but will give to the party injured by the erection of those buildings compensation in damages. It appears to me that this is a precisely one of such cases.’ Consequently the learned Vice-Chancellor considered that, the buildings being erected, the comparative values of the defendants’ buildings and the plaintiff’s were sufficient to induce him to refrain from granting an injunction in a case where, if the buildings had not been erected, he would have granted the injunction. If that is so, and if those considerations are to weigh with the Court upon the question of damages or injunction, I ought not to allow the defendant to proceed with his building, which will put him in such an advantageous position as regards the plaintiff’s when the case comes to a hearing." There the Court mainly granted injunction because of the fact that though the building is allowed to be completed, that would be a ground for raising a contention before the Court that the Court may or may not order pulling down of the building and instead of pulling down the building, the Court may grant compensation in damages to the plaintiff. There the defendant intended to put up new building of considerable magnitude and importance while the two houses of the plaintiff were comparatively of small value and importance and it has been decided that in such a case the Court will not as a matter of course order the defendant to pull down his new building but will give to the party injured by erection of those buildings compensation in damages. Here in this case the respondents Nos. Here in this case the respondents Nos. 2 to 4 state before this Court that they are prepared to give an undertaking before the trial Court stating that they would not canvass or urge before the trial Court or before the appellant Court that because they have constructed factory sheds over the suit plots, no order of pulling down the said factory sheds should be pressed against them. They are prepared to give an undertaking to the effect that they would not claim any equities on the ground that they have constructed over the suit plots. In this set of circumstances, it cannot be aid that by permitting respondents Nos. 2 to 4 to construct over the suit plots, the appellant would suffer in any way. In the case of Pawatlii v. Kuttan Pillai reported in AIR 1962 Kerala 17 (sic) Thomas Ben v. Parvathy, AIR 1962 Kerala 16) after considering the aforesaid decision in the case of Aynsley v. Glover reported in (1874) 18 Eq. 544, the Court held as under: "The undertaking that was contemplated by the aforesaid decision was an undertaking to pull down the building if the court should so think fit, which meant that the court in that case had still a discretion to decide at the time of hearing of the suit whether the party injured by the erection of those buildings should be paid compensation in damages or the defendant should be directed to pull down his new building. In such a case, allowing the defendant to build on the land pending suit would mean putting him in an advantageous position as regards the plaintiff when the case comes to a hearing. In the present case the undertaking that was given in the lower court appears to be an unconditional one to pull down and remove the building without raising any claim for compensation in case the plaintiffs were found entitled to recover possession of the property. In such a case the question of putting the defendant in an advantageous position vis-a-vis the plaintiff does not arise and the court not called upon to decide whether it thinks fit to direct the pulling down of the building." In the present case also the respondents Nos. In such a case the question of putting the defendant in an advantageous position vis-a-vis the plaintiff does not arise and the court not called upon to decide whether it thinks fit to direct the pulling down of the building." In the present case also the respondents Nos. 2 to 4 are prepared to give an undertaking to the trial Court that if a final decree is passed against them, they would not claim in any set of circumstances that the construction which they intend to put upon the suit plots should not be pulled down before the Court. They themselves would pull down the said construction at their own cost and risk. In this set of circumstances, it cannot be said that the respondents Nos. 2 to 4 would be placed in any advantageous position as against the appellant when the case comes to a hearing because the respondents Nos. 2 to 4 are prepared to give unconditional undertaking to pull down and remove the building without raising any claim for compensation or without raising any claim of equity or without raising any claim that by pulling down the factory sheds the labourers in the factory would be placed in difficulty. Therefore, in this type of a case the question of putting the respondents Nos. 2 to 4 in advantageous position vis-a-vis the appellant does not arise because the Court would not be called upon to decide whether it thinks fit to direct pulling down of the construction made by the respondents Nos. 2 to 4. 7. Further, the aforesaid case in Aynsley v. Glover (supra) was considered in the case of Newson v. Pander, 27 Chancery Division 43. In that case the plaintiffs being the owners of an ancient building which had numerous windows pulled it down and rebuilt it. A few of the windows in the new house included the space occupied by ancient windows, but were of larger dimensions; several others included some portion of the space occupied by ancient windows; and in some cases the spaces occupied by ancient windows were entirely built up in the new house. A few of the windows in the new house included the space occupied by ancient windows, but were of larger dimensions; several others included some portion of the space occupied by ancient windows; and in some cases the spaces occupied by ancient windows were entirely built up in the new house. The defendants commenced to build a house on the opposite side of the street, which if completed according to the plans would materially interfere with the light coming to the plaintiff’s window's. The Court granted an interim injunction in favour of the plaintiffs till the hearing as the plaintiffs had shown an intention to preserve their ancient lights and because there was a fair question of right to be tried at the hearing and considering that the balance of convenience was in favour of granting an injunction rather than of allowing the defendants to complete their building with an undertaking to pull it down if required to do so. In that case Baggallay, L.J. held that one cannot feel with confidence that upon the facts coming before the Court the result might not happen which has happened upon other occasions where the Court has felt the destruction of property very undesirable, and a view has been, which the plaintiff has been unable to resist, that he should accept compensation in the form of damages instead of the pulling down of the premises. Cotton, L.J. held as under: "That in my view, not because I doubt the efficacy of undertakings to pull own; for in my opinion it ought to be at least as advantageous to the plaintiffs to have such an undertaking as for the Defendants to give it; and I repeat again what I have said before in other cases, that where the defendant says that his building when completed will do no damage, and if he is not restrained he will undertake to pull it down, if it is found at the hearing that it will, I think it would be wrong if the Court were to take such an undertaking, and then when it comes to a hearing not to enforce it, such as much as it would grant an injunction if the building had not been put up. I therefore do not decide in favour of granting a continuance of the injunction upon the ground that the Judge upon the hearing would decline to enforce the undertaking offered by the defendants in order to avoid an interlocutory injunction, but because upon the whole I think it is better here to continue the injunction. (Emphasis added.) The Court after considering the balance of convenience granted the interim injunction. The purpose behind the grant of temporary injunction is to protect legal rights and to avoid future injury during the pendency of litigation until the disposal of the suit. Now here looking to the fact that respondents Nos. 2 to 4 are prepared to give an undertaking as stated above, it cannot be said that any legal rights of the appellant would be affected in any way." 8. In this case also after considering the contentions of the parties in detail the trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by applicant No. 1 at this stage, without entering into the merits of the case, if the injunction as prayed for is refused after taking the undertaking from opponent No. 1 as submitted by the learned advocate on his behalf, the applicants would not suffer any loss or damage and their legal rights would not be pri-judicially affected. But at the same time opponent No. 1 will construct only if he fulfills condition No. 10 of the grant which provides that the Society shall be registered and files an undertaking before this Court as stated here in below. 9. The learned advocate for the applicants has further submitted that the Collector had suspended the grant in favour of opponent No. 1 by its order dated 5-7-1982. Opponent No. 1 submits that he would make construction over the land in dispute after the order dated 5-7-1982 is cancelled Before that he would not make any construction. 10. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the application filed by the applicants is, therefore, dismissed. However, opponent No. 1 shall file an undertaking before this Court within fifteen days from today to the effect that whatever construction he will make on the disputed land, it shall be removed by him within two months at his cost and risk if the appeal is finally decided against him. However, opponent No. 1 shall file an undertaking before this Court within fifteen days from today to the effect that whatever construction he will make on the disputed land, it shall be removed by him within two months at his cost and risk if the appeal is finally decided against him. He shall further state that he will not claim any equities on the ground that he has made construction over the disputed land. Nor he would urge before the Court that the said construction should not be ordered to be pulled down or that he may be relieved from the undertaking to pull down the construction. Opponent No. 1 shall also state in the above undertaking that he would make construction over the land in dispute only after the order of the Collector dated 5-7-1982 is cancelled and the proposed Society is duly registered. Opponent No. 1 shall not make any further construction for two weeks. Liberty to apply. Order accordingly.