JUDGMENT 1. - The writ petitions listed in Schedule-I raise same common questions of law, so they are being disposed of by this common order. 2. The petitioners are the transferees of the land situated in the Rajasthan Canal Project Area. The transfers by sale had been effected in their favour by the transferors to whom the lands were allotted under the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs (Concessions for Khudkasht in Rajasthan Canal Project Area) Rules, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the Rajasthan Concession Rules) framed under the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to 'as the Jagir Act'). The transferors had acquired khatedari rights in the lands allotted to them. Hjwever the transfers were effected without the consent in writing of the Collecter. The Colonisation Authorities in view of Section 13 of the Colonisation Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), considered the transfers to be void, so after the amendment of section 13 called upon the transferees to move an application to regularise the transfers by making payment of price as directed in the notice failing which it was stated that the proceedings for eviction would be initiated under section 13(2) of the Colonisation Act. The petitioners have challenged the applicability and constitutionality of section 13 of the Colonisation Act. 3. The petitioners' case is that the provision of section 13 of the Colonisation Act is not applicable to the lands of the petitioners as no rights or interests have been vested in them by or under the provisions of the said Act. The petitioner' predecessors were allotted the lands being Ex-Jagirdars whose Jagirs had been resumed under the Jagir Act and the Rules framed thereunder. Although. the General Colony Conditions, 1955 were made applicable to such allotment of the lands to Ex-Jagirdars, but on account of their applicability, it cannot be said that the Ex-Jagirdar were allotted the lands under the Colonisation Act and that their rights were subjected to the provisions thereof. I need not state the grounds of attack as the same will be considered hereafter while dealing with the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioners. 4. On behalf of the petitioners the main arguments were advanced by Shri B.L. Purohit Advocate and Shri A.K. Mathur, Addl. Advocate General has opposed the writ petitions on behalf of the respondents. 5. I need not state the grounds of attack as the same will be considered hereafter while dealing with the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioners. 4. On behalf of the petitioners the main arguments were advanced by Shri B.L. Purohit Advocate and Shri A.K. Mathur, Addl. Advocate General has opposed the writ petitions on behalf of the respondents. 5. Before dealing with the contentions advanced in these writ petitions on the applicability of section 13 of the Colonisation Act it would be proper to take into account the relevant law. The Jagir Act in Chapter Ill made the provisions for conferment of khatedari rights in the Jagir lands. So far as the khudkasht land of the Jagirdar is concerned, section 10 provided that the khudkasht land of the Jagirdar shall be deemed to be held by the Jagirdar as a khatedar tenant from the date of resumption of the Jagir land and shall be assessed at the village rate. 6. Section 2 clause (i) of the Jagir Act defined the word "Khudkasht" to mean any land cultivated personally by a Jagirdar and includes (i) any land recorded as Khudkasht. Sir. Hawala in settlement records and (ii) any land allotted to a Jagirdar as Khudkasht under Chapter IV. 7. Chapter IV of the Jagir Act made the provisions for Khudkasht. Under section 14 of this Chapter, an application could be made by the Jagirdar, who does not hold any Khudkasht land or who holds Khudkasht less in the area than the maximum area as specified in section 18 within the time as prescribed in that provision. Section 16 provided for allotment of the Khudkasht by the Commissioner of the Khudkasht land, or the Collector. Section 18 provided for maximum area of the Khudkasht. Section 19 of the Act related to the categories of the lands that may be allotted as Khudkasht and category (VI) was in respect of the land commanded by the Bhakra and Chambal Project or by Jawai Bandh or by any other irrigation project provided that the allotment of such land as Khudkasht shall be on such concessional terms and conditions as may be prescribed. The Government of Rajasthan in exercise of the power conferred by section 48 first of all framed the rules namely the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagir (Concessions for Khudkasht in Bhakra Project Area) Rules, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the Bhakra Concession Rules), which were published in the Gazette on 8-6-1955. In respect of the Rajasthan Canal Project Area. the Government of Rajasthan framed the Rajasthan Concession Rules. Rule 2 and 16 of the Bhakra Concession Rules are as under : "2. Colony Conditions to apply.- Allotment of land in the Bhakra Project area under these rules will be governed also by the statement of General Colony Conditions issued under the Rajasthan Colonisation Act, 1954 and for the time being in force, in so fur as the said conditions are not repugnant to these rules." "16. Accrual of Khatadari Rights.- On the full payment of all the instalments as they fall due, or at the choice of the grantee in It lump sum at any earlier date, Khatedari rights will accrue to the grantee in accordance with the General Colony Conditions for the time being in force as issued under the Rajasthan Colonisation Act, 1954." Similarly, rule 2 and rule 15 of the Rajasthan Concession Rules are as under:- "2. General Colony Conditions to apply.-The statement of general conditions for colonies namely, the Rajasthan Colonisation (General Colony) Conditions, 1955, in so far as the said conditions are not repugnant to these rules, shall govern all allotments of land made under these rules." 15. Accrual of Khatadari Rights. - On the full payment of all the installments as they fall due, or at the choice of the allottee in lumpsum at any earlier date, Khatadari rights shall accrue to the allottee in accordance with the General Colony Conditions for the time being in force as issued under the Rajasthan Colonisation Act, 1954 (Rajasthan Act No.XXVII of 1954)." 8. The relevant provisions of the Colonisation Act are as under ; "Sec. 3. Application of Act.- This Act shall apply to all lands in a colony. Sec.7.- Issue of statement of conditions of tenancy. - (1) The State Government may grant land in a colony to any person on such conditions as may be prescribed. (2) The State Government may issue a statement or statements of the conditions on which it is willing, to grant land in a colony to tenants. Sec.7.- Issue of statement of conditions of tenancy. - (1) The State Government may grant land in a colony to any person on such conditions as may be prescribed. (2) The State Government may issue a statement or statements of the conditions on which it is willing, to grant land in a colony to tenants. (3) Where such statements of conditions have been issued; the Collector may, subject to the control of the State Government, allot land to any person, to be held subject to such conditions contained in the statement issued under sub-section (2) of this section as the Collector may, by written order, declare to be applicable to the case. (4) No person shall be deemed to be a tenant or to have any right or title in the land allotted to him until such a written order has been passed and he has taken possession of the land with the permission of the Collector, and after possession has been so taken, the grant shall be held subject to the conditions declared applicable thereto. Sec. 13. (Prior to the amendment) Transfer of rights.- (1) No tenant shall transfer or charge his right or interest vested in him by or under this Act, without the consent in writing of the Collector by way of sale, exchange, gift, will, mortgage or in any manner otherwise than by exchange as permitted by section 12, except to the State Government or except by way of mortgage, for the purpose of obtaining a loan for development of his holding from the State Government or a land development bank as defined in the Rajasthan Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 (Rajasthan Act 13 of 1965), or any scheduled bank or any other institution notified by the State Government in that behalf in the Official Gazette, or sub-let the same for more than five years in the case of a tenant who has acquired Khatedari rights. (2) Any such transfer, sub-lease or charge made in contravention of sub- section (I) shall be void and if the transferee has obtained possession he shall be ejected under the orders of the Collector. Sec. 20. (2) Any such transfer, sub-lease or charge made in contravention of sub- section (I) shall be void and if the transferee has obtained possession he shall be ejected under the orders of the Collector. Sec. 20. Special conditions applicable to certain Khatedar tenants.- Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or in any statement of conditions issued under this Act, a tenant who has previously to the commencement of this Act acquired rights in any land to which this Act for the time being applies, shall in respect of such land be bound by the conditions set out in the Schedule to this Act. Sec. 27. Legalisation of orders pissed previously to the Act.- Any act hitherto done or order passed by the State Government or by any officer appointed for colonisation of a colony or by any other officer within any area to which this Act may be applied, which is not contrary to the provisions of this Act, shall be deemed to have been done or passed under this Act. Sec. 28. Power to make Rules.- The State Government may, by notification in the (Official Gazette) make rules generally for carrying into effect the provisions and purposes of this Act and in particular for all matters which are required by the Act to be prescribed or which may be prescribed thereunder." 9. The Government of Rajasthan in exercise of the power conferred by section 28 read with sub-sections (1) and (2) of section of the 1954 Act issued a statement of the General Conditions for Colonies under the title "The Rajasthan Colonisation (General Colony) Conditions, 1955." These conditions were published in the Rajasthan Gazette on 3.3.1956. Condition No. 3 provided for the application of the Colonisation Act and the terms of the statement of the General Conditions to other statements of the conditions. Condition No. 3 provided for the application of the Colonisation Act and the terms of the statement of the General Conditions to other statements of the conditions. Clause (a) and (b) of Condition 3 are as under: "(a) This statement is issued subject to the provisions of the Act: (b) All grants of land under the Act, whether by way of Ghair Khatedari tenancy or conferment of Khatedari rights or otherwise, and whether made under this statement or any subsequent or special statement of conditions, shall be subject to its provisions, so far as they are applicable thereto and save and in so far as they may be expressly modified abrogated or supplemented by such subsequent or special statement of conditions applicable to any particular part of the State or class of land." Condition 9 made a provision for the procedure for acquisition of rights under the heading "Grants of Interests in the Lands". Under the heading -Obligations of Grantee". several conditions were laid down and Condition 17 related to other obligations. It was provided in Condition 17 that the Grantee shall be and remain bound by the obligations specified under that condition and shall be deemed to have entered into covenant for their due observance and performance. Sub-Condition (10) of Condition No. 17 is as under: "(10) Alienation.-Not to transfer or attempt to transfer without previous sanction in writing of the (State Government) any right, title or interest in or possession of the whole or any part of the said lands or sublet the same or create or attempt to create any charge thereupon till Khatedari rights on the said lands have accrued to the grantee." 10. Mr. B. L. Purohit, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the predecessors in title of the petitioners were allotted the land under the Jagir Act and the Rules framed thereunder and khatedari rights had accrued to them thereunder and not under the provisions of the Colonisation Act, or the statement of Conditions or the rules, made thereunder. As such, section 13 of the Colonisation Act will have no application to the lands, which were allotted to the Ex- Jagirdars. As such, section 13 of the Colonisation Act will have no application to the lands, which were allotted to the Ex- Jagirdars. He submitted that the judgment of this Court in (1) Sanwat Singh and others v. The Board of Revenue and others, 1983 WLN (UC) 252 , is per-incurium, although in that case, this view has been taken that section 13 of the Colonisation Act will apply to the lands allotted to the Ex-Jagirdars after resumption of the Jagirs under the Bhakra Concessions Rule as the lands were allotted to which the General Colony Conditions 1955 were applicable. He submitted that the learned Judge, in view of the provisions of section 3 of the Colonisation Act observed that section 13 would automatically become applicable to any transfer of tenancy rights of which the land is situated in a Colony. Mr. Purohit. submitted that no doubt, section 3 provides that the Colonisation Act shall apply to all lands in a colony but so far as the transferability of the rights or interest is concerned, section 13 clearly provides that bar against transfer will apply only when any right or interest has been vested in the tenant by or under the Colonisation Act. If no right or interest in vested in the tenant by or under the Colonisation Act, then, in terms. section 13 will not apply. The application of the Act to all lands in a colony under section 3 means the application of section 13 as well, and, when section 13 itself does not apply to those tenants in whom the right or interest is not vested by or under the Colonisation Act, by virtue of section 3, section 13 cannot be made applicable to such tenants in whom, the right or interest is not vested by or under the Colonisation Act. Besides that section 3 is a general provision and section 13 is a special provision dealing with transfer of rights. Section 13 therefore will override section 3. Viewed from any angle the reasoning given by the learned Judge according to Mr. Purohit is not correct. 11. He further submitted that the learned Judge reached to the conclusion by taking into consideration Clause 3 (b) of the General Colony Conditions. Mr. Section 13 therefore will override section 3. Viewed from any angle the reasoning given by the learned Judge according to Mr. Purohit is not correct. 11. He further submitted that the learned Judge reached to the conclusion by taking into consideration Clause 3 (b) of the General Colony Conditions. Mr. Purohit submits that Clause 3 (b) will not apply to the Ex-Jagirdars to whom, the land has been allotted as their Khudkasht under the Jagir Act and the Concession Rules made thereunder. Simply because, rules 15 and 16 of the Rajasthan Concessions Rules and Bhakra Concessions Rules quoted above. provide for accrual of khatedari rights 'in accordance with' the General Colony Conditions, it does not mean that right or interest is vested in the Ex-Jagirdars by or under the Colonisation Act. As a matter of fact, the right or interest has been vested in the Ex- Jagirdar Allottees under the Jagir Act and the Rules made thereunder. Clause 3 (b) of the General Conoly Conditions applies only when the grants of the land are made under the Colonisation Act and not otherwise. Mr. Purohit further submitted that rules 15 and 16 of the Rajasthan Concession Rules and Bhakhra Concession Rules only lay down the procedure for accrual of the khatedari rights to the Ex-Jagirdar Alottees in accordance with the General Colony Conditions. The expression "in accordance with" only connotes that the accrual of khatedari rights would be by the procedure or in the manner given under the General Canal Conditions but the right will accrue under the said Rules 15 and 16 as the case may be. 12. Mr. Purohit, further submitted that Section 27 of the Colonisation Act has also been pressed into service by the learned Judge but the said provision cannot he pressed into service. Section 27 will apply only to past actions or orders passed by the State Government or by any officer appointed for the Colonisation or by any other officer of a Colony, which are not contrary to the Colonisation Act and for such acts and orders, it has been provided that they will be deemed to have been done or passed under the Colonisation Act. Section 27 would not be attracted when an action is done and order is passed under the Jagir Act or the Rules made thereunder. 13. Mr. Section 27 would not be attracted when an action is done and order is passed under the Jagir Act or the Rules made thereunder. 13. Mr. Purohit, learned counsel for the petitioners emphasised that application of the General Colony Conditions, under rule 2 of the Bhakra Concession Rules or of the Rajasthan Concession Rules should be taken to mean legislation by reference or legislation by incorporation and it should be taken that the General Colony Conditions have been bodily lifted or transposed in the Bhakra Concession Rules or the Rajasthan Concessions Rules. It such is the position then the only conclusion to which one can arrive at is that the right or interest is vested in the Ex-Jagirdar allottee not under the Colonisation Act bat under the Jagir Act and in this view of the matter, the bar and restriction against alienation of lands provided under Section 13 of the Colonisation Act, will not apply to the grants of the land made in a colony. 14. Mr. Purohit pointed out that for allotment of khudkasht, there are provisions contained in Chapter IV of the Jagir Act and an application for allotment of khudkasht can be made by an Es-Jagirdar under Section 14 of the Act. That application has only to be processed and ultimately when allotment is made. the khatedari or Gair-khatedari right or other interest would accrue to the allottee under the Jagir Act and for this purpose, he also referred to the definition of khudkasht, which in its ambit includes the land allotted to an Ex-Jagirdar as khudkasht under Chapter IV and over such khudkasht land, the khatedari right would accrue to him under Section 10 of the Act. 15. He further referred to sub-condition (10) of Condition 17 and submitted that the restriction against the alienation exists only till the khatedari right on the lands accrue to the grantee. The General Colony Conditions have been made applicable to the Ex-Jagirdar allottees under the Bhakra Concession Rules and the Rajasthan Concession Rules. That would mean that in the light of sub-condition (10), bar or restriction against alienation as provided under sub-condition (10) will have force till the khatedari rights accrue to the grantee and once the khatedari rights accrue, the bar will cease to operate and the provision of Section 13 of the Colonisation Act would not come in the way of Ex-Jagirdar allottees or grantees. 16. Mr. 16. Mr. Purohit submitted that a harmonious construction should be taken of sub-condition (10) and section 13, else, sub-condition (10) would be repugnant and inconsistent with Section 13 and so far as the Ex-Jagirdar allottees are concerned, such a construction would be most appropriate in view of the fact that allotment of the land to the Ex-Jagirdar has not been made under the Colonisation Act but under the Jagir Act and so, the sub-condition (10) can apply to them till the khatedari rights accrue to them. He pointed out that attention was not invited to this aspect of the matter in Sanwat Singh's case (supra). 17. Mr. Purohit, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the learned Judge in Sanwatsingh's case (supra) proceeded to reason out in order to reach the conclusion to which he has arrived, in the manner that the circumstances, which would make the provisions of the Act and the General Colony Conditions applicable, is that the allotment has been made of land in a Colony and that it cannot be visualised that such grantees of lands in a colony would not be subjected to same treatment as is applicable to other allottees of lands in the very same area, and that there is no provision permitting transfer of any right or interest in the lands, after or before the accrual of khatedari rights in the Bhakra Concession Rules or the Rajasthan Concession Rules, so, there is no repugnancy and inconsistency in these Rules and the General Colony Conditions. Hence, the allotment of the land in favour of the Ex-jagridars in the Project Area would also he governed by the provision of the Colonisation Act. The aforesaid reasoning is not correct if looked in the light of the amended provision of See. 13 wherein the provision of Section 15-AAA of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act has been inserted and also if viewed in the light of Section 19A and 19B and the Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagir Rules, 1954. 18. I have given my serious and anxious consideration to the submissions made by Mr. B. L. Purohit, learned counsel for the petitioners. 13 wherein the provision of Section 15-AAA of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act has been inserted and also if viewed in the light of Section 19A and 19B and the Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagir Rules, 1954. 18. I have given my serious and anxious consideration to the submissions made by Mr. B. L. Purohit, learned counsel for the petitioners. There appears to be some force in the contention that the General Colony Conditions 1955 should be considered to have been bodily lifted or incorporated in the Bhakra and the Rajasthan Concession Rules as the Conditions shall govern the allotment of the lands under the Bhakra and the Rajasthan Concession Rules as the case may be so far as the said conditions are not repugnant to those rules. It is also true that elaborate provisions have been made under the Jagir Act and the Jagir Rules and the said Concession Rules for allotment of khudkasht to those Ex-Jagirdars, who have no khudkasht lands or who hold less khudkasht lands than the prescribed maximum area and the provisions for exchange of lands as well as cancellation of allotment of land have also been made in Section 19A and Section 19B of the Jagir Act and the power of review has also been conferred under Section 40A on the Commissioner of khudkasht land. From these elaborate provisions, it can be found that the Ex-Jagirdars have been allotted the lands under the Jagir Act and the Rules framed thereunder, although, the General Colony Conditions have been made applicable to such allotments. The matter does not end here. Condition 3 (a) of the General Colony Conditions makes it very clear that the statement of conditions of tenancy is issued subject to the provisions of the Act. The General Colony Conditions, 1955 as a whole have been made applicable to all allotments of the land made to the Ex-Jagirdars in the Project Areas. That would mean, that Condition 3 (a) also has been applicable, so the allotment made to the Ex-Jagirdars would also be subject to the provisions of the Act, meaning thereby, that the allotment would be subjected to the provision of Section 13 of the Act. I am unable to agree with the submission of Mr. That would mean, that Condition 3 (a) also has been applicable, so the allotment made to the Ex-Jagirdars would also be subject to the provisions of the Act, meaning thereby, that the allotment would be subjected to the provision of Section 13 of the Act. I am unable to agree with the submission of Mr. Purohit that Condition 3 (a) does not apply to the allotments made to Ex-Jagirdars and that Conditions beginning from Condition No. 4 will only apply to such allotments. The incorporation Clause in the Rajasthan Concession Rules does not exclude Condition 3 (a) and the incorporative Clause categorically states that the General Colony Conditions, 1955 as a whole will apply to all allotments to the Ex-Jagirdars in so far as, they are not repugnant to those Rules. There is no repugnancy in subjecting the allotments to the provision of the Colonisation Act. Both the Concession Rules do not make any provision permitting the transfers. Had there been any such provision permitting the transfer of rights or interests in the allotted lands, then it could be said that Section 13 of the Act will not apply. As both the Concession Rules make no provision for permitting the transfer of the land. so see no repugnancy. So far as the applicability of Section 13 is concerned. I may state that the khatadari rights would not accrue to the Ex-Jagirdars under Section 10 of the Jagir Act. Section 10 of the Jagir Act. in my opinion, would apply to the existing khudkasht land only and not to those khudkasht lands. which may be allotted under Chapter IV of the Jagir Act. The lands which were allotted tinder Chapter IV would be governed by the provisions of Chapter IV and of the Concession Rules and the khatedari rights over such land would accrue under the respective Concession Rules, i.e. Rules 15 and 16, in accordance with the General Condition Rules. Section 10 of the Jagir Act is a deeming provision to the effect that from the date of resumption of the Jagir land, Khudkasht land held by the jagirdar shall be deemed to be held by him as a Khatedar tenant. Further, I am unable to agree with the submission of Mr. Purohit that sub-condition (10) of Condition 17 will apply to the Ex-Jagirdars and under that sub-condition, after accrual of the Khatedari rights. the transfer is permissible. Conditions 3A. Further, I am unable to agree with the submission of Mr. Purohit that sub-condition (10) of Condition 17 will apply to the Ex-Jagirdars and under that sub-condition, after accrual of the Khatedari rights. the transfer is permissible. Conditions 3A. 17 (10) and Section 13 of the Act have to be read together. Conditions have been subjected to the provision of the Act expressely and besides that conditions being subordinate legislation will not over-ride the provisions of the Act. So, it cannot be taken that Condition 17 (10) permits transfer after accrual of the Khatedari rights and the sub-condition applies to only Ex-jagirdar allottees. On this submission of Mr. Purohit as well. I do not find any substance that the subordinate legislation is always subjected to the provision of main Act, so there was no need of Condition 3(a) and Condition 3(a) should be completely ignored in respect of those allotments of the land, which are made under the Jagir Act and the Rules framed thereunder. It is true that the subordinate legislation is always subject to the main legislation and such being their interrelation there may not be need to embody such a provision in the subordinate legislation. But such sub-ordinate legislation assumes significance. when that subordinate legislation is made applicable to other subordinate legislation and it may be that in that situation such a provision may serve the desired purpose. As in the present case, the General Colony Conditions, 1955 as a whole is made applicable to the Concession Rules and as such the allotment made under the Concession Rules would be subjected to the provisions of the Colonisation Act. 19. I agree with the submission of Mr. B. L. Purohit that the amendment of Section 13 whereby Section 15 AAA of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act was once inserted and Section 20 of the Colonisation Act go to point that there may exist Khatedari rights in the lands even in a Colony. which may not have accrued to the holders of the land under the Colonisation Act, but under some other Acts and as such, by virtue of Section 3 of the Colonisation Act, Sec. 13 may not govern those lands as Khatedari rights have not accrued to the holders of the lands by or under the Colonisation Act. which may not have accrued to the holders of the land under the Colonisation Act, but under some other Acts and as such, by virtue of Section 3 of the Colonisation Act, Sec. 13 may not govern those lands as Khatedari rights have not accrued to the holders of the lands by or under the Colonisation Act. In the light of the foregoing discussions, I agree with the view taken in Sanwatsingh's case (supra) that the restriction under Section 13 of Act will even apply to the Ex-Jagirdars allottees and this conclusion, I have reached by applying Condition 3 (a) of the General Colony Conditions. 20. Mr. Purohit, learned counsel for the petitioners next contended that under Section 13 of the Act, no guide lines have been provided for withholding or refusing the consent by the Collector for transfer of right and interest by way of sale, exchange, gift, will or mortgage or in any manner otherwise than exchange as provided by Section 12. In the absence of guidelines, the power conferred on the Collector is arbitrary, unbriddled and uncanalised, so, such a conferment of power is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Mr. Purohit submitted that there is nothing in the Act, which may provide as to how the Collector will exercise the power under Section 13 of the Act. Even no rule has been framed under the Act, which may guide, control or regulate the exercise of power by the Collector under Section 13 of the Act. Mr. Purohit, in his rejoinder refuted the submissions of Mr. A. K. Mathur, learned Addl. Advocate General that sufficient guide lines have been provided under the General Colony Conditions as well as in the Rules framed under the Act. Mr. Purohit pointed out that for the exercise of the power by the Collector under Section 13, the provisions under the General Colony Conditions or the Rules made under the Act provide no guidelines. The General Colony Conditions and the Rules only make the provision as to whom the lands can be allotted in a colony to what extent and what would be the terms and conditions for allotment. Even it has not been laid down therein that the Collector will exercise the power u/s 13 keeping in view the provisions relating to the allotment of land. Reliance was placed by Mr. Purohit on some case law. 21. Mr. Even it has not been laid down therein that the Collector will exercise the power u/s 13 keeping in view the provisions relating to the allotment of land. Reliance was placed by Mr. Purohit on some case law. 21. Mr. A. K. Mathur, learned Additional Advocate General on the other hand, submitted that it is true that under Section 13 of the Act itself, nothing has been provided as to how the Collector should exercise the power of giving or refusing the consent for transfer of the right or interest but it is expected from him that while exercising the power under Section 13 of the Act, he will have due regard to the provisions contained in the General Colony Conditions and the Rules framed under the Act. Any transfer of right or interest, which may not come in conflict with the terms and conditions of the allotment as laid down in the General Colony Conditions and the Rules may be considered permissible and consent can be given by the Collector in respect of such transfer and if any transfer is in conflict with the Conditions or the Rules, the Collector may withhold his consent and may not permit the transfer. It was not necessary for the legislature to have specifically provided in the Act or in the Conditions or in the Rules as to how the Collector shall exercise the powers under Section 13 of the Act. The Collector is a high authority and it can be expected from such a high authority that he may exercise the power in such a manner, so that the same may not be in contravention of the Conditions and the Rules. Besides that, Mr. Mathur also submitted that the order of the Collector with-holding the consent under Section 13 of the Act would be an appealable order and if the consent has been wrongly withheld, the appellate authority may reverse the order of the Collector and grant the consent. He pointed out that the provision of Section 13 itself as such, does not confer arbitrary power and if any order withholding the consent is passed by the Collector without justifiable reasons, the same may be open to challenge but the power itself conferred tinder Section 13 is not open to challenge under Article 14 of the Constitution. 22. He pointed out that the provision of Section 13 itself as such, does not confer arbitrary power and if any order withholding the consent is passed by the Collector without justifiable reasons, the same may be open to challenge but the power itself conferred tinder Section 13 is not open to challenge under Article 14 of the Constitution. 22. If the matter is considered in the light of the rival submissions, it would appear that under Section 13 itself, the power conferred on the Collector on the face appears to be blanket and unbriddled. No criteria or guide lines is provided under Section 13 as to how the Collector shall exercise the power regarding granting or withholding the consent. Section 13. no doubt, place; a complete bar on transfer of right or interest by a tenant and if any right or interest is transferred by a tenant without the consent in writing of the Collector in contravention of sub- sec. (1) of Section 13. then the consequence is grave. Such a transfer shall be void under sub-sec. (2) of Section 13 and transferee is liable to he ejected under the orders of the Collector. It may be stated that the Act was enacted to make better provision for the Colonisation and administration of the lands in the State of Rajasthan. New Colonies have to he established. How and in what manner and on what conditions, the lands are to be allotted and how they are to be administered, were part of the scheme of setting up of the colonies. If we have a look to the General Colony Conditions, 1955 and the Rajasthan Colonisation (Temporary Cultivation Lease-holders) Conditions, 1955, there would appear a certain scheme in connection with the allotment of the lands, although, it would appear that the original scheme has changed in course of time. In the year 1967, the Rajasthan Colonisation (Rajasthan Canal Project Government Land Allotment and Sale) Rules, 1967 came into force and thereafter, the Rajasthan Colonisation (Allotment and Sale of the Government Lands in the Rajasthan Canal Colony Area) Rules, 1975 came into force. In the year 1967, the Rajasthan Colonisation (Rajasthan Canal Project Government Land Allotment and Sale) Rules, 1967 came into force and thereafter, the Rajasthan Colonisation (Allotment and Sale of the Government Lands in the Rajasthan Canal Colony Area) Rules, 1975 came into force. By the 1975 Rules, the Rajasthan Colonisation (Rajasthan Canal Project Pre 1975 Temporary Tenants Government Land Allotment) Conditions 1971 i.e. pre-1955 Conditions; and the Rajasthan Colonisation (Sale and Allotment of the Government Land to Post 1955 Temporary Cultivation Lease Holders and other Landless persons in the Rajasthan Canal Project Area) Rules, 1971 i.e. Post 1955 Rules were repealed. Under the General Colony Conditions, Condition No. 19 provided for settlement of the grantee permanently in the Chak or village in which grant is situated within six months from the date of direction of the Collector regarding delivery of the possession and Condition No. 19 further provided that within one year of the sale, he shall build up a house of an approved plan either on a site allotted by the Collector or with the permission of the Collector on his own lands. Condition No. 7 of the Lease Conditions made a provision for the eligible persons. It also provided for order of priority. The first category of eligible person is of the landless tenants, who are residing in the village before 1.4.55, then a landless tenants residing in the village coming within the Rajasthan Canal Project in the same Tehsil then the landless tenants residing in the village outside the Rajasthan Canal Project but within the same Tehsil, then those, with the residence qualification of the same district, then those with the residence qualification of the same division and then the residence qualification of any part of the Rajasthan and in the last category is the landless agriculturist residing in any part of Rajasthan. 23. Condition 16 of the Leases Conditions placed restriction on the assignment and it was provided that a tenant shall not sub-let or transfer by mortgage or otherwise part with the land or any part thereof in any manner whatsoever or have khudkasht through labour hired by way of share in crops. 23. Condition 16 of the Leases Conditions placed restriction on the assignment and it was provided that a tenant shall not sub-let or transfer by mortgage or otherwise part with the land or any part thereof in any manner whatsoever or have khudkasht through labour hired by way of share in crops. If the transfer of any right or interest is found by the Collector to be in conformity with various conditions and the Rules which are in force at the time of transfer, the Collector may permit the transfer else he may refuse to give consent for effecting any transfer. The restriction on transfer appears to have been placed only with this point of view that the transfer may not be effected contrary to the scheme or policy of allotment of the lands in the Canal Project Area or settlement of the colonies. The Collector would certainly be guided by the Colony Conditions and the Rules, while exercising the power under Section 13 of the Act. He will not disregard the conditions and the Rules and accord consent and equally, it can be said that he cannot refuse the consent, if there is no contravention of any conditions and the Rules and the transfer is within the scheme or the policy thereof. In my opinion, for the exercise of the power under Section 13, sufficient guidelines have been provided under the various Conditions and the Rules. Although, specifically it is nowhere provided as to how the Collector will exercise the power but on that basis alone, Section 13 is not liable to be struck down. It is significant to note that the legislature, while enacting Section 13 had in view that the State Government will issue statement of the conditions of the Tenancy under section 7 and will make the Rules under Section 28 for giving effect to the provisions and for purposes of the Act. When such statements of the Conditions of tenancy are issued or the Rules are made under the Act, the Collector has to act under them and not beyond them. The legislature has therefore, intended that the Collector will exercise the power in conformity with the statement of the conditions of the tenancy as well as in conformity with the Rules made under Section 28. 24. The legislature has therefore, intended that the Collector will exercise the power in conformity with the statement of the conditions of the tenancy as well as in conformity with the Rules made under Section 28. 24. Besides that, if the consent is wrongly withheld by the Collector then the aggrieved tenant as defined under the Act, may resort to remedy of appeal or revision. In Section 2 Clause(IX), the tenant has been defined to mean any person holding the land in the colony and includes his predecessors and successors in interest and transferees, so, Section 13 will apply to all persons holding the land in the Colonies. 25. Some case law has been referred from both the sides. Mr.B.L. Purohit, learned counsel for the petitioners cited decision in (2) State of Punjab v. Khan Chand, AIR 1967 SC 225 , in which, Section 2 and other provisions of the East Punjab Movable Property (Requisitioning) Act, 1947 were declared violative of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution and it was observed that the Act confers uncontrolled power on the State Government or the officers authorised by it to requisition any movable property. No guidelines have been laid down regarding the object or the purpose for which it becomes necessary or expedient to requisition a movable property. Even the authority requistioning movable property is not required to specify the purpose for which it has become necessary or expedient to requisition that property. There is no provision in the Act that power of requisitioning movable property can be exercised under the Act only for a public purpose nor is there any provision that power under the Act can be exercised only in an emergency or in some special contingency. 26. He also referred to a decision in Hari Chand Sarda v. Mizo Distract Council and another, AIR 1967 SC 829 , in which Section 3 of the Lushai Mills District (Trading by non-Tribals) Regulation was held violative of Article 19 (1)(g), Section 3 of the Regulation conferred on the licensing authority unrestricted power in the matter of granting or refusing licence or its renewal to non-tribal trader. 27. Reference was also made to Air India v. Nargesh Meerza and others, AIR 1981 SC 1829 . 27. Reference was also made to Air India v. Nargesh Meerza and others, AIR 1981 SC 1829 . In that case, the power conferred on the General Manager to retain an Air-hostess upto the age of 40 years was struck down as invalid because it does not lay down any guidelines or principles. 28. Reference was also made to a decision in Sudhir Chandra v. Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. and others, AIR 1984 SC 1064 . In that case a rule leading to payment of gratuity was incorporated as Standing Orders and thereby acquired the status of statutory conditions of service. There was another rule conferring absolute discretion on the company to refuse to pay or not to pay the gratuity even when all the conditions for earning gratuity will satisfy. Their Lordships held that the rule is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 29. Mr. Purohit, referred to a decision in D. S. Nakara and others v. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 130 . In that case, the classification in revised pension formula between pensioners on the basis of date of retirement specified in the memoranda was held to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution as the same was severable, beneficial part was retained and made applicable to all pensioners. 30. Reference was also made to a decision in Rao Manohar Singh and others v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1954 Raj. 85 . In that case, Section 71 (2) of the Rajasthan Excise Act, 1950 was held to be discriminatory and, therefore, void. It was observed that there is nothing in the entire Act either in the preamble or elsewhere therein to show whether and if so on what basis an exemption from the operation of the provisions of the Act could be granted to any class of persons and in respect of any exciseable articles or with reference to any specified area or any specified period or occasion. It is further remarkable that the section permits exemption in the case of a single person as well. Section 71, (2), therefore, is clearly of a character which would place unregulated and unbridled power in the hands of the Government by which it would be open to it to exempt whatsoever from the operation of the Act as contradistinguished from any other person without any rhyme or reason. 31. Mr. Section 71, (2), therefore, is clearly of a character which would place unregulated and unbridled power in the hands of the Government by which it would be open to it to exempt whatsoever from the operation of the Act as contradistinguished from any other person without any rhyme or reason. 31. Mr. A.K. Mathur, on the other hand placed reliance on Ch. Tika Ramji and others v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and others, AIR 1956 SC 675 . In that case, the powers were given to the Cane Commissioner under Section 15 of the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953, which were well defined and any order by the Cane Commissioner was liable to appeal to the State Government at the instance of the party aggrieved and the same was the position in regard to the orders made by the Cane Commissioner in the course of his management and supervision of the Cane Growers Co- operative Societies or any order made by him in regard thereto is subject to appeal to the State Government at the instance of the party aggrieved. It was observed that it cannot he urged that wide powers are conferred on the Cane Commissioner, which can be used by him in a discriminatory manner, so as to violate the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 14. It was further observed that any Cane Growers or a Cane Growers Co-operative Society or the occupier of a factory can make an appeal to the State Government against any order passed by the Cane Commissioner and such provision is a sufficient safeguard provided in the Act and the Rules against any arbitrary exercise of those powers by the Cane Commissioner and takes them out of the ban of Article 14. 32. Reference was also made by him to the decision of the Supreme Court in Mangalore Ganesh Beedi Works etc. v. Union of India, AIR 1974 SC 1832 . In that case, there was a challenge to Sections 3 and 4 of the Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Act, 1966 as violative of Article 19(l) (g) and Article 14 on account of procedural unreasonableness and conferment of unfettered powers on the licensing authority without the requisite safeguards. The licensing authority is required to communicate his reasons in writing, when he refuses to grant a licence. Section 5 of the Act. The licensing authority is required to communicate his reasons in writing, when he refuses to grant a licence. Section 5 of the Act. provided an appeal to the appellate authority against such an order. It way observed that the power to grant or refuse a licence is sufficiently controlled by necessary guidance. There are safeguards preventing the abuse of power. The right of appeal is a great safeguard. Although, in that case, in Section 4 various matters indicated in Section 4 where the licences are granted which are to be considered and rule out any arbitrary act and there was machinery as well as procedure for determining the grant or refusal of licence. So, it was held that there is neither unfairness nor unreasonableness in Section 3 and 4 of the Act. 33. In Registrar, Co-operative Societies and another v. K. Kunjabmu and others, AIR 1980 SC 350 . Section 60 of the Madras Co-operative Societies Act conferred power on the State Government, by general or special order, to exempt any registered society from any of the provision of the Act or it may direct that such provision shall apply to such society with specified modifications as may be specified in the order. It was a case of challenge on the ground of excessive delegation and in that context. their Lordships observed that a preamble, scheme and other material must be examined to see if there are any discernible guidelines. Their Lordships considered that the power has been conferred on the State Government under Section 60 of the Act, with a view to deal with the situation which may arise in the enforcement of the law and the State Government will exercise the power in accordance with the guidelines and the policy of the Act. 34. From the review of case law as cited by the learned counsel for the parties, it would appear that the question requires consideration and examination taking into account all possible aspects. It is not necessary that the provision conferring the power should itself contain as to how the power is to be exercised, in what manner and in what cases. One has to look to the enactment and the rules as well as prevailing conditions at the time of enactment. It is not necessary that the provision conferring the power should itself contain as to how the power is to be exercised, in what manner and in what cases. One has to look to the enactment and the rules as well as prevailing conditions at the time of enactment. The Act was promulgated with a view to provide for better colonisation and administration of lands in accordance with a particular scheme and policy, which would appear from the General Colony Conditions. Leases Conditions and subsequent Rules framed by the Government. The colony is to be settled by those, who are local residents, economically backward and landless tenants. The Act is in the nature of temporary measure Under Section 4 of the Act, the State Government has been conferred the power to withdraw a colony or any part of the colony from the operation of all and any of the provisions by notification in the Gazette and under Section 19 as well, it has got a power to abrogate any of the limitations and obligations imposed upon tenants as part of the conditions of their tenure. The Collector will exercise the power under Section 13 having due regard to the implementation of the scheme and the policy as provided in the statements of conditions of tenancy and the Rules. Furthermore, if the Collector exercises the power wrongly and refuses or withholds the consent, the aggrieved tenant can take up the matter in appeal, or revision as the case may be or such an order of the Collector would he open to challenge by availing of an appropriate legal remedy. It is equally well settled that where the power is conferred on the high authority then the conferment of such power cannot be held to he violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Thus, I do not find force in this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that Section 13 of the Act is violative of Article 14 on the ground of conferment of arbitrary power on the Collector. 35. Mr. Purohit, also submitted that introduction of Section 13-A as has been done from time to time shows that there was no intention of the legislature that the transfers have to be in conformity with the conditions and the Rules and that the Collector will guide himself according), while granting or refusing consent. 35. Mr. Purohit, also submitted that introduction of Section 13-A as has been done from time to time shows that there was no intention of the legislature that the transfers have to be in conformity with the conditions and the Rules and that the Collector will guide himself according), while granting or refusing consent. With the introduction of Section 13A, it should be taken that Section 13 provided no guidelines and conferred arbitrary power. The reasoning is fallacious. The legislature realise the grave consequences and hardship caused to people on account of breach or contravention of Section 13. A large number of transfers had taken place, so, with a view to meet the situation, the legislature had to step in and rightly, and introduced a provision for validation of certain transfers and declaration of consent to transfers by complying with the requirements of that provision. Compounding-fee has been levied as the land was allotted on concessional or cheaper rates and by sale of the land, profits must have been earned. 36. Mr. B. L. Purohit, learned counsel for the petitioners next argued that Section 13 (1) places an unreasonable restriction on the right to acquire, hold and dispose of the property and the restriction is absolute as no transfer can be effected without the consent in writing of the Collector. The said restriction is not even in the interest of general Public. The petitioners can enforce their right to property as the right had accrued to them before the deletion of Article 19 (1)(f), Article 19 (1) (f) was omitted by the Constitution (Forty Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, in this connection Mr. Purohit. placed reliance on the observations made in the decision of Waman Rao and others v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 271 . In Para 12, it was observed that, "By Section 7 of the Constitution (Forty Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978 the reference to Article 31 was deleted from the concluding portion of Article 31 A (I) with effect from June 20, 1979, as consequence of the deletion by Section 2 of the 44th Amendment of Clause (f) of Article 19 (1), which gave to the citizens the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property. The deletion of the right to property from the array of fundamental rights will not deprive the petitioners of the arguments which were available to them prior to the coming into force of the 44th Amendment, since the impugent Act were passed before June 20, 1979 on which date, Article 19 (1) (f) was deleted." 37. Mr. A. K. Mathur, submitted that the aforesaid observations will have no application. He urged that what is material is the date of seeking of enforcement of right. On the date right is sought to be enforced. Article 19(1) (f) had already been omitted. In Waman Rao's case (supra), the enforcement of right was sought much before the deletion of Clause (f) of Article 19 (1). It is true that the present writ petitions have been presented after deletion of Clause(f) of Article 19(l ), but the Act of which the provision is under challenge was enacted much before the deletion of Clause (f) of Article 19 (1). The constitutionality of law is open to challenge in accordance with the provision of the Constitution as it stood at the time of enactment. Under Article 13 (2) the of the Constitution, the State is forbidden to make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by Part III and any law made in contravention of Clause (2) of Article 13 is void. So, the question would be as to whether on the date of enforcement of the Act, Section 13 (1) had placed unreasonable restriction on the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property in the interest of general public. 38. On this aspect of the case, Mr. B. L. Purohit placed reliance on Harichand Sarda's case (supra) in which it was observed that when unrestricted power is conferred on an authority, then such conferment of power is violative of Article 19 (1) (g). He urged that when an unrestricted power is conferred on the Collector, it would he violative of Article 19 (1) (f). 39. He also referred to a decision in the (12) Collector of Customs, Madras v. Nathella Sampathu Chetty and another, AIR 1962 SC 316 . In that case, it was held that the provision cannot be said to have over-stepped the limit of reasonableness on the freedom guaranteed under Article 19(1) (f) and the provision is not unconstitutional on that ground. Mr. In that case, it was held that the provision cannot be said to have over-stepped the limit of reasonableness on the freedom guaranteed under Article 19(1) (f) and the provision is not unconstitutional on that ground. Mr. Purohit placed reliance on the observations made in Para 16. Their Lordships did not accept the submission that the validity of Section 178-A with reference to Article 19 (1) (f) and (g) can be examined by the same reasoning, which was the basis for the contention relating to Article 14. In that connection, their Lordships observed that: "No doubt, there are situations when the points regarding a violation of Article 14 and an objection that a restriction is not reasonable so as to conform to the requirements of Article 19 (5) or (6) may converge and appear merely as presenting the same question viewed from different angles. Such, for instance, are cases when the denial of equality before the law is based on the ground that the power vested, say, in an administrative authority to affect rights guaranteed to a citizen is arbitrary, being unguided or uncanalised. The vesting of such a power would also amount to the imposition of an unreasonable restriction on the exercise of the guaranteed right to trade or carry on a business etc. Where however, there is guidance and the legislation is challenged on the ground that the law with definite guidance for which it provides has out stepped the limits of the Constitution by imposing a restraint which is either uncalled for or unreasonable in the circumstances, the scope and content of the enquiry is far removed from the tests of conformity to rational classification adopted for adjudging whether the law contravened the requirement of equal protection under Article 14." 40. It may be stated that there is no absolute ban on transfer of right or interest vested in a tenant under Section 13 of the Act. What Section 13 actually provided is that before effecting the transfers, consent in writing has to be obtained and if there is contravention of this provision, then the transfer shall be void. As already discussed the power has been conferred only with a view to enforce and implement the scheme and purpose of the Act as finds express mention in the statement of conditions of tenancy and the Rules framed under the Act. As already discussed the power has been conferred only with a view to enforce and implement the scheme and purpose of the Act as finds express mention in the statement of conditions of tenancy and the Rules framed under the Act. The Ex Jagirdar allottees or other allottees of the land have been allotted the land on concessional terms or at cheaper price and the whole object of settlement of colonies appears to be either to rehabilitate the Ex-Jagirdars, who have no khudkasht lands or landless tenants of the area. The object appears to be settlement of such tenants in a colony, so they may earn their livelihood and in course of time may become prosperous. If the lands allotted are allowed to be sold at any time as one likes, the whole object of enactment would be defeated and frustrated and it is with this end in view that restriction has been placed. Else the lands, which have been allotted on concessional terms or at the cheaper price would be sold at a higher price to such persons, who may not be tenants or agriculturists and the lands may pass in such hands, which may further give rise to concentration of wealth. The restriction appears to have been placed in the interest of weaker sections of the community, who may be landless like Ex-Jagirdar allottees or landless tenants of the colony area. The provision of such a nature, in my opinion, is in the `public interest' and the expression 'interest of general public' is synonymous of `public interest'. The restriction too, does not appear to be unreasonable. It is neither excessive nor arbitrary. The Collector may give consent if he is of the opinion that the transfer will not in any way defeat the purpose of the Act, the Conditions and the Rules. 41. Mr. A. K. Mathur, in order to meet the argument of Mr. B. L. Purohit, referred to the decision in Narendra Kumar and others v. The Union of India, AIR 1960 SC 430 , it was observed that: "It is reasonable to think that the makers of the Constitution considered the word 'restriction' to be sufficiently wide to save laws inconsistent with Article 19 (1), or taking away the rights conferred by the Article, provided this inconsistency or taking away was reasonable in the interests of different matters mentioned in the clause. There can be no doubt. therefore that they intended the word 'restriction' to include cases of prohibition also. The contention that a law prohibiting the exercise of a fundamental right is in no case saved cannot, therefore, be accepted. It is undoubtedly correct, however, that when the restriction reaches the stage of prohibition. special care has to be taken by the Court to see that the test of reasonableness is satisfied. The greater the restriction, the more the need for strict scrutiny by the Court." 42. In the aforesaid case, Clauses 3 and 4 of the Non-ferrous metal Control Order, 1958 were under challenge and it was held that the Clauses placed only reasonable restrictions in the interest of general public. 43. Reference was also made to decision of the Supreme Court in M/s. Daruka & Co. v. The Union of India & ors., AIR 1973 SC 2711 . In that case, by a certain scheme export was canalised and only the recognised agency could carry on trade. The effect of refusal of licence to other traders, was that, they could not carry on trade in those goods. The restriction on the traders was held to be reasonable and that there was no violation of Article 19 (1) (g). 44. Besides what I have considered above it may also be stated that the Colonisation Act as well as Conditions, and the Rules have been enacted and enforced for the implementation of directive principles with a view to distribute the material resources of the community to subserve the common good and with a view to prevent concentration of wealth and means of production. Viewed in the light of directive principles, the restriction is not unreasonable and it is in the public interest. 45. The validity of Section 13 has also been challenged on the ground that it offends Article 31 of the Constitution as it existed prior to its deletion. It was urged by Mr Purohit that Section 13 is in the nature of an acquisition provision and it does not provide for compensation and, therefore, it is violative of Art 31 too and, the Colonisation Act also was not reserved for consideration of the President and had not received the assent of the President, so, as well the law is bad. Even otherwise Section 13 is bad, it is most unjust and unfair and reliance has been placed on a decision of the Bombay High Court in Basantibai Fakirchand Khetan and others v. State of Maharashtra and another, AIR 1984 Bom. 366 . 46. I am unable to agree with the above submission of Mr. Purohit. The rights in the land have arisen to the tenants subject to certain conditions and if condition is breached, the tenancy will come to an end and the State as a landholder can evict the tenant and re-enter the land. Section 13 is also in the nature of a condition of tenancy and by Section 13 transfer of right is forbidden except without consent in writing. If this condition is broken or disregarded, the consequence is that the possession can be obtained from the transferee which would only mean forfeiture or resumption of tenancy. For breach of Section 13, action can be taken under Section 14. Although, under sub-sec. (2) of Section 13 it is provided that the transferee shall be ejected under the order of the Collector if the transferee has obtained the possession of the land but the Collector will proceed after giving an opportunity to the tenant. It is true that monetory penalty can be imposed for breach of Condition under Section 14 but resumption can alone be ordered, when there is contravention of Section 13 as the transfer is void. Dispossession of the transferee can be effected after resumption of tenancy and in that situation Section 15 of the Act will apply and the Collector may fix compensation for the uncut and ugathered crops and for the improvements if any made by the tenant. The three provisions of Section 13, 14 and 15 thus, will have to be read together and if so read Section 13 will not offend under Article 31 of the Constitution as it existed before deletion. Right to property after the Constitution (44th Amendment) Act, 1978 has ceased to be a fundamental right and now, under Article 300-A, a person can be deprived of his property by the Authority of law. If the State re-enters the land under Section 13 of the Act, it is under the authority of law, which is not open to challenge on the ground of offending any right to property. 47. Mr. If the State re-enters the land under Section 13 of the Act, it is under the authority of law, which is not open to challenge on the ground of offending any right to property. 47. Mr. Purohit, further contended that under Article 21 no person can be deprived of his personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law. Personal liberty even extends to right to acquire, hold or dispose of the property. If a tenant does not obtain the consent of the Collector, the transfer will be void and the tenant will be liable to be evicted from his holding under sub-sec (2) of Section 13. Without payment of any compensation, the tenant will be completely deprived of his property. The content of right to personal liberty extends to right to property as has been observed in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India & anr., AIR 1978 SC 597 , that "the law must, therefore, now be taken to be settled that Article 21 does not exclude Article 19 and that even if there is a law prescribing a procedure for depriving a person of 'personal liberty' and there is consequently no infringement of the fundamental right conferred by Article 21, such law in so far as it abridges or takes away any fundamental right under Article 19 would have to meet the challenge of that article." 48. Mr. Purohit, also placed reliance on K. Yadaih and others v. Government of A.P. AIR 1984 NOC (5) A. P. (F. B.) . In connection with the provision of Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, it was observed that courts must insist on strict observance of procedure prescribed under the Act. Refusal to be so by reference to provisions of Directive Principles of State Policy in Chapter IV of the Constitution or on ground of deletion of right to property as fundamental right by 44th Constitutional amendment was held to be impermissible. In headnote (B), it is stated that : "For the administration of day-to-day justice ordinary laws are still indispensable. It follows that the ordinary law must be enforced by the courts following the ordinary canons of statutory interpretation. The objection based on Directive Principles cannot be substantiated on basis of deletion property as a fundamental right by 44th Constitutional Amendment. All rights are essentially personal rights only. Property rights are no more than personal rights in property. It follows that the ordinary law must be enforced by the courts following the ordinary canons of statutory interpretation. The objection based on Directive Principles cannot be substantiated on basis of deletion property as a fundamental right by 44th Constitutional Amendment. All rights are essentially personal rights only. Property rights are no more than personal rights in property. In the ultimate analysis these rights in property delimit the powers a man might enjoy or duties he may be obliged to discharge in a civil society. Personal liberty guaranteed in Article 21 of the Constitution cannot be enjoyed without minimal rights in property easier but did not do away with the rights, in property altogether. Today Article 21 of the Constitution should, therefore, comprehend rights in property also." 49. Mr. Mathur, on the other hand, referred to it decision of the Supreme Court in Ambika Prasad v. State of U. P., AIR 1980 SC 1762 . In that case, for the law as propounded in the case of Maneka Gandhi's case (supra), Krishna Iyer, J. speaking for the court, observed as under : "Proprietary personality was integral to personal liberty and a mayhem inflicted on a man's property was an amputation of his personal liberty. Therefore land reform law, if unreasonable, violates Article 21 as expensively construed in Maneka Gandhi, (1978) 1 SCC 248 . The dichotomy between personal liberty, in Article 21, and proprietory status in Articles 31 and 19 is plain, whatever philosophical justification or pragmatic realisation, it may possess in political or juristic theory. Maybe a penniless protetarian, is unfree in his movements and has nothing to lose except his chains. But we are in another domain of constitutional jurisprudence. Of course. counsel's report to Article 21 is prompted by the absence of mention of Article 21 in Article 31-A and the illusory hope of inflating Maneka Gandhi to impart a healing touch to those whose property is taken by feigning loss of personal liberty when the State takes only property. Maneka Gandhi is no universal nostrum or cure-all, when all other arguments fail." 50. Maneka Gandhi is no universal nostrum or cure-all, when all other arguments fail." 50. It is true that the scope of Article 21 has been widened so as to include within its ambit the other fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 19 but when the provision has been examined from the point of view of Articles 14 and 19 there will hardly be any justification to Judge the validity of Section 13 from the stand point of Article 21. Besides that property in the nature of rights is only being taken away according to law, which is reasonable and just as considered above. 51. Mr. Mathur, in the end also submitted that the Rajasthan Colonisation Act has been included in the IXth Schedule at S.No. 162 by the Constitutional Amendment Act of 1976. Therefore, the Act is immune for challenge tinder Article 31-B. In this connection, Mr. B. L. Purohit, submitted that the Constitutional Amendment, which takes away the power of judicial review would be invalid as it would be violative of basic structure of the Constitution. Bhagwati, J. in Minerva Mills Ltd. and others v. Union of India and others, AIR 1980 SC 1789 , in para 97 observed that- "in every case, therefore, where a constitutional amendment includes a statute or statutes in the 9th Schedule its constitutional validity would have to be considered by reference to the basic structure doctrine and such constitutional amendment would be liable to be declared invalid to the extent to which it damages or destroys the basic structure of the Constitution by according protection against violation of any particular fundamental right." 52. It is true that by inclusion of statute in the 9th Schedule, the constitutional amendment seeks to take away the power of judicial review, which would be violative of basic structure of the Constitution, after the decision of Keshvanand Bharti case (supra) and on that basis, the protection under Article 31-B cannot be taken. But it is a question in which I need not enter as I have already tested the constitutionality of the provision contained in Section 13 from all aspects by which constitutionality is sought to be challenged before me. The constitutional amendment can be struck down when it abridges any fundamental right involving the basic structure of the Constitution. 53. But it is a question in which I need not enter as I have already tested the constitutionality of the provision contained in Section 13 from all aspects by which constitutionality is sought to be challenged before me. The constitutional amendment can be struck down when it abridges any fundamental right involving the basic structure of the Constitution. 53. The protection of Section 13 cannot be sought on the basis that the legislation is covered by Article 31-A and Article 31-C. Mr. A.K. Mathur, learned Addl. Advocate General has placed reliance on the following observations made by G.M. Lodha, J., in Budha Ram v. State of Rajasthan & others (S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1736, decided on June 11, 1984) : "Mr. Mridul's contention is that land-reforms. or aggrarian law meant for reforms would not have in their compass various rules and particularly Rules of 1975, which arc under challenge because they are not laws of ceiling of land, is wholly untenable and completely devoid of any force on the test of the above principles and I am firmly of the opinion that all provisions in the Colonisation Act or Rules of 1975 or other Rules or Tenancy Act or Land Revenue Act, wherefrom, directly or indirectly, the area of legislation covers the allotment, acquisition, requisition, cancellation of allotment, eviction, and distribution of agriculture land, they would all be squarely covered by the broad terms, 'Land Reform' and would attract Article 39 of the Constitution on the one hand and Article 31-A and Article 31-C of the Constitution on the other hand." 54. But for law to be valid under Articles 31 -A and 31-C, the law is required to be reserved for the assent of the President and received the assent of the President. Admittedly, this compliance has not been made in respect of the Rajasthan Colonisation Act. The Rajasthan Colonisation Act had simply received the assent of His Highness the Rajpramukh on the 17th day of December 1954, so, protection of the Rajasthan Colonisation Act cannot be held under Article 31-A and 31-C. 55. No other point has been pressed before me. 56. In the light of my conclusion on the contention advanced before me, all the writ petitions deserve to be dismissed. 57. Consequently, all the writ petitions fail and are hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.Petitions dismissed. *******