JUDGMENT B.L. Yadav, J. - By this petition the judgment dated 21-1-1977 passed by the Board of Revenue is sought to be quashed. The facts of the case are in a very narrow compass. The respondent no. 1 has filed a suit under section 229-B alleging that one Tota Ram was the real brother of Ghanshyam, the father of the petitioner. Tota Ram expired and, incorrectly the name of the petitioner was recorded and when the mutation application of the respondent was dismissed, he filed the present suit under Section 229-B with the prayer that he may be declared to be sirdar and he also claimed that in case some other relief was available to him the same may be given to him. 2. This suit was contested by the petitioner who denied the plaint allegations alleging inter alia that the suit may be dismissed as it was barred by section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. 3. The trial Court by the judgment and decree dated 19-9-1974 decreed the suit and thereafter first appeal was filed by the petitioners which was allowed holding that the suit was barred by section 34 of the Specific Relief Act and thereafter a Second appeal was filed by the respondent and the same was allowed by the judgment dated 21-1-1977 holding that the suit was not barred by section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. It was held by the Board of Revenue that apart from claiming the declaration in respect of sirdari rights, the plaintiffs have also claimed that some other relief which may be available to the plaintiff may be given to him, hence this clause in the relief was comprehensive enough to cove relief for possession in the alternative. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that no specific relief was claimed by the respondent no. 1 about the possession in the alternative, hence the suit was barred by section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. Learned counsel for the respondent argued in support of the decision of the Board of Revenue and further stated that amendment application of the plaint was filed by the respondent No. 1 which was still pending before the Board of Revenue and no order has been passed upon it. Learned counsel for the respondent argued in support of the decision of the Board of Revenue and further stated that amendment application of the plaint was filed by the respondent No. 1 which was still pending before the Board of Revenue and no order has been passed upon it. Learned counsel for the petitioners also agreed that the amendment application moved by the respondent No. 1 was still pending before the Board of Revenue. It has been consistently held by the Privy Council including, Mahant Govind Rao v. Sita Ram Kesho and others, 25 Indian Appeal page 195, Mohumad Zahoor Ali Khan and Mussumat Thakooranee Rutta Kuer and others, IX Noor Indian Appeal page 468 and Maung Sin v. Maung Byaung and others, 1941 Privy. Council, page 51, that the pleadings of the Mofussil court have to be liberally interpreted and they should not be scrutinised technically and in a padantic manner. Hence the relief of possession claimed by the plaintiff respondent No. 1 would obviously be included in the relief claimed by the petitioner to the effect that some other relief may also be made available to the plaintiff in case he was entitled to the same under the facts and circumstances of the case. Further in view of the fact that the amendment application moved by the respondent No. 1 was still pending in the Board of Revenue, hence in all propriety I think that the case may be remanded to the Board of Revenue for decision afresh after passing the order on the amendment application moved by the respondent No. 1. 5. In view of the aforesaid discussion the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The judgment of the Board of Revenue dated 21-1-1977 is quashed and the case remanded to the Board of Revenue for decision afresh in the light of the observation made above. In the circumstances of the case however there shall be no order as to costs.