JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS is the appeal of the accused Jasbbir Singh against his conviction and sentence under section 3 read with section 7 of the essential Commodities Act, 1955. ( 2. ) THE trial Courts order of conviction having been assailed principally on legal points, the relevant facts no longer disputed, for appreciation of points of law involved, are succinctly stated thus : p. N. Pande, Food Inspector, Raigarh, on 24-9-1983, filed a complaint in writing in the particular Court, against the appellant-accused, for his prosecution under section 3 read with section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the act), for infraction of section 3 (1) of M. P. Khadya Padarth (Khan Pan Sthapana Dwara Mulya Pradarshan) Adesh, 1983. This complaint was addressed to the Court of special Judge, Raigarh, and came to be presented in the Court of C. M. Das who, though was an Additional Sessions Judge, was at the relevant time, temporarily officiating as Sessions Judge. Shri Das took cognizance of the offence on 28-9-1983; and thereafter, continued the proceedings for certain date. On 10-12-1983, R. K. Bajpai, who was duly appointed Sessions judge in Raigarh Sessions Division, passed an order, handing over this case for trial to 1st Additional Judge-cum-Special Judge Raigarh. Shri C. M. Das was the 1st Additional Judge; and, therefore, the trial continued in his Court only, till its final termination, and the appellant-accused came to be convicted and sentenced by Shri C. M. Das, purporting to act as Special Court. ( 3. ) NOW, in the present appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant-accused has, in the first place, challenged the powers of C. M. Das to try this case under the Act. According to appellants learned counsel, Sessions judge, Raigarh was appointed as the Presiding Officer of the Special Court in Raigarh Revenue District as per the High Court Notification; and as such, C. M. Das, who was only an Additional Sessions Judge and not the sessions Judge, lacked the competency for trial of the case under the Act as amended by the Essential Commodities (Special Provisions) Act, 1981. In this connection, it is also canvassed, that, this illegality for trial for want of jurisdiction, was not curable by any provisions of the Code of Criminal procedure; and as such, the whole trial and the resulting conviction and sentence are completely vitiated. In this connection, it is also canvassed, that, this illegality for trial for want of jurisdiction, was not curable by any provisions of the Code of Criminal procedure; and as such, the whole trial and the resulting conviction and sentence are completely vitiated. It is, next, urged in the light of section 11 and clause (e) of sub-section (1) of section 12-AA of the Act, that the cognizance of the offence by the Special Court could only be taken on a police report and not otherwise. ( 4. ) I have considered the arguments advanced Considering, at first, the question of taking cognizance of the offence under the Act in the present case, it may be stated that there is no merit in the contention that cognizance could be taken, only on the strength of police report and in no other way. In the matter of cognizance of offence, section 11 of the Act has been specifically enacted for this purpose. Provision of this section is self-contained and independent; and is not dependant, for its interpretation, on any other provisions of the Act, e. g. clause (e) of section 12-AA (1)ibid. Section 11 of the Act reads as under: - "11. Cognizance of offences.-No Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under this Act except on a report in writing of the facts constituting such offence made by a person who is a public servant as defined in section 21 of the Indian Penal Code. (45 of 1860 ). " Food Inspector, indisputably, is a public servant, covered under section 21 of the Indian Penal Code; and, therefore, on a report in writing by him, of the facts constituting an offence under the Act, Court is found to be fully competent to take cognizance of the said offence. ( 5. ) AS per section 10-A of the Act, every offence under the Act has been made "cognizable". It follows that a police officer, by virtue of sections 156 and 157 Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, and the subsequent provisions, has, hence, the power of investigation of such offence. Sub-sections (1), (2) and (2-A) of section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, further empower the police investigating officer for detention of the arrested person accused of or suspected of the commission of the cognizable offence which, as earlier stated, covers every offence under the Act. Sub-sections (1), (2) and (2-A) of section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, further empower the police investigating officer for detention of the arrested person accused of or suspected of the commission of the cognizable offence which, as earlier stated, covers every offence under the Act. It may be observed that it is with regard to such detention authorised by the Magistrate, that clauses (b), (c) and (d) of section 12-AA (1) of the Act provide the procedure for release or otherwise by the Special Court, of the person so detained, who has to be forwarded before Special Court by the Magistrate concerned. It is, hence, in the context of these clauses (b), (c) and (d)of section 12-AA (1) of the Act, pertaining to sub-sections (2) and (2-A) of section 167 of the Code, that the next following clause (e), of section 12-AA (1) ibid, which is to the effect that "a special Court may, upon a perusal of police report of the facts constituting an offence under this Act, take cognizance of that offence without the accused being committed to it for trial;" has to be understood and appreciated. This clause (e) is by way of an enabling provision, as is apparent from the use of the word "may" therein. The clause (e), therefore, appears to be intended to meet the contingency that even when the accused is not before the Special Court, the latter, upon perusal of police report of facts constituting the offence under this Act, "may" take cognizance of that offence. It may be seen that this provision as contained in clause (e) ibid, has obviously nothing to do with any question of commitment of the case by the Magistrate, to the special Court, since the language used in this sub-clause (e) refers to a situation viz. "without the accused being committed to it, (i. e. Special Court) for trial" instead of "without the case being committed to it for trial. " ( 6. "without the accused being committed to it, (i. e. Special Court) for trial" instead of "without the case being committed to it for trial. " ( 6. ) NOW taking up the question of competence of the Judge Shri c. M. Das for disposal of the case under the Act, it may be stated, at first, in the light of mandatory provision contained in clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 12-AA of the Act, that exclusive jurisdiction for trial of all offences under the Act, has been given to special Court as may be specified in this behalf by the High Court. Constitution of such special court is obviously, in keeping, with the provisions of sections 4 (2), 5 and 26 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. State of U. P. v. Sadir All, AIR 1964 S C 1673. is a clear authority for the proposition that if a Special law mentions a Court by which the offences created by such a law, are to be tried, trial by any court not so mentioned, will be void, Sonatal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1972 MPLJ 763 and A. R. Antulay v. R. S. Nayak, AIR 1984 SC 718 . ( 7. ) SECTION 460 (e) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (old section 529) which condones any erroneous assumption of jurisdiction by the magistrate under section 190 of the Code will not obviously be available for curing the defect of jurisdiction of a Special Court, whose jurisdiction arises, not from any provisions of the Code but of the Special Statute, under which, such Court is constituted (See Bhajahari v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1959 SC 8 .) It has been held in Smt. Rajkumari v. Deoraj AIR 1977 S C 1101. , that jurisdiction with respect to the power of the Court to try particular kind of offences being one which goes to the root of the matter, any transgression of the same would make the entire trial void; and, hence, such defect of jurisdiction would not be curable by any provisions of the Code. (Also see Pyarelal v. State of Punjab, AIR 1962 S C 690.) ( 8. (Also see Pyarelal v. State of Punjab, AIR 1962 S C 690.) ( 8. ) NOW, coming to the present case, it is noticed that the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, vide Notification No. A/1105/teen 6-7-64 Part-1 dated 10-2-1983, has appointed Sessions Judge Raigarh to be the Special court under section 12-AA (1) (a) of the Act, for trial of all offences under the Act for the area comprised in the Revenue District of Raigarh. As per section 9 of the Code, there is a provision for appointment of only one sessions Judge, for every Sessions Division, with a further provision for appointment of Addl. Sessions Judges and Asstt. Sessions Judges. Thus, if shri C. M. Das is found to be a Sessions Judge for the whole period of trial of the offence against the appellant-accused, under the Act, then he would be Special Court and consequently his jurisdiction for trial would be valid; but not otherwise. ( 9. ) NOW, Shri C. M. Das, who as per High Court Notification no. A/5232/do-3-1 /81 (Bhag-1) dated 30-5-1981, was an Addl. Sessions judge in Sessions Division Raigarh, is found to be appointed later, vide high Court Notification No. A /6798 /do-2-1 /83 dated 9 8-1983 to be the sessions Judge of Raigarh Sessions Division, with effect from the date of his taking over the charge. Registry of this Court has informed that Shri c. M. Das had officiated as Sessions Judge Raigarh, only during the period from 20-9-1983 to 9-12-1983; and on 10-12-1983, Shri R. K. Bajpai had taken over the charge as Sessions Judge Raigarh, by virtue of High Court notification No. A /9706 /do-2-1 /83 dated 2-11-1983, whereby, he "was appointed as such, with effect from the date, he took over the charge. Shri das is found to have validly continued the proceedings of the case from 24-9-1983 till the recording of his order-sheet dated 3 1-10-1983, since he was the duly appointed Sessions Judge during that period. Order-sheet of the Court below shows that on 10-12-1983, Sessions Judge R. K. Bajpai, who took over charge on that date, had handed over this case to Shri c. M. Das for trial according to law. Consequent to Shri R. K. Bajpais taking over the charge, as Sessions Judge on 10-12-1983, it was he as a sessions Judge who would be Special Court under section 12-AA (l) (a) of the Act. Consequent to Shri R. K. Bajpais taking over the charge, as Sessions Judge on 10-12-1983, it was he as a sessions Judge who would be Special Court under section 12-AA (l) (a) of the Act. On and after 10-12-1983, Shri C. M. Das had come to hold the substantive post of Additional Sessions Judge; and he continued to be so, till he disposed of the case vide his Judgment dated 24-2-1984 Sessions judge Shri R. K. Bajpai was not competent to make over the case to Additional Sessions Judge C. M. Das on 10-12-1983, for disposal, since, as per high Court Notification No. A/1105/teen-6-7/64 Part-1 dated 10-2-1983, it was not the Addl. Sessions Judge but Sessions Judge alone who was specified by the High Court as Special Court. Therefore, trial of the appellant-accused by Addl. Sessions Judge C. M. Das for the offence under the Act and his final order of conviction and sentence as passed against the appellant-accused, had obviously become void for want of inherent jurisdiction to try the case. Section 194 of the Code which clothes the Sessions judge with powers for making over the case to Addl. Sessions Judge or assistant Sessions Judge for trial, could not be available to the Sessions judge R. K. Bajpai for making over the case to C. M. Das on 10-12-1983, inasmuch as, R. K. Bajpai, as per High Court Notification, was alone the special Court on 10 12-1983 in view of his being Sessions Judge; and there being no other Special Court constituted under section 12-AA (l) (a) of the act for the Raigarh District, the case under this Act could not be transferred to any other Judge, be he Addl Sessions Judge or any other Judge. Shri C. M. Das, having thus, tried, convicted, and sentenced the appellant-accused for the offence under the Act, without competent jurisdiction, the order of conviction and sentence passed by him, deserves to be set aside. ( 10. ) IN the result, thus, the appeal is allowed. Orders of conviction and sentence as passed by Addl. Sessions Judge C. M. Das is set aside; and the whole proceedings for trial after the date 10-12-1983 are equally quashed. Consequently, the case, under the Act, is sent back to Sessions Judge, sessions Division Raigarh for trial and disposal according to special Statute viz. Orders of conviction and sentence as passed by Addl. Sessions Judge C. M. Das is set aside; and the whole proceedings for trial after the date 10-12-1983 are equally quashed. Consequently, the case, under the Act, is sent back to Sessions Judge, sessions Division Raigarh for trial and disposal according to special Statute viz. the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 as Special Court, appointed under section 12-AA (l) (a) of the Act. The appellant-accused to appear in the special Court on 8-10-1984 for further and fresh proceedings, after the proceedings dated 31-10-1983. Order accordingly.