Judgment :- 1. Respondent herein as divorced wife of the petitioner filed M.C. 74 of 1979 before the judicial Magistrate of the First Class, Tirur claiming maintenance under S.125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short'the Code'). The application was opposed by the present petitioner but was allowed by the learned Magistrate who directed him to pay maintenance at the rate of Rs. 30/- per month from the date of the petition. This order was challenged by both sides in revision before the Sessions Court, petitioner challenging the liability and the respondent seeking a higher amount. The Sessions Court dismissed both the revisions. The petition is filed seeking interference under S.482 of the Code. 2. Admittedly, petitioner and the respondent were married about three decades ago. Two daughters were born in the marriage and both of them are married. The marriage subsisted for about 10 to 15 years and thereafter the petitioner divorced his wife. He has married again and is living with his second wife and five children. Therefore, respondent put forward the claim as divorced wife in the light of Explanation (b) to S.125(1) of the Code. Petitioner herein filed a written statement contending that after he divorced the respondent, respondent was married by one Abubacker and the latter also divorced her on account of her immoral ways. The alleged second marriage was denied by the present respondent examined as pw.1 and was attempted to be proved by the present petitioner examined as CPW.1 and another witness CPW. 2. CPW.1 evidently had no personal knowledge about the marriage. CPW. 2 claimed to have attended the marriage. But both the courts below declined to accept his evidence and accepted the denial by pw.1 and held that the respondent still remains the divorced wife of the petitioner and she had not remarried. I do not think in proceedings under S.482 of the Code I should attempt re-appreciation of the evidence and take any different view. Prima facie, it appears that respondent is a woman who has been divorced by her husband, the petitioner, and therefore she falls within the extended definition of the expression "wife" as given in Explanation (b) to S.125(1) of the Code for the purpose of putting forward the claim for maintenance. 3. Prima facie, it appears that respondent is a woman who has been divorced by her husband, the petitioner, and therefore she falls within the extended definition of the expression "wife" as given in Explanation (b) to S.125(1) of the Code for the purpose of putting forward the claim for maintenance. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously contended that the extended definition of the expression "wife" which includes a divorced wife would apply only to a wife who has been divorced after the coming into force of the Code and cannot apply to a wife who was divorced prior to the coming into force of the Code. According to him, to hold that the definition takes in a wife who was divorced prior to the coming into force of the Code would amount to giving retrospective effect to the provision and that is not warranted. 4. An identical question came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in Kunhi Moyin v. Pathumma (1976 KLT. 87). Dealing with the argument based on retrospective operation, Khalid J., as he then was, speaking for the Bench stated as follows: "10. According to us, the argument based on the retrospective operation of the section betrays a confusion of thought. There is an apparent fallacy in the said argument. The concept of retrospectivity or retroactivity cannot and need not enter the field of discussion while construing S.125 of the new Code. If this section had given a right to a wife, who was divorced before the Act, to claim past maintenance under the new Code, then the argument would be well-founded. Both S.488 of the old Code and S.125 of the new Code deal only with future maintenance. There is no question of claiming any past maintenance under either of these sections. Therefore, the section does not confer any right to a woman who was once a wife, to claim maintenance for the period after divorce till her re-marriage. That is why we say that the concept of retrospectivity is misplaced in a discussion of the new definition of wife occurring in S.125. All that the section does, is to give to an ex-wife the right to claim future maintenance from her quondam husband for a future period till she gets re-married. (11) xxxxxx (12) xxxxxX 13. The essence of retrospectivity is to apply an Act solely to past actions. All that the section does, is to give to an ex-wife the right to claim future maintenance from her quondam husband for a future period till she gets re-married. (11) xxxxxx (12) xxxxxX 13. The essence of retrospectivity is to apply an Act solely to past actions. That is not the case here. That is why, we expressed ourselves earlier in the judgment, that if the section bad given a right to the ex-wives to claim maintenance which accrued due prior to the passing of the new Code, then the argument of retrospectivity would be effective. But in this case, all that the Legislature has done is to import a legal fiction to create an artificial status of husband and wife for the only purpose of enabling the wife who has been divorced or who has obtained divorce, and was not re-married to claim maintenance. Viewed thus, we do not find our way to accept the contention that there is either an element of retrospectivity or that the section impairs a right already available to a party. S.125 has to be read in the context of the benefit that it, seeks to confer and in so doing if a few women who were divorced prior to the Act became entitled to claim maintenance, the object of the section itself cannot be defeated to protect the interests of their husbands. 14. In considering social welfare legislations, the Courts will De justified in straining the language a little to achieve the object of the enactment. If the object of the enactment can be achieved only by the martyrdom of a few husbands, we will boldly do so and would not shirk our duty in effectuating the object of the enactment. It statistics are taken, it will be clear that women who have taken advantage of such protection are young divorcees who have been mercilessly divorced by their husbands or who had to obtain divorce from their husbands on account of cruelty or for other reasons. The exceptional cases of old divorces will be few and far between. (15) xxxxxxx 16 We have therefore no hesitation in rejecting the plea put forward by counsel for the petitioners that it will be doing violence to the wording of the section and to the accepted canons of interpretation of statutes to give retrospective operation to the section." 5. The exceptional cases of old divorces will be few and far between. (15) xxxxxxx 16 We have therefore no hesitation in rejecting the plea put forward by counsel for the petitioners that it will be doing violence to the wording of the section and to the accepted canons of interpretation of statutes to give retrospective operation to the section." 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out that this decision has been overruled by a Full Bench of this Court in Mariyumma v. Mohammed Ibrahim (1978 KLT. 573). In Kunhi Moyin's case, the Bench proceeded to observe that sub-s. (4) of S.125 which states that no wife shall be entitled to receive an allowance from her husband if she is living in adultery, or if, without any sufficient reason, she refuses to live with her husband, or if they are living separately by mutual consent, would also apply in the case of a divorced wife. It was this view which was overruled by the Full Bench in Mariyumma's case. That is because there is no question of a divorced wife, as long as she does not re-marry, living in adultery or being required by law to live with the divorced husband and the concept of living separately by mutual consent also could not apply to such a case. The Full Bench also noticed that this particular point did not actually arise for consideration in Kunhi Moyin's case. The point actually decided in Kunhi Moyin's case was that S.125 (1) of the Code would apply also to a woman who was divorced prior to the coming into force of the Code and that view has not been overruled by the Full Bench. 6. I may notice that the Calcutta High Court also has taken the same view in Mushaque Mondal v. Joysun Bibi (1977 Crl.L.J 484). The Supreme Court dealt with a similar case in Bai Tahira v. Ali Hussain Fissaili Chothia and another (AIR. 1979 SC. 362). That was a case in which the parties proceeded on the basis that the divorce took place in 1962 and the Magistrate ordered payment of maintenance. The Sessions Court and the High Court held that she was not entitled to maintenance. 1979 SC. 362). That was a case in which the parties proceeded on the basis that the divorce took place in 1962 and the Magistrate ordered payment of maintenance. The Sessions Court and the High Court held that she was not entitled to maintenance. It was argued before the Supreme Court that the decision of the Sessions Court and High Court was arrived at ignoring Explanation (b) to S.125(1) of the Code giving an extended definition to the expression "wife" so as to include divorced woman who has not re-married. Krishna Iyer J., speaking for the court observed as follows: "This is obviously beyond dispute on a simple reading of the sub-section and it is curious how this innovative and sensitive provision with a benignant disposition towards destitute divorcees has been overlooked by all the courts below. We hold that every divorcee, otherwise eligible, is entitled to the benefit of maintenance allowance and the dissolution of the marriage makes no difference to this right under the current Code." 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the intention of the Parliament would not be to mulct a person with liability to pay maintenance to a woman whom he had divorced decades ago for valid reasons. Learned counsel also pointed out that the view taken by the Full Bench in Mariyumma's case that sub-s. (4) of S.125 does not apply to a divorced wife, would also be a factor to be taken into consideration. As pointed out by the Division Bench in Kunhi Moyin's case cases of persons being asked to maintain women whom they divorced decades ago and that too for valid reasons would be few and far between and the fact that there will be such exceptional cases cannot compel the court to impute to the Parliament an intention which on the face of it is not disclosed in the provision. What Explanation (b) to S.125(1) says is that for the purpose of the Chapter, "wife" includes a woman who has been divorced by or has obtained divorce from her husband and has not re-married. The construction of the explanation does not indicate that it refers only to a future status. Any woman who has the status of a divorced wife on the date of coming into force of the Code. The construction of the explanation does not indicate that it refers only to a future status. Any woman who has the status of a divorced wife on the date of coming into force of the Code. or who acquires the status thereof is deemed to be a 'wife' as long as she has not re-married. There is, nothing in the provision to indicate that this extended definition is restricted only to a woman who has been divorced or who has obtained divorce from her husband after the coming into force of the Code. As pointed out in Kunhi Moyin's case, the question does not involve retroactivity. The extended definition of the word "wife" cannot apply to sub-s. (4). At any rate, the controversy in this case is unaffected by sub-s. (4). I am not therefore able to agree that the decision in Kunhi Moyin's case requires re-consideration. The respondent was admittedly divorced by the petitioner and since the alleged re-marriage was hot proved, she has to be treated as a "wife" for the purpose of S.125(1) of the Code. 8. The other contention urged by learned counsel for the petitioner! is that neglect or refusal to maintain being a jurisdictional matter and since there is neither pleading nor proof in that regard, the maintenance order should not have been passed. There is no doubt that under S.125(1) of the Code, maintenance can be ordered only where a person having sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain any of the persons mentioned in clauses (a) to (d) thereof and upon proof of such neglect or refusal. In the normal course, one would expect a person claiming maintenance to raise a plea to that effect and also adduce proof. But pleadings in proceedings, under S.125 of the Code cannot be construed strictly. They have to be interpreted liberally taking into consideration the purpose of the provision, namely, to help destitutes and to eradicate vagrancy. In appropriate cases, the very fact that a person has filed a petition under S.125(1) of the Code would suffice to show that she has a case of neglect or refusal on the part of the person liable to maintain her. Of course, where neglect or refusal to maintain is denied by the opposite party, the person claiming maintenance, can hope to succeed only on satisfying the court regarding such neglect or refusal. Of course, where neglect or refusal to maintain is denied by the opposite party, the person claiming maintenance, can hope to succeed only on satisfying the court regarding such neglect or refusal. That is a matter which depends on appreciation of the facts, evidence and circumstances of each, case. There may be cases where the person with liability to maintain disclaims his liability and does not put forward a case that he has been maintaining her. In such cases where the court holds that he is liable to maintain or pay maintenance, his conduct and the nature of his contentions and the findings thereon may by themselves be sufficient to show neglect or refusal to maintain. In matters like this, the court cannot take a strict view of the pleadings or even of burden of proof In Bai Tahira's case, the Supreme Court observed as follows: "8. S 125 requires, as a sine qua non for its application, neglect by husband or father. The Magistrate's order proceeds on neglect to maintain; the Sessions Judge has spoken nothing to the contrary; and the High Court has not spoken at all. Moreover, the husband has not examined himself to prove that he has been giving allowances to the divorced wife. His case, on the contrary, is that she has forfeited her claim because of divorce and the consent decree. Obviously, he has no case of non-neglect. His plea is his right to ignore. So the basic condition of neglect to maintain is satisfied. In this generous jurisdiction, a broader perception and appreciation of the facts and their bearing must govern the verdict not chopping little logic or tinkering with burden of proof." 9. While, according to the respondent, she was divorced about 15 years prior to the petition, according to the petitioner, the divorce was in 1957 and that because of her immoral ways, a contention which he never attempted even to prove. He also set up a case that she re-married and was again divorced on account of her bad ways. The re-marriage has been concurrently found against. The respondent bad only two daughters and both of them have been married. According to her, she lives in a house belonging to the daughters. He also set up a case that she re-married and was again divorced on account of her bad ways. The re-marriage has been concurrently found against. The respondent bad only two daughters and both of them have been married. According to her, she lives in a house belonging to the daughters. In the M.C. Petition, she has clearly averred that she has no means to maintain herself while the opposite party has means to pay maintenance and as a divorced wife she has a right to claim maintenance. In his written statement, the present petitioner denied his liability to maintain her on several grounds and also set up a case that the M. C. petition was instigated by one of his enemies. He also stated that be has no means to pay separate maintenance to her and prayed for the dismissal of the petition. The averments in the M. C. petition as well as the written statement clearly spell out a case of neglect to maintain the respondent by the petitioner. That is the basis on which the M. C. petition was filed and that basis was more or less accepted by the present petitioner who disclaimed his liability completely. 10. The respondent, examined as pw.1, stated that after the marriage of her daughters there is nobody to look after her and she has no income at all. It was suggested to her that she has immovable properties. She denied the suggestion. No worthwhile attempt was made to show that she has immovable properties or other income. The present petitioner examined as CPW.1 clearly stated even in chief examination that after the divorce he did not pay any money to the divorced wife for her existence. In these circumstances, it is clear that a case of neglect has been established. Therefore, the Magistrate had jurisdiction to pass an order of maintenance. The amount awarded is a paltry sum of Rs. 30/- per month. Petitioner has been working as Villageman. According to him, his take home pay is Rs. 320/- per month. He has forty cents of paramba land also. He has, of course, his second wife and five children to maintain. pw.1 undeniably has no source of income. The amount awarded is a paltry amount. I therefore do not find any reason to interfere with the order of maintenance. The petition is therefore dismissed.