JUDGMENT : D.P. Mohapatra, J. - The petitioner, one of the accused sons in G. R. Case No. 595 of 1978 in the court of the Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate. Bargarh, has filed this application quashing the Criminal Proceedings against him. By order ed 36-2-1980 charges under section 420/34, I.P.C. were framed against the petitioner alleging that he on 24-9-1978 Barpali cheated opposite party by dishonestly inducing him to deliver 350 of ground-nut oil valued at Rs. 45,000/- which was the property of the said opposite party to the petitioner in furtherance common intention and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 420/34, I.P.C. The gist of the allegations contained in the F.I.R. lodged the opposite party is that the opposite patty is the proprietor Rukumani Oil Mill situated at Barpali in the district of Sambalpur. The petitioner, a local man of Barpali and well known to the opposite party used to visit the mill premises for purchasing oil cakes and for helping the opposite party in sale of om the Mill. The further allegation in the F.I.R. was that petitioner gave out to the opposite party that he knows a contactor at Burla who had got a contract for supply of oil to the hospital there and he will purchase oil from the opposite party every month. The petitioner requested the opposite party for sample oil for showing the same to the contractor and took one bottle of oil for the purpose. A few days thereafter, the petitioner again came to the Mill and told the opposite party that he (petitioner) has been informed by the contractor that the sample has been approved and he (the contractor) will take oil within 15 to 20 days. Thereafter, the petitioner came with another person whom he introduced to the opposite party as an employee of the contractor and said that this person has been sent to purchase 350 tins of ground-nut oil and he would pay Rs. 6,000/- towards advance. The person accompanying the petitioner signed an agreement for supply of the oil and left the Mill premises saying that he would come some other day for lifting the stock. 6,000/- towards advance. The person accompanying the petitioner signed an agreement for supply of the oil and left the Mill premises saying that he would come some other day for lifting the stock. Thereafter, on 24-9-1978 at about 9 p.m. the petitioner came to the Mill premises in truck number ORS 3605 along with the owner of the truck, the helper and some labourers and one Bhagabat Subudhi said to be the agent of the contractor. The petitioner gave out to the opposite party that the contractor has sent Bhagabat Subudhi as his agent to lift the stock of 350 tins of oil and has sent Rs. 6,000/- towards the advance and has promised to pay the balance amount within 15 days. The opposite party believing in good faith the statement of the petitioner, agreed to hand over 350 tins of oil. On the query of the opposite party Bhagabat Subudhi gave out the name of the contractor as B. Chudadhar. He paid Rs. 6,000/- to the opposite party towards advance. Accordingly, the opposite party prepared a credit memo in the name of B. Chudadhar for Rs. 45,500/- towards the price of 350 tins of ground-nut oil and showed payment of Rs. 6,000/- towards advance in the said credit memo. Bhagabat Subudhi signed the credit memo on behalf of B. Chudadhar. After the stock was loaded in the truck, the petitioner and Bhagabat Subudhi left the Mill premises with the same. Since the balance amount was not paid within 15 days the opposite party approached the petitioner several times but the petitioner avoided to go to the contractor on some plea or other. Growing suspicious about the matter the opposite party on 19-10-1978 came to Burla and on enquiry he was told by several persons that there are no such persons by name of B. Chudadhar or Bhagabat Subudhi at Burla. When he traced out the owner of the truck No. ORS 3605 to be one Jogendra Singh and approached him, he gave out to the site patty that on 24-9-1978 the petitioner approached him with a request to bring 350 tins of oil from Barpali and unload the stock at Janata Hotel, Thereafter, the owner of the truck lent to the petitioner's house at 8 p.m. on 24-9-1978 and from there he went to the Mill premises. After leaving the Mill raises with the stock when Jogendra Singh asked the petitioner sale tax papers he expressed his inability to produce the same and asked him to unload the stock at his (petitioner's) house. Accordingly, the stock was unloaded in the house of the Petitioner. 2. On these allegations, investigation was undertaken on completion of investigation, charge-sheet was submitted under section 420/34, I.P.C. the court took cognizance, examined three witnesses and framed charges against the petitioner and one Sanyasi Rao under the said sections. The proceeding is challenged mainly on the ground that allegations contained in the F.I.R and the materials so collected do not establish a prima facie case under section 420 I.P.C. against the petitioner The submission on behalf of petitioner is that the main ingredients in Section 420, I.P.C. the deception must be by way of a false representation and that the representation must be false to the knowledge of the accused when it was made are lacking in this case Reliance has been placed on a statement made by Jogendra Singh that when the stock of oil was unloaded in the house of the petitioner, he lid Rs. 250/- towards the charges for the truck and the labourers and Rs. 50/- towards advance saying that after the requisite papers are collected he would take the goods to Burla. He has per stated that 3 to 4 days thereafter Sanyasi Rao (the other accused met him at Burla and wanted the refund of Rs. 50/- paid towards advance. But he refused saying that he would land the amount only after taking Judhistir Das (petitioner). 3. Ordinarily, criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory stage. The High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction does not ordinarily interfere with a criminal proceeding at an interlocutory stage unless there are exceptional circumstances. The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash the proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash the proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The Supreme Court in the case of R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab AIR 1960 S.C. 866 , has enumerated some such circumstances as follows:- "(i) Where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the criminal proceeding in respect of the offence alleged. Absence of the requisite sanction may, for instance, furnish case under this category. (ii) Where the allegations in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety,do not constitute the offence alleged; in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises, it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the First Information Report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. (iii) Where the allegations made against the accused person do constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge, in dealing with this class of cases it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where there is legal evidence which on its appreciation may or may not support the accusation in question. In exercising its jurisdiction under section 561-A the High Court would not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. That is the function of the trial Magistrate and ordinarily it would not be open to any party to invoke the High Court's inherent jurisdiction and contend that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence the accusation made against the accused would not be sustained." In a subsequent decision. That is the function of the trial Magistrate and ordinarily it would not be open to any party to invoke the High Court's inherent jurisdiction and contend that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence the accusation made against the accused would not be sustained." In a subsequent decision. Hareram Satpathy v. Tikaram Atarwala & Others AIR 1978 S.C. 1568 , the Supreme Court has held that as the Magistrate is restricted to finding out whether there is a prima facie case or not for proceeding against the accused and cannot enter into a detailed discussion of the merits or demerits of the case and the scope of the revisional jurisdiction is very limited, the High Court cannot launch on a detailed and meticulous examination of the case on merits and set aside the order of the Magistrate directing issue of process against the accused persons. It is also held that the inherent powers possessed by it under section 482, Cr. P.C. can be invoked and exercised only when the facts alleged in the complaint, if they are accepted to be correct at their face value, do not make out an offence with which the accused is charged. Since the case is pending for trial any observation relating to the materials on record may prejudice the accused. But suffice it to say that in the present case, the allegations in the F.I.R. and the statements of the persons recorded under section 164, Cr. P.C reveal the involvement of the petitioner in the entire transaction right from the beginning. It is not possible at this stage, to say definitely that there is no prima facie case for proceeding against the petitioner and that the petitioner had no knowledge that the representation made by him was false. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on a decision of this Court in a case of Hiralal Mundra v. Ms. Asok Kumar Rasiklal Co. through Ramniklal Dholkia 39 (1973) C.L.T. 597 wherein the criminal proceedings were quashed. On a perusal of the said decision. I find that it is not comparable on facts. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on a decision of this Court in a case of Hiralal Mundra v. Ms. Asok Kumar Rasiklal Co. through Ramniklal Dholkia 39 (1973) C.L.T. 597 wherein the criminal proceedings were quashed. On a perusal of the said decision. I find that it is not comparable on facts. In the said case, the Court on a consideration of the materials on record came to hold that neither the complaint petition nor initial deposition of the complainant made out any offence under section 420, I.P.C. and no overt act was attributed to the accused in either of them which prima facie establishes making of any representation to the complainant which was false to the knowledge of the accused and which induced the complainant to deliver the goods. Some other circumstances which weighed with the Court in the said case where the delay of three years in instituting the complaint case and filing of a civil suit for realisation of the balance price shortly after instituting the criminal case and also the fact that the accused tried to honour the contract and paid more than half of the price due. These circumstances led the court to hold that he had no criminal intent when he entered into the contract. The facts and circumstances in the present case, as stated earlier, are completely different. Hence, the decision has no application to the present case. The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court may be exercised to quash proceedings only in extraordinary cases, to prevent abuse of the process of the court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The facts of this case do not warrant the exercise of the said power of this Court. 5. In view of the discussion aforesaid, the revision has no merit and it is accordingly dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed