Order: 1. This civil revision petition is directed against the order of the Court below striking out the caveat filed by the petitioner in O.P. No. 23 of 1980, Sub-Court. Nili-girls at Ootacamund, on an application taken out in that regard by the respondent herein under Sections 283 and 284 read with Section 285 of that Indian Succession Act XXXIX of 1925 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The circumstances giving rise to the revision petition are as follows: 2. In O.P. No. 23 of 1980, Sub-Court, Nil-girls at Ootacamund, the respondent herein, claiming to be a beneficiary to the estate of one Mary Aline Browne who died on 23rd March, 1972, under the terms of a will stated to have been executed by her on 12th March 1962, has filed an application for Letters of Administration with a copy of the will annexed. The testatrix Mary Aline Browne was the wife of Herbert Evander Browne, who was the eldest son of one John Browne. The testatrix had a daughter of the name of Zoe Enid Browne and she died on 8th October, 1977. The respondent prayed that he may be allowed to prove the will dated 12th March, 1962 executed by the testatrix in common form and had filed an affidavit of an attestor of the name of A.D. Dawson, In that proceeding, the petitioner and her deceased husband had lodged a caveat on the ground that Mary Aline Browne did not execute any will and that the will propounded by the respondent herein was a fictitious and forged one intended to disentitle Zoe Enid Browne, daughter of the testatrix, from claiming any interest in the estate of her mother and also to prevent the petitioner from claiming rights under the will of Zoe Enid Browne dated 23rd June, 1975 and under a deed of gift stated to have been executed by her in favour of the petitioner, In I.A.No.870 of 1981, the respondent put forward the plea that Zoe Enid Browne had at best only a life interest in certain properties and had no estate to bequeath and therefore, the petitioner did not have any interest in the estate of the deceased and further had no locus standi to file a caveat. This was repudiated by the petitioner on the ground that she had such an interest on the basis of the will dated 23rd June, 1975, a deed of gift stated to have been executed by Zoe Enid Browne and also in her capacity as a Trustee of John Browne Trust of Ootacamund. 3. Before the Court below on behalf of the respondent Exs. A-1 to A.8 were marked and P,W, 1 and P.W.2 were examined, while on behalf of the petitioner, Exs. B-1 and B-2 were filed and the petitioner was examined as R.W.1. On a consideration of the evidence, the learned Subordinate Judge found that the petitioner is not in any manner related to either Mary Aline Browne or Zoe Enid Browne, who were British subjects, that the petitioner has not established that she has any interest in the estate of Mary Aline Browne either on the strength of the deed of gift or even the will dated 23rd June, 1975 stated to have been executed by Zoe Enid Browne in her favour or in her capacity as a Trustee of John Browne Trust of Ootacamund and that in the absence of proof of any interest in the estate, the caveat filed by the petitioner ought to be struck out. It is the correctness of this order that is challenged in this civil revision petition. 4. In support of this Civil Revision Petition, the learned counsel for the petitioner, while not challenging the correctness of the factual conclusions, arrived at by the Court below, urged two points, The learned counsel first submitted that under Section 288 of the Act, the Court below, being a district delegate, having regard to the contentious nature of the proceedings before it, ought to have returned O.P. No. 23 of 1980 to the respondent herein with a direction that that proceeding should be presented to the District Court and that without doing so, had proceeded to consider the same, to do which it had no jurisdiction. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent contended that by virtue of the notification under Section 29 (1) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Courts Act, the District Court as well as the Sub-Court have concurrent jurisdiction in matters like this and it was therefore unnecessary for the Court to have resorted to a return of the petition under Section 288 of the Act. Reliance in this connection was placed by the learned counsel for the respondent upon the decision of the Full Bench of this Court reported in R. Rama Subbarayalu Reddiar v. Rengammal1 and Annammal and others v. Santagu and others2. 5. In order to appreciate this contention, it is necessary to briefly notice the provisions of the Act, particularly those relating to the grant and revocation of probate of a will or letters of Administration. The relevant sections are embodied in Chapter VI of Part IX of the Act. The expression “District Judge” is defined by Section 2(bb) of the Act as meaning the judge of principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction. Under Section 265 of the Act, provision is made for the appointment of judicial officers within the district as the High Court may think fit to act for the District Judge as Delegates to grant probate and letters of administration in non-contentious cases under Section 264 of the Act, Jurisdiction is conferred on the District Judge to grant or revoke a probate or letters of administration. There also a restriction in the powers of the District Delegate in that the District Delegate can grant probate or letters of administration when the deceased at the time of his death had a fixed abode. The powers of the District Judge on this matter are wider in that the District Judge can grant the probate or letters of administration where the deceased at the time of his death had a fixed abode or where any movable or immovable properties are situate within his jurisdiction. Non-contentious cases can ordinarily be disposed of by the District Delegate under the provisions of the Act but when once a contest is raised under Section 288 of the Act, the matter has got to be returned for presentation to the District Judge. An application for revocation of a grant in a non-contentious proceeding cannot ordinarily be decided by the District Delegate as the filing of the application for the revocation itself would raise a contest. The non-contentious matter can always be referred by the Delegate to the District Judge. In addition, there is also a difference even on the question of the conclusiveness of a grant made by the District Delegate and the District Judge. The conferment of such limited jurisdiction on the District Delegate was not something peculiar under the provisions of the Act only, for. In addition, there is also a difference even on the question of the conclusiveness of a grant made by the District Delegate and the District Judge. The conferment of such limited jurisdiction on the District Delegate was not something peculiar under the provisions of the Act only, for. even in the earlier enactments, the difference in the scope of the jurisdiction of the delegate and the District Judge had been maintained. This led to large scale accumulation of work in the District Court and in turn, legislation in several States was passed with a view to enable the High Court to authorise any Subordinate Judge or even Munsif to take cognizance of or any District Judge to transfer to a Subordinate Judge or Munsif any contentious proceeding under the Act of 1865 and the Probate end Administration Act, 1881. Though originally in this State, the Tamil Nadu Civil Courts Act, 1873 , was passed no provision for any transfer as such had been made therein and this was noticed subsequently which led the passing of Act XIV of 1926 which introduceed Section 29 in the Tamil Nadu Civil Courts Act, 1873. Sub section (2) provided that the District Judge may withdraw any such proceedings taken cognizance of by, or transferred to a Sub-ordinate Judge and may either himself dis-pose of them or transfer them to a Court under his control competent to dispose of the same. Sub-section (3) provided that notwithstanding anything contained in Section 13, proceedings taken cognizance of by or transferred to a Subordinate Judge under the provisions of this section, shall be disposed of by him, subject to the law applicable to like proceedings, when disposed of by the Distrsct Judge. In this connection, it is also necessary to refer to two notifications conferring jurisdiction on Sub-Courts dealing with such matters All Subordinate Judges in Madras Psovince were appointed as ex-officio District Delegates within the local limits of their respective jurisdiction pursuant to a notification by this Court under Section 265 of the Act By yet another notification under Section 29(1) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Courts Act, 1873, all Subordinate Judges have been authorised to take cognizanee of proceedings under the Act, which cannot be disposed of by the District Delegates. By virtue therefore of the notifications so made, the Subordinate Judge is invested with the jurisdiction to try a proceeding of the nature now under consideration. By the combined effect of Section 29(1) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Courts Act and the notifications referred to earlier the investiture of jurisdiction on the Sub-courts in such matters does not take away the jurisdiction conferred on the District Judge, so that the District Judge as well as the Subordinate Judge will have concurrent jurisdiction for trying matters arising within the jurisdiction of the District Judge. Such proceedings in this case have been taken in the Sub-Court and it is only in conformity with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure to the effect that the proceedings should be initiated only before the lower court competent to try such a proceeding. The aforesaid position is clearly established by the decision of the Full Bench in R. Rama Subbarayalu Red-diar v. Rengammal1 by the following observations: “It would appear from the wide terms in which Section 29(1) of the Madras Civil Courts Act is enacted that the Subordinate Judge invested with a power under a notification issued thereunder by the High Court will have jurisdiction to hear and dispose of not merely contentious proceedings relating to the issue of probate or letters of administration but other matters under the Act as well”. 6. In Annammal and others v. Santagu and others1 the question arose as to proper forum for an appeal in regard to proceedings for the grant of a probate of a will which was presented originally to the District Court, but subsequently dealt with by the Sub-Court on transfer. The appeal was sought to be preferred before this Court. An objection regarding the maintainability of the appeal was raised by the office that the proper forum would be only the District Court and not this Court. In considering this, after referring to the notifications issued by the Court under Section 265 of the Act as well as Section 29(1) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Courts Act, it was held that the effect of the order passed by the Subordinate Judge on transfer by the District Judge is the same as that passed by the District Judge exercising the jurisdiction under the provisions of the Act and therefore the appeal filed before this Court was competent. This decision again reiterates the principle that the District Judges and Subordinate Judges, by reason of the notification issued by this Court and also under Section 29(1) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Courts Act, have in the matter of entertaining and disposing of proceedings under the Act, the same jurisdiction as well as similar powers. In view of this, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that since the proceeding before the Subordinate Judge was a contentious proceeding in that a caveat had been lodged or entered by the petitioner, the Subordinate Judge, should have transferred the proceedings to the District Judge since as a District Delegate, the Subordinate Judge was not competent to enter upon and hear the matter, cannot be accepted. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner next contended that by reason of the will of Zoe Enid Browne stated to have been executed by her on 23rd June, 1975, the petitioner had in her an interest sufficient in law to justify her opposition to the grant of the letters of administration by lodging a caveat and that the court below was in error in holding contra. Reliance, in this connection was placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner upon Section 211 (1) of the Act as well as some decisions. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent drew attention to the evidence of the petitioner, examined as R.W.1, to the effect that the petitioner had filed the caveat only on the strength of her interest under the terms of the will of Zoe Enid Browne and pointed out that even the will had not been produced before the Court to show some in terest in the petitioner which would enable her to lodge a caveat in opposition to the application for the grant of letters of administration made by the respondent and that the petitioner cannot claim any interest relying upon Section 211 (1) of the Act, as an executor under a will not produced and proved. Drawing attention to the scope of the proceedings for probate or letters of administration, the learned counsel for the respondent contended that the enquiry is restricted to the disposing state of mind as well as the dispos-tion by will and any caveat should also be confined to the scope of the petition and should not be allowed to be converted into a suit for resolving disputed questions of title. Reliance in this connection was placed on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Ishwardeo Narain Singh v. Smt. Kamta Devi and others1 and Will and Codicils of Venkata Narasamma2. Referring to the nature of the interest which would justify the lodging of acaveat, the learned counsel for the res-podent submitted that the petitioner has not satisfied the test of displacement of any interest of hers by the grant and therefore, the Court below was right in striking out the caveat lodged by the petitioner. Reference in this connection was made to the decisions in M. K Sowbagiammal and another v. Komalangi Ammal By Guardian Kandaswami Ghetti and auother3, Komalangi (minor) By her father and Guardian Kandasmai Chettiar v. M.K, Sowbhagiammal and another4 affirming the decision in M. K. Sowbahagimmal and another v. Komalangi Ammal by Guardian Kandasami Chettiar3, Meenakshi Achi and others v. Dr. Chidambaram and others1 affirmed by a Division Bench of this Court in C. V. C. T. R. Ranganathan Chettiar v. R.M. Meenakshi Achi and others,2 Even on the assumption that the petitioner can be regarded as a person having some interest under the terms of the will dated 23rd June, 1975 stated to have been executed by Zoe Enid Brown, the learned counsel would further submit that such an interest can be recognised by the Court only in a manner known to law and in the absence of proof of execution of the will and nature of interest claimed by the petitioner she cannot contend that as a person securing an interest thereunder she must continue to be permitted to oppose the proceeding for the grant of letters of administration by a caveat lodged by her. Reference in this connection was made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Mrs. Hem Nolini Judah (since deceased) and after death her legal Representative Mrs. Mariean Wilkinson Mrs. Isolyne Sarojbashini Base and others3. 8. Reference in this connection was made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Mrs. Hem Nolini Judah (since deceased) and after death her legal Representative Mrs. Mariean Wilkinson Mrs. Isolyne Sarojbashini Base and others3. 8. The petitioner, examined as R.W.1, in the course of her cross-examination admitted that she was not in any manner related to late John Browne or Mary Aline Browne or Zoe Enid Browne. She would also further admit that even her husband was not related to either Mary Aline Browne or Zoe Enid Browne. However, she stated that she had lodged a caveat only on the strength of the will of Zoe Enid Browne and further that she has not obtained any probate or letters of administration in relation to that will. The will dated 23nd June, 1975 has also not been produced by the petitioner before the Court and there is no knowing whether as an executor appointed under that will, the petitioner can claim to be a representative of Zoe Enid Browne and interested as such. So, the reliance placed upon Section 211 (1) of the Act would not in any manner assist the petitioner to lodge a caveat on the footing that she is an executor under a will which is not produced before the Court. Further, under Section 213 (1) of the Act even the right as an executor can be established in any court, only if a court of competent jurisdiction had granted probate of the will under which the right is claimed or has granted letters of administration with the will or with a copy or authenticated copy of the will annexed. A conjoint reading of Sections 211 (1) and 213 (1) of the Act shows that though the executor is the representative of a deceased person, such representative capacity becomes complete only on production of the will and proof of the execution of same in a manner known to law resulting in the obtaining of the probate or letters of administration, as the case may be. In this case, even the will relied on by the petitioner is not before the Court and the court is called upon to assume that the petitioner is an executor under the terms of a will not made available. In this case, even the will relied on by the petitioner is not before the Court and the court is called upon to assume that the petitioner is an executor under the terms of a will not made available. Under those circumstances, reliance placed by the petitioner upon Section 211 (1) of the Act as justifying the opposition of the petitioner to the grant of letters of administration in her capacity as an executor, cannot be accepted. 9. In this connection, it is also necessary to determine the scope of the proceedings for the grant of probate or letters of administration. Essentially, the proceeding is one for the proof of the will and not for an investigation into questions of complicated and disputed rival claims of title to the property dealt with under the will. in Iswardeo Narain Singh v. Smt. Kamata Devi and others1 the Supreme Court pointed out that the Court is probate is only concerned with the question as to whether the document put forward as the last will and testament of a deceased person was duly executed and attested in accordance with law and whether at the time of such execution the teastator had sound disposing mind but that the question whether a particular bequest is good or bad is not within the purview of the probate court. In Inre Last Will and Codicil of Venkata Narasamma,2 a Division Bench of this Court considered the scope of the proceedings for the grant of probate and it was pointed out that in such proceedings, the caveator will not be entitled to raise title in himself to the whole or any part of the estate of the deceased and that the title of the testator or the testatrix, as the case may be, to the whole or any part of the property forming the subject matter of disposition, is entirely and necessarily outside the scope of probate proceedings as these questions can be settled only by a regular suit. Further it was pointed out that by the entry of caveat the position of a caveator is no better and a proceeding for probate cannot be and should not be allowed to be converted into a suit for resolving disputed title. Further it was pointed out that by the entry of caveat the position of a caveator is no better and a proceeding for probate cannot be and should not be allowed to be converted into a suit for resolving disputed title. Considering the stand taken by the petitioner in the light of the will stand to have been executed by Zoe Enid Browne on 23rd June, 1975, it is obvious that the petitioner is attempting to set up in herself title to certain properties which, according to her, belonged to Zoe Enid Bronwe and had been bequeathed to her under a will. This precisely is not the scope of the proceedings commenced by the respondent and the petitioner cannot, therefore be heard to contend or put forth rights to the property under the will stated to have been executed by Zoe Enid Browne in opposition to the relief of grant of letters of administration made by the respondent in the proceedings initiated for that purpose before the court below. 10. Apart from this, there is one other aspect with would also establish that the petitioner cannot claim that the caveat lodged should not have been struck off in the manner done by the Court below and that relates to the question whether the petitioner as a caveator had the necessary interest. It has already been noticed that the petitioner is not in any manner related to either Mary Aline Brown or Zoe Enid Brown and therefore, she has no interest in impeaching the will, as a heir, who would have otherwise taken an interest on intestacy. The test is whether the petitioner would be otherwise entitled to any right, which the grant of probate or letters of administration, would displace. Applying the test, it is seen that the petitioner has not made out that she has such an interest. Indeed, it is pointed out by Venkatasubba Rao. J., in M.K. Sowbagi-ammal and another v. Komalangiammal by guardian Kandaswami Chetti and another1 that in every case, it must be shown that the caveator, but for the will, would be entitled to a right of which, that will deprives him. Indeed, it is pointed out by Venkatasubba Rao. J., in M.K. Sowbagi-ammal and another v. Komalangiammal by guardian Kandaswami Chetti and another1 that in every case, it must be shown that the caveator, but for the will, would be entitled to a right of which, that will deprives him. While so holding the learned Judge has prefaced it by the following observations at page 383: “………I am asked to go into the question of the ownership of these jewels and declare by my judgement, that the deceased was not the owner and that his will in regard to them is inoperative. Two things I regard to be clearly settled by authority, firstly, that the interest alleged is not an interest as would support a caveat, secondly, that a Probate Court does not decide questions of title in regard to the property disposed of by the Will”. 11. After so stating, the learned Judge proceeds to observe as follows at page 386. --- “The function of the court of probate is to decide whether the will propounded is the last will of the testator and whether the right to represent the estate may be conferred upon the applicant. The court of probate does not profess to decide the disputed title to every item of property mentioned in the will. If a testator disposes of, say, 15 items of property and 10 different claimants appear before the Court, each claiming one of them as his own, is the court to postpone the decision on the validity of the will and on the representative character of the applicant, until it decides the disputed ownership of the various items? By delaying the grant, serious injury may be caused to the estate, there being none during this interval to-represent it. Then, again, innumerable persons, each with his grievance, may come to oppose the grant, from one who claims a property worth some lakhs, down to one who sets up title to a property worth a paltry sum. It is certainly not to be expected that the application is to be decided in the presence of each one of these claimants. If. then, the scope of a testamentary proceedings is correctly understood, no difficulty can arise. Can the executor to whom probate is granted, on the strength of that probate, recover property which is not the testator's? It is certainly not to be expected that the application is to be decided in the presence of each one of these claimants. If. then, the scope of a testamentary proceedings is correctly understood, no difficulty can arise. Can the executor to whom probate is granted, on the strength of that probate, recover property which is not the testator's? Does the probate confer on the executor right to property to which he is otherwise not entitled? If it is remembered that these questions ought to be answered in the negative, it does not in the least matter, what the properties are, which the testator professes to treat as his own and to dispose of by his will. The remarks I have made apply equally to applications for letters of administration. In dealing with the question has the caveator the necessary interest; the test is, does the grant displace any right to which the caveator would otherwise be entitled? If so, he has such an interest, if not, he has not. An heir on intestacy has an interest in impeaching the will; for, but for the will, he would succeed to the property. A legatee under a previous will has a similar interest; for, he is interested in establishing the validity of that will and impeaching the validity of the later will which deprives him of the benefit. A reversionary heir under the Hindu Law has such an interest; for, normally, a widow has only a limited estate and the reversioner is interested in impeaching a will, which professes to enlarge that interest, or again, which purports to confer upon her rights to make an adoption (See Brindaban Chandra Saha v. Sureswar Saha1. But in every case it must be shown that the caveator but for the will would be entitled to a right of which that will deprives him. 12. This decision was appealed against in Komalangi Ammal (minor) By her Father and Guardian Kandasami Chettiar v. M.K. Sowbhagiammal and another2. In the course of that judgment Ramesam, J. adverted to the claim of ownership made to certain jewels dealt with in the will and it was pointed out to be not an interest in the estate of the deceased as her right to the jewels cannot be affected whether the will is genuine or not. In the course of that judgment Ramesam, J. adverted to the claim of ownership made to certain jewels dealt with in the will and it was pointed out to be not an interest in the estate of the deceased as her right to the jewels cannot be affected whether the will is genuine or not. Cornish, J., in the course of his judgment stated that the interest entitling a person to lodge a caveat must be an interest in the estate of the deceased, that is to say, there must be no dispute as to the title of the deceased to the estate, but that the caveator in that case was alleging that the jewels which the testator had disposed of in the will are her own property thereby setting up a title adverse to the testator's title to the property and therefore, it is impossible to say that she had an interest in the deceased's estate when she claimed that the property in question did not form part of the estate of the deceased. Padmanabhan, J, reiterated the aforesaid principles in Meenakshmi Achi and others v. Dr. Chidhambaram and others3 and that decision was affirmed by a Division Bench in Ranganathan Chettiar and others v. R.M. Meenakshi Achi4. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of petitioner by lodging a caveat, is attempting to protect her own title to the properties on the strength of the will of Zoe Enid Browne stated to have been executed by her on 23rd June, 1975 in opposition to the disposition under the will dated 12th March, 1962 stated to have been executed by Mary Aline Browne Indeed, it is seen from the objections filed by the petitioner that she desires the Court in these proceedings to uphold her title to certain properties on the strength of a gift as well as a deed of trust. As pointed out earlier, having regard to the scope of the proceedings, the petitioner cannot be permitted to do so, for to recognise the interest claimed by the petitioner would tantamount to accepting that those properties did not form part of the estate of the deceased testatrix in respect of whose will, the letters of administration have been sought for. As pointed out earlier, having regard to the scope of the proceedings, the petitioner cannot be permitted to do so, for to recognise the interest claimed by the petitioner would tantamount to accepting that those properties did not form part of the estate of the deceased testatrix in respect of whose will, the letters of administration have been sought for. Since the petitioner was not in any manner related to the deceased testatrix, there is no question of her claiming any interest in the estate of the deceased in her capacity as heir, but for the will dated 12th March, 1962. Equally the petitioner has not placed before the Court the will dated 23rd June 1975 stated to have been executed by Zoe Enid Browne to establish that under the will dated 12th March, 1963 stated to have been executed by Mary Aline Browne, some interest given to the petitioner under the will dated 23rd June, 1975 of Zoe Enid Browne, is liable to be in any manner affected or otherwise displaced, by the grant of letters of administration in respect of the will dated 12th March, 1962 stated to have been executed by Mary Aline Browne. Having regard to these considerations, the petitioner cannot be stated to have satisfactorily established that she has a caveatable interest justifying her opposition to the proceedings initiated by the respondent herein for the grant of letters of administration of the will dated 12th March, 1962 alleged to have been executed by Mary Aline Browne. 13. Earlier, it has been seen how the petitioner has not even produced the will on the strength of which she claims to have an interest in the estate of Mary Aline Browne to justify her lodging a caveat. Even if it can be assumed that Zoe Enid Browne executed such a will in favour of the petitioner as claimed by her on 23rd June, 1975 there would be an insuperable difficulty in the way of the petitioner persuading the Court as accept her case that she has some interest as an executor or even as a legatee. Id the course of the evidence of the petitioner in, her cross-examination, she had admitted that she had not obtained any probate or letters of administration with reference to the will dated 23rd June 1975 stated to have been executed by Zoe Enid Browne. Id the course of the evidence of the petitioner in, her cross-examination, she had admitted that she had not obtained any probate or letters of administration with reference to the will dated 23rd June 1975 stated to have been executed by Zoe Enid Browne. Section 213 of the Act would, under these circumstance stand in her way for no right as an executor or a legates can be proved, unless probate or letters of admi nistration of the will, under which such right is claimed has been obtained. Interpreting the scope of this section the Supreme Court in Mrs. Nolini Judah (Since deceased) and after her legal Representative Mrs. Marcan Wilkinson v. Mrs. Isolyne Base and others1 pointed out that the section does not say that no person can claim as a legatee or as an executor unless he obtains probate or letters of administration of the will under which he claims; but that no right as an executor or legatee can be established in any court of Justice, unless probate or letters of administration, have been obtained of the will, under which the right, is claimed and therefore, whosoever wishes to establish that right, whether it be a legatee or an executor himself or somebody else, who might find it necessary in order to establish the right of some legatee or executor from whom he right have derived title, he cannot do so unless the will under which the right as” a legatee or executor is claimed, has resulted in the grant of a probate or letters of administration. It is therefore clear that if the petitioner wishes to establish her right either as a legatee or as executor under the will dated 23rd June, 1975 stated to have been executed by Zoe Enid Browne, she can do so only by obtaining a probate or letters of administration and without that, the Court cannot countenance rights projected by her either as executor or as legatee, in view of the provisions of Section 313 of the Act. Thus, on a consideration of the nature of the interest of the petitioner as well as the objections raised by her and the non-obtaining of a probate of the will dated 23rd June, 1975 stated to have been executed by Zoe Enid Browne the petitioner cannot claim to be a person who has a caveatable interest in the estate of the deceased testratrix Mary Aline Browne, in respect of whose, will, proceedings for the letters of administration have now been taken by the respondent, On a careful consideration of the entire matter the conclusion of the court below that the caveat lodged by the petitioner has to be struck off is quite correct and has to be upheld. There is no illegality or irregularity in the order so passed by the Court below. No other point was urged. Consequently, the civil revision petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.