JUDGMENT Amarendra Nath Varma, J. - This bunch of petitions is being disposed of by a common judgment as the controversies involved therein are identical. In addition to these controversies, in some petitions, additional points were urged. We will deal with the main controversies first, and, thereafter, the additional points. 2. The petitioners have in these petitions challenged the validity of the notifications issued under Sections 28 and 32, U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as the Adhiniyam) as well as notices issued in pursuance of these notifications under S. 9, Land Acquisition Act, read with S. 55 of the Adhiniyam for taking possession over the land belonging to the petitioners. These notifications have been issued in regard to certain housing Schemes floated in various districts. 3. The first point raised in these petitions stands disposed of against them by a Full Bench decision of this court rendered on May 7, 1984. Indeed most of these petitions were admitted mainly because this point was the subject matter of a reference to the Full Bench. The argument ran thus. Section 55 of the Adhiniyam makes the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act applicable to any land required by the U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad established under the Adhiniyam. Section 55 further provides that the Land Acquisition Act shall apply as amended in its application to Uttar Pradesh subject to the modifications specified in the Schedule to the Adhiniyam. Clause 2 of the schedule to the Adhiniyam equates a notification issued under S. 28 of the Adhiniyam with a notification under sub-s. (1) of S. 4, Land Acquisition Act, and notification issued under sub-s. (4) of S. 32 of the Adhiniyam with a notification under S. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. By U.P. Act No. 13 of 1967, a proviso was added to S. 6(1), Land Acquisition Act, stating that no declaration in respect of any particular land covered by a notification under S. 4(1) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967 (1 of 1967) shall be made after the expiry of three years from the date of such publication. That being so. That being so. the petitioners contend, inasmuch as in each of these cases more than 3 years have elapsed between the publication of notifications under Sections 28 and 32 of the Adhiniyam, the notification under S. 32 as well as all subsequent proceedings consequent thereto must be deemed to be null and void. 4. The Full Bench dealt with the above argument in considerable depth relying on authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court as well as the Privy Council and answered the question against the petitioners. The Full Bench ruled that the limitation incorporated by the U.P. Legislature under S. 6, Land Acquisition Act, was not applicable to the procedure for issue of notifications under S. 28(1 and S. 32(4) of the Adhiniyam and these provisions were not inhibited by any amendments which might have been made by the State Legislature in the Land Acquisition Act. 5. Learned Counsel for the petitioners made no attempt to challenge the correctness of the conclusions reached by the full Bench in this behalf. They merely submitted that they were not giving up the point. We have examined the reasoning of the Full Bench for ourselves and, with respect we are in entire agreement with the decision of the Full Bench on this issue. 6. The point which was, however, mainly canvassed on behalf of the petitioners before us was that S. 31 of the Adhiniyam obligates the Board itself to hear the objections received by it under S. 30 of the Adhiniyam in pursuance of the notices issued under S. 29, whereas, in fact, the objections were heard by a committee called the Noyojan Samiti which was appointed by the Board for hearing the objections filed by the objectors under S. 30 of the Act. Learned counsel submitted that the power given to the Board under S. 31 to consider the objections filed under S. 30 after giving an opportunity of being heard to the objectors was not delegable by its very nature which was quasi judicial. 7. We are unable to agree. The submission completely ignores the legal position settled long since by the views unanimously expressed in all the authoritative texts on administrative law as well as by the judicial pronouncements both of this Court and of all the other countries. 8. 7. We are unable to agree. The submission completely ignores the legal position settled long since by the views unanimously expressed in all the authoritative texts on administrative law as well as by the judicial pronouncements both of this Court and of all the other countries. 8. The legal position as we have been able to cull out from the various authorities seems to be that ordinarily a discretion conferred by a statute is, prima facie intended to be exercised by the authority on which the statute has conferred it and by no other authority, but this intention may be negatived by any contrary indications found in the language, scope or object of the statute. This principle is founded on the maxim "delegatus non potest delegare." 9. S. A. desmith in Judicial Review of Administrative Action (Third Edition) at page 263 states the law thus : "A discretionary power must, in general, be exercised only by the authority to which it has been committed. It is a well known principle of law that when a power has been confided to a person in circumstances indicating that trust is being placed in his individual judgment and discretion, he must exercise that power personally unless he has been expressly empowered to delegate it to another. (Emphasis added) 10. A little further on, at the same page, desmith observed : "Special tribunals and public bodies exercising functions broadly analogous to the judicial are also precluded from delegating their powers of decision in the absence of express authority to that effect. But, as we have already seen, the courts will sometimes concede that a public body has an implied power to entrust a group of its own members with authority to investigate, to hear evidence and submissions and to make recommendations in a report, provided that (1) it retains the power of decision in its own hands and receives a report full enough to enable it to comply with its duty to hear before deciding, and (ii) the context does not indicate that it must perform the entire adjudicatory process itself (emphasis added)." 11. Wade on 'Administrative Law' (fourth edition) stated the principle thus at page 311 : "Since in practice Government demands a great deal of delegation, this has to be authorised by statute, either expressly or impliedly. Wade on 'Administrative Law' (fourth edition) stated the principle thus at page 311 : "Since in practice Government demands a great deal of delegation, this has to be authorised by statute, either expressly or impliedly. The whole of the committee system, as operated by local authorities, is dependent upon the powers of delegation conferred by statute, currently by the Local Government Act, 1972. This empowers local authorities to arrange for the discharge of any of their functions by committees, sub-committees or offices of the authority or by any other local .authority, or by acting jointly with other local authorities through joint committees, etc." 12. In Bombay Municipal Corporation v. Dhondu Narayan Chowdhary, AIR 1965 SC 1486 their Lordships observed that judicial powers cannot ordinarily be delegated unless the law expressly or by clear implication permits it. The view expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of Pradyot Kumar Bose v. Hon'ble Chief Justice of Calcutta High Court, AIR 1956 SC 285 at page 291, is also much the same. 13. The position which emerges out of the above authorities, to our mind, leads to the unmistakable conclusion that if the statute which confers power on an authority named by it itself either expressly or by necessary implication provides that the authority can delegate all or any of its functions and duties to any other committee or individual, no exception can be taken to the fact that the functions so delegated were exercised not by the authority specifically named in the statute but by his delegate. In this case we find that under S. 12 of the Adhiniyam, the Board has been specifically empowered to delegate, either unconditionally or subject to conditions, to any committee appointed by it or to the Housing Commissioner or any other officer of the Board such of its powers and duties under the Adhiniyam, as it may deem necessary. Section 12 reads thus : "12. Delegation of powers :- (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and the rules, the Board may by general or special order delegate, either unconditionally or subject to such conditions, including the conditions of review by itself, as may be specified in the order to any committee appointed by it or to the Housing Commissioner or any officer of the Board such of its powers and duties under this Act, as it may deem necessary. (2) Subject to the provisions of this Act and the rules, the Housing Commissioner may by general or special order delegate, either unconditionally or subject to such conditions including the condition of review by himself, as may be specified in the order, to any officer of the Board such of his powers and duties under this Act. not being powers and duties delegated to him under sub-s. (1), as he may deem ' necessary. 14. In view of S. 12, it cannot be argued with any validity that the Board which is a body corporate itself was obliged to hear personally the objectors or to record the evidence which they might choose to adduce in support of their objections. The Board consists of an Adhyaksh appointed by the State Government and a large number of other members, such as, the Secretary of the Finance Department, Government of Uttar Pradesh, ex officio, the Secretary, Housing Department. Government of Uttar Pradesh, ex officio, the Secretary, Local Self Government Department, Government of Uttar Pradesh, ex officio, the Chief Engineer, Town and Village Planning Department, Uttar Pradesh ex officio, the Managing Director, Uttar Pradesh Jal Nigam, Lucknow, ex officio, the Director, Central Building Research Institute, Roorkee, ex officio, the Housing Commissioner, ex officio, in addition to six non-official members, appointed by the State Government, of whom one shall be the Nagar Pramukh of a Nagar Mahapalika and two shall be the members of the State Legislature, one from each house. Housing schemes for the execution of which proceedings may be going on simultaneously in a number of districts involve consideration of objections running into thousands at each place. Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that the Legislature thought it necessary to arm the Board with the power of delegation of its various functions and duties as it would not have been reasonably practicable for the Board to hear each and every objector personally and to receive evidence in support of these numerous objections. 15. That being so, the broad argument that power to hear objections under S. 31 of the Adhiniyam was not delegable to the various Niyojan Samitis appointed by the Board for receiving evidence, consideration of objections and submitting their recommendations to the Board, is not acceptable to us and must be rejected. 16. Learned counsel for the petitioners. 15. That being so, the broad argument that power to hear objections under S. 31 of the Adhiniyam was not delegable to the various Niyojan Samitis appointed by the Board for receiving evidence, consideration of objections and submitting their recommendations to the Board, is not acceptable to us and must be rejected. 16. Learned counsel for the petitioners. however, placed reliance on two decisions (i) Jeffs v. New Zealand Dairy Production and Marketing Board, (1966) 3 All ER and (ii) Gullapali Nageswara Rao Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, AIR 1959 SC 308 (para 31), both of which are, in our opinion clearly distinguishable. In the case of Jeffs (supra) the findings on the facts of that case recorded by the Privy Council was that the duty to hear and consider the evidence under the enactment was that of the New Zealand Dairy Board. The Board had. however, entrusted the work to zoning committee consisting of three members of the Board to investigate the questions and to report back to the Board. On a consideration of the material on record, their Lordships of the Privy Council came to the conclusion that the Board had really not applied its mind to the evidence recorded in the case. In the present case, however, it cannot be said that the Board in passing the ultimate order of approving or modifying the scheme failed to consider the objections filed by the parties. In the counter affidavits filed by the Board in these cases it has been categorically asserted that it had approved the scheme after considering the entire record on the basis of which the Niyojan Samiti had made recommendations. 17. In any case, the vital difference between that case and the case in hand is that under the Dairy Board Act, the Board had. at the relevant time, ceased to have any power to delegate its functions. This was specifically stressed by the Privy Council at page 870. Their Lordships observed : Section 11 Dairy Board Act, 1953, gave the Dairy Board power to appoint committees of two or more persons and with the consent of the Minister to delegate to a committee any of the powers or functions of the Board other than the fixing of a levy. This section was repealed by the Act of 1961 and was replaced by S. 13 of that Act. This section was repealed by the Act of 1961 and was replaced by S. 13 of that Act. which gave the respondent Board power to appoint committees to advise it but no power to delegate." 18. In the case at hand, S. 12 of the Adhiniyam specifically confers the power of delegation on the Board. 19. The decision reported in Gullapalli Nageswara Rao, AIR 1959 SC 308 (supra) is equally distinguishable. There too there was no power of delegation vested in the authority under Sections 68C and 68D, Motor Vehicles Act. Further. under R. 10 framed thereunder, the authority was obliged to hear the objectors in person or through authorised representatives. For both these reasons. this decision is of no assistance. 20. Learned counsel for the petitioners, however. invited our attention to R. 4 of the Rules framed by the State Government under S. 92(2)(g) in which under the Schedule thereto a list of powers has been mentioned as non-delegable. One of the powers which have been made non -delegable by the Board is that of abandonment. modification or sanction of scheme under S. 31 of the Adhiniyam. 21. The above rule is of no assistance in resolving the controversy. All that has been made non-delegable by the Board is the ultimate power of abandoning, modifying or sanctioning of a scheme, none of which has been delegated by the Board to the Niyojan Samiti. The learned Standing Counsel appearing for the Board produced before us the original records containing the various resolutions by which the Board delegated its functions and duties to the Niyojan Samitis and from a perusal of the same it was apparent that the Board had not delegated its ultimate power to abandon. modify or sanction the scheme. 22. Further, in the counter-affidavits filed on behalf of the Board, it has been very categorically 'asserted that the Board had not delegated its ultimate function of abandoning. modifying or sanctioning the scheme. The resolutions passed by the Board delegating powers to various Niyojan Samitis constituted by it authorised them merely to receive evidence, consider the objections, give their decision on the objections and thereafter submit their recommendations thereon. The power of sanction of the scheme was, as asserted in the counter -affidavit, always retained by it. modifying or sanctioning the scheme. The resolutions passed by the Board delegating powers to various Niyojan Samitis constituted by it authorised them merely to receive evidence, consider the objections, give their decision on the objections and thereafter submit their recommendations thereon. The power of sanction of the scheme was, as asserted in the counter -affidavit, always retained by it. We do not agree that the power of approval of the scheme which was made non-delegable also took away from the Board the power expressly conferred upon it under S. 12 of delegating any of its duties and functions which include the function of receiving objections and hearing them and making its recommendations thereon to the Board. These duties and functions are clearly severable from the ultimate power of sanctioning or modifying the scheme, and are, even on general principles as enunciated by de Smith (vide the passages quoted hereinabove), delegable provided the ultimate decision that of sanctioning or abandoning the scheme is retained with the authority. That power the Board did not abdicate at any time. 23. The next submission of Shri S. P. Gupta challenging the Moradabad Scheme was that the scheme which the Board was seeking to execute under the Adhiniyam was published under S. 36, U.P. Town Improvement Act, before the Adhiniyam came into force at Moradabad. Objections were invited and filed under the U.P. Town Improvement Act. The Adhiniyam was applied to the area in question in 1967 and the scheme stood transferred for further execution to the Board under S. 97(3) of the Adhiniyam at the stage of consideration of those objections. Under the U.P. Town Improvement Act a scheme notified under S. 36 thereof also served as a notification under S. 4(?), Land Acquisition Act, for the purpose of acquisition in virtue of cl. (2) of the Schedule appended to the U.P. Town improvement Act under S. 58 thereof. With the repeal of the U.P. Town Improvement Act in 1967 upon the enforcement of the Adhiniyam in Moradabad. the clause of the aforesaid Schedule also stood repealed. With the result, it was urged, even though the Scheme framed under S. 36 could be contained under the Adhiniyam. its notification under S. 36 could no longer be deemed to be one issued under S. 4, Land Acquisition Act. That being so. the entire acquisition proceedings must be held to be null and void. 24. With the result, it was urged, even though the Scheme framed under S. 36 could be contained under the Adhiniyam. its notification under S. 36 could no longer be deemed to be one issued under S. 4, Land Acquisition Act. That being so. the entire acquisition proceedings must be held to be null and void. 24. We cannot agree. The argument ignores the true scope and intendment of S. 97(3) of the Adhiniyam which reads as follows : 97. Dissolution of Improvement Trust and its consequences. (1) and(2)... ... (3) Every scheme and all proceedings relating thereto under the U.P. Town Improvement Act, 1919 (U.P. Act VIII of 1919), including proceedings for the levy, assessment or recovery of betterment tax, pending on the appointed day shall stand transferred to the Board, which shall proceed further with the scheme or with the execution thereof or with the levy. assessment or recovery of betterment fee in connection therewith, from the stage at which it was transferred to it, in accordance with the corresponding provisions of this Act; Provided that the Board may, if it thinks fit, recall any step or proceeding already gone through under the said Act and take that step or proceeding afresh under the corresponding provision of this Act." 25. This provision clearly implies that the Board shall proceed further with the scheme or with the execution thereof from the stage at which it was transferred to it in accordance with the corresponding provisions of this Act. In the present case. it was not disputed by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the scheme had reached the stage which corresponded with the stage of S. 30 of the Adhiniyam and all that remained to be done was consideration of the objections under S. 31 of the Adhiniyam and the further steps which are contemplated thereunder. In our opinion, when the Legislature provided that the Board shall proceed further with the scheme from the stage at which it had reached when it was transferred to it. it clearly meant that all the previous stages contemplated under the Adhiniyam up to the stage of the transfer of the scheme have been crossed in accordance with the scheme of the Adhiniyam. it clearly meant that all the previous stages contemplated under the Adhiniyam up to the stage of the transfer of the scheme have been crossed in accordance with the scheme of the Adhiniyam. The legislative intent behind .S. 97(3) clearly seems to be that there would be no repetition of the stages which the scheme has already crossed under the Town Improvement Act, which means that where a scheme has already been framed and published under S. 36. Town Improvement Act serving also the purpose of a notification under S. 4, Acquisition Act, the Board shall proceed further with the execution thereof on premise that a notification under S. 28 with all its implications has already been duly issued under the Adhiniyam. This is clearly stressed by the legislative mandate evidenced by the words "which shall proceed further with the scheme or with the execution thereof.... from the stage at which it was transferred to it in accordance with the corresponding provisions of this Act....." occurring in section 07(3). 26. In this connection, learned counsel placing reliance on a recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court reported in Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, Bangalore v. B.A. Jayaram, AIR 1984 SC 790 submitted that the legal fiction created under cl. (2) of the schedule could not be extended further so as to equate a notification issued under S. 36, Town Improvement Act also with a notification under S. 4. Land Acquisition Act. We have already given reasons for rejecting this argument in the immediately preceding para. The argument of Sri Gupta completely ignores S. 97(3). The conclusion which we have reached is the result of a combined reading of S. 97(2) read with cl. (2) of the Schedule. We cannot read cl.(2) of the Schedule divorced from S. 97(3) and the legislative scheme unmistakably reflected by it. It is not as though we are extending the legitimate field created by the legal fiction incorporated under cl. (2) of the Schedule. It is section 97 of the Adhiniyam an understanding of the true scope and the purpose of which leads to the inference reached by us. As for the decision cited by the learned counsel the same is clearly distinguishable. There the scope of S. 57(8). Motor Vehicles Act. was up for consideration. (2) of the Schedule. It is section 97 of the Adhiniyam an understanding of the true scope and the purpose of which leads to the inference reached by us. As for the decision cited by the learned counsel the same is clearly distinguishable. There the scope of S. 57(8). Motor Vehicles Act. was up for consideration. Their Lordships held that in the first place the phraseology of the provision is not that which is usually employed by the legislature for creating a legal fiction. Secondly. their Lordships analysed the purpose of S. 58(8) and came to the conclusion that the Scheme of S. 57 showed that the legislative intent by using the words "shall be treated as an application for the grant of a new permit" merely was that the procedure in regard to an application under S. 57(8) would be the same as laid down under sub-ss. (3) to (7) of S. 57. Their Lordships applied the famous dictum of Lord James in Ex Parte Walton, In re : Levy, (1881) 17 Ch D 746, 748, 756 CA : "When a statute enacts that something shall be deemed to have been done, which in fact and in truth was not done. the Court is entitled and bound to ascertain for what purposes and between what persons the statutory fiction is to be resorted to." This precisely has been our approach, namely, to ascertain and give effect to the purpose behind S. 97(3) as well as cl. (2) to the Schedule. This decision, therefore, far from supporting the petitioner's contention fortifies the view which we have been persuaded to take. 27. Learned counsel in the various petitions also submitted that under S. 23, Land Acquisition Act, the compensation payable to the petitioners is to be calculated on the basis of the market value of the property as on the date of publication of notification under S. 4, Land Acquisition Act, which means S. 28 of the Adhiniyam, in the instant case. whereas more than eight years have since elapsed because of the delay in publication of the notification under S. 32. During this period the market value has appreciated considerably and. consequently, the compensation payable to the petitioners becomes wholly unrealistic, illusory and expropriatory in nature. 28. whereas more than eight years have since elapsed because of the delay in publication of the notification under S. 32. During this period the market value has appreciated considerably and. consequently, the compensation payable to the petitioners becomes wholly unrealistic, illusory and expropriatory in nature. 28. This point need not detain us in view of the fact that the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the Board produced before us during the arguments 'a resolution passed by the Board on 24-3-1984 to the effect that the Board had decided to make an ex-gratia enjoyment in all those cases where the notification under S. 28(1) was published more than 8 years ago. In all these petitions, more than 8 years shall have elapsed since the publication of notification under S. 28(1) by the time possession is taken by the Board. In this view, the point urged by the petitioners need not be considered on merits as the resolution of the Board sufficiently safeguards the interests of the petitioners. We. however, make it clear that we should not be taken to have expressed any opinion, either way, on the merits of this contention. 29. Sri S. P. Gupta also submitted in regard to the Moradabad Scheme that the Adhiniyam was enforced there in 1967, whereas the resolution by which Niyojan Samiti was authorised to hear objections was passed by the Board on 27-8-1966. It was urged that any resolution passed prior to enforcement of the Adhiniyam could not constitute a valid delegation under S. 12(1) of the Adhiniyam. 30. The argument is devoid of any merit. The original resolution of the Board dated 27-8-1966 was produced before us. By this resolution the Board constituted a Niyojan Samiti (Planning & Development Committee) consisting of the Housing Commissioner as the Chairman, : the Chief Engineer, Local Self Government, : the Chief Engineer, Town and Country Planning, U.P. and two non-official members to be selected by the Board from among its non-official members. This Committee was authorised by the said resolution to consider any objections under Sections 28 and 30 of the Adhiniyam, hear the objectors and submit to the Board the scheme together with its recommendations as regards whether the scheme should be abandoned or sanctioned. The Niyojan Samiti was to perform these functions for all the districts and for all the schemes within the State. The Niyojan Samiti was to perform these functions for all the districts and for all the schemes within the State. It was, in our opinion, clearly competent to the Board to constitute such a committee for the entire State and from the mere fact that the Adhiniyam happened to be applied to Moradabad subsequently could not, in our opinion, affect the validity, of the delegation in favour of the Adhiniyam. 31. In any case, finding that the Niyojan Samiti could not effectively perform its functions in every housing and improvement scheme in the State, hear objections by moving from place to place and further finding that the official members were not always easily available, the Board passed another resolution on 4-12-1973 constituting three Niyojan Samitis to perform the aforesaid functions in various districts. Under that resolution the Niyojan Samiti constituted for the western region was authorised to perform the aforesaid functions including local inspections, hearing objections, giving their decisions thereon and thereafter submitting their recommendations for the consideration of the Board. Among the fourteen districts falling under this region Moradabad is also one. We, therefore, find no merit in the contention that there was no validly authorised Niyojan Samiti for the Moradabad Scheme. We may further observe that in the writ petitions there was no challenge to the fact that the Board had delegated its function of hearing the objections to the Niyojan Samiti. The only contention of the petitioners in this behalf was that the Board had no jurisdiction to delegate its function or duty of hearing objection under S. 31 of the Adhiniyam to the Niyojan Samiti, an argument which we have already dealt with and negatived. 32. Sri S. P. Gupta next argued that there is nothing on the record to show that the objections were also considered by the Board. This argument has no merit. In the writ petitions there is no assertion or challenge that the Board approved the scheme without considering the record of the various objections or without applying its mind to the recommendation of the Niyojan Samiti and the material on which the same was based. Under the resolution of the Board authorising these Niyojan Samitis the latter were required to submit their recommendations as well as decisions taken by them. Under the resolution of the Board authorising these Niyojan Samitis the latter were required to submit their recommendations as well as decisions taken by them. In the various counter affidavits which have been filed on behalf of the Board, it has been asserted that it had duly considered the recommendations of the Niyojan Samiti as well as the material on the record and thereafter it referred the scheme to the State Government for approval, the cost of the scheme exceeding Rs. 20 lacs (see para 20 of the counter affidavit of Inamul Haq filed in writ petition No. 1171 of 1980 along with an application D/- 23-4-1980 for vacating the interim order D/- 5-2-1980). 33. In regard to the schemes Nos.1 and II of Kanpur, learned counsel submitted that the area which was sought to be acquired and over which the schemes are being sought to be enforced fall within the city of Kanpur in which, according to the learned counsel, the Adhiniyam had not been enforced. We find no merit in this contention either. In exercise of the powers under sub-s. (3) of S. 1 of the Adhiniyam, the Governor of Uttar Pradesh issued a notification stating that the Adhiniyam, shall apply with effect from 1-4-1966 to the cities of Kanpur, Allahabad. Varanasi, Agra and Lucknow as constituted under S. 3 of the U.P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, 1959. Learned counsel, however, placed reliance on a notification issued under sub-s. (3) of S. 1 of the Adhiniyam published in the gazette on 25-10-1969 by which the Adhiniyam was enforced with effect from 20-10-1969 to such areas of Kanpur, Agra, Varanasi, Allahabad and Lucknow as are declared as regulated areas under sub-s. (1) of S. 3, U.P. Regulation of Building Operation Act, 1958, "but not falling within the limits of the abovementioned cities declared as such under S. 3, U.P. Mahapalika Adhiniyam, 1959." Learned counsel . particularly stressed the above quoted portion of the notification and argued that the city of Kanpur has been specifically excepted from the operation of the Adhiniyam. 34. The submission is entirely untenable. The notification issued on 25-10-1969 did not rescind, the notification already issued earlier on 1-4-1966 by which the Adhiniyam was made specifically applicable to the city of Kanpur among others. By the 1969 notification the operation of the Adhiniyam was extended further to the areas outside the limits of the abovementioned cities. 34. The submission is entirely untenable. The notification issued on 25-10-1969 did not rescind, the notification already issued earlier on 1-4-1966 by which the Adhiniyam was made specifically applicable to the city of Kanpur among others. By the 1969 notification the operation of the Adhiniyam was extended further to the areas outside the limits of the abovementioned cities. At the relevant time, therefore, the Adhiniyam was fully applicable to the city of Kanpur within which the aforesaid two schemes have been enforced. 35. In writ petition No. 6784 of 1979 pertaining to the Moradabad Scheme, in addition to the other submissions considered hereinabove, Sri S. P. Gupta argued another point. It was urged that though in the scheme as framed under S. 36, U.P. Town Area Act (corresponding with S. 28 of the Adhiniyam), the whole of plot No. 308 measuring 3.64 acres was included. From a letter D/- June 25, 1977 addressed by the Assistant Engineer of the Board at Moradabad to the prescribed Authority, Urban Land Demarcation,' Moradabad, it was apparent that only an area of 1.2 acres was decided to be .acquired which meant that the rest of the area of the said plot was left out or abandoned from the scheme ultimately approved by the Board. In support of this submission learned counsel also invited our attention to the assertions made by the petitioner in paras 27. 28 and 29 of the writ petition in which it has been alleged that after the Parishad took possession over one acre of land on 6-3-1974 nothing further was done which further corroborated the fact that the Board had decided to abandon the remaining 2.44 acres out of the Total area of 3.64 acres of plot No. 308. However, despite the aforesaid letter, the Board was now threatening to take possession over the remaining 2.44 acres also which is wholly unauthorised and illegal. 36. We find it difficult to accept the above argument. In the letter referred to above, the Assistant Engineer has no doubt mentioned that out of the total area of plot No. 308 i.e. 1.20 acres (which fact is admittedly wrong), the Board had been able to take possession of only one acre of land on 6-3-1974 and that over the rest of the .20 acre the Board has not been able to take possession on account of some buildings standing thereon. In our opinion, this letter can be neither conclusive nor helpful in determining whether any part of the plot was later left out of the scheme. 37. In paras 16, 17 and 18 of the counter affidavit which has been filed on behalf of the Board, it has been categorically stated that the whole of plot No. 308 having an area of 3.64 acres was included in the scheme and was duly acquired. However, possession was taken over one acre on June 3, 1974 and over another area measuring 1.86 acres on 1-11-1979. It has also been stated that on plot No. 308 the Board has already constructed a room for storing its building materials, etc. It is clear from the assertions made in the counter affidavit that the Board has not abandoned or excluded any area out of plot No: 308 from the scheme at any stage. In any case, the letter of the Assistant Engineer by itself cannot indicate that the Board had abandoned any portion of plot No. 308 at any stage. Apart from this letter, there is no other resolution or order which may show that any part of plot No. 308 was later dropped from the scheme. 38. We will now consider another submission which was raised in respect of the two schemes of Kanpur. In writ petition No. 6067 of 1981. it was alleged that no opportunity of hearing was afforded to the petitioner by the Board or Niyojan Samiti. It was alleged in para 15 of the petition that no personal notices were given to the petitioner and that the petitioner came to know of the date fixed for consideration of the objections, namely, 16 and 17-1-1980 only through the newspaper 'Dainik Jagran' D/- 16-1-1980 as a result of which the petitioner was deprived of the opportunity contemplated under S. 31(1) of the Adhiniyam. 39. The argument is completely devoid of any substance. In paras 14 and 15 of the counter affidavit of Rameshwar Prasad filed on behalf of the Board it has been very categorically stated that the petitioner was afforded full opportunity under S. 31(2) by the Niyojan Samiti and that in response to the said notice the petitioners' representative actually appeared before the Niyojan Samiti and was heard by the Samiti personally. These assertions have not been denied by the petitioner. These assertions have not been denied by the petitioner. Indeed no rejoinder affidavit was filed denying those categorical assertions made in the counter affidavit. In addition to what has been stated in the counter affidavit, learned counsel for the Board also produced before us the original record of the proceedings which established that the petitioner's husband appeared before the Niyojan Samiti on 16th and he was heard in support of the objections which were also filed by the petitioner's husband as holder of a power of attorney from the petitioner. 40. In the other cases of these two schemes also, we examined affidavits filed by the parties and it is established beyond doubt that in response to the notices issued to the affected persons identical objections were filed by everyone and the petitioners actually appeared on January 16 and 17 before the Niyojan Samiti and made their submissions. The assertions made in these objections were completely identical. Having appeared before the Niyojan Samiti in response to the notices issued to them the petitioners cannot be heard to say that they had no notice of the date fixed for the consideration of these objections or that they were not afforded any opportunity. 41. The newspaper in which the notice was published was produced before us. The notice states that the objections will be heard on January 16 and 17 in regard to which prior intimation had already been sent to the affected persons. Further in the counter affidavit it has also been stated that notice was also given by beat of drum. 42. On the material brought on record by the parties we are fully satisfied that the plea of the petitioners that they were not afforded any opportunity of hearing by the Niyojan Samiti is wholly without any basis. 43. The petitioners also submitted that their objections were never placed before the Board and all that the Board had before it was the recommendation of the Niyojan Samiti. This submission again has no basis in fact. 43. The petitioners also submitted that their objections were never placed before the Board and all that the Board had before it was the recommendation of the Niyojan Samiti. This submission again has no basis in fact. In the counter affidavits filed both on behalf of the Board as well as the Government in this bunch of petitions it has been clearly asserted that the objections were considered by the Niyojan Samiti and thereafter the entire scheme along with the relevant record was submitted to the Board for its approval and the Board on a consideration of the entire material approved the schemes. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Government also it has been asserted that even the Government also considered the entire material before according sanction to the scheme submitted by the Board for its approval under S. 31(2). 43A. Having carefully considered the material on the record, we are clearly of the opinion that the contention raised in regard to the various other schemes as well that the Board did not apply its mind to the objections heard by the Niyojan Samiti and submitted to the Board with its recommendation or decision has no substance and remained unsubstantiated. In the counter affidavits filed on behalf of the Board in respect of each of the schemes the validity of which is being considered by us it has been asserted that the entire record containing the objections. the decision of the Niyojan Samitis as well as their recommendations were all considered by the Board before it approved the same and this is true not only of the two schemes of Kanpur but of the other schemes as well in respect of which this bunch of petitions has been filed. 44. In respect of the Pandeypur Housing Scheme of Varanasi. Sri Aditya Narain Singh submitted that there was nothing to indicate that the Niyojan Samiti has heard the petitioners. The submission is without any merit. In para 6 of the counter affidavit filed in Writ Petition No.9390 of 1981 it has been stated that notices were issued to the petitioners and they were duly informed that their objections would be heard by the Niyojan -Samiti on 28-8-1978 at 11 A.M. at the Circuit House, Varanasi, and that it was incorrect that the petitioners were not afforded personal hearing on that date by the Niyojan Samiti. It is also stated that the petitioner Chhedilal appeared in person before the Niyojan Samiti when the objections were heard. In Para 7 of the counter affidavit again it has been reiterated that apart from giving individual notices the date of hearing was also notified in the newspapers and by beat of drum and in pursuance of the same the Niyojan Samiti heard the objections of the petitioners on 28-8-1978 and, after considering the objections of the petitioners. it submitted its recommendations which included a recommendation that the pucca constructed buildings which were standing on the date of hearing he exempted from the scheme. 45. The next submission of Sri Aditya Narain Singh was that some of the petitioners had made constructions prior to the framing of the scheme as notified either under the Adhiniyam or its predecessor enactments and that the same could not he legally acquired by the respondents. In the counter affidavit which has been filed on behalf of the Board it has been stated that apart from some pucca constructions standing over some plots with regard to which the Niyojan Samiti had made its recommendations for exemption, no other pucca constructions on any of the plots of the petitioners were standing at the time of the issuance of the notifications under S. 28. It is asserted that the constructions were raised by the petitioners after the issue of notification under S. 28 of the Adhiniyam and were hence not liable to be exempted. 46. The above is a highly disputed question of fact on which, on the material existing on the record of these cases, it is not possible to give any finding either way -in these proceedings. This is a question which may be considered either by the acquiring authorities themselves or by any court or authority which may be legally competent to consider such objections. In any case, this being a highly disputed question of fact no relief could be granted to the petitioners in these proceedings. 47. Sri K. N. Tripathi appearing in some of - the petitions challenging the validity of the Bhelupura Scheme of Kanpur made two submissions. His first submission was that the Nagar Mahapalika had by a resolution decided not to acquire the land falling in zone No. ll. The Scheme will, therefore, be deemed to have been abandoned in respect thereof. At any rate. His first submission was that the Nagar Mahapalika had by a resolution decided not to acquire the land falling in zone No. ll. The Scheme will, therefore, be deemed to have been abandoned in respect thereof. At any rate. in view of that resolution it is not open to the respondents to acquire the petitioners' land under the Adhiniyam. 48. We find no merit in the above contention. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents stating that the above resolution of the Nagar Mahapalika was subsequently rescinded and that, at any rate, the same could not bar the Board from proceeding according to law under the Adhiniyam in respect of the scheme which was transferred to it under the Adhiniyam for further execution. Further. even on facts. we are not satisfied that the petitioners were entitled to the benefit of the resolution of the Nagar Mahapalika relied on by them. The affidavit which was filed along with the amendment application on this part of the controversy is completely vague and' unreliable. 49. The second argument was equally devoid of merit. It was urged that the Board had. while submitting its proposals to the State Government, abandoned some portions of land which were shown in the scheme as originally framed and consequently the impugned notifications were hit by Article 14 of the Constitution. On this point again, we find that the averments are entirely vague. No particulars have been supplied by the petitioners to enable this court to entertain such a plea. It is open to the Board while taking a decision under S. 31 to abandon any part of the scheme or modify it for good and proper reasons and unless it is established that there has been any discrimination, no exception could be taken to part of the original area mentioned in the scheme being left out by the Board from the scheme. 50. Finally, it was feebly urged in Writ Petition No. 12320 of 1982 that the Government had taken a policy decision to leave out small tenure-holders while enforcing the Adhiniyam in any area. That being so, it was urged that the petitioners' land which is very shall ought to have been left out by the Board. This submission, however, could not be substantiated by the learned counsel. That being so, it was urged that the petitioners' land which is very shall ought to have been left out by the Board. This submission, however, could not be substantiated by the learned counsel. He placed reliance on annexure 2 to the writ petition which does not, in our opinion, lay down any such policy decision. 51. The above discussion exhausts all the points which were urged in the various petitions which are being disposed of by this judgment. No other point was urged by the learned counsel in these cases. 52. In the result, the petitions fail and are dismissed. We. however, make no order as to costs. The interim orders passed in these petitions are hereby vacated.