V. D. GYANI, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner Bank by this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, challenges the orders passed by the respondents, being Annexures 9, 8 and 5 to the petition and further prays for issuance of a writ of Certiorari quashing the proceeding as a whole. ( 2 ) BRIEF facts necessary for disposal of this petition are that the petitioner is a Co operative Bank, deemed to have been registered under the M. P, Co-operative societies Act, 1960. Respondent No. 5 an employee of the Bank was initially appointed on the post of a Samiti Sevak and eventually promoted to the post of a supervisor. As his conduct and work was not found to be satisfactory, his services were terminated by the petitioner vide Resolution date 9-8-1976. Respondent No. 5 was paid three months pay in lieu of three months notice as per rule 18 of the Service Rules framed by the Registrar, Co-operative societies M. P. under Sec. 55 (1) of the M. P. Co-operative Societies Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). Against the said order of termination of service respondent No. 5 filed a dispute under Sec. 5 (2) of the Act before the Registrar, Co-operative Societies, M. P. Bhopal on 7-12-1976 who is appointed respondent No- 440 decide the dispute under Sec. 55 (2) of the Act. The dispute was registered as Case No. 2 of 1977. ( 3 ) THE petitioner rai ed a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the dispute and by order dated 9-7-1977 the objection was upheld and the dispute was dismissed. Thereafter respondent No. 5 preferred as appeal, which was allowed by that Joint Registrar, who remanded the case to the Deputy registrar for disposal in accordance with law. ( 4 ) IT is at this stage that a crucial situation, which goes to the root of these proceedings, arises. Respondent No. 3 the Deputy Registrar fixed 30-3-1979 as the date of hearing and the notice. For this date was served on the petitioner bank on 30-3-79 at 3. ( 4 ) IT is at this stage that a crucial situation, which goes to the root of these proceedings, arises. Respondent No. 3 the Deputy Registrar fixed 30-3-1979 as the date of hearing and the notice. For this date was served on the petitioner bank on 30-3-79 at 3. 40 P. M. and this fact about service or notice, has not been disputed by the respondents and in view of this undisputed fact question that falls for consideration in this petition is whether respondent No. 3 was justified in proceeding ex-parte on 11-4 1979 when the case was adjourned to this date on 30-3-1979. As the proceedings have continued ex-parte, naturally the objections which could have been raised, were raised by the petitioner by a latter stage when the final o> der was passed. Therefore, it cannot be said that objections raised by the petitioner in this petition were not raised by the petitioner-Bank at the earliest stage of the proceedings. The contention raised by Shri sethi learned counsel for the respondent No. 5 in this behalf therefore, fails and is accordingly rejected. ( 5 ) RESPONDENT No. 3 by order dated 25. 5-1979 quashed the termination order and directed reinstatement of respondent 5, but without back wages. This order is filed by the petitioner as Annexure 5 to the petition. The petitioner reinstated respondent 5, who joined the service on 18. 6. 1979 on no work no pay basis, vide order dated 18. 6. 1979. Respondent No. 5 preferred on appeal against the order, Annexure-5. This appeal was numbered as 246 of 1979. The Petitioner-Bank on receipt of notice of this appeal on 15. 2. 1980, filed cross-objections under O. 41, R. 22 read with Sec. 67 of the Act. Objections relating to limitation and maintainability of the dispute were raised in these cross-objections as well : "the petitioner Bank contended that the termination order was passed on 13. 10. 1976 and was also served on the Respondent No. 5 on the same day while the Respondent No. 5 filed the dispute before the Registrar, Co-operative Societies, M. P. on 7. 12. 1976, which was clearly barred by time by 25 days and, therefore, could not be entertained, the Registrar, as provided by Section 55 of the said Act. " ( 6 ) THE respondent No. 2, vide judgment dated 1. 12. 1976, which was clearly barred by time by 25 days and, therefore, could not be entertained, the Registrar, as provided by Section 55 of the said Act. " ( 6 ) THE respondent No. 2, vide judgment dated 1. 10,1981, maintained the order passed by respondent No. 3. This order is filed as Annexure-8 to the petition. It was also held by him that the dispute was filed beyond the prescribed time but he condoned the delay without there being any application or affidavit for the purpose. Against this order both the petitioner as well as respondent No. 5 preferred appeals before the respondent No. 1, who by judgment dated 4. 1. 1983, allowed the respondent No. 5's appeal and awarded him full wages from the date of termination till the date of rainstatement. Needless to add, the petitioners' appeal was dismissed. The judgment of respondent no. 1 has been filed as Aunexure-9 to the petition. ( 7 ) NOW, in this petition the points which arise for consideration are (1) whether the dispute was filed in time (2) whether respondents 3 and 4 had jurisdiction to entertain the dispute, which was apparently barred by time and as such time be condoned by the respondents, and (3) whether the order dated 11. 9. 1979, proceeding ex-parte, was legal and proper. Before proceeding to deal with these points it would be pertinent to note that the facts stated above are not in dispute. ( 8 ) SHRI Sethi, learned counsel for respondent No. 5 does not dispute the proposition that presentation of dispute by post is not permissible under the rules. In view of this undisputed legal position, even Annexure-R 3, which is a communication to the counsel for respondent No. 5, from the Superintendent, registrar's office, to which attention was invited by the learned counsel for respondent No. 6, is of no avail to him, apart from the suspicious nature of this document. It is of no use in view of the fact that Rules do not permit such presentation of a dispute by post. ( 9 ) SHRI Sethi contended that Section 65 (3) of the Act empowers the registrar to condone any delay in the matter of presentation and this discretion exercised by the respondents should not be interfend ed with in the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court. ( 9 ) SHRI Sethi contended that Section 65 (3) of the Act empowers the registrar to condone any delay in the matter of presentation and this discretion exercised by the respondents should not be interfend ed with in the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court. ( 10 ) SHRI Chaphokar, learned counsel for the petitioner on the other hand contends that so far as Sec. 55 of the Act is concerned, such power of condonation is not vested and Sec, 65 (3) of the Act cannot be construed so as to cover a dispute relating to a service matter. On correct interpretation Shri Chaphokars contention deserves to be unheld. Section 65 lalls under Chapter VII, which is captined as 'disputes and Arbitration. ' Thus, it is clear that the dispute contemplated by Sec. 65 (3) is one, which is covered by Section 64 of the Act, this position becomes demonstrably clear by reading sub-section (3) of Sec. 63 in just a position with sub-section (1) of Sec. 65 of the Act. A comparative reading of Sec. 55 and the proviso to sub-section (2) thereof would show that the period prescribed for a dispute regarding disciplinary action taken by a society is 30 days. It is a settled principle of interpretation of statutes that a proviso to a section merely carves out and exception to what has been generally provided in the body of the Section itself. Sub-section (3) of Sec. 65 has, therefore, no application to the instant case. On facts, as established, the presentation of the dispute by respondent No. 5, was apparenly barred by time. It is further held that the respondents 2 and 3 have no powers under the Act to condone the delay in presentation of a dispute, contemplated by sec 55 of the Act. In the instant case there was no application or affidavit in this behalf. Thus, respondents 1 and 2 arrogated to themselves the power of condonation of delay, which has not been conferred on them by the Act itself. ( 11 ) THE Second submission made by Shri Chaphekar learned counsel for the petitioner is that there was no notice to the petitioner and the ex-pane order dated 11. 4. 1979, passed by respondent No. 3 was wholly unjustified. Shri Sethi, on the other hand, contend that as admitted by the petitioner, the notice was served at 3. ( 11 ) THE Second submission made by Shri Chaphekar learned counsel for the petitioner is that there was no notice to the petitioner and the ex-pane order dated 11. 4. 1979, passed by respondent No. 3 was wholly unjustified. Shri Sethi, on the other hand, contend that as admitted by the petitioner, the notice was served at 3. 40 p m. on 30-3-1979 and the petitioner could have appeared before the respondent No. 3 at Indore, if so desired. It does not stand to reason that the service of a notice on the date of hearing at 3. 40 p. m. would be considered to be a service of notice in law so as to enable any party to appear before the court or authority on that very day, even if it is a matter of appearing in the same town or city. In the instant case the petitioner was served at Dhar and naturally it cannot be expected that appearance could have been made during the office-hours. There is absolutely no material on record to show as to what prompted respondent No. 3 to proceed ex-parte on 11. 4. 1979 and before passing such as order to proceed ex-parte. It was incumbent upon respondent no. 3 to satisfy itself about the service, and the order passed on 11. 4. 1979 by proceeding ex-parte can in no circumstance be allowed to stand. In his view of the matter, the subsequent proceedings continued ex-parte cannot also be said to be valid. ( 12 ) THE fundamental principle of natural justice has the party proceeded against must have an opportunity of being heard and this opportunity of enjoined by principles of natural justice is not an empty formality, it has to be meaningful opportunity before it can be said that the proceedings were in accordance with the principles of natural justice. The hasty decision on the part of the respondent No. 3 to proceed ex-parte suffers from violation of the principles of natural justice. ( 13 ) THE proceedings has had a chequered career and the delay, if any, is solely attributable to respondents 3 and 2 who in their haste have not bothered to follow the principles on natural justice and have also overlooked the salient provision of law as regards limitation. ( 13 ) THE proceedings has had a chequered career and the delay, if any, is solely attributable to respondents 3 and 2 who in their haste have not bothered to follow the principles on natural justice and have also overlooked the salient provision of law as regards limitation. The petitioner having been deprived of as available opportunity to place its objection before the respondents and the wrong assumption of powers in the matter of condonation of delay in present of the dispute a power not conformed by a statute the orders, Annexures 5, 8 and 9, deserve to be quashed. But it would again involve hardship to respondent no. 5, therefore, this Court called upon the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and respondent No. 5 to come to an agreeable via-media and it should be said to the credit of the petitioner's counsel that he has agreed to such a proposal that instead of quashing the proceedings as a whole, which would ultimately result in throwing respondent No. 3 cut of employment, even if proceedings are directed to continue from 11-4-19/9 onward, when the ex-parte order was passed by the respondent No. 3 the learned counsel agreed that in fact of the apparent bar of limitation, the dispute presented by respondent no. 5 calls for a summary dismissal in face of the petitioner's objection. That would again result in untold hardship to respondent No. 5, who will have to suffer because of the hasty action on the part of respondents 2 and 3. It is directed that even without any further inquiry other the proceedings dated 11. 4. 1979 would be disastrous in so far as respondent No. 5 is concerned, who has by now put in about more than five years service after his reinstatement and it would hit him hard. So to avoid such a situation it is only Annexure-9 which is quashed as a whole, i. e. awarding back wages awarded by respondent no. 1 is quashed. The orders, so far as they relate to reinstatement shall remain in force. ( 14 ) IN view of the discussion and the legal position that emerges the orders, Annexures 5 and 9 are liable to be quashed as a whole. 1 is quashed. The orders, so far as they relate to reinstatement shall remain in force. ( 14 ) IN view of the discussion and the legal position that emerges the orders, Annexures 5 and 9 are liable to be quashed as a whole. However taking into consideration the chequered history of this case involving service career of a young man, would be jeo-pardise if the legal position emerging on ultimate analysis is given eifect to, it is only Annexure-9, the order passed by the Revenue board, which is quashed as a whole and that order Aanexure-8. is allowed to stand. The net effect is that the respondent No. i shall be entitled to only reinstatement and not back wages. ( 15 ) IN the result, this petition is partly allowed, as indicated above. However, there shall be no order to costs of this petition. The outstanding amount of the security deposit after verification, if any, shall be refunded to the petitioner. Petition partly allowed. .