JUDGMENT K.C. Agarwal, J. - This second appeal has been preferred by Smt. Jamuna Kunwar against the judgment of the Second Temporary Civil and Sessions Judge, Fatehpur, dated 22-11-67 allowing the plaintiffs appeal and decreeing the suit for return of Rs. 3400/- as sale consideration with interest. 2. The facts of the suit are these. The plaintiff Santosh Kumar came to the court with the allegation that the defendant Smt. Jamuna Kunwar claiming herself to be Bhumidhar of the plots, mentioned in Schedules A and B attached to the plaint, sold them to the plaintiff under two sale deeds. Plots of Schedule A were sold on 18-2-1960 for Rs. 2400/- whereas the plots shown in Schedule B were sold for Rs. 1000/- on 5-5-60 in his favour. After having purchased these plots, the plaintiff filed an application for mutation of his name before the Assistant Consolidation Officer, which was contested by Smt Jamuna Kunwar on the ground that the property sold under the two sale deeds belonged to Thakur Balramji Maharaj, and as such, the plaintiff had derived no title under the sale deeds. The Assistant Consolidation Officer upheld the plea of Smt. Jamuna Kunwar and refused to mutate the name of the plaintiff. Thereupon, the plaintiff brought the suit giving rise to the present appeal, for the refund of Rs. 3400/- paid as consideration under the two sale deeds, mentioned above. 3. The suit was contested by Smt. Jamuna Kunwar on a number of pleas. One of the pleas was that Shambhu Dayal, father of the minor plaintiff, was related to the defendant and that taking advantage of the old age and close relationship, he misrepresented the facts and by obtaining the signatures on blank papers on a false pretext be had converted them into sale deeds. The defendant asserted that she had not executed any sale deed in favour of the plaintiff, and, as such, she was not liable to refund any amount. She asserted that she had not received any consideration under the two sale deeds. 4. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned Munsif framed five issues. He held that the defendant Smt. Jamuna Kunwar did not execute the sale deeds in question, and that the same were not enforceable against her. He also found that Smt. Jamuna Kunwar had not received any consideration as mentioned in the sale deeds. 4. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned Munsif framed five issues. He held that the defendant Smt. Jamuna Kunwar did not execute the sale deeds in question, and that the same were not enforceable against her. He also found that Smt. Jamuna Kunwar had not received any consideration as mentioned in the sale deeds. On the findings arrived at by him the learned Munsif dismissed the suit, against which the plaintiff went up in appeal which came to be decided by the II-Temporary Civil and Sessions Judge, who by the impugned judgment allowed the appeal, set aside the decree of the trial court, and decreed the suit. Being aggrieved, the defendant Smt. Jamuna Kunwar has filed the present second appeal. She died during the pendency of the appeal in this court and thereupon her heirs and legal representatives were substituted. 5. The lower appellate court allowed the appeal, inter alia, on the finding that as the plaintiff did not seek to enforce the sale deeds alleged to have been executed by the defendant Smt. Jamuna Kunwar, the principle applicable to the case of proof by a purchaser in a matter of Pardanasheen and illiterate lady could not be applied. He also found that as there was an endorsement of the Sub-Registrar on the back of the sale deeds, there was a presumption of the execution. 6. Both of these grounds given by the lower appellate court are incorrect and legally unsound. The lower appellate court did not set aside the finding of the trial court that the defendant was about 82 years of age and was illiterate. The relationship between the defendant and the plaintiffs father and the fact that the plaintiffs father Shambhu Dayal had been looking after her work in court have also not been found to be incorrect. It is the background of these facts that the question raised before the lower appellate court has to be decided. 7. Before dealing with this controversy, I consider it appropriate to decide the conclusiveness of the endorsements made on the sale deeds. The lower appellate court appears to have relied on the Registration Act Section 60 does lay down a prima facie presumption in favour of the correctness of the endorsement on a registered document. 7. Before dealing with this controversy, I consider it appropriate to decide the conclusiveness of the endorsements made on the sale deeds. The lower appellate court appears to have relied on the Registration Act Section 60 does lay down a prima facie presumption in favour of the correctness of the endorsement on a registered document. But, that presumption would not preclude the person claimed to be bound by it from challenging its genuineness, in the instant case, execution of the documents was being challenged by Smt. Jamuna Kunwar on the basis that she had not executed the sale deeds, which was the basis for the return of the consideration. Her case was that signatures had been obtained by Shambhu Dayal, father of the plaintiff, by misrepresentation. In case these facts were found established, the endorsements made on the sale deeds would not preclude her from setting up the defence of illiteracy, misrepresentation and undue influence. 8. At this place it may be noticed that the finding of the trial court that the plaintiff was an old lady of about 82 years and was illiterate, has not been set aside by the lower appellate court. To prove this fact, she was examined on commission. The plaintiff examined his father Shambhu Dayal alone who stated that the two sale deeds were executed by Smt. Jamuna Kunwar and the sale deeds were read over and explained to her. It was after having understood the contents of the sale deeds that she put her thumb impressions on the same. He further stated that the amounts mentioned in the sale deeds had been paid to her. In the cross-examination, he admitted that in a suit between the defendant Smt, Jamuna Kunwar and her son she made a statement that he was the Muktar-i-am of the defendant and later on he filed an affidavit on her behalf in criminal proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P. C. The copy of the affidavit filed by Shambu Dayal mentioned that the defendant Smt. Jamuna Kunwar was about 100 years of age and her mental condition was very bad. 9. From these facts, the learned Munsif had concluded that Smt. Jamuna Kunwar was an infirm, illiterate and a Pardanasheen lady, and that the burden to prove that the sale deeds had been executed by her after understanding them was on the plaintiff. 9. From these facts, the learned Munsif had concluded that Smt. Jamuna Kunwar was an infirm, illiterate and a Pardanasheen lady, and that the burden to prove that the sale deeds had been executed by her after understanding them was on the plaintiff. According to the trial court, in the background of these facts, she was entitled to the benefit of the law applicable to a case of Pardanasheen lady. The lower appellate court did not reverse the finding of the trial court on this point, I have gone through the evidence myself and, in any opinion, the trial court was right in taking that view. The lower appellate court was led away by irrelevant considerations in holding that Smt. Jamuna Kunwar had not proved non-receipt of the consideration. She had in the very opening part of the statement denied the receipt of the sale consideration. By omitting to consider this aspect, the lower appellate court wrongly found that the endorsements of payment made by the Sub-Registrar on the sale deeds were conclusive. 10. From the facts mentioned above, the things established were that not only that Shambhu Dayal was a son of confidence of Smt. Jamuna Kuawar and had special relationship with her, but also she was illiterate and, as such, entitled to the protection available to a Pardanasheen lady. It has been laid down in a number of decisions of this court and other High Courts that in such a matter, the burden of proof will be on the person who takes the sale deed. One of these cases reported in Paras Nath Rai and others v. Tileshra Kuer, (1965 ALJ 1980). 11. That apart, when two persons stand in such relations that confidence is reposed by one and the influence which grows out of that confidence is passed by the other, and this confidence is abused or the influence is exerted to obtain an advantage, the person so availing himself of his position will not be entitled to retain the advantage. 12. In the Instant case, the plaintiff did not bring any evidence on record excepting relying on the endorsements made on the sale deeds about the payment of consideration. The statement of Shambhu Dayal was insufficient to prove the said fact/and the trial court was right in holding it to be so. 12. In the Instant case, the plaintiff did not bring any evidence on record excepting relying on the endorsements made on the sale deeds about the payment of consideration. The statement of Shambhu Dayal was insufficient to prove the said fact/and the trial court was right in holding it to be so. The lower appellate court, as mentioned above, erroneously found that the present was since not a suit for enforcement of a contract, the principle laid down in Paras Nath Rai v. Tileshra Kuer, did not apply. When the plaintiff brought the suit for the recovery of consideration, he was doing nothing else but enforcing the contract which, according to him, was execution of the sale deeds by Smt. Jamuna Kunwar. This view of the lower appellate court is wholly incorrect. 13. For what I have said above, it necessarily follows that the lower appellate court incorrectly found that the plaintiff was entitled to the decree. The plaintiff failed to prove that consideration had been paid to the defendant Smt Jamuna Kunwar, and on that ground the suit was liable to be dismissed. In the instant case, I had to examine the record and to consider the evidence due to the fact that the lower appellate court had not dealt with it, in deciding the appeal and decreed the suit of the plaintiff without referring to the same. In view of this finding, it is not necessary for me to consider the question of limitation. 14. For these reasons, the second appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate court is set aside, and the suit is dismissed with costs.