Padam Chand : Bhanwar Lal v. Gordhan Das : Gordhan Lal
1984-12-20
KANTA BHATNAGAR
body1984
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : 1. These two revision petitions are directed against the orders dated December 1, 1983 passed by the District Judge, Churu in Civil Appeal Nos. 13 and 14 of 1983 by which the orders passed by the learned Munsif & Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Sasrdarshahr dated February 14, 1983, allowing the applications under Section 13(5) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter to be referred as 'the Act') were affirmed and the defence of the defendants-petitioners was struck off. 2. the two orders are of the same dates and exactly on the same point. The dates of the fixing of the provisional rent and of filing the various applications and replies by the parties are also the same. The only difference is about the rate of rent and the amount determined. A common question of law as to whether in the given circumstances of the case, the learned Munsif was justified in striking out the defence of the defendants-petitioners is involved in the case. Hence, I propose to dispose of the two revision petitions by one common order. 3. Notices were issued to the non-petitioner at admission stage and Mr. N.M. Singhvi has put in appearance on his behalf. At the request of the learned counsel for the parties, the petitions were heard for final disposal. 4. The facts relevant for the disposal of the revision petitions are as under:-Non-petitioner filed suits against the petitioners for eviction from the suit premises and recovery of arrears of rent on the ground of default and personal bonafide requirement of the suit premises. The suits were filed on December 15, 1980. Written statements were filed by the non-petitioner on April 26, 1982. The learned Munsif determined the provisional rent under Section 13(3) and issued directions Under section 13(4) of the Act for depositing the amount as determined within 60 days and to go on deposition monthly rent by the end of 15th of the month next to which the rent becomes due. The petitioners did not comply with that order.
The learned Munsif determined the provisional rent under Section 13(3) and issued directions Under section 13(4) of the Act for depositing the amount as determined within 60 days and to go on deposition monthly rent by the end of 15th of the month next to which the rent becomes due. The petitioners did not comply with that order. On the next date of hearing i.e. on July 19, 1982 the landlord non-petitioner filed applications under section 13(5) of the Act with the prayer that as the provisional rent determined on April 16, 1982 has not been paid or deposited and the defendants have failed to comply with the directions under section 13(4) of the Act, the defence against the eviction be struck off. On September 6, 1982 the petitioners filed applications that as they had deposited the rent under section 19A of the Act, the applications of the plaintiff may be dismissed. On January 24, 1983 applications under Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter to be referred as the Code) Order 13, Rule 2 of the Code were filed by the petitioners for placing on record certain vouchers and receipts to substantiate their case that they had deposited the rent in the Court under section 19A of the Act. By the order dated February 14, 1983 the applications under Order 13, Rule 2 of the Code were allowed. By the same order the applications of the petitioner under section 13(5) of the Act dated July 19, 1982 were allowed. It is second part of the order which caused grievance to the petitioners and they have invoked the revisional jurisdiction of this Court. 5. Mr. L.M. Lodha, learned counsel for the petitioners strenuously contended that the Act is a beneficial legislation for the poor helpless tenants and in order to help them in cases of the landlord refusing to accept the rent Section 19A of the Act has been enacted. According to Mr. Lodha that since the petitioners had deposited the rent under section 19A of the Act, it was incumbent upon the learned Munsif to adjust that amount while determining the provisional rent. That, it was all the more necessary because in the written statements the petitioners have averred that they had deposited the rent in the Court. 6. Mr.
Lodha that since the petitioners had deposited the rent under section 19A of the Act, it was incumbent upon the learned Munsif to adjust that amount while determining the provisional rent. That, it was all the more necessary because in the written statements the petitioners have averred that they had deposited the rent in the Court. 6. Mr. Lodha vehemently stressed that by the replies dated September 6, 1982 to the applications dated July 19, 1982, the amount deposited in the Court under section 19A of the Act on the various dates and by filing the applications under Order 13 Rule 2 of the Code on January 24, 1983 the vouchers and receipts of the aforesaid deposits had been brought to the notice of the Court and, therefore, the Court should not have, by brushing aside the plea lightly, passed the order dated February 14, 1983. 7. Mr. N.M. Singhvi, learned counsel for the non-petitioner controverted these contentions on the ground that while determining the provisional rent on April 26, 1982 the parties were granted opportunity to state their point regarding the amount of the rent due. That, it was the proper stage for the defendants-petitioners to bring to the notice of the Court as to what amount, in what manner and no what dates was deposited under section 19A of the Act. Mr. Singhvi urged that it was long after the provisional rent being determined that the applications under Order 13 Rule 2 of the Code were filed and they were also decided by the impugned orders. Mr. Singhvi contended that it is not a case where there was any material before the Court on the date of determining the Provisional rent and the non-petitioner filing the application on July 19, 1982, to show that the amount determined had been deposited or the deposit under section 19A of the Act was in accordance with the provisions of that Section and, therefore, the Court had rightly struck out the defence of the petitioners. 8. There is no dispute on the point that the amount determined under section 13(3) of the Act on April 26, 1982 was not paid and, therefore, there was no compliance of Section 13(4) of the Act. 9.
8. There is no dispute on the point that the amount determined under section 13(3) of the Act on April 26, 1982 was not paid and, therefore, there was no compliance of Section 13(4) of the Act. 9. The pertinent point emerging for determination is as to whether deposit of rent under section 19A of the Act and the mere mention to or it in the written statements could have entitled the petitioners to take the benefit of Section 13(6) of the Act and the Court was the error in striking out the defence of the petitioners under section 13(5) of the Act. Before expressing any opinion on the point involved in the case, I would refer to the principles enunciated in the various cases referred to by the learned counsel for the parties to substantiate their respective contentions. 10. In the case of Shri Vidya Prachar Trust v. Pandit Basant Ram, the question was whether the deposit in the Court under section 31 of the Relief of Indebtedness Act, 1934 was equivalent to tender of rent to landlord under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 as the tenant on the first date of hearing claimed that he had made two deposits under section 13(2)(1) of the East Punjab Relief of Indebtedness Act, 1934 which was a valid tender of the balance rent to the landlord. The Rent Controller decided that the respondent was not in default and the appellate authority as well as the high Court took the same view. When the matter went before the Supreme Court, their Lordship did not affirm that view and were pleased to observe that the deposit under section 31 of the Relief of Indebtedness Act did not save the tenant from the consequences of the default as contemplated by Section 13 of the Urban Rent Restriction Act. The reasons given were that Section 31 is intended to operate between debtors and creditors where difficulty in making the 'payments either wholly or partly may arise and the debtor wishes to save himself from interest which is running. No interest is agreed to be paid by tenants, at any rate not ordinarily, and therefore, the Section cannot be said to cover a case between a tenant and a landlord. 11.
No interest is agreed to be paid by tenants, at any rate not ordinarily, and therefore, the Section cannot be said to cover a case between a tenant and a landlord. 11. The case of Dulichand v. Maman Chand, 1979 (2) RCJ 52 was, also related to the provisions of East Urban Rent Restriction Act 1949 and the tenant prayed for the benefit because of the deposit under section 31 of the Relief Act, in the same Court. Their Lordships were pleased to hold that even if the tenant had obtained the order of the Rent Controller for making the deposit, by referring to Section 31 of the Relief Act, the fact remained that the money was custodia legis and could be ordered to be paid to the landlord there and then by the Court at the first hearing. It was further observed that it might have been different if the deposit had been made in some other Court. The case of Vidya Prachar Trust (supra) was brought to the notice of their Lordships and their Lordships did not feel the necessity to reconsider that decision because according to their Lordships, the case before them was clearly distinguishable from the case. The distinguishing feature was that the rent for three months in Dulichand's case (supra) was deposited in the Court of the same Rent Controller in which the eviction petition was filed, and consequently, the rent deposited was in the custody of that Court and could be made available to the landlord who at the first hearing, if not earlier, was informed that he was entitled to withdraw that deposit. 12. Placing reliance on Dulichand's case, Mr. L.M. Lodha contended that in the present case the amount deposited under section 19A of the Act was in custodia legis and the Court should have directed the landlord to withdraw that amount if he had not already done so. Mr. Lodha submitted that it was the duty of the Court to calculate the amount so deposited and adjust it with amount alleged to be due and then determine the balance to be paid. The argument is of no help to the petitioners because of the peculiar circumstances of the case.
Mr. Lodha submitted that it was the duty of the Court to calculate the amount so deposited and adjust it with amount alleged to be due and then determine the balance to be paid. The argument is of no help to the petitioners because of the peculiar circumstances of the case. In the Supreme Court decision just referred to above, on the first date of bearing the respondent had made an application to the Rent Controller that the amount specified in the application has already been deposited in the Government Treasury under the orders of the Court of the Rent Controller Sum-Senior Sub Judge towards the rent of the two months and thereafter a further amount towards the rent of the one month under the Punjab Relief of Indebtedness Act, 1934 was deposited to the credit of the landlord about which notice had been issued to him. Along with that application, he further tendered some amount including the amount of interest and cost and amount for overhead expenses and deposited the same in the Court to the credit of the appellant because the latter declined to accept the amount tendered, saying that the tender was not in compliance with the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 13 of the Rent Act. 13. From the discussion that would follow it would be clear that the circumstances of the present cases were altogether different from the case of Dulichand and the principle enunciated in that case cannot be pressed into service in these cases. In the cases on hand, it has, of course, been stated in the written statements that the rent was being deposited under section 19A of the Act but neither the amount nor the dates of payment have been specified. The provisional rent was determined on April 26, 1982. The next date was July 19, 1982. On that date also the petitioners did not make any prayer for any adjustment of amount deposited by them in the Court under section 19A of the Act. 14. In the replies filed on September 6, 1982, to the applications under section 13(5) of the Act it was not made clear that the deposit was in accordance with Section 19A of the Act. Though in the given circumstance there was no importance of the replies filed by the petitioners to the applications under Section 13(5) of the Act still Mr.
Though in the given circumstance there was no importance of the replies filed by the petitioners to the applications under Section 13(5) of the Act still Mr. Lodha insisted for consideration of these replies. Mr. Singhvi, learned counsel for the non-petitioner pointed out that even if those replies are considered those deposits were not in accordance with the provisions of Section 19A of the Act and Mr. Lodha could not meet that contention. Be it as it may, this is established position that the Court had no material before it on April 26, 1982 while determining the rent to take into consideration the amount said to be deposited under section 19A of the Act. The vouchers and receipts claimed by the petitioners to be relating to those deposits were also not brought to the notice of the Court either on the date of determination of rent or subsequent there 'to while filing replies to the application under section 13(5) of the Act. It was after the lapse' a period of more than six months that on January 24, 1983 that the application under Order 13 Rule 2 of the Code was filed. Filing of that application in itself would not establish the facts contained in these documents or help the petitioners to get out to the vigour of Section 3(5) of the Act. 15. Mr. Lodha next referred to the case of Ms. Martin & Harris Pvt. Ltd. v. Prem Chand, AIR 1974 Raj. 136 (F.B.), wherein their Lordships have been pleased to enunciate the principle that in case a tenant has deposited rent under section 19A of the Act, he would not be required to make a fresh deposit of the same amount in Court under section 13(4) of the Act. 16. There is no dispute on the point that tenant cannot be saddled with burden to pay the rent twice. But this is also the requirement that the tenant should bring it to the notice of the Court on the date of the determination of the provisional rent under section 13(3) of the Act that he had deposited the rent in the Court under section 19A of the Act and was regularly doing so.
But this is also the requirement that the tenant should bring it to the notice of the Court on the date of the determination of the provisional rent under section 13(3) of the Act that he had deposited the rent in the Court under section 19A of the Act and was regularly doing so. If the tenant, as in the present case, does not bring it to the notice of the Court and keeps quiet for long, then the Court commits no error in applying Section 13(5) of the Act at the request of the plaintiff. The detailed information by the tenant regarding the deposit under section 19A required to be brought to the notice of the Court while determining the amount of rent is that the deposit under section 19A is in accordance with those provisions. Reference in this connection may be made to the provisions of Section 19(1) which provides that no rent deposited with the Court under section 19A shall be considered to have been validly deposited under that Section unless the deposit is made within the time specified in Clause (c) of sub-Section (3) of the said Section. Evidently, in the present case there was no material before the Court at the time of determining have been deposited under section 19A of the Act. 17. In the Rajasthan case (supra) just referred have their Lordships while dealing with the deposit under section 19A of the Act, as stated earlier were also pleased to observe that such a tenant must raise all dispute in respect thereof on the first date of hearing under section 13(5) of the Act. 18. True it is that after the amendment of the Act, the position about the determination of rent changed. Previously, it was the tenant who had to deposit this rent or to file an application on the first date of hearing for determination of rent praying that he was prepared to pay interest etc. Under the amended Section 13(3) of the Act, the scheme is that the Court should provisionally determine the rent and issue direction for the payment of the same under section 14(4) of the Act. The duty is now cast upon the Court to determine the provisional rent.
Under the amended Section 13(3) of the Act, the scheme is that the Court should provisionally determine the rent and issue direction for the payment of the same under section 14(4) of the Act. The duty is now cast upon the Court to determine the provisional rent. But that does not mean that the tenant is absolved of the responsibility of raising any dispute about the rate of rent or the amount determined or any other fact including the deposit, if any, made by him under section 19A of the Act. 19. Mr. Lodha next contended that since that deposit has in the same Court it was the mistake of the Court in not calling the file. He referred to the case of Jyotinder Kumar Srivastava v. Smt. Kewaljhari Devi. In that case arrears of rent deposited in the Court by the tenant fell short by a paltry sum on account of the contributory mistake on the part of the Ministerial Official of the Court and the tenant was held to get the benefit on the principle that a party should not be made to suffer for any mistake on the part of any official. In that view of the matter the provisions for striking out the defence were not construed strictly, and the order for striking out the defence was set aside. 20. In the present case when no dispute was raised at the time of the determination of the provisional rent nor was it brought on record at that time as to when, where and to what extent the amount of rent was deposited, there arises no question of any mistake of the Court in determining the amount and the petitioners-defendants justifying non-compliance of the directions under Section 13(4) of the Act. 21. In the case of Suraj Narain v. Smt. Laxmi Devi, ILR (1982) 32 Raj. 152. his Lordship while discussing the scheme of legislation in enacting Section 13 was pleased to observe that the Court can interpret and not legislate. It was emphasised that compliance of both parts of Section 13(4) of the Act i.e. the payment of the amount determined as well regular payment in every succeeding month as envisaged by the second part of that Section is essential.
It was emphasised that compliance of both parts of Section 13(4) of the Act i.e. the payment of the amount determined as well regular payment in every succeeding month as envisaged by the second part of that Section is essential. If the tenant commits default in complying with either of the two he can do so at his own peril by exposing himself to the consequence of eviction. 22. In the case of Rajasthan State Agricultural Marketing Board, Jaipur v. Mst. Gurdeep Kaur, 1983 R.L.W. 210 while discussing the provisions of Section 13(4) of the Act his Lordship was pleased to observe that however favourable a view the Court may like to take for the benefit of the tenant, it has no right to override the express provisions of law. His Lordship affirmed the order passed by the trial Court striking out the defence of the tenant under sub-Section (5) of Section 13 of the Act on account of the failure of the defendant-tenant to deposit monthly rent for the months of April, May, June and July, 1982 within the stipulated period provided under section 13(4) or even within the period for which extension could have been granted to the maximum extent under the aforesaid provisions. 23. The necessity for rent Control legislation arose for the reason that because of the contract between the landlord and the tenant, the former was in an advantageous position to reoccupy the premises putting the latter in a helpless position of being without roof over his head on account of the shortage of the accommodation. The legislation no doubt was brought for the benefit of the tenants in order to save them from whim and caprice of greedy landlords. The interest of the landlords against the tenants avoiding payment of rent and thereby placing them in a disadvantageous position was, however, protected by inserting Section 13(5) of the Act. 24. Prior to the amendment of the Act it was the duty of the tenant to deposit the amount of arrears of rent along with interest on the first date of hearing and to regularly make the payment by 15th of each succeeding month. On his failing to do so, his defence against eviction was liable to be struck off. Even a slight mistake in calculation could have led to the consequences of striking out the defence.
On his failing to do so, his defence against eviction was liable to be struck off. Even a slight mistake in calculation could have led to the consequences of striking out the defence. The legislature again came to the help of the tenant and accepted the provisions, creating duty on the Court to determine the rent so that the tenant may not be held responsible for any wrong calculation. Under Section 13(4) of the Act the tenant is to comply with two directions : firstly; he shall deposit in Court or pay to the landlord the amount determined by the Court under sub-section (3) within fifteen days from the date of such determination, or within such further time, not exceeding three months, as may be extended by the Court and secondly; he shall also continue to deposit in Court or pay the landlord, month by month the monthly rent subsequent to the period upto which determination has been made, by the fifteenth of each succeeding month or within such further time, not exceeding fifteen days, as may be extended by the Court as the monthly rate at which the rent was determined by the Court under sub-section (3). The two parts of Section 13(4) of the Act are to be read conjointly. Both these directions are to be strictly complied with and on failure to do so the inevitable consequence under section 13(5) would follow : 25. Upon a careful examination of the record I find force in the contention of Mr. Singhvi that there was no material whatsoever with the Court that the provisions of Section 19A were complied with by the tenant or that after the present litigation, the tenant made any effort to get that amount adjusted or complied with the second part of Section 13(4) of the Act. In both the cases the petitioners failed to raise the dispute on April 26, 1982 or subsequent thereto within the reasonable period. Even thereafter they failed to specifically bring on record the exact amount paid and the regular payment as envisaged by Section 19A of the Act. In such circumstances the Court was left with no alternative but to allow the prayer of the plaintiff non-petitioner and proceed under section 13(5) of the Act. 26.
Even thereafter they failed to specifically bring on record the exact amount paid and the regular payment as envisaged by Section 19A of the Act. In such circumstances the Court was left with no alternative but to allow the prayer of the plaintiff non-petitioner and proceed under section 13(5) of the Act. 26. So far as the argument about the amount being paid twice is concerned reference may be made in Section 13(7) and 13(8) of the Act under which the Court is to finally decide the amount actually paid and the amount due. The determination of the provisional amount would not mean that the petitioners will have to pay twice the amount for a particular period. The amount deposited, if any, is bond to be adjusted at the time of final decision of the matter. But that does not mean in the circumstances discussed above, that the tenants may save themselves from the consequences of non-compliance of the directions under Section 13(4) given by the Court while determining the provisional rent under section 13(3) of the Act. 27. The learned Munsif has properly interpreted the provisions of Sections 13 and 19A of the Act and in his order dated February 14, 1983 is based on sound reasoning and so is the order dated December 1, 1983 passed by the appellate Court. As neither of the two Courts has acted illegally or without material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction no interference by this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction is called for. 28. Consequently, both the revision petitions having no merits are dismissed. Costs are made easy.Revision petitions dismissed.