JUDGMENT K. N. Misra, J. 1. In the present case the dispute relates to Khata No. 4 situate in village A jaipur, Parana Kodari Purvi, District Sitapur. In the basic years Khatauni the disputed land was recorded in the names of petitioners Harnath and Shital son of Chandra Bhal along with Govind as Sirdars. During verification of Khatauni made by consolidation staff, three disputes were recorded, firstly, it was found that Govind one of the recorded tenure-holder had died and it was alleged that his minor son Ram Sagar alias Babbu was the legal heir and successor ; secondly, Ram Sanehi, Munna, Chhotkan and Kuttu Lal sons of Ram Autar, opposite parties 5 to 8 claimed to be co-tenants in the disputed holding and thirdly, one Chhote Lal son of Parmeshwar claimed to have acquired Sirdari rights by adverse possession over one of the plots of the disputed holding namely, plot No. 1783/1. An objection was filed by the petitioners wherein they asserted that Govind had died unmarried and he had not left any heir. It was further asserted that Ram Singh and others were not co-tenure-holders in the disputed holding. Chhote Lal withdrew his claim with regard to the plot No. 1783/1. Thus the dispute remained between the petitioners and opposite parties 4 to 8. The Consolidation Officer after taking evidence of parties upheld the claim of opposite parties 5 to 8 and held them to be co-tenure-holders along with the petitioners. He also upheld the claim of opposite party No. 4 and held him to be son of Govind and directed that his name be recorded as co-tenure-holders in place of Govind. Petitioners and opposite party No. 4 were held to be entitled to 1/6th share each and opposite parties 5 to 8 were held to be entitled to 1/8th share each. Petitioners preferred appeal which was dismissed by the Settlement Officer Consolidation, Sitapur, vide judgment and order dated 10th of November, 1976. Thereupon petitioners preferred revision which was dismissed on 19th May, 1978. Petitioners have challenged these orders in this writ petition. 2. Petitioners preferred appeal which was dismissed by the Settlement Officer Consolidation, Sitapur, vide judgment and order dated 10th of November, 1976. Thereupon petitioners preferred revision which was dismissed on 19th May, 1978. Petitioners have challenged these orders in this writ petition. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioners Sri P. L. Misra urged that the opposite parties 1 to 3 have erred in holding Ram Sanehi and others as co-tenure-holders in the disputed holding on the basis of the alleged compromise filed in the revenue suit 5/68 under Section and 176 of U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. He urged that the said suit filed by Ram Avtar father of Ram Sanehi and others was dismissed in default on 16-4-1968. He disputed the genuineness of the compromise and further urged that at any rate the opposite parties 5 to 8 could not be given co-tenancy rights on the basis of alleged admission contained in the said compromise which was not acted upon nor any decree was passed in pursuance of the alleged compromise. Learned counsel further contended that the petitioners have established that the land in dispute was acquired by their father Chandra Bhal and so merely on the basis of the alleged admission contained in the so called compromise cannot confer co-tenancy rights. He urged that the said compromise cannot operate as an estoppel between the parties nor co-tenancy rights could accrue on its basis. Learned counsel further urged that the Consolidation Officer had proceeded to decide the case treating the land in dispute to be joint family holding. He further urged that the Consolidation Officer merely on the basis of the alleged compromise has held the opposite parties 5 to 8 to be co-tenure -holders. Learned counsel further pointed out that the perusal of the order passed by the Settlement Officer Consolidation would indicate that the case of Ram Sanehi was that the land in suit was ancestral (Paitrik) and that the name of Chandra Bhal was recorded in the representative capacity. Learned counsel by referring to the finding recorded by the Deputy Director of Consolidation urged that the Deputy Director of Consolidation had made out a new case for the parties holding that the land in dispute was acquired by Chandra Bhal and Ram Avatar Jointly. Learned counsel by referring to the finding recorded by the Deputy Director of Consolidation urged that the Deputy Director of Consolidation had made out a new case for the parties holding that the land in dispute was acquired by Chandra Bhal and Ram Avatar Jointly. He had, therefore, not adverted himself to the case set up by opposite party in court below to the effect that the land in dispute is ancestral joint family property. Learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the Deputy Director of Consolidation has observed that since the land in dispute was acquired jointly by Ram Avatar and Chandra Bhal some 50 years ago when they were members of the joint family, and, as such, it would be immaterial if the land in dispute has not been proved to be ancestral. Learned counsel further urged that while recording this finding regarding joint acquisition of land by Ram Avatar and Chandra Bhal, the Deputy Director of Consolidation has not referred to any evidence whatsoever in support of that finding. Thus, apart from a new case being set up by the Deputy Director of Consolidation himself for the opposite parties 5 to 8, the impugned judgment passed by him cannot be sustained as he has by a non-speaking order recorded said finding. He has also failed to consider the evidence, if any or record, in support of his finding. Learned counsel thus urged that the impugned orders passed by the consolidation authorities deserve to be quashed. In reply learned counsel for the opposite parties Sri Pradeep Kant Advocate urged that all the three consolidation authorities have correctly held that the opposite party No. 4 Ram Sagar alias Babbu, to be son of Govind, who was real brother of the petitioners and, as such, the opposite parties 1 to 3 have rightly held him to be co-tenure-holders along with the petitioners having l/6th share in it. Learned counsel for the opposite parties further contended that a finding has been recorded to the effect that opposite parties 5 to 8 are sons of Ram Avatar, who was real brother of Chandra Bhal the father of the petitioners, and that both these brothers formed a joint family at the time when it was jointly acquired some 50 years ago. Learned counsel urged that the Deputy Director of Consolidation has not made out any new case for the opposite parties to the effect the impugned orders do not suffer from any infirmity and do not call for any interference by this court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 3. I have carefully considered the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the impugned orders and the averments contained in the writ petition and the counter affidavit. It is not disputed that in the basic year khatauni the name of petitioners and Govind was recorded as tenure-holder of the holding in question. It has been correctly held by opposite parties 1 to 3 that Govind was the real brother of the petitioners, and, as such, the claim of the opposite party No. 4 Ram Sagar alias Babbu appears to have rightly upheld by the consolidation authorities. So far as the claim of opposite parties 5 to 8 is concerned, it is evident from the perusal of the order passed by the Consolidation Officer that he has, after recording a finding that the opposite parties 5 to 8 are sons of Ram Avatar who was brother of Chandra Bhal, gave them half share in the land in dispute merely on the basis of the alleged compromise said to have been entered between the petitioners and Ram Avatar in Regular Suit No. 5 of 1968, under Section 229-B/176 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, which was dismissed in default on 16-4-1968 although compromise is said to have been filed on 12-12-67 and the same was also got verified by court. It, thus appears that the suit was not disposed of in terms of that compromise. The suit was ultimately dismissed in default vide order dated 16-4-1968. The compromise therefore, did not merge in the decree and the claim of Ram Avatar father of opposite parties 5 to 8 who had filed the aforesaid suit cannot be said to be determined on the basis of the alleged compromise filed in the said suit. 4. It is next to be seen as to what would be the legal value and the worth of the alleged compromise. 4. It is next to be seen as to what would be the legal value and the worth of the alleged compromise. Learned counsel for the opposite party had urged that the said compromise would operate as estoppel between the parties and the petitioners would be bound by the admissions contained in the compromise regarding title and share of the opposite parties 5 to 8 in the holding in dispute. In other words his contention was that although a decree was not passed in terms of the said compromise, but the admission contained in the compromise and the compromise itself would not become non'est. The petitioners would be estopped from urging against their own admission contained in the said compromise which was filed and verified before the court in the said suit. He urged that the petitioners cannot now urge that their admission in the said compromise was erroneous or untrue and that the land exclusively belonged to their father Chandra Bhal. In reply learned counsel for the petitioners urged that the admission contained in any deed or document is not conclusive or true in respect of the matter stated therein. IT cannot be shown to be erroneous or untrue unless operates as estoppel. I have carefully considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and I find much substance in what has been urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners. 5. It is well settled that an admission is not conclusive as to the truth in the matter stated therein. IT is only a piece of evidence, the weight to be attached to it must depend on the circumstances under which it is made. IT can be shown to be erroneous or untrue so long as the person to whom it is made has not acted upon it to his detriment and it may become conclusive by way of estoppel. See Nagubai Ammul v. B. Shama Rao, AIR 1956 SC 593 . 6. In Rahmanul Hasan v. Zahurul Hasan, AIR 1947 Allahabad 281, Malik, J. observed that ; "An admission is not conclusive evidence against any party. If from the facts it could be shown that the admission was wrong, it would fail to have any effect. It is only prima-facie evidence against the party making the admission and shifts the burden of proof. " In Kishori Lal v. Mt. If from the facts it could be shown that the admission was wrong, it would fail to have any effect. It is only prima-facie evidence against the party making the admission and shifts the burden of proof. " In Kishori Lal v. Mt. Chaltibai, AIR 1959 SC 504 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that :- "An admission shifts the onus on the person admitting the fact on the principle that what a party himself admits to be true may reasonably be presumed to be so and until the presumption is rebutted, the fact admitted must be taken to be established. This principle is stated in 34 Ind. App. 27 (P. C). However, the question of onus loses its efficacy when it is never objected to in the lower courts and evidence having been led by the parties, at the appellate stage the Court has to adjudicate on the material before it." (emphasis supplied-herein in italics). 7. It was further held in para 20 of the report that :- "If the facts are once ascertained, presumption arising from conduct cannot establish a right which the facts themselves disprove. (See Tayamal's Case, 10 Moo Ind. App. 429 at page 433)." 8. In Mohd. Imam Ali Khan v. Sardar Ali Khan, 25 Indian Appeals 161, it was held by the Privy Council that :- " An admission by the plaintiff of title in the defendant proved to have no real existence and to have been gratuitous can be withdrawn at any time in the absence of any obligation incurred to the contrary. In Madho Singh v. Kalloo Singh, AIR 1933 Oudh 28, the Division Bench of Oudh Chief Court also took the similar view and it was observed that a gratuitous admission can always be withdrawn. But in my opinion before this rule can be invoked it must be shown by the maker that the admission is erroneous and untrue and that it does not operate as estoppel against him. It cannot be disputed that an admission is not conclusive against the party as to the truth of the matter stated therein. It however, places onus on the maker to prove the contrary. It can be shown to be erroneous and untrue unless it operates as an estoppel. 9. It cannot be disputed that an admission is not conclusive against the party as to the truth of the matter stated therein. It however, places onus on the maker to prove the contrary. It can be shown to be erroneous and untrue unless it operates as an estoppel. 9. Regarding questions of estoppel it may be noticed that under the English law estoppel is of three kinds : estoppel by judgment, estoppel by deed and estoppel in pais. Estoppel by judgment is embodied in the Indian Law in the doctrine of res-judicata. The doctrine of estoppel in pais is embodied in Section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act; whereas doctrine of estoppel by deed coupled with the doctrine of feeding the grant by estoppel, where the deed is a transfer for consideration, is embodied in section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act with slight modification. 10. An admission so far as facts are concerned, would bind the maker of the admission provided it operates as estoppel and does not appear to be factually incorrect. If the person to whom it was made was not induced to change his position by acting on it to his detriment, the same cannot be said to have become conclusive by way of estoppel. A gratuitous admission regarding title of a party who does not possess any title in the property in question, can be withdrawn and shown to be erroneous and untrue wherever and whenever it is sought to be relied upon against the maker, provided it does not operate as estoppel. The question whether an admission contained in a compromise can be shown to be mistaken and untrue, Nanavutty, J. in Mohd. Abdul Haseeb Shifaul Mulk Khan v. Zia Uddin Ahmad Qazi, 1937 Oudh Weekly Notes 423, observed that : "Where the plaintiff does not show that he has been induced by a statement in a compromise amounting to an admission by the defendants to alter his position to his detriment, the defendants are at liberty to prove that such admission was mistaken or was untrue." 11. In Rani Chandra Cunwar v. Chaudhari Narpat Singh, 1907 (34) Indian Appeals 27 (35) which was noticed in the aforesaid decision, it was observed by their lordships of the Privy Council that :- "Law upon the point is clear. In Rani Chandra Cunwar v. Chaudhari Narpat Singh, 1907 (34) Indian Appeals 27 (35) which was noticed in the aforesaid decision, it was observed by their lordships of the Privy Council that :- "Law upon the point is clear. In Heans v. Rogers, (1829) 9 BC 577 (586), Rayley, J. in delivering the judgment of the Court, lays it down that there is no doubt that the express admissions of a party to the suit, or admissible implied from his "conduct, are evidence, and strong evidence against him, but we think he is at liberty to prove that such admissions were mistaken or were untrue, and is not estopped or concluded by them unless another person has been inducted by them to alter his condition. In such a case the party is estopped from disputing their truth as against that person (and those claiming under him) and that transaction, but as to third parties he is not bound. " 12. In the present case, consolidation authorities have not adverted to the question as to whether the father of opposite parties 5 to 8 namely, Ram Avatar had been induced by the compromise filed in the said suit to alter his position to his detriment. Nothing has been brought on record of this writ petition to indicate and establish the said fact. It also does not appear that any such stand was taken and established by the opposite parties 5 to 8. Since no decree was passed on the basis of the alleged compromise, and, as such, it cannot be taken to have assumed the legal character of a binding executable decree based on the compromise. If the decree would have been passed on the basis of the alleged compromise, the same could have operated as estoppel by record having been incorporated in the decree passed by a court on its basis. Since no decree was passed by court in the present case, and the suit was dismissed in default, the alleged compromise taken by itself cannot become nor it can assume the character of an executable decree or legally binding on the parties. It can at the best be referable merely as a piece of evidence containing an admission of the parties. It can at the best be referable merely as a piece of evidence containing an admission of the parties. Since the alleged compromise cannot operate as estoppel because the so called admission contained therein appears to be merely gratuitous being not based on the recognition of any pre-existing right in the land and there is also nothing to indicate that acting on the admission the father of opposite parties 5 to 8 had changed his position to his detriment, and, as such, the so called admission contained in the compromise could be shown to be erroneous and untrue. Since both the parties have led evidence in support of their respective claims about their title in the land in dispute, the question of laying onus of proof at this stage would not be relevant for determining the crucial question as to whether the admission contained in the alleged compromise regarding title of opposite parties 2 to 5 in the land in dispute is incorrect or not. The case of the opposite parties 5 to 8 is that they are co-tenure-holders having half share in the holding in dispute whereas the petitioners assert that the land in dispute exclusively belonged to their father Chandra Bhal. The respective claims of the parties is to be determined on the basis of evidence with regard to title in the land in dispute. If on the consideration of evidence on record, the opposite parties or their predecessor-in-interest cannot be taken to be co-tenure-holders in the land in dispute, their case would fail because in that event the alleged admission contained in the said compromise would be taken to be erroneous and untrue, and it would thus not operate to create title in favour of the opposite parties 5 to 8 because it is well settled that an admission cannot create title in favour of a party if there is none (see AIR 1951 Nagpur P. 327 at 336). An admission of a party contained in a compromise or in any other deed or document, can no doubt be taken to be a substantive piece of evidence but the same has got to be scrutinised and considered on merits along with other evidence led by the parties in support of their respective cases. An admission of a party contained in a compromise or in any other deed or document, can no doubt be taken to be a substantive piece of evidence but the same has got to be scrutinised and considered on merits along with other evidence led by the parties in support of their respective cases. If the admission is shown to be factually incorrect on the consideration of evidence on record, the claim of the party relying on it cannot be upheld merely on its basis because an erroneous and untrue admission cannot confer title on a person if he has no title in the property in question. 13. In the present case Consolidation Officer has upheld the claim of the opposite parties 5 to 8 merely on the basis of the alleged compromise. He has not recorded any finding on the case set up by the opposite parties 5 to 8 as to whether the land in dispute is joint family property and the name of Chandra Bhal was recorded merely in the representative capacity or not. The Settlement Officer Consolidation held the land in dispute to be ancestral property (Paitrik). He had, however, not referred to any evidence whether the land in dispute was ever recorded in the name of Ram Narain or not. The Dy. Director of Consolidation, however, held that the land in dispute was acquired jointly by Chandra Bhal and Ram Avatar about 50 years ago without referring to any evidence whatsoever in support of that finding. It appears that before the Deputy Director of Consolidation an argument was addressed that there is nothing on record to indicate that the land in dispute is ancestral, and, as such, the finding recorded by the Settlement Officer Consolidation is per-se wrong. The learned Deputy Director of Consolidation without considering the submission on merits held by a non-speaking order that the land in dispute was jointly acquired by Ram Avatar and Chandra Bhal more than 50 years ago. Thus I find that the impugned order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation is unsustainable and deserves to be quashed and the case deserves to be remanded back to him for deciding it afresh on merits after considering pleadings and evidence of parties led in support of their respective claims. 14. Thus I find that the impugned order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation is unsustainable and deserves to be quashed and the case deserves to be remanded back to him for deciding it afresh on merits after considering pleadings and evidence of parties led in support of their respective claims. 14. In the result the writ petition succeeds and is hereby allowed and the impugned judgment and order dated 19-5-78 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation is hereby quashed, and he is directed to restore the revision to its original number and decide it afresh on merits according to law and in the light of the observations made above. Parties are directed to bear their own costs. --- Petition allowed.