ORDER A. Banerji, J. - This writ petition has been filed by the Indian Institute of Petroleum, Dehradun, hereinafter referred to as the Institute, against an order passed by the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal (V), Meerut, date 19-9-1983, disposing three preliminary issue Nos. 1, 2 and 9. On issue No. 2, it was held that the Institute was an "industry" within the meaning of S. 2(k) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, hereinafter referred to as the Act. On issue Nos. 1 and 9, the Presiding Officer held that the Institute was a unit of Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, which was registered as a society under the Societies Registration Act, but it was not being run by or under the authority of the Central Government and the appropriate Government in this case is the State Government of U.P., as the Institute is situated at Dehradun, U.P. 2. Aggrieved, the Institute has filed the present writ petition on 20th Feb., 1984. On 23rd March, 1984 an order was passed that the petition be listed for admission on 7th May, 1984 and respondent 3 be served. On 7th May, 1984, if considered expedient the writ petition may be finally disposed of. On the 7th May, 1954 the case was adjourned to 11th July, 1984 for admission and, if deemed necessary, for disposal of the petition. It may be stated here that the case came up on the 11th of July, 1984 by which time the parties had exchanged their affidavits, and respondent 3 had moved an application for vacating the interim order. I deemed it proper to dispose of the petition, as it is directed against an order disposing of the three preliminary issues and touching the question of jurisdiction. Merely admitting the petition and keeping it pending would not serve the cause of justice, hence I heard the learned counsel for the parties. The arguments were, as expected, quite extensive. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner-Institute raised two principal questions viz : "1. That the Institute was not an Industry within the meaning of S. 2(k) of the Act and, as such, the Industrial Tribunal had no jurisdiction to decide the matter. 2. That the Reference under S. 4-K of the Act by the State Government of U.P. was patently invalid as the 'appropriate Government' to make the Reference was the Central Government. That the Institute was not an Industry within the meaning of S. 2(k) of the Act and, as such, the Industrial Tribunal had no jurisdiction to decide the matter. 2. That the Reference under S. 4-K of the Act by the State Government of U.P. was patently invalid as the 'appropriate Government' to make the Reference was the Central Government. Further the Institute was a unit of Council of Scientific and Industrial Research and was being run under the authority of the Government of India through the Ministry of Petroleum, Chemicals and Fertilizers, New Delhi, and even if the Institute was deemed to be an "Industry", the appropriate Government would be the Central Government. 4. Learned counsel submitted that the order of Reference made by the State (Government of U.P. was without jurisdiction, illegal and null and void. 5. Learned counsel for the respondents Shri G.C. Gahrana before replying to the arguments raised a preliminary objection to the hearing of the writ petition. He urged that the Courts do not entertain writ petitions against decisions of some of the issues or preliminary issues. In other words, his contention was that the writ petition should not be entertained until the entire matter referred before the Industrial Tribunal was finally disposed of. He further urged that until that stage was reached the Petitioner- Institute could have no grievance, as no orders had been passed qua the workman against the Institute so far. Learned counsel in support of his contention relied on two decisions of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of D.P. Maheshwari v. Delhi Administration (1983) 4 SCC 293 and S.K. Verma v. Mahesh Chandra, (1983) 4 SCC 214 . The writ petition having been filed in this Court on the 20th Feb., 1984 and interim orders having been passed thereon, it would be deemed that the Court has entertained the writ petition although no formal order of admission had been passed. Keeping in view the observations made in the case of D.P. Meheshwari (supra). I deemed it fit and proper to admit the petition and take it up for hearing at once at so that further delay in the disposal of the matter may be avoided. In the case of S.K. Verma (supra) their Lordships observed that it had become quite a fashion for employers particularly public sector corporations to raise objections viz. I deemed it fit and proper to admit the petition and take it up for hearing at once at so that further delay in the disposal of the matter may be avoided. In the case of S.K. Verma (supra) their Lordships observed that it had become quite a fashion for employers particularly public sector corporations to raise objections viz. that there is no industry; that there is no industrial dispute and that the workman is no workman. Their Lordships further observe that it did not behove the public sector corporations to raise such objections, for it delayed proceedings and dragged the workman from Court to Court. In the case of D.P. Maheshwari (supra.) their Lordships observed that the Industrial Tribunals are constituted to decide expeditiously special kinds of disputes and their jurisdiction to so decide is not to be stifled by all manner of preliminary objections. Their Lordships further observed that in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court is not required to be too astute to interfere with the exercise of jurisdiction by special Tribunal at interlocutory stages and on preliminary issues. However in the next sentence their Lordships observed that "having sermonised this much, we may now proceed to state the facts which provoked the sermon." 6. While adhering to the observations of their Lordships, which merit highest consideration by this Court, I think it will be proper to decide the questions raised on behalf of the petitioner-Institute so that that the matter is finally settled as far as the petitioner-Institute is concerned. 7. I have heard Mr. O. C. Mathur learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. G.C. Gahrana, appearing for respondent 3, the workman. 8. A few relevant facts may be mentioned. A dispute had arisen between the workman and the petitioner-Institute. The State Government made a Reference under S. 4-K of the Act to the Industrial Tribunal Meerut, which was registered as Adjudication Case No. 104 of 1979. Parties had filed their respective written statements, rejoinder affidavit and documents. It appears that nine additional issues were framed by the Tribunal. Evidence of the parties was taken on the additional issue Nos. 1, 2, 6, 8, and 9. Four witnesses were examined by the petitioner-Institute and one witnesses was examined on behalf of the workman. Arguments were heard on three preliminary issue Nos. It appears that nine additional issues were framed by the Tribunal. Evidence of the parties was taken on the additional issue Nos. 1, 2, 6, 8, and 9. Four witnesses were examined by the petitioner-Institute and one witnesses was examined on behalf of the workman. Arguments were heard on three preliminary issue Nos. 1, 2 and 9 regarding the validity of the Reference order and the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. These issues were : Issue No. 1-] Whether the present order of' reference is null and void for the reasons mentioned in preliminary objection 'A' of the written statement of the employers ? Issue No. 2.-] Whether Indian Institute of Petroleum is not an Industry ? If not, its effect ? Issue No. 9] Whether the Institute is a unit of Council of Scientific and Industrial Research run under the authority and control of the Government of India. If so, its effect ? The Tribunal by its order dated 9th Sept., 1983 came to the conclusion that the reference under the State Government was not null and void and the Tribunal had acquired jurisdiction. The other additional issues of the matters of dispute were directed to be heard together, but before the same could be heard, the writ petition had been filed in this Court and ad interim order obtained. 9. Having surveyed briefly the dispute between the parties and the points raised in this petition. I propose to deal with the first question posed by the counsel for the petitioner viz., whether the Indian Institute of Petroleum is an "industry" within the meaning of Section 2 (k) of the Act. It is undisputed that the Institute is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act Government officials and nominees of the Central Government are its members. It is also undisputed that practically all its funds come from the Central Government and small amount comes from the sale lease or transfer of technology. It will therefore, not be incorrect to assume that it is not run with a profit motive or as commercial proposition. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that in a recent decision of this Court in Ramesh Chandra Singh v. Union of India. (1981) 42 Fac LR 328, this Court held that the National Sugar Institute, Kanpur was not an "industry" within the meaning of S. 2 (k) of the Act. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that in a recent decision of this Court in Ramesh Chandra Singh v. Union of India. (1981) 42 Fac LR 328, this Court held that the National Sugar Institute, Kanpur was not an "industry" within the meaning of S. 2 (k) of the Act. National Sugar Institute is primarily a Research Institute and the Court held that it was not an industry. Learned counsel heavily relied on this case. However, on an examination of the case it is apparent that the matter had come up before this Court in a second appeal. The appellant was a garden supervisor in the said Institute and his services were terminated on the ground that the office of the Garden Supervisor was being abolished Plaintiff thereupon filed a suit challenging the said order on a number of grounds including that the order of termination was by way of punishment and no opportunity to show cause had been given to him. The suit was contested and inter alia, it was pleaded that the Government had abolished the post and therefore the plaintiff had no jurisdiction to remain in service. The trial Court decreed the suit on the ground that although a notice for termination of service had been given, but a month's salary had not accompanied the same, and since this had not been done, the order of termination was invalid. 11. On appeal by the Union of India, the lower Appellate Court reversed the finding regarding illegality of the notice and dismissed the suit. The court hearing the second appeal was of the view that it was not necessary to send a month's salary along with the notice. However, a fresh point was argued in the second appeal saying that Notional Sugar Institute was an 'industry' and the relationship of employers and employees would be governed by the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act. Reference was made to the tests laid down in the case of Bangalore Water Supply v. A. Rajappa, AIR 1978 SC 548 . The Court referred to the triple tests laid down in the above case and applying the same held : "......... Reference was made to the tests laid down in the case of Bangalore Water Supply v. A. Rajappa, AIR 1978 SC 548 . The Court referred to the triple tests laid down in the above case and applying the same held : "......... the National Sugar Institute is predominantly a research Institute and its objective is to devise ways and means of economising in sugar production and also to design machines and machine parts so as to make the working of the sugar mills more efficient. It also helps the industry in solving their specific problems and to advice the industry in various others ways to make the whole industry more effective and viable. The defendant has admitted in its written statement that the Institute charges for advice to the industries and also undertakes other jobs of research on payment by industries. It is indeed an organised and systematic enterprise but to my mind it does not qualify to the various requirements which can make an enterprise an industry. It is purely a technical institute which provides the industry with its know how and skill and gives advantage of its research to the industry, of course, on payment but not on profit. Under these circumstances, I find myself unable to agree with the submission made by the appellant that the research Institute was an Industry" . The Court further observed that if the National Sugar Institute, Kanpur, be assumed to be an "Industry" and the plaintiff a "workman" in dispute arising between them to which provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-F of the Act were made applicable it would necessarily amount to industrial dispute and would be covered by the provisions of the Act. It was urged that the appellant had a right either to approach the civil court or to seek remedy under the Industrial Disputes Act. He having chosen to come to the civil court cannot claim that the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act should be applied in his case to find out as to whether his rights had been adversely affected or not. The Court then observed that the remedy for the plaintiff was to have sought relief under the Industrial Disputes Act rather than coming to the civil court. 12. The Court then observed that the remedy for the plaintiff was to have sought relief under the Industrial Disputes Act rather than coming to the civil court. 12. Learned counsel urged that the test applied in the above case would also be applicable in the instant case because the petitioners was also a Research Institute and was primarily involved in dealing with research for improvement of technology regarding oil and oil exploration by this country. I am, however, of the of opinion that in order to decide whether the Petitioner-Institute is an "industry" within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Act, we have to examine the question a little more deeply keeping in view the observations made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Bangalore Water Supply (supra). 13. First the definition of the word "industry" in the Act : "(k) "Industry" means any business, trade undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers and includes any calling, service, employment, handicraft, or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen." In the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, hereinafter referred to as the Central Act the definition in S. 2 (k) is the same as in the Act. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court were considering the definitions of "industry" as given in Section 2 (j) of the Central Act. The two definitions being identical, the observations made therein would be fully applicable in the present case also. 14. Before I advert to the specific passage from the above decision as reported in AIR 1978 SC 548 I would refer to an argument raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. He cited the case as reported in (1978)1 Lab LJ 349. He referred to the head-note in column 2 on page 350, which reads as follows : "Industry as defined in S. 2 (j) and explained in Banerji's case ( AIR 1953 SC 58 ) has a wide import. 1. He cited the case as reported in (1978)1 Lab LJ 349. He referred to the head-note in column 2 on page 350, which reads as follows : "Industry as defined in S. 2 (j) and explained in Banerji's case ( AIR 1953 SC 58 ) has a wide import. 1. (a) Where (i) systematic activity, (ii) organised by co-operation between employer and employee (the direct and substantial element is commercial (iii) for the production and/or distribution of goods and services calculated to satisfy human wants and wishes (not spiritual or religious bent inclusive of material things or services geared to celestial bliss, i. e. making on a large scale of (prasad or food) prima facie, there is an industry in that enterprise." Paragraph 131 of the Report on page 404 of the (1978)1 Lab LJ 349: quotes the above also. 15. Learned counsel referred the above as the triple tests to determine as to what is "industry" within the meaning of Section 2 (j) of the Central Act laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. 16. Leaving apart the rest of the contents in para 131 of the Report for the time being. I may refer to an argument raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. He urged that out of the aforementioned three tests, he would lay emphasis on the second one, viz., "systematic activity organised by co-operation between employer and employee (the direct and substantial element is commercial) In other words, he urged that unless there was substantial commercial element in the systematic activity, it would not come within the purview of "industry". In support of this contention, learned counsel referred to a passage from para 102 of the above Report : "We must look at the predominant character of the institution and the nature of the relations resulting in the production of foods and services. Stray wage earning employees do not shape the soul of an institution into an industry." In other words, his contention was that the Institute was a non-profit making body doing research and its predominant character was not commercial but public service through research. His main thrust was that unless the predominant character of the activity was commercial in nature, it would not be an "industry". I have referred to the above passage, for this was argued and that particular Law Journal was relied upon in arguments. His main thrust was that unless the predominant character of the activity was commercial in nature, it would not be an "industry". I have referred to the above passage, for this was argued and that particular Law Journal was relied upon in arguments. Regrettable as it is must be pointed out that the aforesaid Journal has wrongly reported the judgment of their Lordships and the head-notes prepared by it are patently wrong and misleading. My attention was drawn by the learned counsel for the respondents to the report of the aforementioned case in All India Reporter and in Supreme Court Cases. Para 131 of the Report in the Labour Law Journal is pars 161 in the AIR and sub-para (a) reads as follows : "(a). Where (i) systematic activity. (ii) organised by co-operation between employer and employee (the direct and substantial element is chimerical). (iii) for the production and/or distribution of goods and services calculated to satisfy human wants and wishes (not spiritual or religious but inclusive of material things or services geared to celestial bliss, i.e., making on a large scale prasad or food), prima facie, there is an "industry" in that enterprise." Similar is the reporting in (1978)(2) SCC 213 and in (1978)3 SCR 207 on page 282. There is no mention whatsoever of the word "commercial" in either of these two Reports. As a matter of fact, the head-note in the above case by All India Reporter uses the word "Chimerical" and not "Commercial". As a matter of fact the word 'commercial" does not fit into the sentence. This takes away all the emphasis from the argument that there ought to be a commercial element in the activity to bring it within the term "industry" as used in the Act. Their Lordships have in the very same report laid emphasis that it is not necessary that there should be a commercial activity or that there should be a motive to make profit, Mr. Justice Krishna Iyer in para 37 of the Report observed : "........ Their Lordships have in the very same report laid emphasis that it is not necessary that there should be a commercial activity or that there should be a motive to make profit, Mr. Justice Krishna Iyer in para 37 of the Report observed : "........ ...............An industry is a continuity, is an organised activity, is a purposeful pursuit not any isolated adventure, desultory excursion or casual fleeting engagement motivelessly undertaken Such is the common feature of a trade, business, calling, manufacture, mechanical or handicraft based service employment, industrial occupation or avocation." Their Lordships referred to the decision of Lord Denning in Hotel & Catering Industry Training Board v. Automobile Proprietary Ltd., (1968)1 WLR 1526 at p. 1530) : "It is true that 'the industry' is defined, but a definition is not to be read in isolation. It must be read in the context of the phrase which it defines, realising that the function of a definition is to give precision and certainty to a word or phrase which would otherwise be vague and uncertain but not to contradict it or supplant it altogether." 17. Coming back to the decision in Bangalore Water Supply (supra), their Lordships observed : (b) Absence of profit motive or gainful objective is irrelevant, be the venture in the public, joint, private or other sector. (c) The true focus is functional and the decisive test is the nature of the activity with special emphasis on the employer-employee relations." Explaining the term 'undertaking' their Lordships observed : ".... ............... all organised activity possessing the triple elements in 1 (supra), although not trade or business. may still be 'industry' provided the nature of the activity, viz. the employer-employee basis, hears resemblance to what we find in trade or business. This takes into the fold 'industry' undertakings, callings and services, adventures 'analogous to the carrying on of trade or business.' All features, other than the methodolgy of carrying on the activity viz. in organising the co-operation between employer and employee may be dissimilar. It does not matter, if on the employment terms there is analogy." Their Lordships then said : "The consequences are (i) professions, (ii) clubs, (iii) educational institutions, (iv) co-operatives, (v) research institutes, (vi) charitable projects and (vii) other kindred adventures, if they fulfil the triple tests listed in I (supra), cannot be exempted from the scope of Section 2(j)." 18. It does not matter, if on the employment terms there is analogy." Their Lordships then said : "The consequences are (i) professions, (ii) clubs, (iii) educational institutions, (iv) co-operatives, (v) research institutes, (vi) charitable projects and (vii) other kindred adventures, if they fulfil the triple tests listed in I (supra), cannot be exempted from the scope of Section 2(j)." 18. Their Lordships have specifically dealt with research institute in para 135 of the Report and have ultimately concluded : "It follows that research institutes, albeit run without profit motive, are industries." This decision therefore lays down the tests for determining whether a particular institute is 'industry' within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the Central Act, Research institutes are usually non-profit making establishments. Their intent is to produce results which are for the general good of the public. Usually there is no profit motive. Such institutes may be an organisation in the public sector or in the private sector. Still if the institute fulfils the triple tests laid down by their Lordships, it will be an 'industry' as defined in Section 2(j) of the Central Act. 19. In the present case, there is a systematic activity, organised by co-operation between employer and employee for the production of results for better and proper use of oil and oil exploration in the country. Such service satisfies human wants and desires for the better utility of oil and its products in the life and works of its citizens The cardinal elements are all there in the case of the Indian Institute of Petroleum to bring it within the definition of 'industry' in Section 2(k) of the Act Several other decisions were also cited by the learned counsel, but they have been considered in the above case. 20. Krishna Iyer, J.. has traced various decisions of the Supreme Court from the case of B. N. Barerji v. P.R. Mukherjee. AIR 1953 SC 58 to the Indian Standards Institute case, AIR 1976 SC 145 . 20. Krishna Iyer, J.. has traced various decisions of the Supreme Court from the case of B. N. Barerji v. P.R. Mukherjee. AIR 1953 SC 58 to the Indian Standards Institute case, AIR 1976 SC 145 . His Lordships reviewed the earlier decisions of the Court and observed:- "This Court, within a few years of the enactment of the salutary statute, explained the benign sweep of industry in Banerji, AIR 1953 SC 58 which served as beacon in later years Ahmedabad Textile Research, AIR 1961 SC 484 acted on it, Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, AIR 1960 SC 610 and Nagpur Corporation, AIR 1960 SC 675 marched in its sheen........." However, from 1962 there was a procession of decisions in the Solicitors' case AIR 1962 SC 1080 , University of Delhi, AIR 1963 SC 1873 , Gymkhana Club, AIR 1958 SC 554 , Cricket Club of India, AIR 1969 SC 276 , Chartered Accountants, (1963)1 Lab LJ 567, and lastly Safdarjung case. AIR 1970 SC 1407 , carved out certain exceptions to the rule propounded in Banerji's case (supra). Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Bangalore Water Supply case overruled Safdarjung, Solicitors' case, Gymkhana, Delhi University and Dhanrajgiri Hospital case The decision in the case of Hospital Mazdoor Sabha was rehabilitated. Although all the Hon'ble Judges concluded with the ultimate decision of Krishna Iyer, J., that the appeal be dismissed but there were separate judgments from Chief Justice M. H. Beg, Chandrachud, Jaswant Singh and Tulzapurkar, JJ. There was a general agreement among the learned Judges that it was necessary that the Legislature should step in a comprehensive bill to clear up and set at rest the controversy which crops up from time to time. According to the decision of the Supreme Court, the legal position at present prevails and until a party satisfies that organisation, institute or enterprise is not an 'industry' within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Act, it would be an 'industry' provided it satisfies the triple tests outlined by Krishna Iyer, J. in his judgment. 21. According to the decision of the Supreme Court, the legal position at present prevails and until a party satisfies that organisation, institute or enterprise is not an 'industry' within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Act, it would be an 'industry' provided it satisfies the triple tests outlined by Krishna Iyer, J. in his judgment. 21. Applying these principles and tests, I am of the view that the Indian Institute of Petroleum although a Research Institute run by a society registered under the Societies Registration Act and whose members are all Government nominees and whose almost entire funds come from Government coffer and whose main work is to do research in oil and exploration without any profit motive or as a commercial enterprise is nevertheless an 'industry' within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the Central Act as also Section 2(k) of the Act. The essential element of relationship between the employer and the employee fulfils the tests laid down in Bangalore Water Supply case (supra) and is applicable in the present case. I see no distinction. 22. For the reasons indicated above, the first point has no merits. 23. Now I come to the second point. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the reference by the State of U. P. under Section 4-K of the Act was bad in law inasmuch as the Institute being an organisation run by the Central Government by or under the authority of the Central Government a reference could only have been made by the Central Government. It was further urged that the "appropriate Government" in this context was the Central Government and no such reference having been made by the latter the reference made by the State Government was bad in law. Learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his contention referred to the origin of the founding of the Institute which was originally a part of the Central Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) although both the CSIR and the Institute were societies registered under the Societies Registration Act, these organisations were run under the authority of the Central Government the entire funds for running these Institutes came from the Central Government and these Institutes were not running either with the intent of profit-making or as a commercial organisation. The Central Government had full rights to remove any of the directors/members and had a right to nominate any person or Government official to be a member director of these research organisations. Reference was made to Annexure I to the rejoinder affidavit which was a memorandum of association and rules and regulations and bye-laws of the Council of the Scientific and Industrial Research, New Delhi as also the rules and regulations and bye-laws of the Institute. 24. Learned counsel for the respondent vehemently argued that the entire contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner was misconceived. He urged that the Institute was an industry within the meaning of Section 2-K of the Act and being situate in Dehradun in the State of Uttar Pradesh and being an independent entity the State Government was perfectly within its jurisdiction to make a reference under Section 4-K of the Act. He further urged that the "appropriate Government" in the present case was the State Government and not the Central Government. Consequently, the reference made by the State Government was valid. In support of his contention learned counsel cited the following cases : (i) AIR 1970 SC 82 , Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union v. State of Bihar ; (ii) AIR 1975 SC 1737 , Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. v. Workmen ; (iii) AIR 1975 SC 1329 , Sabhajit Tewari v. Union of India ; (iv) to the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court dated 24-4-1979 in 3 connected writ petitions, National Textile Corporation v. Industrial Tribunal ; and (v) (1984) 48 Fac LR 25 (Raj ). The case relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner in this context shall be referred to in the appropriate place. 25. The case relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner in this context shall be referred to in the appropriate place. 25. First of all the definition of industrial dispute as given in Section 2(1) of the Act is as under : "'Industrial dispute' means any dispute or difference between employers and employers or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the term of employment or with the condition of labour of any person, but does not include an industrial dispute concerning :- (i) any industry carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government, or by a Railway Company, or (ii) such controlled industry as may be specified in this behalf by Central Government, or (iii) banking and insurance companies as defined in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, or (iv) a mine or an oil-field." 26. This makes it clear that an industry carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government "does not come within the definition of industrial dispute" mentioned above. Therefore, one of the aspects of the matter would be whether the Institute was an industry carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government. I have already held that the Institute is an industry within the meaning of Section 2-K. Therefore, the only question to he seen is whether it is being carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government. 27. It will be relevant in this context to see some of the decisions of their Lordships of the Supreme Court of this point. The first case is Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union v. State of Bihar (supra). This was a case in which the trade union of the Heavy Engineering Corporation, Ranchi went before the Supreme Court and contended that it was an industry carried on by a Corporation incorporated under the Companies Act and not by the Central Government or any of its Departments. It was not an industry that was carried on by Central Government although its shares were owned by the President of India and some officials. Their Lordships held that an incorporated company has a separate existence and the law recognises it as a juristic person separate and distinct from its members. This new personality emerges from the moment of its incorporation. Their Lordships held that an incorporated company has a separate existence and the law recognises it as a juristic person separate and distinct from its members. This new personality emerges from the moment of its incorporation. Their Lordships further observed : "..............the mere fact that the entire share capital of the respondent company was contributed by the Central Government and the fact that all its shares are held by the President and certain officers of the Central Government does not make any difference. The company and the shareholders being, as aforesaid, distinct entities the fact that the President of India and certain officers hold all its shares does not make the company an agent either of the President or the Central Government." On the question whether a corporation is an agent of the State their Lordships opined that it would depend upon the facts of each case where a statute setting up a corporation so provides such a corporation can easily be identified as the agent of the State. In the absence of a statutory provision, however, a commercial corporation acting on its own behalf even though it is controlled wholly or partially by a Government department will be ordinarily presumed not to be a servant or an agent of the State The fact that a Minister appoints the members or directors of a corporation he is entitled to call for information, to give directions which are banding on the directors and to supervise over the conduct of the business of the corporation does not render the corporation as an agent of the Government Their Lordships were of the view that the Heavy Engineering Corporation Ranchi was not being carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government. It would be relevant to mention here that in the case of Institute the entire funds came from the Central Government all its directors were Government nominees and the Government gave directors to it from time to time, but then it was neither a Department of the Government nor was there any statutory provision making it so. As a matter of fact, admittedly the Institute was a society registered under the Societies Registration Act and was a distinct entity separate from the Central Government or any of its department. However, one distinctive feature is there. As a matter of fact, admittedly the Institute was a society registered under the Societies Registration Act and was a distinct entity separate from the Central Government or any of its department. However, one distinctive feature is there. There Heavy Engineering Corporation, Ranchi was incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1956 and a corporation under the said Act is a juristic person. 28. The next case is of M/s. Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (supra). It is a Government company incorporated under Section 617 of the Companies Act. Shares of The company are entirely owned by the Central Government. The Divisional Office of the company is located at Bangalore and a branch of the Company is at Barrackpore (West Bengal). A dispute arose in respect of the employees working in the branch and the Company and the State of West Bengal made a reference under Section 10 (1) of the Central Act. The Court held that the Barrackpore branch was engaged in an industry of repairs of aircrafts or the like at Birrackpore. For the purposes of the Act or on the facts of the case the Barackpore branch was an industry carried on by the Company as a separate unit. Consequently, the reference of the State Government was appropriate. In the present case an attempt was made by the learned counsel for the Company to distinguish the case of Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union (supra) but their Lordships rejected the contention. It, therefore, transpires that the observation made in the case of Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union was approved and reiterated. 29. Reference may be made to the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in 3 writ petitions of National Textile Corporation v. Industrial Tribunal. The management of 3 companies at Kanpur was taken over by the Central Government. The Central Government appointed the National Textile Corporation as the custodian of the two Undertakings. The National Textile Corporation in its turn appointed the National Textile Corporation (U. P.) Ltd. as the additional custodian of these undertakings. The management of 3 companies at Kanpur was taken over by the Central Government. The Central Government appointed the National Textile Corporation as the custodian of the two Undertakings. The National Textile Corporation in its turn appointed the National Textile Corporation (U. P.) Ltd. as the additional custodian of these undertakings. An industrial dispute having arisen the State Government made a reference under Section 4-K of the Act A preliminary objection was raised in each of these cases by the National Textile Corporation (U.P.) Ltd. that the references were invalid inasmuch as the management of two mills had been taken over by the Central Government and the State Government was not competent to make the references inasmuch as these industries were on account of their management being taken over by the Central Government, 'carried on by or under the authority of the Central Govt.' within the meaning of Section 2 (1) (i) of the Act. The preliminary objection having been overruled both by the Industrial Tribunal, Kanpur and the Labour Court, Kanpur, the matters were pursued in writ jurisdiction. The Division Bench referred to a host of cases including the Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union (supra). An argument was raised that since the Central Government had taken over the management of the two mils, these mills were industries 'carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government, and hence the reference ought to have been made by the Central Government. Reference made in this connection to the case of D.P. Kelkar v. Ambadas, AIR 1971 Bom 124 : but the Court held that the view taken in that case did not alter the legal position as enunciated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union (supra). The Court observed that the taking over of the management of the undertakings in the public interest, pending nationalisation of such undertakings did not make it an industry being carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government. The Division Bench observed : Till the two mills were nationalised their ownership could not vest in the Central Government, in such matters the acid test is whether the companies have been divested of their proprietary rights. The Division Bench observed : Till the two mills were nationalised their ownership could not vest in the Central Government, in such matters the acid test is whether the companies have been divested of their proprietary rights. ............The Central Government after injecting life and blood in an ill managed undertaking and making it a viable undertaking shall be bound, unless it chooses to nationalise it, to return its management to its owner. The temporary external control of the management of the mills does not deprive the companies of their corporate character nor their right to property in the mill............What has been done under the provisions referred to above is that the power of the director has been vested in the custodian and to a certain extent the powers of the shareholders have been curtailed............This being the position it cannot be said that the industry in respect of the two mills on account of their management being taken over under the Act is carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government." It is thus clear from the above that where the management of a public company has been taken over and the company is run by an organisation which is a creation of the Central Government, the Courts have ruled that it is not an industry carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government. This case is helpful to indicate that one of the points is pari materia to the case Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union (supra). It is laid down that even in a case where the management of the public limited company has been taken over by the Central Government and the National Textile Corporation has been entrusted with the running of the companies it does not amount to the carrying on of the industry by or under the authority of the Central Government. 30. Another case of Sabhajit Tewari v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 1329 , concerned the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research. An argument was raised that the CSIR was an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. This contention was repelled by their Lordships. It will be relevant to mention here that the CSIR is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act. Under rule 3, the Prime Minister of India is the ex-officio President of the society. An argument was raised that the CSIR was an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. This contention was repelled by their Lordships. It will be relevant to mention here that the CSIR is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act. Under rule 3, the Prime Minister of India is the ex-officio President of the society. The governing body consists of persons appointed by the Government of India representing the Administrative Ministry under which the CSIR is included and the Ministry of Finance and one or more members appointed by the Government of India. The Government of India has the power to terminate the membership of any member or at one and the same time of all members other than the ex-officio members of the governing body. Rule 45 state that the governing body shall have the management of the affairs and funds of the society. Rule 46 empowers the governing body to frame, amend or repeal the bye-laws, not inconsistent with the rules for the administration and management of the affairs of the society with the sanction of the Government of India. These provisions are also to be found in the Rules framed for the Institute. They are pari materia on all these points. Their Lordships considered these matters and then observed : "Extracting the features as aforesaid, it was contended that these would indicate that the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research was really an agency of the Government. This contention is unsound. The Society does not have a statutory character like the Oil and Natural Gas Commission, or the Life Insurance Corporation or Industrial Finance Corporation it is a society incorporated in accordance with the provisions of the Societies Registration Act. This contention is unsound. The Society does not have a statutory character like the Oil and Natural Gas Commission, or the Life Insurance Corporation or Industrial Finance Corporation it is a society incorporated in accordance with the provisions of the Societies Registration Act. The fact that the Prime Minister is the President or that the Government appoints nominees to the Governing Body or that the Government may terminate the membership will nor establish any thing more than the fact that the Government takes special care that the promotion, guidance and co-operation of scientific and industrial research, the institution and financing of specific researches, establishment or development and assistance to special institutions or departments of the existing institutions for scientific study of problem affecting particular industry in a trade, the utilisation of the result of the researches conducted under the auspices of the Council towards the development of industries in the country are carried out in a responsible manner." 31. The Court also referred to the cases of Praga Tools Corporation v. C.V. Imanual, AIR 1969 SC 1306 ; Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union v. State of Bihar (supra) S. L. Agarwal v. General Manager Hindustan Steel Ltd., AIR 1970 SC 1150 and held that the Praga Tools Corporation, Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union and Hindustan Steel Ltd. are all companies incorporated under the Companies Act and the employees of these companies do not enjoy the protection available Government servants as contemplated in Article 311 of the Constitution. The companies were held in those cases to have existence independent of the Government and by the law relating to corporations. Their Lordships further observed : These could not be held to be departments of the Government". For these reasons the Court opined that the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research is not an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. 32. In my opinion, the law laid down by their Lordships in the cases of Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union and Sabhajit Tewari are apt and fully applicable in the present case. 33. For these reasons the Court opined that the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research is not an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. 32. In my opinion, the law laid down by their Lordships in the cases of Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union and Sabhajit Tewari are apt and fully applicable in the present case. 33. Learned counsel for the petitioners, however, tried to distinguish the cases of Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union and the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, on the ground that the words -by or under the authority of "were not incorporated according to the law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of S. K. Gupta v. K. P. Jain (1979) 3 SCC 54 . Their Lordship laid down in the above case that where in a definition section of a statute a word is defined to mean a certain thing, wherever that word is used in that statute, it shall mean stating in the definition unless the context otherwise requires. Their Lordships observed that the above is the normal rule and will prevail. However, it can be departed from if there is something to show that the definition will not apply. Learned counsel urged that the expression "by or under the authority of" has not been defined anywhere in the Act and therefore, it was necessary for the Court to find out from the facts whether these corporations were being carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government. I think it is not necessary to enter into this question of interpretation in the present case for the law laid down their Lordships in the case of Sabhajit Tewari (supra) is fully applicable to the facts of the present case, It was not a case of Corporation. It was a case of the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, which was parent body of the Institute. They separated and became two separate entities but the Institute had all those provisions which the CSIR has and which have been mentioned in the judgment of their Lordships. This case is in all fours with the facts and circumstances of the instant case. The contention that the CSIR was run by or under the authority of the Central Government was rejected. Reasons were given which have been referred to earlier. Some reasons would be applicable in the present case too. This case is in all fours with the facts and circumstances of the instant case. The contention that the CSIR was run by or under the authority of the Central Government was rejected. Reasons were given which have been referred to earlier. Some reasons would be applicable in the present case too. I have therefore, no hesitation in rejecting the contention raised by the learned counsel that the institute was being run by or under the authority of the Central Government' which being a distinct and independent entity and located at Dehradun in the State of Uttar Pradesh, the reference made by the State Government was, therefore, valid in law. 34. An argument was raised that the State Government was not the appropriate Government but it was the Central Government. After the conclusion reached on the other point I am of the view that it is unnecessary to examine this matter in depth for if the Institute was not a department of the Central Government or run by or under the authority of the Central Government the Central Government would not be vested with any right or jurisdiction to refer the case. I may, however refer to the relevant provisions of the definition of the words "appropriate Government" as given in S. 2 (a) of the Central Act. It reads as follows : "2. Definitions. - In this Act unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context. (a) "appropriate Government" means - (i) in relation to any Industrial Disputes concerning any industry carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government or by a Railway Company or concerning any such controlled industry as may be specified in this behalf by the Central Government. (ii) in relation to any other Industrial Dispute, the State Government." 35. (a) "appropriate Government" means - (i) in relation to any Industrial Disputes concerning any industry carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government or by a Railway Company or concerning any such controlled industry as may be specified in this behalf by the Central Government. (ii) in relation to any other Industrial Dispute, the State Government." 35. From the above definition it is apparent that all those industries carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government or in relation to an industrial dispute concerning the Industrial Finance Corpn, of India, the Employees' State Insurance Corpn., the Indian Airlines, the Air India Corpn., the Life Insurance Corporation, the Agricultural Refinance Corporation, the Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Unit Trust of India, the Food Corporation of India, Regional Rural Bank, or the Banking Service Commission or a Banking or an Insurance Company, a mine, an oil field or a cantonment Board, or a major port, the Central Government would be the appropriate Government. In respect of other industrial disputes it would be the State Government. It would be seen from the above definition that unless he Institute came within the purview of the words "any industry carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government or being a controlled industry as may be specified in this behalf by the Central Government," the Central Government would not be an appropriate Government. The other corporations or bodies named in Section 2 (a) (i) do not include the CSIR or the Indian Petroleum. The question whether the Institute is an industry carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government has been examined above and it has been held that it is an 'industry' within the meaning of of S. 2 (k). There is a further finding that it is not being carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government. Therefore, in this case the Central Government would not be the appropriate Government. 36. Let me now examine whether it is a controlled industry. There is nothing in the petition or in any material brought to my notice that the CSIR was a controlled industry. There is nothing to show that there is any notification issue, in this respect specifying this or any such research institute is a controlled industry. 36. Let me now examine whether it is a controlled industry. There is nothing in the petition or in any material brought to my notice that the CSIR was a controlled industry. There is nothing to show that there is any notification issue, in this respect specifying this or any such research institute is a controlled industry. In the case of Bijay Cotton Ltd. v. Its Workmen, AIR 1960 SC 692 , their Lordships have held that there must be a specification by the Central Government to make it a 'controlled industry'. Similar view has been taken in the case of Vishnu Sugar Mills v. Workman, AIR 1960 SC 812 . Learned counsel thereafter did not press the point that the industry carried on by the Institute is a 'controlled industry'. 37. It is, therefore, clear that for the Institute the appropriate Government is not the Central Government. Now if the Institute does not come within cl. (i) of S 2 (a) of the Central Act then the State Government is the only appropriate Government. Reference may be made to Section 10 of the Central Act which gives the power of reference to Boards. Courts or Tribunals. The power is to be exercised by the appropriate Government. As seen above, the appropriate Government in the present case is the State Government and not the Central Government. In this view of the matter, the State Government alone is entitled to make the reference. 38. In view of the above conclusions, the Writ Petition must fail and is accordingly dismissed. The ad interim orders dated 23rd March and 7th May, 1984 are vacated. I further direct that the proceeding before the Industrial Tribunal No. V, Meerut shall be resumed at the earliest and should be expedited so as to conclude within a period of six months. The contesting respondents will be entitled to their costs in this Court.