JUDGMENT K.N. Singh, J. - By means of this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the petitioner has challenged the validity of the order of the Chairman-cum-Managing Director of National Textile Corporation (U. P.) Ltd., Kanpur, D/- 26-11-1976, terminating the petitioner's services by giving him one month's salary in lieu of notice. 2. Briefly the facts giving rise to this petition are that the petitioner was appointed as Factory Welfare Officer in Atherton West & Co., Kanpur, by an order on 21-3-1952. In May, 1975, the workmen of the Company were laid off and continued to be laid off till 19-7-1976, the management was taken over by the Central Government under Section 3 (7), Laxmiratan and Atherton West Cotton Mills (Taking Over of Management) Ordinance, 1976 (Ordinance No. 11 of 1976) promulgated by the President of India on 19th July, 1976. The Central Government, in exercise of its powers under clause 4 (1) of the Ordinance appointed the National Textile Corporation Ltd., a Government Company, as the Custodian of the two undertakings, the Laxmiratan Cotton Mills and the Atherton West Cotton Mills for the management of the two Mills. The notification further authorised the Custodian to appoint the National Textile Corporation, a Government Company as the Additional Custodian of the two undertakings. In pursuance of the authority conferred by the aforesaid notification, the National Textile Corporation Ltd. was appointed as the additional Custodian of the two undertakings for the purpose of carrying on the management of the undertakings of the two Companies for and on behalf of the Central Government. The Ordinance was later on replaced by Act VIII of 1976. The Chairman-cum-Managing Director of the National Textile Corporation U. P. Ltd., was of the opinion that the petitioner's employment in the undertakings was unduly onerous and accordingly in exercise of his powers under Section 13 of Act VIII of 1976, hereinafter referred to as `the Act' terminated his services by his order D/- 26-11-1976, by giving him one month's salary in lieu of notice. Aggrieved the petitioner has approached this Court by means of this petition for the quashing of the order. 3. During the pendency of the petition when arguments were concluded but before judgment was delivered, the petitioner R.K. Nigam died on 20-7-1984 leaving behind Smt. Chandra Kanta Nigam, as his widow, Pradeep Ranjan Nigam and Jaideep Nigam, his sons, Km. Rubi and Smt. Dr. 3. During the pendency of the petition when arguments were concluded but before judgment was delivered, the petitioner R.K. Nigam died on 20-7-1984 leaving behind Smt. Chandra Kanta Nigam, as his widow, Pradeep Ranjan Nigam and Jaideep Nigam, his sons, Km. Rubi and Smt. Dr. Alka Garg, his daughters. They made an application for substituting their names as petitioners. Counsel for the respondents did not contest their application Accordingly, we allowed the application, as a result of which the legal heirs and representatives of R. K. Nigam have been substituted as petitioners. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner made the following submissions :- (i) The petitioner being a Welfare Officer was holding a public office which was statutory in nature, his appointment and continuance in service did not amount to contractual employment, as such his services could not be terminated under Section 13 of the Act. (ii) The petitioner being a permanent holder of a public office had a vested right to hold the same till his services were terminated in accordance with the U. P. Factories Welfare Officers Rules, 1955. Any order terminating his service in exercise of power under Section 13 of the Act could not be passed without affording opportunity to the petitioner. Since the order has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice, the order is rendered void. (iii) Even if Section 13 was applicable the petitioner's continuance in service was not "unduly onerous as contemplated by Section 13 of the Act. The order of termination has been passed arbitrarily. (iv) The order of termination was passed mala fide on account of malice of Sri S. N. Agarwal, Secretary of the National Textile Corporation Ltd., 5. We will deal with the submissions in seriatim :- As noted earlier, the management of the Atherton West Cotton Mills was not able to manage the factory and it had laid off its workmen for two months which caused labour unrest. The Company was mainly engaged in the production of coarse and medium varieties of cloth needed by the weaker Section of the community and as the Company was suffering losses, the President of India promulgated the Ordinance No. 11 of 1976, which authorised the Central Government to take over the management of the company. As noted earlier the Ordinance was converted into an Act. As noted earlier the Ordinance was converted into an Act. Section 13 of the Act conferred power on the Custodian to terminate a contract of employment of an employee on one month's notice or salary in lieu thereof if the Custodian was of the opinion that any contract of employment entered into by the Company at any time before the taking over of the management of the company was unduly onerous. The Managing Director-cum-Chairman of the National Textile Corporation, U. P. Ltd., terminated the petitioner's services in exercise of powers under Section 13 of the Act as he was of the opinion that the petitioner's continuance in service was unduly onerous. 6. Section 49, Factories Act, 1948, Provides that in every factory wherein five hundred or more workers are ordinarily employed the occupier shall employ in the factory such number of Welfare Officers as may be prescribed. Sec. 49 further lays down that the State Government may prescribe the duties, qualifications and conditions of service of Welfare Officers employed in a factory. The State of Uttar Pradesh has framed the U. P. Factories Welfare Officers Rules, 1955, which regulate the service conditions of Welfare Officer appointed in a factory. Rule 3 provides for appointment of Welfare Officers where in a factory 500 or more workers are ordinarily employed. The rule further prescribes three grades for Welfare Officers. Grade I relates to the factories, ordinarily employing 2500 or more workers per day in the scale of pay of Rs. 900-1600. Grade II relates to the factories ordinarily employing from 1000 to 2499 workers per day in the scale of pay of Rs. 550-1200 Grade-III relates to the factories. ordinarily employing from 500 to 990 workers per day in the scale of pay of Rs. 750-850. The Rules provide the age and qualifications, the period of probation and confirmation, functions and duties of Welfare Officers. The Rules also prescribed the age of superannuation at the age of 58 years. Rule 8 lays down that the Welfare Officer shall have the status of an officer of the factory. Rule 10 lays down that all appointments shall be made on permanent basis on one year's probation. Rule 12 lays down that probationer shall be confirmed in his appointment at the end of his period of probation, or at the end of the extended period of probation. Rule 10 lays down that all appointments shall be made on permanent basis on one year's probation. Rule 12 lays down that probationer shall be confirmed in his appointment at the end of his period of probation, or at the end of the extended period of probation. Rule 15 prescribes punishment which may be awarded by the Management of a factory. The punishments prescribed include (i) Censure, (ii) withholding of increments, including stoppage at any efficiency bar. (iii) reduction to lower stage in the time scale, (iv) suspension and (v) dismissal or termination of service in any other manner. The management is not empowered to impose any punishment other than censure except with the previous concurrence of the Labour Commissioner. Rule 16 provides for appeal to the State Government against the order of punishment awarded by the Management, with the concurrence of the Labour Commissioner. Rule 21 prescribes that age of superannuation of Welfare Officer shall be 58 years. 7. The scheme of the Factories Act and the rules framed by the State Government demonstrates that the office of Welfare Officer is a public office and the terms and conditions of his appointment are regulated by statutory rules. The office is of a permanent character hedged in by statutory safeguards. The duties of the Labour Welfare Officer are of public nature, because they affect the interest of a large number of workers employed in the factory. The employer has no right to terminate the services of a Welfare Officer without obtaining concurrence of the Labour Commissioner. In Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. v. G. C. Kumar (1972) 25 Fac LR 146, a Division Bench of this Court while considering the question as to whether a mandamus can be issued to a private company to compel it to do its duty which is of a public nature considered the nature of the office held by a Labour Welfare Officer. On a detailed discussion, the Bench held that the post of Labour Welfare Officer is an office created by the Act, it is a public office and the holder of the office is required to perform duties which are of public nature and therefore a mandamus can be issued by the Court to a company to restore the office to a person whose services may have been wrongly terminated. In Prem Narain Srivastava v. Kanpur Chemical Works, (1973) 27 Fac LR 408 : (1975 Lab IC 479) (All) it was again held that a Labour Welfare Officer enjoyed a statutory status and his employment was of a public nature, even though the employer is a private individual or company it did not have any inherent power to terminate the services of a Labour Welfare Officer as the terms and conditions of his service are regulated by statutory provisions. We are in agreement with the view expressed in the aforesaid cases. Accordingly, we hold that the office of a Labour Welfare Officer is a public office and its holder is required to perform duties and functions which are of public nature. The tenure of such an officer is not contractual, instead it is statutory in nature. The employer has no right or power to terminate the services of a Labour Welfare Officer by terminating the contract of employment, instead his services are terminable only in accordance with statutory provisions. 8. Section 13 reads as under:- "If the Custodian is of opinion that any contract of employment entered into by either of the two companies or any managing agent or managing or other Director of either of the two companies at any time before the appointed day is unduly onerous, he or it may, by giving to the employee one month's notice in writing or salary or wages for one month in lieu thereof terminate such contract of employment. The Custodian is empowered to terminate the contract of employment which may have been entered into by either of the two companies or Managing Agent or Managing Director any time before the appointed day if the Custodian is of the opinion that a contract of employment is unduly onerous, and in pursuance thereof services of the employee may be terminated by giving one month's salary or notice in lieu thereof. Section 13 read with Section 7 of the Act has overriding effect notwithstanding anything contained in any other law. Section 13, if applicable, certainly empowers the custodian to terminate the services of a Labour Welfare Officer, notwithstanding the statutory protection granted to the officer under the U. P. Labour Welfare Officers Rules, 1953, as Section 13 read with Section 7 has an overriding effect on the existing laws. 9. Section 13, if applicable, certainly empowers the custodian to terminate the services of a Labour Welfare Officer, notwithstanding the statutory protection granted to the officer under the U. P. Labour Welfare Officers Rules, 1953, as Section 13 read with Section 7 has an overriding effect on the existing laws. 9. The question, however, arises as to whether Section 13 confers power on the Custodian to terminate the services of an employee who holds a Public office and performs public service and whose services are regulated by statutory provisions. As to whether the 'contract of employment as occurring in Section 13 contemplates appointment and termination of a Labour Welfare Officer. The expression 'contract of employment as occurring in Section 13 appears to refer to the contract of employment under which the various employees may have been employed in the two companies. Whenever an employer engages an employee in service specially in the case of employment in a private company or undertaking the terms and conditions of the employment are contained in the contract of employment entered into between the employer and the employee. A contract of employment generally contains terms and conditions of service. A written contract of employment is not generally necessary for the appointment of a person to a public office whose terms and conditions are regulated by statutory provisions. In our opinion Section 13 (comprehends a contract of employment entered into by the employer with the employee containing terms and conditions of service creating relationship of master and servant. In the event of an appointment of a Labour Welfare Officer in accordance with the Factories Act and the rules there need not be a contract of Employment between the employer and the employee, because the employer has on free volition to employ or not to employ a Labour Welfare Officer. Once the number of employees in a factory is 500 or more the employer is under a mandatory duty to employ a Labour Welfare Officer whose terms and conditions are regulated by statutory provisions. Where a person enters into service through a contract of employment his services are liable to be terminated by revoking the contract of employment. In such an event the employee has no right to reinstatement although he may be entitled to a decree for damages. The expression `contract of employment' occurring in Section 13 of the Act refers to such contracts. In such an event the employee has no right to reinstatement although he may be entitled to a decree for damages. The expression `contract of employment' occurring in Section 13 of the Act refers to such contracts. In case of appointment to a public office or statutory office, where the terms and conditions of employment are regulated by statutory rules, the termination of service in violation of the statutory provisions would entitle the employee to reinstatement. Since a Labour Welfare Officer holds a public office and his terms and conditions of service are regulated by statutory rules, his appointment and continuance in service do not depend upon the contract of employment. The office of the Labour Welfare Officer is mandatory in nature and the person who holds that office holds a public office and acquires a status which cannot be terminated by the employer by revoking the contract of employment. 10. Learned counsel for the respondents urged that the expression 'contract of employment occurring in Section 13 is of wide import and it comprehends the appointment of a Labour Welfare Officer. According to the learned counsel, whenever a Labour Welfare Officer is appointed by the employer, a contract of employment comes into being even though the terms and conditions of service are regulated by statutory rules, but nonetheless the employee continues to be under a contract of employment. We find no merit in the submission. It is well settled that though the Government like any other master may have a contractual right, but a Government servant acquires a status on appointment to his office. His rights and obligations are determined under statutory or constitutional authority and the terms of his employment cannot be terminated merely by revoking the contract of employment. An ordinary individual in a case of master and servant's contractual relationship cannot enforce any breach of contract. In such a case it is open to the employer to terminate the relationship of master and servant by revoking the contract of employment. In case of appointment to a public office where statutory rules regulate the terms and conditions of service, the failure to observe the rules would render the order of termination or dismissal void. See Sukhdeo Singh v. Bhagat Ram, AIR 1975 SC 1331 : (1975 Lab IC 881). In case of appointment to a public office where statutory rules regulate the terms and conditions of service, the failure to observe the rules would render the order of termination or dismissal void. See Sukhdeo Singh v. Bhagat Ram, AIR 1975 SC 1331 : (1975 Lab IC 881). In this view we are of the opinion that the "contract of employment" in Section 13 contemplates appointment of persons who do not enjoy statutory protection and the terms and conditions of their employment are regulated by contract of employment. Section 13 does not confer power on the custodian to terminate service of a person holding public office whose terms and conditions of service are regulated by statutory provisions. We accordingly hold that the custodian had no power to terminate the petitioner's service in the manner it was done. 11. The petitioner's submission that his services were terminated in violation of the principles of natural justice is not disputed as he was not given any opportunity before the issue of the order of termination. It is, however, urged on behalf of the respondents that Section 13 does not contemplate affording of any opportunity to the employee whose services may be terminated in exercise of power under that provision. It is true that Section 13 does not expressly provide for affording any opportunity to the employee whose services may be terminated. Absence of specific provision for giving opportunity to the affected employee does not exclude the application of principles of natural justice. Opportunity of hearing is a sacred limb of principles of natural justice. Its application is not dependent on the express provisions in any enactment or rule. Where the statutory provision is silent the principles of natural justice would apply. The question whether principles of natural justice are attracted depends upon the setting and the background under which the power is exercised. In the instant case the petitioner was holding a public office on a permanent basis. He was enjoying the protection of statutory provisions. The employer had no right to terminate his employment without complying with the statutory provisions. The petitioner had a vested right to hold he office of Labour Welfare Officer. The Custodian's order terminating the petitioner's services on the ground of its being onerous affected the petitioner's right adversely. The Custodian was under a duty to observe the rules of natural justice. The petitioner had a vested right to hold he office of Labour Welfare Officer. The Custodian's order terminating the petitioner's services on the ground of its being onerous affected the petitioner's right adversely. The Custodian was under a duty to observe the rules of natural justice. In Sukhdeo Singh v. Bhagat Ram (1975 Lab IC 881) (supra) the Supreme Court held that whenever a man's rights are affected by a decision taken under statutory powers the Court would presume existence of duty to observe rules of natural justice. In State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei, AIR 1967 SC 1269 the Supreme Court held that the principles of natural justice apply even to administrative actions. Since the petitioner's services were being terminated on the ground that his continuance in service was onerous, the observance of the rules of natural justice by giving opportunity to the petitioner was necessary for a just decision. If the petitioner had been given opportunity he would have placed material before the Custodian to see that the petitioner's continuance in service was not onerous and that he held a public office and continuance of his service was mandatory in accordance with Section 49, Factories Act. It is pertinent to note at this stage that after the termination of petitioner's services, two persons were employed as Labour Welfare Officers, although in different grades. This clearly shows that there was necessity for the continuance of the Labour Welfare Officer in the Company, but in spite of that the petitioner's services were terminated. Had the petitioner been given opportunity he would have persuaded the Chairman-cum-Managing Director of the respondent Corporation to take a view that the petitioner's continuance in service was not onerous. The denial of opportunity to the petitioner before the order of termination was passed resulted into great injustice to the petitioner. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner then urged that the rules of natural justice and specially the principle of audi alteram Partem does not apply to exercise of administrative functions. In our opinion, it is now too late in the day to contend that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to administrative orders. The concept of natural justice lias undergone a great deal of change in recent years. In our opinion, it is now too late in the day to contend that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to administrative orders. The concept of natural justice lias undergone a great deal of change in recent years. The dividing line between administrative and quasi judicial functions is blurred, as was observed by the Supreme Court in A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 150 . 13. Although Section 13 is silent regarding giving of opportunity to the employee whose services are terminated, yet regard being had to the legislative history, the status of the office of the Welfare Officer and the rights and responsibilities and statutory protection to the holder of the office to continue in service for the full term of the office, if the petitioner's right to continue in service is taken away it certainly entails Civil consequences so as to justify the insistence upon the observance of the principles of natural justice before an order of termination is passed. Since the petitioner was not given opportunity of being heard by the Custodian prior to the issue of the termination order, the order of termination must be held to have been passed in contravention of the principles of natural justice which renders it void. 14. In view of the aforesaid discussion we do not consider it necessary to consider the third and fourth submissions made on behalf of the petitioner as the petitioner is entitled to relief in view of our findings on the first two grounds. 15. In the result the petition succeeds and is accordingly allowed. The impugned order D/- 26-11-1976, terminating the petitioner's service is quashed. The petitioner is entitled to his costs. 16. As the order terminating the petitioner's service is quashed, he shall be deemed to have been in service till he attained the age of superannuation and his legal heirs who have already been impleaded as petitioners will be entitled to the benefit of the services of the petitioner.