Judgment 1. The plaintiff is the appellant in this Second Appeal, which is directed against a judgment of reversal, the trial Court having decreed the plaintiffs suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession over 19 kathas and 1« dhurs of land described in Schedule-I to the plaint. 2. Relevant facts for disposal of the limited contentions raised before this Court may be stated as follows: Undisputedly, one Mosst. Mahabati Devi (defendant No. 2) is the owner of the suit property described in Schedule-I to the plaint. On 9-8-1957, she executed a power of Attorney (Exhibit-1) in favour of her relation Satrughan Prasad Singh (defendant No. 3) authorising him, inter alia, to execute deeds in respect of her immovable properties on her behalf. Defendant No. 3, in his capacity as mokhtar-e-aam of defendant No. 2 executed the sale deed (Exhibit-4) dated 14-5-1966 in favour of the plaintiff for a consideration of Rs. 3000.00 transferring the suit land to him. Rs. 1000.00 out of the consideration money was paid before the Registrar at the time of registration, Rs. 1000.00 was paid at the time of taquabajul badlan, Rs. 500.00 was adjusted towards the dues of a handnote (Exhibit-2) and Rs. 500.00 was paid at the time of agreement for sale (Exhibit-3). According to the plaintiff, he came in possession of the suit land, got his name mutated on 3-11-1966 and obtained the rent receipts. There was a proceeding under Sec.145 of the Criminal Procedure Code in respect of the suit land between the plaintiff and Rohin Mandal defendant No. 1 (first party), who alone contested the suit, defendants 2 and 3 having been arrayed as defendants 2nd party. This proceeding was decided in favour of defendant No. 1 leading to the fling of the instant suit by the plaintiff with an alternative prayer for a decree of Rs. 3000.00 against the defendants 2nd party. 3. One of the pleas raised by defendant No. 1 was that the power of attorney (Exhibit-1) was got executed by defendant No. 3 by practising fraud on defendant No. 2, that the power of attorney did not authorise defendant No. 3 to execute sale deed on her behalf and that the sale deed Exhibit-4 was an illegal and sham transaction. One of the pleas raised by defendant No. 1 was that the power of attorney (Exhibit-1) was got executed by defendant No. 3 by practising fraud on defendant No. 2, that the power of attorney did not authorise defendant No. 3 to execute sale deed on her behalf and that the sale deed Exhibit-4 was an illegal and sham transaction. Defendant No. 2 was said to have executed Exhibit C dated 25-5-1966 cancelling the power of attorney and was further said to have executed the sale deed Exhibit-A dated 25-5-1966 in respect of the suit property in his (defendant No. 1) favour for consideration and he came in possession thereof. 4. The trial Court recorded a finding that the sale deed (Exhibit-4) was a genuine and valid document for consideration duly executed by defendant No. 3 by virtue of powers conferred on him under the powers of attorney (Exhibit-1) which was also found to be a genuine, valid and operative document. It also recorded a finding that the deed of cancellation (Exhibit-C) and the sale deed (Exhibit-A) were brought into existence collusively to obliterate the effect of sale deed (Exhibit-4) and as such Exhibit-A was an illegal, invalid and inoperative document. The result was that the trial Court decreed the plaintiffs suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession. 5. Defendant No. 1 carried the matter in appeal. The lower appellate Court held that there was nothing to show that defendant No. 2 executed the power of attorney (Exhibit-1) before the Sub-Registrar or that the Sub-Registrar authenticated the same as required by sub-section (1) of Sec.33 of the Registration Act (Act XVI of 1908) (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and as such, Exhibit-1 was not a valid document. It further held as follows: "Under such circumstances the presentation of the sale deed Exhibit-4 is not lawful and it being so is void". There was a further finding that on a construction of entire deed (Exhibit-1) it showed that the power of attorney did not give any authority to defendant No. 3 to raise loans for defendant No. 2 or to enter into any contract of sale on her behalf or to sell her immovable properties. There was a further finding that on a construction of entire deed (Exhibit-1) it showed that the power of attorney did not give any authority to defendant No. 3 to raise loans for defendant No. 2 or to enter into any contract of sale on her behalf or to sell her immovable properties. That being so, the action of defendant No. 3 in executing the hand note (Exhibit-2), the mahadanama (Exhibit-3) as also the sale deed (Exhibit-4) was beyond the power conferred on him under Exhibit-1 and consequently Exhibit-4 did not confer any title on the plaintiff. For these reasons, the appeal was allowed and the judgment of the trial court was set aside and the suit was dismissed. The plaintiff has now carried the matter to this Court in Second Appeal. 6. The substantial question of law that was framed by this Court, while admitting this Second Appeal, may be found in Order No. 3 dated 18-10-1979. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the lower appellate Court wrongly dismissed the plaintiffs suit by adopting a wrong approach. The sole submission of Sari Tara Kant Jha, learned counsel for the Respondents was that the power of attorney (Exhibit-1) not having been executed and registered as envisage in sub-section (1) of Sec.33 of the Act, it cannot confer any power on defendant No. 3 to execute sale deed (Exhibit-4) in favour of the plaintiff and consequently the plaintiff cannot acquire any tide on the basis of that sale deed. Sri S.C. Ghose, learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant refuted this submission of Sri Jha and further submitted that, in any case, a decree of Rs. 3,000.00 should be passed in favour of the plaintiff as per the alternative prayer made in the plaint. 7. That validity of the sale deed (Exhibit 4) was challenged by Sri Tarakant Jha, on the sole ground that the power of attorney (Exhibit-1) which formed the basis of the powers of defendant No. 3 to execute the sale deed, was an invalid document, it not having been executed and registered in the manner laid down in sub-section (1) of Sec.33 of the Act. This contention of Shri Jha has no merit and it must fail. The sale deed (Exhibit-4) was executed by defendant No. 3 and not by defendant No. 2 and was registered on being presented by defendant No. 3. This contention of Shri Jha has no merit and it must fail. The sale deed (Exhibit-4) was executed by defendant No. 3 and not by defendant No. 2 and was registered on being presented by defendant No. 3. Coming to Exhibit-1, it was executed by defendant No. 2 and it was she (defendant No. 2) who presented it for registration. It is nobodys case that Exhibit-1 was executed by defendant No. 2 and was presented by registration by defendant No. 3 or that Exhibit-4 was executed by defendant No. 2 and presented for registration by defendant No. 3. 8. Sec.32 of the Act deals with presentation of documents for registration and it states, inter alia, that every document to be registered under this Act, shall be presented at the Registration Office :- (a) by some person executing or claiming under the same (b) by the representative or assign of such person, or (c) by the agent of such person, representative or assign duly, authorized by power-of-attorney executed and authenticated in manner hereinafter mentioned. Then follows Sec.33 of the Act, sub-section (1) (a) of which is relevant for the purpose of the instant case. Sec.33 (1) (a) of the Act states as follows:- "For the purposes of Sec.32, the following powers of attorney shall alone be recognized, namely, (a) if the principal at the time of executing the power-of-attorney resides in any part of India in which this Act is for the time being in force, a power-of-attorney executed before and authenticated by the Registrar or Sub-Registrar within whose district or sun-district the principal resides." The words "for the purposes of Sec.32" occurring in sub-section (1) of Sec.33 of the Act have to be significantly noted. Sec.33 of the Act refers to a power of attorney for the sole purpose of procuring registration. It does not refer to a power-of-attorney empowering a person to execute a document. A person, who has executed a document as agent, is, for the purpose of registration, the actual executant and is entitled to present the document for registration. Had the document (Exhibit-4) been executed by defendant No. 2 and presented for registration by defendant No. 3, the mischief contemplated under subsection (1) (a) of Sec.33 of the Act would have come into play. Had the document (Exhibit-4) been executed by defendant No. 2 and presented for registration by defendant No. 3, the mischief contemplated under subsection (1) (a) of Sec.33 of the Act would have come into play. But in the case before us, Exhibit-4 was executed by defendant No. 3 and it was registered on being presented by him for registration. In such a situation, the mischief of Sec.33 (1) (a) of the Act cannot come into play. 9. Coming to Exhibit-1, it too was executed by defendant No. 2 and presented for registration by her and not by defendant No. 3. Learned counsel for the Respondent relied on a decision of Privy Council reported in AIR 1914 PC 16 (Jambu Prasad V/s. Mohammad Nawab Aftab Ali Khan). This decision can be of no assistance to the Respondents. In that case, the mortgage deed dated 2nd July, 1882 was presented for registration on 11th July, 1882 on behalf Lala Mitter Sen, by one Nathu Mal, who held the power of attorney, of the 19th June, 1882 from Lala Mitter Sen. That power of attorney did not empower Natu Mal to present the document for registration on behalf of the executant. The power of attorney had been duly authenticated by the Sub-Registrar on 19th June, 1882 but apparently it had not been executed before the Registrar or the Sub-Registrar. It had not been proved in that case that Nathu Mal held any other power of attorney from Lala Mitter Sen. The mortgage deed of 10th August, 1886 also suffered from similar defects. It was presented for registration on 9th September, 1886 at the registration office on behalf of Lala Mitter Sen by one Illahi Baksh who held a power of attorney of 17th February, 1885 from Lala Mitter Sen, which, however, did not empower Illahi Baksh to present the documents for registration. As stated above, in the instant case, Exhibit-4 was executed by defendant No. 3 and it was he who presented it for registration. Exhibit-1 too was executed by defendant No. 2 and presented for registration by her (defendant No. 2). 10. An English version of Exhibit-1 was prepared by the office of this Court and it has been kept on the record. Exhibit-1 too was executed by defendant No. 2 and presented for registration by her (defendant No. 2). 10. An English version of Exhibit-1 was prepared by the office of this Court and it has been kept on the record. It states, inter alia as follows:- "That in case of necessity, the aforesaid Mokhtar (meaning thereby defendant No. 3) himself shall execute all kinds of deeds in favour of other persons in respect of the immovable properties of me, the executant and he himself shall put his signature on them on behalf of me, the executant and shall file the same in the Registry Office on behalf of me in respect thereof and admit the registration of the same before the Sub-Registrar and take the receipt and make exchange of equivalents of the same and take the consideration money and Rehan money. In short, all the work done by the aforesaid Mokhtar Aam shall be deemed to have been done by me the executant." Keeping in view the above provisions in Exhibit-1, can it be said that defendant No. 3 had no right to execute the, sale deed Exhibit-4 by virtue of the powers conferred on him under Exhibit-1? The reply would be in the negative. Exhibit-4 contains recitals about the necessity and it further states that except, selling the land, there is no other way to meet the necessity. The plaintiff examined himself as P. W. 8. He satisfactorily stated that defendant No. 3 had taken loan of Rs. 500.00 on the hand note on behalf of defendant No. 2, as defendant No. 2 required money for repair of her house. Defendant No. 2 had other necessities for which the sale deed was executed. 11 It was faintly argued that Exhibit- 1 did not authorise defendant No. 3 to execute a hand note or to execute an agreement for she. If defendant No. 3 had the power to execute a sale deed which is clear borne out by Exhibit-1, his powers to execute a deed of agreement for sale would follow therefrom It is true that Exhibit-1, does not specifically provide for execution of hand note by defendant No. 3 on behalf of defendant No. 2, but this, by itself, would not affect the validity of the sale deed Exhibit-4 when there is satisfactory evidence to show that Rs. 1000/-, out of consideration money of Exhibit-1, was paid before the Sub-Registrar, Rs. 1000.00 was paid at the time of taquabajul badlan and Rupees 500.00 was paid at the time of agreement for sale. The execution of the deed of cancellation (Exhibit-C) cannot affect the validity of Exhibit-4 as it (Exhibit-4) was executed earlier than Exhibit-C even if Exhibit-C be assumed to be genuine. Consequently, title having already passed to the plaintiff under Exhibit-4, Exhibit-A, executed on 25-5-1966, cannot take away the effect of Exhibit-4. The learned trial Court rightly held that the plaintiff acquired valid title to the property in suit by virtue of Exhibit-4 and decreed the plaintiffs suit. The finding of the lower appellate Court to the contrary, is wrong and illegal. If the plaintiff succeeds in getting the main relief, the question of allowing the alternative relief to the plaintiff namely, a decree for Rs. 3000.00 will not arise. 12. The result is that the appeal succeeds and is allowed with costs and pleaders fee and pleaders clerk fee at Rs. 64/- and Rs. 4/- respectively. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court are set aside and those of the trial Court are upheld.