JUDGMENT K.N. Misra, J. - Opposite party No. 2, Sri Banshi was appointed as Jamadar in the institution, Higher Secondary School, Itari, district Sitapur by the Principal of the said institution with effect from 1st April, 1973 on regular basis. Opposite party No. 2 proceeded on three days leave on 19th May, 1977, but after expiry of leave period he did not report for duty and was not available. It has been averred in paragraph No. 3 of the writ petition that he was rather absconding due to his involvement in some case of the nature of moral turpitude. On 25th May, 1977 a notice was issued by the Principal to opposite party No. 2 pointing out that he is absent from duty. He was required to resume his duties latest by 31st May, 1977. This notice was sent by post to opposite party No. 2 at his address available in the record of the petitioner institution. A copy of this notice has been annexed as Annexure No. 1 to the writ petition. Opposite Party No. 2, however did not report for duty on 31st May, 1977 and, thus, another notice was issued by the Principal to him on 2nd June, 1977 requiring him to report for duty by 7th June, 1977 vide Annexure No. 2 Opposite Party No. 2 did not join duties in pursuance of the notice contained in Annexure No. 2 and again the Principal of the institution issued a notice to opposite party No. 2 to resume his duties by 11th June, 1977. It is averred that this notice was sent through peon of the institution, who reported that opposite party No. 2 refused to take the notice. It is also averred that as per the directions of the Principal the said notice was pasted on the door of the residential house of opposite party No 2. Opposite party No. 2 however, did not join failed and to attend to his duties. Thereupon an order was passed by the Principal on 8th July, 1977 terminating the services of opposite party No. 2 as he was absent from duties from 1st June, 1977. This order was passed by the Principal, who was the appointing authority of Class IV employees of the institution. Thereupon an order was passed by the Principal on 8th July, 1977 terminating the services of opposite party No. 2 as he was absent from duties from 1st June, 1977. This order was passed by the Principal, who was the appointing authority of Class IV employees of the institution. It appears that the opposite party No. 2 made a representation to the District In sector of Schools on 19th September, 1977 challenging the order of the termination of his services by the Principal of the said institution. The District Inspector of Schools (for short the D.I.O.S.) vide order dated 5th December, 1977 (Annexure No 6) ordered that opposite party No. 2 Sri Banshi Lal be taken in employment in R.B.S.B Inter College, Kamlapur, district Sitapur as in the petitioner institution no post was lying vacant. It may be noticed that on the termination of the services of opposite party No. 2 the Principal had appointed one Sri Kallu, opposite party No. 3 in place of Sri Banshi who is working ever since 1977 on the post of Jamadar in the institution. Opposite party No. 2 has averred in the counter affidavit that when he went to joint in the institution R.B.L B. Inter College, Kamlapur, district Sitapur, he was told that there was no vacancy and he cannot be taken in employment. It appears that the D O.S., on being appraised of said fact, proceeded to consider the representation of opposite party No. 2 again and he allowed the representation vide order dated 1st March, 1978, contained in Annexure No. 7 to the writ petition. It was ordered that Sri Banshi be taken in employment from 1st March, 1978 or from such date on which he may join the institution and from that date he will be entitled to get his salary It was further ordered that Sri Banshi would be deemed to be on leave without pay from 1st June, 1977 to 5th December, 1977. It was further ordered that opposite party No. 3, who was appointed in place of Sri Banshi would cease to be an employee of the institution with effect from 1st March, 1978 or from such date on which Sri Banshi may join his duties. Aggrieved by this order, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition. 2. It was further ordered that opposite party No. 3, who was appointed in place of Sri Banshi would cease to be an employee of the institution with effect from 1st March, 1978 or from such date on which Sri Banshi may join his duties. Aggrieved by this order, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition. 2. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at some length and have perused the averments contained in the writ petition and in the counter and rejoinder affidavits. We have also gone through the impugned order passed by the D I.O.S. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner Sri Mannan urged that opposite party No. 1, having once passed an order dated 5-12-1977 on the representation of opposite No. 2, had no jurisdiction to review the order and proceed to pass another order. He urged that the impugned order dated 1st March, 1978, contained in Annexure No. 7, is illegal and without jurisdiction and deserves to be quashed. He urged that since opposite party No. 2 was absconding, and, as such, the provisions of sub-clause (1) of Regulation No. 36 would not apply in the present case and the order dated 8th July, 1977 is removal of opposite party No. 2 from services was validly passed. In support of his contention he referred to sub-clause (2) of Regulation 36 which provides that clause (1) shall not apply where the person concerned has absconded, or where it is for other reasons impracticable to communicate with him. Learned counsel for opposite party No. 2 Sri R. K. Singh urged that no disciplinary proceedings were initiated against opposite party No. 2 as was required under Regulation 36 (1), contained in Chapter III of the U. P. Education Manual, and, as such, the order of termination of services of opposite party No. 2 is per se illegal and the same has been rightly quashed by the D I.O.S. He urged that opposite party No. 2 would not be treated to be absconding and he was not served with any notice. The entire procedure adopted by petitioner in removing him from services is per se illegal, and, as such, no interference is called for with the impugned order passed by the DIOS., who allowed the representation filed by opposite party No. He contended that the procedure prescribed under Regulations 31 to 37 was applicable to Class IV employees in the institution but it has been violated. 4. We have given our anxious consideration to the matter. The foremost crucial question for consideration in the present writ petition is whether the services of opposite party No. 2 were validly terminated by order dated 8th July, 1977 (Annexure No. 4) passed by the principal of the institution or not. It is not disputed that the Principal was the appointing authority and, as such, he could pass said order. It has, however, been urged by the learned counsel for the opposite party No. 2 that the procedure prescribed under Regulation 36 (1) was not followed inasmuch as no charge sheet was served nor any opportunity of hearing was afforded in the matter by the Principal while passing the impugned order contained in Annexure No. 4. 5. It is no doubt correct to say that no formal charge sheet was prepared and served on opposite party No. 2 as is required under Regulation 36 sub-section (1) But in view of provisions contained in sub-clause (2) of Regulation 36 we find that the procedure contained in sub-clause (I) of Regulation 36 would not be attached where the employee was found to have absconded or where it is for other reasons impracticable to communicate with him. In these two contingencies the procedure prescribed under sub-clause (1) of Regulation 36 is not to be followed as the said provision would not be attracted in view of sub clause (2) of Regulation 36. In the present case it is to be seen whether the provisions contained in sub-clause (2) of Regulation 36 were attracted to the facts of the present case or not. The petitioner has annexed three notices dated 25th May, 1972 2nd June, 1977 and 7th June, 1977 as annexure Nos. 1, 2 and 3 by which opposite party No. 2 was required to report for duty. In the counter-affidavit, opposite party No 2 has asserted that these notices were not received by him nor he had any information about the same. 1, 2 and 3 by which opposite party No. 2 was required to report for duty. In the counter-affidavit, opposite party No 2 has asserted that these notices were not received by him nor he had any information about the same. In the rejoinder affidavit the facts stated in the writ petition have been reiterated and along with it report dated 1st July, 1977 submitted by Sarfaraz Hussain, Assistant Teacher of the institution to the Principal has been annexed as Annexure No R-2 wherein it Is mentioned that after making detailed inquiry he has arrived at the conclusion that opposite party No 2 is absconding as he is not available. He had also called mother of opposite party No.2 who intimated that his son is not available and she apprehends that he has been murdered The other Class IV employees of the institution were also asked to make every attempt in the matter and to find out the whereabouts of Banshi, but they also failed to trace him out Two more reports have been annexed as Annexure Nos. R-3 and R-4 which were submitted by Sri Shamshul Afaq and Mohd. Hafiz, who arc Assistant Teachers of the petitioner institution. They have also reported that opposite party No. 2 is not traceable and he is absconding. Let another report dated 7th July, 1977 submitted by Sri R.P. Srivastava, Assistant Teacher, has been annexed as R 6. In this report Sri Srivastava has mentioned that after making due inquiry in the matter he is of the opinion that Sri Banshi is absconding and he is not traceable In these circumstances, the impugned order was passed by the Principal on 8th July, 1977, terminating services of opposite party No. 2. Since after due inquiry it was found that opposite party No. 2 had absconded, and, as such we are of the opinion that sub-clause 12) of Regulation 36 will be attracted to the present case and the provisions of sub-clause (1) of Regulation 36 would not be applicable In the impugned order dated 8th July, 1977, it has been clearly mentioned that since opposite party No. 2 is absconding and has not joined duties inspite of three notices given to him, and, as such he is treated to be illegally absent from duty from 1st Jane, 1977 and his services are terminated on the ground. In view of these facts we do not find that the order dated 8th July, 1977 terminating services of opposite party No. 2 is in any manner illegal or without jurisdiction 6. Against the aforesaid order dated 8th July, 1977 opposite party No. 2 had the remedy of filing appeal to the Managing Committee of the institution as is provided under Regulation 37 Admittedly no appeal was filed by opposite party No 2 to the Committee of Management of the institution. Instead of it he preferred a representation/appeal to the D.I.O S Learned counsel for the opposite party No. 2 urged that since the Manager of the institution had approved the order of the Principal terminating services of opposite party No. 2, and, as such, no appeal could be filed to Cornute of Management against that order. We are not impressed by this argument 7. If the Manager of the noticing 1 approved the order of termination passed by the Principal of the institution, it cannot amount to an order passed by Committee of Management in exercise of appellate jurisdiction against that order. The order of approval passed by the Manager of the institution cannot amount to a decision of the Committee of Management. The order of approval passed by the manager cannot be deemed to be an order passed on an appeal to the Committee of Management. Even if the Manager had approved the order passed by the Principal the Committee of Management could entertain and decide the appeal on merits. The order of approval of the Manager could not deter the Committee of Management from taking an appropriate decision in the appeal, if it would have been preferred by opposite party No. 2. Thus, we find that opposite party No. 2 could validly present appeal to the Committee of Management in spite of the fact that the order passed by the Principal was approved by the Manager of the Institution. Having not filed an appeal before the Committee of Management, as is provided under Regulation 37, we find that the D.I.O.S. could not exercise jurisdiction in the matter in interfering with the order passed by the Principal. Having not filed an appeal before the Committee of Management, as is provided under Regulation 37, we find that the D.I.O.S. could not exercise jurisdiction in the matter in interfering with the order passed by the Principal. Apart from it, it is worth noticing that the D.I.O.S. in the present case passed an order dated 5th December, 1977 (Annexure No. 6) whereby he directed that the opposite party No. 2 be taken in employment by some other aforesaid institution. Such order could be or could not be passed by the D I.O.S. is a different question, but the facts remains that he passed the order dated 5th December, 1977 on the representation/appeal tiled by opposite party No. 2 before him on 19th September, 1977. The appointment of opposite party No. 3, Sri Kallu on the said post was approved by the D I.O.S. and he in his order dated 5th December, 1977 has observed that since there is no vacancy in the petitioner institution, and, as such, as is accommodating opposite party No. 2 in the aforesaid institution, R.B.L,B. Inter College, Kamalpur, district Sitapur. This order dated 5th December, 1977, Annexure No. 6, passed on the representation/appeal of opposite party No 2 by the D.I.O.S. could not be reviewed by him and the impugned order dated 1st March, 1978, contained in Annexure No. 7, could not be passed as it is well settled that the D I.O.S has got no jurisdiction to review his order. There is no provision under the Regulations conferring power of review on District Inspector of Schools nor it can be said that he is vested with inherent jurisdiction to review an order once made by him 8. In the result we find that the impugned order dated 1st March, 1978, contained in Annexure No. 7, is illegal and without jurisdiction and deserves to be quashed. We, therefore, allow the writ petition and quash the impugned order dated 1st March, 1978, contained in Annexure No. 7. We, however, direct the parties to bear their own costs.