JUDGMENT A. Banerji, J. 1. This petition is directed against an order of the District Judge, Dehradun, dated 31st August, 1981 allowing an appeal under Section 33 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, hereinafter referred to as the Act. 2. Respondent No. 2 Baba Kali Kamliwala Panchayati Kshetra Rishikesh, Dehradun had sent a notice purporting to be under section 26 of the Act to the Competent Authority under the Act at Dehradun intimating that a particular plot of land situate in Dehradun city belonging to respondent no. 2 was proposed to be sold and transferred. It appears that instead of proceeding under section 26 of the Act, the Competent Authority passed an order directing the Sub-Registrar, Dehradun not to register the sale deed executed by respondent no. 2 transferring the said land. Representations were made by respondent no. 2 to the Competent Authority, but it seems they were of no avail. Ultimately by an order dated 11-12-1980 respondent no. 2 was informed that the earlier orders had also been passed and it was open to respondent no. 2 to take such action as it desired. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, respondent no. 2 filed an appeal under section 33 of the Act before the District Judge, Dehradun. Learned District Judge allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the Competent Authority containing the aforementioned directions. The learned District Judge held that the appeal was maintainable. RESPONDENT no. 2 was registered as a society under Societies Registration Act and it was exempt from the provisions of Section 19 of the Act. Consequently the Competent Authority was not right in declaring that the notices were illegal or that respondent no. 2 was incompetent to execute the sale deeds. The State of U. P. and the Competent Authority have filed this petition against the aforesaid order. I have heard the learned Standing Counsel Mr. K. C. Dhuliya, on behalf of the petitioners and Mr. Sudhir Chandra on behalf of the respondent no. 2. 3. Mr. Dhuliya contended that no appealable order had been passed in the present case and consequently no appeal lay and, in any event, the appeal was filed beyond time and therefore was liable to be rejected. K. C. Dhuliya, on behalf of the petitioners and Mr. Sudhir Chandra on behalf of the respondent no. 2. 3. Mr. Dhuliya contended that no appealable order had been passed in the present case and consequently no appeal lay and, in any event, the appeal was filed beyond time and therefore was liable to be rejected. Learned counsel further contended that the provisions of section 19 of the Act had no application in the present case and the land was not exempt from the provisions of the Act. He further contended that in any event the provision of section 19 (1) was subject to the provision of section 19 (2) of the Act and as such the provisions of section 19 (1) (iv) or (vii) would not be attracted. Lastly, he contended that the District Judge has observed that respondent no. 2 was one of the biggest charitable trusts of Northern India although this fact was not borne out from the record. 4. As regards the maintainability of the appeal two contentions have been raised. Firstly, that the order dated 11th December, 1980 as passed by the Competent Authority was not an appealable order and secondly that the appeal, in any event, was filed beyond time provided under section 33 of the Act. The provisions of an appeal against an order made by the Competent Authority is provided under section 33 of the Act. Sub-section (1) of section 33 makes it clear that no appeal would lie against an order passed under section 11 or sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the Act. This case does not involve any order under either Section 11 or sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the Act. Section 33 further provides that the appeal has to be filed within thirty days of the date on which the order is communicated to the person aggrieved. The proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 33 gives power to the Appellate Authority to entertain an appeal after the expiry of the period of thirty days provided sufficient cause is made out for filing the appeal belatedly. Sub-section (2) of Section 33 lays down that the Appellate Authority shall pass orders as soon as possible after an opportunity for hearing has been given to the appellant. Sub-section (3) makes it clear that the order of this Appellate Authority is final. 5. Sub-section (2) of Section 33 lays down that the Appellate Authority shall pass orders as soon as possible after an opportunity for hearing has been given to the appellant. Sub-section (3) makes it clear that the order of this Appellate Authority is final. 5. In the present case we are concerned with the provisions of section 26 of the Act. This section requires a person, who holds vacant land within the ceiling limit, to intimate in writing of any intended transfer by way of sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise to the Competent Authority. Section 26 of the Act does not contemplate obtaining any permission to transfer vacant land. After the intimation to the Competent Authority of the intention to transfer vacant land the latter may within sixty days from the date of the receipt of the notice exercise the option to purchase the said land on behalf of the State Government. The provision also makes it clear that if such option is not exercised within the aforesaid stipulated period, a presumption shall be drawn that the Competent Authority has no intention to purchase such land on behalf of the State Government. Consequently, it would be lawful for such a person to transfer such land to whomsoever he may like. The Competent Authority, therefore, could not direct the Registrar or Sub-Registrar of the district not to register such a sale deed if executed. He could however give a direction to the Registrar or Sub-Registrar in the district, where the Competent Authority has indicated to the person concerned that he would purchase the land on behalf of the State Government. In order to safeguard the interest of the State Government the Registrar or the Sub-Registrar concerned could be directed not to register, if and when such a sale deed was presented for registration, at the instance of the owner of the land, but not otherwise. 6. Section 27 of the Act, however, prohibits the transfer by way of sale, mortgage, gift, lease for a period exceeding ten years any urban or urbanisable land with a building (whether constructed before or after the commencement of the Act) except with the previous permission in writing of the Competent Authority. 6. Section 27 of the Act, however, prohibits the transfer by way of sale, mortgage, gift, lease for a period exceeding ten years any urban or urbanisable land with a building (whether constructed before or after the commencement of the Act) except with the previous permission in writing of the Competent Authority. However, in the case of Bhim Singhji v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 234 the above provision of SECTION 27 (1) of the Act was held to be invalid in so far as it seeks to affect a citizen's right to dispose of his urban property within the ceiling limits. The provisions of SECTION 26 and 27 are, therefore, different. In the present case the owner (respondent No. 2) had given notice to the Competent Authority of the intended sale of a vacant piece of land within the ceiling limits. If the Competent Authority did not exercise the option within a period of sixty days of the receipt of notice, there could be no order restraining the owner from transferring such land after the expiry of the said period. Any restraint in such event would be contrary to law. In the present case the Sub-Registrar's refusal appeared to be based on instructions issued by the Competent Authority and that would be contrary to law. Since the order passed by the Competent Authority in this respect places embargo on the right of the owner to transfer vacant property, covered by the provisions of Section 26 of the Act. Such an order would be appealable under Section 33 of the Act. I am, therefore, of the view that the appeal lay and was competent. 7. The next question for consideration is whether the appeal was filed belated. The order of the Competent Authority is dated the 11th December, 1980 and the appeal had been disposed of by the District Judge the Appellate Authority, by the order dated the 31st August, 1981. Nothing has been pointed out in the petition as to when the above order was served on respondent No. 2 and the date when the appeal had been presented before the Appellate Authority. Since Section 33 (1) of the Act lays down a time limit for filing an appeal, it was necessary for the petitioner to have made out a case that the appeal was filed belatedly. The relevant dates have not been mentioned at all. Since Section 33 (1) of the Act lays down a time limit for filing an appeal, it was necessary for the petitioner to have made out a case that the appeal was filed belatedly. The relevant dates have not been mentioned at all. The proviso to Section 33 (1) also gives power to the Appellate Authority to entertain an appeal even after the period of thirty days, if Appellate Authority is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time. In view of the fact that relevant dates and particulars in this respect have not been mentioned in the writ petition or even in the rejoinder affidavit, it is not possible to hold that the appeal was filed beyond time. In case it was filed beyond time, the appellate authority had ample power under the proviso to condone the delay. 8. Another argument raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners was that respondent no. 2 had already been intimated on 7-10-1978 that the notice given by it under Section 26 of the Act was illegal. Consequently, the respondent no. 2 ought to have approached the appellate authority within 30 days of the receipt of that order and that having not been done, the present appeal was clearly barred by time. In the first place, copy of the letter/order dated 7-10-1978 has not been filed in this Court, nor are we aware as to when it was served. The original notice sent by respondent no. 2 to the Competent Authority is also not on the record of the writ petition. From the subsequent application made by respondent no. 2 dated 13th December, 1978, it is discernible that an order was passed by the Competent Authority holding that the notice given under Section 26 of the Act was bad in law. Even in this letter there is no indication as to when the letter dated 7-10-1978 was received by respondent no. 2. It will, therefore, be apparent that necessary facts and particulars in respect of the appeal being barred by time are not on the record of the writ petition and as such it is not possible to hold that the appeal was barred by time. The question of the appeal being belated ought to have been raised and pursued before the appellate authority. The question of the appeal being belated ought to have been raised and pursued before the appellate authority. The order of the appellate authority does not show that any such point was urged there. What is further significant is that no such ground has been taken in the present writ petition. In my opinion, the plea of the appeal being not maintainable as barred by time is untenable and is accordingly rejected. The next question raised by the learned counsel was that the District Judge was in error in holding that respondent no. 2 was one of the biggest public charitable trusts in U. P. without there being any material on the record. He urged that this finding had been given not on the basis of the material on the record but on the impression of the learned District Judge and was clearly wrong. Whether respondent no. 2 is the biggest public charitable Trust or not is not relevant for the purpose of this petition. What is relevant is whether respondent no. 2 is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. The reason is that reliance is placed on clause (vii) of Sec. 19 (1) of the Act by respondent no. 2 and not on the provisions of clause (iv) of Sec. 19 (1) of the Act. Clause (iv) pertains to a public charitable or religious trust. Clause (vii) refers to a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. Learned District Judge has observed that respondent no. 2 is a public charitable trust and is also a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. Learned counsel for respondent no. 2 urged that respondent no. 2 was a public charitable trust and this fact was well-known in the entire Uttrakhand including Dehradun and Rishikesh and it would be deemed to be in public knowledge. Further, learned counsel contended that he was not relying on clause (iv) but on clause (vii) that respondent no. 2 was a society registered under the Societies Registration Act. The necessary document to prove that respondent no. 2 was a duly registered society under the Act was well established and a copy of the registration certificate had been filed before the Competent Authority and was on the original record of the case. A copy of the said certificate has also been filed along with the counter affidavit. The necessary document to prove that respondent no. 2 was a duly registered society under the Act was well established and a copy of the registration certificate had been filed before the Competent Authority and was on the original record of the case. A copy of the said certificate has also been filed along with the counter affidavit. In my opinion, it is not necessary to go into the question whether respondent no. 2 is a public charitable trust or not. There is no dispute that respondent no. 2 is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, i860. 9. The next question is whether respondent no. 2 is entitled to any exemption under the provisions of Sec. 19 of the Act. Section 19 (1) (vii) lays down: "Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), nothing in this Chapter shall apply to any vacant land held by- (vii) any society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, or under any corresponding law for the time being in force and used for any non profit and non-commercial purpose." 10. Section 19 is a part of Chapter III of the Act. This Chapter contains the provisions of Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 which specify that a person is not entitled to hold vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit ; prescribes the ceiling limit ; contains provisions regarding transfer of vacant land and the provision for filing a statement where a person holds vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit. SECTION 19 provides that the provisions of Chapter III of the Act are not to apply to certain vacant land. Exception is granted to certain institutions and one of them is a society which is duly registered under the Socities Registration Act, 1860. It has been held above that respondent no. 2 was a Society duly registered under the provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860. This fulfills the conditions contemplated under clause (vii) of Sec. 19 (1) of the Act. Learned counsel for the petitioners was unable to show that respondent no. 2 was not a Society as contemplated under clause (vii) of Sec. 19 (1) of the Act. In view of the provisions of SECTION 19 (1) of the Act, as seen above, the provisions of Chapter III are inapplicable to a society registered under the Societies Registration Act. Learned counsel for the petitioners was unable to show that respondent no. 2 was not a Society as contemplated under clause (vii) of Sec. 19 (1) of the Act. In view of the provisions of SECTION 19 (1) of the Act, as seen above, the provisions of Chapter III are inapplicable to a society registered under the Societies Registration Act. In other words, the question of bar of holding vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit or applying ceiling limit or the requirement of filing statement in respect of the excess vacant land is inapplicable in the case of a society which is registered under the Societies Registration Act. There is thus a clear exemption from the provisions of the Chapter III of the Act in respect of a duly registered society, as indicated above. Since the provisions of sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Act have no application to respondent no. 2, being exempted under the provisions of Sec. 19 (1) (vii) of the Act, the view taken by the Competent Authority that the ceiling limit provided for category (d) urban agglomeration like Dehradun was applicable to respondent no. 2 was wholly wrong and misconceived. In this view of the matter, no direction could be issued to Sub-Registrar not to register sale deeds executed by respondent no. 2. Consequently, the District Judge has rightly exercised his jurisdiction in setting aside the order passed by the Competent Authority and in allowing the appeal. The writ petition has no merits and must fail. In the result, therefore, the writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.