JUDGMENT M.Wahajuddin, J. - This is a tenant's writ petition. The landlords moved an application under section 21(1)(a) for release of the premises No. 76/147 Coolie Bazar,. Kanpur on the grounds laid down in the judgments of the courts below. One of the landlord, namely, Sarasvati Devi pleaded that she is a tenant in premises No. 76/187. Coolie Bazar, consisting of a single room 8', 8' and in view of the large members of her family the accommodation is insufficient and inadequate for residence. 2. The defense of the tenant was that the landlord's need is not bonafde. Actually it is a device to have the premises vacated as to let it out on higher rent. 3. The prescribed authority came to a finding that landlord's reed is not genuine and the tenant's need is greater and the tenant is an old one and the permission was refused. The appellate court reversed all the findings of the Prescribed Authority and came to the conclusion that the landlord Saraswati Devi has only one room accommodation is premises No. 76/187, Coolie Bazar, and not any further re om and that considering the number of members of her family the need is genuine as compared to the tenant's reed and granted the permission. 4. This has been assailed by the tenant in this writ petition. The case of Raj Rani Mehrotra v. II Adll. District Judge 1980 A.R.C. 311., was cited before this Court as an authority that even if in the Courts below the plea arising out of Rule 16(1)(d) has hot been raised, the High Court in writ petition cannot refuse to consider this plea. On this authority I admitted the writ petition and at the same time to avoid hardship I also fixed an early date. 5. The law is well settled that findings of fact will not be lightly disturbed in writ petition, because exercising the powers under writ jurisdiction, the court does not function as a second court of appeal. It has to simply examine whether the matter has been approached properly, law has been correctly interpreted and evidence has been discussed so forth so on. 6. To my mind the crux of the matter is only two fold. Firstly. It has to simply examine whether the matter has been approached properly, law has been correctly interpreted and evidence has been discussed so forth so on. 6. To my mind the crux of the matter is only two fold. Firstly. ,whether the landlord Saraswati Devi has any other room also in her tenancy and has not come with clean hands, suppressing it and, secondly, what is the implication of Rule 16(1)(d) in this case. As regards the members of the family, the relevant definition of family given in Section 3(h) of Act No. 13 of 1972 has been cited before me and I feel that some of the persons mentioned in the family of the tenant in the Commissioner's report will not fall in that category and after excluding them, the landlord's family of Saraswati Devi, if not larger, will he almost equal to the family of the tenant. In fact, the crux of the matter always is what is the number of family members and whether the existing accommodation will serve or not and whether the need is bona fide. So I pass to consider whether the landlord Saraswati Devi had any accommodation other than one room, which she admittedly has in premises No. 76/187, Coolie Bazar. The tenant did not dispute such a stand taken by the landlord before the Prescribed Authority, but for the first time an application was moved before the Appellate Authority that the aforesaid landlord has one more room in premises No. 76/187 and also one room in premises No.761186, 'Coolie Bazar. This matter was a question of fact and the appellate court gave a finding against the tenant. It was urged that additional evidence was not allowed and that has prejudiced the present petitioner. In fact, Order 41 Rule 27 Civil Procedure Code places car tain restrictions in the matter of allowing additional evidence. In any case, when the appellate court has not allowed it, this court will not say that the discretion exercised was irregular, particularly, when before the Prescribed Authority such plea was not raised at all. Apart from that, I have looked into the application that was preferred by the tenant. The plea was that the landlord be called upon to produce the photostat copy of the ration card prepared in the name of Saraswati's husband and it is in respect of premises No. 76/186. Apart from that, I have looked into the application that was preferred by the tenant. The plea was that the landlord be called upon to produce the photostat copy of the ration card prepared in the name of Saraswati's husband and it is in respect of premises No. 76/186. When the photostat copy was produced the Court found that actually the ration card was for premises No. 76/187. Apart from that, findings cannot be based on conjectures. If a parson pleads that another person has some more accommodation than what is admitted, that has to be proved positively by such individual. This has not been done. Simply because a room was lying locked in the premises there would not mean that such room was also in the tenancy of the landlord Saraswati Devi. Besides, the actual landlord of the other premises gave affidavit otherwise. As regards 76/186 again there was no positive proof, except assessment extracts which had cuttings and in absence of any positive proof this court cannot say that the finding of the appellate court that' no other accommodation is with landlord Saraswati Devi is erroneous or perverse. 7. Now I pass to consider the implications of Rule 16(l)(d) of Act No. 13 of 1972. What the court has to consider is whether by a release of the part of the premises of the landlord, the need of the landlord will be served. In fact, the premises consist of two rooms only, besides of course over-hanging Chhajjas, latrie and stores. If only one room is released, in fact, landlord Saraswati Devi would be in the same plight as before. Secondly. I have seen the survey map of the premises in question and I think that the accommodation is so situated that if one side lives in one room and the other party continues in the other room, instead of solving the problem it will rather create greater hardship for both. In the circumstances, I hold that release of only a part of the premises would not have served the purpose. 8. However, I have to consider also the hardship that may be caused to the tenant in procuring an alternative accommodation and I feel that the justice would demand that while dismissing this writ petition I may allow further reasonable time to the tenant from the date of this judgment to arrange for and vacate the premises. 8. However, I have to consider also the hardship that may be caused to the tenant in procuring an alternative accommodation and I feel that the justice would demand that while dismissing this writ petition I may allow further reasonable time to the tenant from the date of this judgment to arrange for and vacate the premises. The petitioner tenant to vacate the premises involved by 31st December 1984, and hand over the vacant possession of the premises to the landlord. 9. The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed. The parties will bear their own costs.