Deepak Gulati v. Allahabad Development Authority — 1984 DIGILAW 589 (ALL)

JUDGMENT S.K. Dhaon, J. - The Allahababad Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as the A.D.A.) constituted under U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973, invited applications for the allotment of a limited number of flats to persons failing in the mid lie income group. The petitioners and others made applications for the allotment of one flat each to them. The A.D.A. chose the method of selection by the process of draw of lots. A date for the drawing of lots was fixed. The petitioners learnt that the A.D.A. had decided to exclude them from the contest on the ground that they did not fall in the category of the middle income group. Before the lots could be drawn, the petitioners sought the protection of this Court by means of the instant writ petition. 2. The erstwhile Allahabad Improvement Trust, purporting to exercise powers under the Town Improvement Trust Act, 1919, framed a scheme known as the 'Hastings Road Housing Scheme' and published the same for general Petitioners information and for objections thereto. This scheme ran through all the formalities as required by the provisions of the said Act. The final notification as envisaged by Section 42 of the said Act was also issued. Sub-section (2) of Section 42 provided that the publication of a notification under Sub-section (1) in respect of and Scheme shall be conclusive evidence that the Scheme had been duly framed and Sanctioned. Thereafter, the Improvement Trust launched acquisition proceedings for the implementation of the Scheme. This was done in accordance with the provisions of the said Act. These proceedings culminated in a final notification and the land so acquired vested in the Improvement Trust. In 1959, the Uttar Pradesh Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam was enacted and enforced. Later on, the city of Allahabad was constituted into a Mahapalika by means of a notification published in the official Gazette. The said Adhiniyam provided for the repeal of certain enactments operating in the State of Uttar Pradesh including the U.P. Town Improvement Act, 1919, in so far as these enactments were applicable to any area included in the city which was converted into a Mahapalika and thus the provisions of the U.P. Town Improvement Act ceased to have application to the city of Allahabad. The Adhiniyam of 1959 also provided for vesting of all the properties and land etc. which vested in the erstwhile Improvement Trust. The Adhiniyam of 1959 also provided for vesting of all the properties and land etc. which vested in the erstwhile Improvement Trust. It further provided that any notice or notification or sanction of any improvement Scheme for the area included in the city (Mahapalika) issued under the U.P. Town Improvement Act, 1919 or the Cawnporc Urban Area Development Act, 1945, shall be deemed to have been issued under this Act and all further proceedings in furtherance of such scheme may be taken accordingly. 3. Certain conditions of allotment of flats were laid down by the Nagar Mahapalika some time in the year 1970. The parties are at variance on the question as to whether the flat in questions were constructed by the Nagar Mahapalika. For the purposes of the instant writ petition, it is not necessary to resolve this dispute. Some time in 1973, the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Ordinance was promulgated. This Ordinance was replaced by the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973. Under Section 3 of this Act of 1973, a notification was issued. The area falling within the limits of the Nagar Mahapalika, Allahabad, was declared to be a 'development area'. Thereafter the A.D.A. was constituted. Section 59 of the Act of 1973 provides for repeal and Savings and in particular Sub-section (6) thereof provides that anything or any action taken (including any notification issued or order of Scheme made or permission granted) under the U.P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, 1959, shall, so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act of 1973 continue in force and be deemed to have been done or taken under the provisions of the said Act of 1973 unless and until it is superseded by anything done or any action taken under the provisions of the Act of 1973. It is not disputed that the A.D.A. new, is the competent authority for executing the 'Hastings Road Housing Scheme'. 4. The A.D.A. initiated the proceedings for the allotment of the flats in question by inviting application ms through a public notice. In this notification it was recited that the approximate value of one flat was Rs. 80,000/ - and the registration fee for the allotment of one flat was Rs. 10,000/-. It was also stated therein that the lats on Hastings Road will be given on hire purchase basis. In this notification it was recited that the approximate value of one flat was Rs. 80,000/ - and the registration fee for the allotment of one flat was Rs. 10,000/-. It was also stated therein that the lats on Hastings Road will be given on hire purchase basis. It fixed 30th August, 1980, as the last date for the receipt of the applications. It is not disputed that the petitioner No. 1, Sri Deepak Gulati (hereinafter referred to as the male petitioner) and the petitioners No. 2, 3 and 4 (hereinafter referred to as the female petitioners) made separate applications on the prescribed forms. It is also not disputed that each of the petitioners deposited a sum or Rs. 10,000/ - each as the registration fee married and. It is also not disputed that on all relevant dates the female petitioners were living with their respective husbands. Column No. 4 of the prescribed form is material for deciding the controversy between the parties. It is in Hindi and may be extracted : Translated in English it will mean monthly income accompanied by certificate. The prescribed form also contained a declaration, paragraph 3 of which is relevant and will be referred to by us later on. In the prescribed form, against column No. 4, the male petitioner mentioned :- "Rs. 800/ - per month. Chartered Accountant in practice". He filed an affidavit along with the application. In the affidavit he stated : "The deponent is a private practising Chartered Accountant and his monthly income is round about Rs. 800/ - per month". 5. The female petitioners, against column No. 4, mentioned : "House wife". The A.D.A. on 28th January, 1983, it appears, sent individual letters to all the applicants for the allotment of the flats in question including the petitioners. It gave an option to an individual applicant to purchase a flat on payment of its price in a lump sum. According to this letter 20% of the flats, which were initially to be given on hire purchase ha is, were earmarked for being Sold on cash down basis. The petitioners and other s were given fifteen days' time to give their option and to make the necessary payment. Obviously, the petitioners did not accept this offer. It has also transpired to us that for the remaining flats available for allotment, the A.D.A. created certain categories, such as political sufferers etc. The petitioners and other s were given fifteen days' time to give their option and to make the necessary payment. Obviously, the petitioners did not accept this offer. It has also transpired to us that for the remaining flats available for allotment, the A.D.A. created certain categories, such as political sufferers etc. One of them was the general category with which we are at present concerned. 6. A notice purporting to have been issued by the A.D.A. was published in the issue of 18th April, 1983 of the Northern India Patrika. This notice indicated that the selection of the allottees would take place on 23rd April, 1983 by the draw of lots, it was also mentioned therein that those persons, who had not submitted a certificate and an affidavit of their income, should do so by 22nd April, 1983. It was also stated therein that all the applicants should furnished the certificate of the income of their families, which included the income of the husband, by 22nd April, 1983. A warning was given that any applicant, who did not fulfil the aforementioned requirement by 22nd April 1983, will not be included in the proceedings for the allotment of the flats. The male petitioner did nor file any certificate or affidavit before the A.D.A. as required by the A.D.A. However, it appears, the three female petitioners filed their individual affidavits. It appears that the Petitioner No. 2. Smt. Lakshmi Devi, produced before the A.D.A. not only her income certificate but also the income tax return of her husband. The petitioner No. 3 Smt. Sangeeta Midha, filed an affidavit showing an income of Rs. 800/ - per month along with a certificate to that effect The petitioner No. 4, Smt. Usha Midha filed an affidavit showing an income of Rs. 850/ - per month. She filed a certificate in support of this statement. Both the said female petitioners stated that they arc not paying income-tax. It is significant that none of the three female petitioners set - up a case that they had separated from their respective husbands. For the remaining 14 flats which, it appears, fell in the general category, as indicated above, 23rd April, 1983 was fixed by the A.D.A. for purposes of their allotment. The A.D.A. as mentioned above, fixed 23rd April 1983, for the draw of lots, but the matter was postponed to 18th June, 1983. For the remaining 14 flats which, it appears, fell in the general category, as indicated above, 23rd April, 1983 was fixed by the A.D.A. for purposes of their allotment. The A.D.A. as mentioned above, fixed 23rd April 1983, for the draw of lots, but the matter was postponed to 18th June, 1983. It is to be noted that on that very date the instant writ petition was filed in this Court. 7. It is not disputed that in order to fall in the middle income group the annual income of an individual should not exceed Rs. 18,000/ - per annum, with respect to the male petitioner, the stand taken by the A.D.A. is that his failure to produce a certificate in support of the statements of his income rendered his application incompetent. With respect to Smt. Lakshmi Devi, the case set up is that on her own showing her income and the income of her husband, if clubbed together, will exceed Rs. 18,000/ - per annum and, therefore, she is disqualified for an allotment. With respect to the remaining female petitioners, the case of the A.D.A. is that, as they failed to furnish a certificate of the income of their respective husbands, they too stand disqualified. 8. We shall now examine the question as to whether it is permissible to club the income of the female petitioners with the income of their respective husbands. We have indicated that the Hastings Road Housing Scheme had been, in fact, framed by the Allahabad Improvement Trust. A copy of that Scheme is before us. The Hastings Road Housing Scheme' as notified under Section 36 of the Town Improvement Act, J919, was for the development of the area described in the notification and for providing residential accommodation for the purposes of the general public. 1 ho boundaries of the Scheme area were given. The notification under Section 42 (I) of the said Act recited that the Governor sanctioned the "Hastings Road Housing Scheme" of the Allahabad Improvement Trust, detailed in the Schedule, for ' providing additional housing accommodation." The schedule attached to the said notification contained the boundaries as was done in the case of the notification under Section 36. It will thus be seen that the draft scheme as well as the final scheme were conspicuously silent about the norm or the condition of allotment of the houses or flats. It will thus be seen that the draft scheme as well as the final scheme were conspicuously silent about the norm or the condition of allotment of the houses or flats. It is nobody' s case that the Scheme as framed under the Improvement Trust Act does not have a statutory force. According to the A.D.A., as disclosed by affidavit of Sri K.P. Srivastava, its Revenue Officer, some time in the year 1970, the Development Committee of the Nagar Mahapalika, Allahabad, laid down certain conditions of allotment. These conditions as contained in an Annexure filed along with the said affidavit. Paragraph 2 of the norms/conditions has some relevance. It says that flats meant for middle income group shall be allotted to such a person whose certified annual income was not less than Rs. 7,001/ - and not more than Rs. 18,000/-. The A.D.A. by resolution No. 286, dated 13th July, 1981, decided that the term 'income' would mean the income of a particular applicant for allotment from all sources. It also said that the income of the husband/wife and minor children would be clubbed together. The resolution also defined 'family' to mean the applicant - husband/wife and the minor children. The case set up by the A.D.A. is that the norms or conditions as laid down by the Development Committee of the Nagar Mahapalika have been adopted by it and it has proceeded to make the allotment of the flats in question on the basis of the said norms or conditions as well as the norm or condition laid down in its aforementioned resolution dated 13th July, 1981. The resolution No. 286 dated 13th July, 1981, takes the matter beyond the pale of any controversy that the income of ti e respective husbands can be clubbed with the income of the female petitioners for arriving at the maximum figure of Rs. 18,000/ - . 9. In order to get over Ac said resolution, learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that the decision of the Development Committee of the Nagar Palika of 1970 has a statutory force ; whereas the particular resolution of the A.D.A. has no such force. 18,000/ - . 9. In order to get over Ac said resolution, learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that the decision of the Development Committee of the Nagar Palika of 1970 has a statutory force ; whereas the particular resolution of the A.D.A. has no such force. The argument, therefore, is that the resolution of the A.D.A. can neither modify nor override the decision of the Development Committee of the Nagar Mahapalika Learned counsel has pressed into service the provisions of Section 577 (b) and (c) of the U.P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, 1959. Let us, therefore, read Section 577 : "Continuation of appointments, taxes, budget estimate, assessments, etc. Save as expressly provided by the provisions of this Chapter or by a notification issued under Section 579 - (a) any appointment, delegation, notification, notice, tax, order, direction Scheme, licence, permission, registration, rule, Bye-law, regulation, form made, issued, imposed or granted under the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916, or the Cawnpore Urban Area Development Act, 1945, or the U.P. Town Improvement Act, 1919, or any other law in force in any local area constituted to be a City immediately before the appointed day shall, in so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, continue in force until it is superseded by any appointment, delegation, notification, notice, tax, order, direction Scheme, licence, permission, registration, rule, Bye-law, or form made, issued, imposed or granted under this Act or any other law as aforesaid, or as the case may be ; (b) any notice or notification or sanction of any improvement Scheme for the area included in the City issued under the U.P. Town Improvement Act, 1919 or the Cawnpore Urban Area Development Act, 1945, shall be deemed to have been issued under this Act and all further proceedings in furtherance of such scheme may be taken accordingly ; (c) all proceedings for acquisition of land whether in pursuance of aN.S.heme of improvement or otherwise initiated under the U.P. Town Improvement Act, 1919, the Cawnpore Urban Area Development Act, 1945, or the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916, or any other enactment applicable to the area included in the City may be continued as if they had been initiated under this Act ; 10. Neither any other provision in Chapter XXV of the Adhiniyam nor the provisions of Section 579 contained therein have any relevance to the subject at our hands. Neither any other provision in Chapter XXV of the Adhiniyam nor the provisions of Section 579 contained therein have any relevance to the subject at our hands. It is to be noted that the marginal note of Section 577 is "Continuation of appointments, taxes, budget estimates, assessments, etc." Subsection (b) of Section 577 creates a fiction and on the basis of that fiction we will have to concede that the particular housing Scheme with which we are dealing Shall be considered to be the one under the Adhiniyam of 1959. The crucial words in Sub-section (b) are "all further proceedings in furtherance of such scheme may be taken accordingly". We have, therefore, to find out the powers of the Development Committee of the Nagar Mahapalika vis-a-vis the improvement Scheme. Chapter XIV of the Adhiniyam deals with the different improvement Schemes. Section 343 enumerates the type improvement Schemes, one of them being the housing accommodation scheme (343) (f). Section 349, as unamended by the U.P. Act No. 24 of 1972, empowered the Development Committee to frame a housing accommodation scheme. After the endorsement of the U.P. Act No. 24 of 1972, the position is that the Development Committee may by a resolution require the Mukhya Nagar Adhikari to frame a Scheme. However we are concerned with the statute as it stood prior to the enforcement of the U.P. Act No. 24 of 1972 and was endorsed in the year 1970. Section 351 tails of the framing of scheme. Section 353 enumerates the various situations in which an improvement Scheme may be initiated. Section 355 provides for the matters to be considered when framing an improvement Scheme. Under Section 356, the Development Committee is authorised to consider the scheme placed before it by the Mukhya Nagar Adhikari and accept it with or without modification or require the Mukhya Nagar Adhikari to make alterations in it and to re - submit it for consideration Section 357 provides for the notice of the improvement Scheme to the general public so as to enable them to prefer objections. Sub-section (2) of Section 357 provides that the Mukhya Nagar Adhikari shall cause such a notice to be published for three consecutive weeks in the official Gazette and the bulletin of the Mahapalika, if any, and also in one or more local newspaper or newspapers as the Mukhya Nagar Adhikari thinks fit, with a statement of the period within which objections will be received. Sections 359 and 360 are important. The former Section provides that after the expiry of the period prescribed for making objections in respect of any improvement Scheme, the Development Committee shall consider and Such objection or representation received there under and after hearing all such persons making and Such objection or representation who may desire to be heard, and after indicting in the scheme such modification, if any, as it thinks fit, submit to the Mahapalika the scheme together with any objection or representation with its recommendation either that the scheme be abandoned or sanctioned. Under Section 360, the Mahapalika is enjoined to take into consideration and Scheme received from the Development Committee together with any objection or representation received and the recommendation of the Development Committee and Shall either abandon the scheme or sanction the scheme with such modifications, if any, as it may consider necessary. Section 363 provides, inter alia, that whenever a scheme is sanctioned by the Mahapalika, the fact shall be announced by notification in the official Gazette and it shall be incumbent on the Mahapalika, when it sanctions b e scheme under its own authority, immediately to inform the State Government and to submit for the information of the State Government the details required by Sub-section (2) of Section 360. 11. It is nobody's case that the norms/conditions in question were sanctioned by the Mahapalika. It is not the case of the petitioners that any notification in the official gazette as required by the provisions of Section 363 of the Adhiniyam was issued. Therefore, it cannot, possibly, be urged that either the Nagar Mahapalika or its Development Committee modified or supplemented the statutory scheme as framed by the Allahabad Improvement Trust in accordance with the provisions of the U.P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam. Further, we find that the provisions of Section 57, do not confer any power upon the Nagar Mahapalika. They merely provide for the taking over of the existing Scheme etc. by the Nagar Mahapalika. Further, we find that the provisions of Section 57, do not confer any power upon the Nagar Mahapalika. They merely provide for the taking over of the existing Scheme etc. by the Nagar Mahapalika. The Nagar Mahapalika undoubtedly had the jurisdiction or the power to modify the scheme as framed by the Improvement Trust in accordance with the provisions of the Adhiniyan referred to above. Admittedly that has not been done. The terms of the original scheme as framed by the Improvement Trust being Silent, it was open to the Development Committee to frame the norms or conditions of allotment in the exercise of its administrative powers in order to give effect to the scheme. Such a power is implicit or implied as it pertains to the execution of the scheme. The words 'further proceedings in furtherance of such scheme' as used in Sub-section (b) of Section 577 refer to those proceedings for which provisions exist in the Adhiniyam itself. It will be presumed that the Legislature was well aware that, for the purpose of executing an existing Scheme having Statutory force, administrative directions can be issued by the authority empowered to do so. Therefore, it cannot be inferred from a reading of subsection (b) of Section 577 that the crucial words, as referred to above, also embrace the administrative directions of the type with which we are presently concerned. In our opinion Sub-section (c) of Section 577 has no application to the present controversy. 12. Accepting, without conceding, that the norms of 1970 as the Development Committee have statutory force, the question still is as to whether the A.D.A. by its subsequent resolution of 1981 has in any manner modified or destroyed or mutilated or truncated or widened the scope of Paragraph 2 of the norms/conditions. As we have seen, in substance, Paragraph 2 means that no person having an income less than a certain sum and more than a certain sum would be eligible for getting a fiat in the middle income group housing Scheme. The 1981 norms, as framed by the A.D.A. merely supplement the terms of Paragraph 2 of the 1970 norms. Therefore, the norms of 1981 cannot be and Should not be ignored. 13. We now advert again to the norms of 1970 as laid down by the Development Committee. The 1981 norms, as framed by the A.D.A. merely supplement the terms of Paragraph 2 of the 1970 norms. Therefore, the norms of 1981 cannot be and Should not be ignored. 13. We now advert again to the norms of 1970 as laid down by the Development Committee. In our view, having regard to the purpose of the scheme as framed by the Improvement Trust, Allahabad, namely, for providing residential accommodation for the purposes of general public, the fact that it is meant to cater to the needs of persons falling under the middle income group, keeping in view that there is acute paucity of residential accommodations and also keeping in view that there are certain unscrupulous landlords in the society who believe in rack hinting, it is implict or implied in Paragraph 2 that the income of the husband of a lady, who has not separated from her husband, should be taken into account while determining her income. In other words, the income of such a lady should be clubbed with the income of her husband. 14. Learned counsel for the petitioners very faintly argued that the norm of 1981 are violative of Article 300 - A of the Constitution. The argument has merely to be rejected as stated. This particular Article says that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. There is no question of the female petitioners, in the instant case, being deprived of any property. They are as yet neither the owners of the property, nor the occupants of the same, nor are in possession of the same. They have a limited right of being considered far allotment in accordance with law. It cannot be said that the norm of 1981, in so far as it lays down that the income of married lady will be clubbed with that of her husband for the purpose of judging as to whether she falls in the middle income group or not, in either arbitrary or irrational. On the contrary, it appears to be a whole some rule and is not only in the public interest, but has also the backing of public policy. The directive principles of the State policy as contained in our Constitution have by now been given their due place and importance. On the contrary, it appears to be a whole some rule and is not only in the public interest, but has also the backing of public policy. The directive principles of the State policy as contained in our Constitution have by now been given their due place and importance. Article 39 of the Constitution provides that the State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good and that the operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment. In our opinion, the norms of 1981, in so far as the relate to the clubbing of the income of the female petitioners with that of their respective husbands and all the other applicants falling in the category of the female petitioners, conform, not only to the letter but also to the spirit of the directive principles of the Constitution. 15. In Maharoao Saheb Sri Bhim Singh ji v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 234 the Supreme Court examined the validity of the definition of 'family' as contained in Section 2 (f) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. In the said Act 'family' in relation to a person, means the individual, the wife or husband, as the case may be, of such individual and their unmarried minor children. In Paragraph 9 Hon'ble Mr. Justice Krishna Iyer, (as he then was) observed :- "The legislation, as the title indicates, ii obviously a measure for inhiniting concentration of urban land in the hands of a few persons and for equitable distribution of such land to subserve the common good. Article 39 (b) and (c) of the Constitution are directly attracted and there is no doubt that the fullest exploitation of the material resources of the community undoubtedly requires distribution of urban land geared to the crimson good. It is also a notorious fact that concentration of urban land in private hands is an effective for bid dance of the maximum use of such land for industrial purposes at a critical juncture when the nation is fighting for survival through industrialisation. It is also a notorious fact that concentration of urban land in private hands is an effective for bid dance of the maximum use of such land for industrial purposes at a critical juncture when the nation is fighting for survival through industrialisation. It needs no argument to conclude that the objective of the legislation as set out in the long title and in the statutory scheme is implementation of Part IV of the Constitution. The Directive Principle of State Policy being paramount in character and fundamental in the country's governance, distributive justice envisaged in Article 35 (b) and (c) has a key role in the developmental process of the socialist Republic that India has adopted. The conclusion is inevitable that as a broad measure of state Policy, ceiling and relation of urban land ownership is an imperative of economic independence and is, therefore, on the national agenda of planned development." 16. The norms of 1981, therefore, cannot be held bad as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 17. We now come to the letter dated 28th January, 1983, sent by the Allahabad Development Authority to all the applicants including the petitioners. We have already made a reference to it. Learned counsel has contemned that in this letter it was implicit that the A.D.A. did not consider any of the petitioners as disqualified for being allotted one flat each. It is not the case of the petitioners that they in any manner altered their position as a result of this representation on behalf of the A.D.A. It is not the case of the petitioners that but for the said letter they would have furnished the necessary requirements, namely, a certificate of income in the case of male petitioner and the certificates of the income of their husbands in the case of the female petitioners. On the contrary, the stand of the petitioners is and has been that, so far as the male petitioner is concerned, he being a self employed person, a private practising Chartered Accountant and he being not assessed to any income tax, the question of his being asked to furnish a certificate of his income is meaning - less. His contention is that he is being asked to do something which is impossible. His contention further is that his personal affidavit, which accompanied the application, was and is the best certificate regarding his income. His contention is that he is being asked to do something which is impossible. His contention further is that his personal affidavit, which accompanied the application, was and is the best certificate regarding his income. The case set up by the female petitioners is that under the law the A.D.A. is not entitled to take into consideration the income of their respective husbands while considering their eligibility to compete for the allotment of one of the flats in question. Therefore, no useful advantage fan be derived by the petitioners from the contents to the said letter. Moreover, it appears to us that the contents of the letter do not rule out the right of the A.D.A. to scrutinise the applications of the petitioners in the light of the norms of 1970 and 1981 before executing a sale deed and after they had deposited the money in a lump sum. It also appears to us that probably the letter in question was sent to the applicants in a routine manner, mechanically and without any application of mind. This is corroborated by the assertion of the petitioners themselves that this letter was sent to all he applicants for the allotment of the flats in question. 18. On behalf of the female petitioners it is contended that the A.D.A. having invited applications in 1980 and they having made their applications within the time specified in the notice inviting applications, viz. 30th August, 1980, the norms of 1981 cannot be given a retrospective operation. This submission cannot be accepted for more that one reason. The petitioners were required to submit their applications on the prescribed form. That form contained a subhead 'declaration'. Paragraph 3 of the declaration, the contents of which the petitioners accepted with their eyes open, clearly provided that the petitioners and their successors in interest will be bound by all the rules which were at that time in force or may be introduced either by the State Government or by the A.D.A. in future. It was also recited therein that the petitioners and their successors - in interest will raise no objection whatsoever in case such rules are enforced against them. That apart, the status of the petitioners was and is no more than mere applicants for allotment of certain flats. They had not acquired any vested right to be allotted a flat. It was also recited therein that the petitioners and their successors - in interest will raise no objection whatsoever in case such rules are enforced against them. That apart, the status of the petitioners was and is no more than mere applicants for allotment of certain flats. They had not acquired any vested right to be allotted a flat. The only obligation upon the A.D.A. was to consider and dispose of the applications made by the petitioners in accordance with law. The norms of 1981 are procedural in character. It is well - known that in the enforcement of a procedural law retrospectivity is inherent. For, a matter has to be decided or a decision has to be taken in accordance with the procedure prevalent at the time when a decision is being taken or a dispute is being adjudicated upon. 19. The petitioners made their applications along with a deposit of Rs. 10,000/ - each. This was done, admittedly, on or before 30th August, 1980. On or about the 18th June, 1983, the applications made by the petitioners and the amounts deposited by them continued to be with the A.D.A. The A.D.A. has not averred that the petitioners had, at and Stage, applied for the refund of the same. As indicated above, the petitioners having applied within time, they having deposited a substantial amount with the A.D.A. they acquired a legal right of their applications being considered on merits and in accordance with law. The basis requirement of the law is now well-known, namely, no order should be passed or action should be taken adverse to the interest of any person behind his back and without affording him a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The petitioners have asserted that, in fact, the A.D.A. did not afford them any opportunity of hearing and its decision that the petitioners stood disqualified to compete in the selection by the draw of lots had been taken in gross violation of the principles of natural justice. The A.D.A. in its turn, has tried to make out a case that the petitioners were afforded all possible opportunities. The A.D.A. relies heavily upon a notice issued by it and which was published in the issue of the Northern India Patrika dated 18-4-1983. This was a general notice, not addressed to any individual applicant. The A.D.A. in its turn, has tried to make out a case that the petitioners were afforded all possible opportunities. The A.D.A. relies heavily upon a notice issued by it and which was published in the issue of the Northern India Patrika dated 18-4-1983. This was a general notice, not addressed to any individual applicant. We have already made a mention of this notice in the earlier part of our judgment. This notice required that all those persons who had not submitted a certificate and an affidavit of their income should do so by 22nd April, 1983. It also required that all the lady applicants, who had not furnished a certificate of income of their husband or their family, which included the husband as well, should do so. In the notice 22nd April, 1984 was fixed as the last date for submitting the requisite particular s. It also gave a warning that in case it was not done within the specified dale, they will not be considered for the allotment of the flats in question. From a bare reading of this notice, we find that the A.D.A. had not fixed any date for (ho appearance of the petitioners before him. Moreover, we find from the affidavit filed by Sri K.P. Srivastava on behalf of the A.D.A., that the draw of lots with regard to the flats in question was scheduled to be held on 23rd April, 1983, but as one of the employees of the A.D.A. died, the matter was postponed. It is not stated in the affidavit that some other date was fixed to the knowledge of the petitioners. It merely says that on 18th June, 1983, the lots were drawn. In our opinion, the general notice as published in the press did not afford any opportunity much less a reasonable opportunity to the Petitioners to put forward their case. The male petitioner had been crying hoarse that he had done all that he could possibility do to conform to the requirements of the A.D.A. He could not possibility file any certificate of his income as admittedly, he was a self employed person, and was not assessed to income - tax. His affidavit was on the record, The A.D.A. could have, in order to satisfy itself, ask him (the male petitioner) to produce some other material apart from a certificate. His affidavit was on the record, The A.D.A. could have, in order to satisfy itself, ask him (the male petitioner) to produce some other material apart from a certificate. The general notice, so far as this petitioner was concerned, was a misleading and misconceived one. So far as the lady petitioners are concerned, they too have a just grievance is not being given and Specific notice about the proposed stand of the A.D.A. Their stand was that the income of their husbands could not be clubbed with their income. They could have advanced the argument before the A.D.A., if given a proper opportunity, that it was acting rather unjustly in enforcing a decision taken in 1981 even though they had applied as far back as August, 180. They could also have satisfied the A.D.A. that there were certain special features in their respective cases. It is difficult for us to visualise as to what stand they would have taken if they had been given a proper opportunity. In a number of affidavits filed on behalf of the A.D.A. an attempt has been made to make out a case that the petitioners have been visiting the office of the A.D.A. and they have been told times out of number of the defects in their applications. In one of the affidavits filed on behalf of the A.D.A. it is averred that on 23rd April, 1984 the male petitioner personally and the representative of the female petitioners were present in the office of the A.D.A. and there they were told specifically as to what was required of them by the A.D.A. This part of the case set up by the A.D.A. appears to be rather interesting. We find that on that date, viz., 23rd April, 1983, some employee of the A.D.A. had died and even the proceedings for the draw of lots had been postponed on that account. We have no hesitation in presuming that the office of the A.D.A. must have been closed shortly after the office hours had begun and no one there must have been interested in having a business conversation with the petitioners. We have no hesitation in presuming that the office of the A.D.A. must have been closed shortly after the office hours had begun and no one there must have been interested in having a business conversation with the petitioners. We are convinced that the A.D.A. has over stated its case in the various affidavits filed on its behalf while dealing with the question as to whether the petitioners had been afforded a reasonable opportunity of being heard before being condemned as disqualified to compete in the process of selection. At this stage we are tempted to refer to Paragraph 24 of the counter - affidavit filed on behalf of the A.D.A. and Sworn by its Revenue Officer. In Paragraph 24 of the said affidavit it is stated :- "........In this respect senora applicants and citizens of Allahabad had made complaints to the Allahabad Development Authority that the petitioners Nos. 1 to 4 are all rich people, coming from rich family and that they do not come within middle income group category." 20. It is apparent from tin said averments that the A.D.A. had been receiving complaints against the petitioners behind their back and the possibility of it being influenced by those complaints cannot be ruled out. it is not the case of the A.D.A. that it ever gave any opportunity to the petitioners to meet the allegations made by third parties and outsiders. The concept of the principles of natural justice has now firm roots. It is well known that justice must not merely be done but it should appear to be done. In S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, AIR 1981 SC 136 in Paragraph 2 the Supreme Court quoted with approval Jackson's Natural Justice and thereafter gave its dictum. The said paragraph runs "The matter has also been treated as an application of the general principles that justice should not only be done but should be seen to be done. Jackson s Natural Justice (1980 Edn) contains a very interesting discussion of the subject. He says :- "The distinction between justice being clone and being Seen to be done has been emphasised in many cases." "The requirement that justice should be seen to be done may be regarded as a general principle which in some cases can be satisfied only by the observance of the rules of natural justice or as itself forming one of those rules. Both explanations of the significance of the maxim are found in Lord Widgery C. J.'s judgment in R.V. Home Secretary, Ex. P. Hosenball, (1977) 1 WLR 766 , 772, where after saying that 'the principles of natural justice are those fundamental rules, the breach of which will prevent justice from being Seen to be done' he went on to describe the maxim as' one of the rules generally accepted in the bundle of the rules making up natural justice." 21. It is the recognition of the importance of the requirement that justice is seen to be done that justifies the giving of a remedy to a litigant even when it may be claimed that a decision alleged to be vitiated by a breach of natural justice would still have been reached had a fair hearing been given by an impartial tribunal. The maxim is applicable precise when the Court is concerned not with a case of actual injustice but with the appearance of injustice, or possible injustice. In Altco Ltd. v. Sutherland, (1971) 2 Lloyd's Rep 515 Donaldson, J. said that the Court, in deciding whether to interfere where an arbitrator had not given a party a full hearing was not concerned with whether a further hearing would produce a different or the same result. It was important that the parties should not only be given justice, but, as reasonable men, know that they had justice or 'to use the time followed pharase' that justice should not be done but be seen to be done. In R. v. Thamesh Magistrates' Court, ex. P. Polemis, (1974) 1 WLR 1371, the applicant obtained an order of certiorari to quash his conviction by a stipendiary Magistrate on the .ground that he had not sufficient time to prepare his defence. The Divisional Court rejected the argument that, in its discretion, it ought to refuse relied because the applicant had no defence to the charge. 22. It is again absolutely basic to our system that justice must not only be done but must manifestly be seen to be done. The Divisional Court rejected the argument that, in its discretion, it ought to refuse relied because the applicant had no defence to the charge. 22. It is again absolutely basic to our system that justice must not only be done but must manifestly be seen to be done. If justice was so clearly not seen to be done, as on the after noon in question here, it seems to me that it is no answer to the applicant to say, "Well even if the case had been properly conducted, the result would have been the same." That is maxing up doing justice with seeing that justice is done (per Lord Widgery C.J. at p. 1375).' 23. In our view the principles of natural justice known of no exclusionary rule dependent on whether it would have made any difference if natural justice had been observed. The non - observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary. It ill comes from a PCI son who has denied justice that the person who has been denied justice is not prejudiced. As we said earlier where on the admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion is possible and under the law only one penalty is permissible, the Court may not issue its writ to compel the observance of natural justice, not because it is not necessary to observe natural justice but because courts do not issue futile writs. We do not agree with the contrary view taken by the Delhi High Court in the judgment under appeal. 24. We have come to the conclusion that despite the attempt made by the A.D.A. to convert the question as to whether the petitioners were afforded an opportunity of being heard into a disputed question of fact, the position that emerges is that it does not appear to us that in nice has been done by the A.D.A. to the petitioners. 25. We have already referred to the fact that Smt. Lakshmi Devi had submitted a certificate of the income of her husband. The stand of the A.D.A. is that admittedly if her income and the income of her husband is clubbed the amount will exceed the permissible limit of Rs. 18,000/ - . 25. We have already referred to the fact that Smt. Lakshmi Devi had submitted a certificate of the income of her husband. The stand of the A.D.A. is that admittedly if her income and the income of her husband is clubbed the amount will exceed the permissible limit of Rs. 18,000/ - . Be that as it may, the A.D.A. was not absolved of its statutory duty of affording an opportunity to her as well to put forward her cases. For this proposition, we are merely following the decision of the Supreme Court in S.L. Kapoor's case (supra), the relevant portion of which has already been quoted in the preceding paragraph. 26. This petition was presented at the residence of one of us (S.K. D.J.) during the vacations on 18th June, 1983. Sri Mohilay, the learned counsel for the A.D.A. and presumably on official of the A.D.A. were present when the learned counsel for the petitioners was making his submissions on the petition. The writ petition was directed to be listed before the appropriate Bench after the vacations were over. However, on that date, with the consent of the learned counsel for the A.D.A., the following interim order was passed : "The petition is confined to the allotment of houses in the general category. Until further orders the proceedings for the allotment of houses in the general category may go on, in the sense that the lots should be drawn, but effect shall not be given to the decision arrived at by the draw of lots." 27. It is contended on behalf of the A.D.A. that the applicants whom fortune favoured in the process of draw of lots should have been impleaded as respondents to this writ petition, they are necessary parties to the writ petition and the failure of the petitioners to implead them is fatal. Learned counsel for the A.D.A. had submitted before one of us (S.K.D., J.) that all arrangements for the draw of lots in the general category had been finalised and the applicants concerned had arrived on the scene and, therefore, considerable inconvenience will be caused to the persons concerned if proceedings for the allotment of the flats in dispute are stayed altogether. In that view of the matter the interim order, as quoted above, was passed. In that view of the matter the interim order, as quoted above, was passed. We feel that it does not lie in the mouth of the A.D.A. to contend that the alleged allottees are necessary parties. That apart, we now proceed to examine as 10 whether the 14 fortunate persons acquired any rights merely because lots were drawn in their favour. Paragraphs 8 and 16 of the norms/conditions of 1970 as framed by the Development Committee of the Nagar Mahapalika, Allahabad, throw some light on this aspect of the matter. Paragraph 8 provides that, in the event of allotment, the allottee concerned has to deposit an amount equivalent to one fourth of the complete cost of construction of the flat concerned minus the amount deposited as registration fee within 15 days of the receipt of the letter of allotment and balance three - fourth has to be deposited in instalements in a period of ten years. Initially, when the proceedings for the allotment were initiated tire approximate price of one flat was estimated by the A.D.A. at Rs. 80,000/ - . Later on, the A.D.A., it appears, revised the price of the flats. It placed the flats into three categories. The cost of the flats situate on the corner in the ground floor, the other flats situate on the ground floor and the flats situate on the first floor were revised and refixed at Rs. 1,45,000/ - , 1,35,000/ - and 1,22,000/ - each respectively. It is also apparent from a reading of Paragraph 8 of the aforementioned norms that the A.D.A. had to give a letter of allotment to an allottee. As this Court had, on 18th June, 1983, directed that effect would not be given to the decision arrived at by the draw of lots, the A.D.A. could not and, therefore, did not issue any letter of allotment to any body. It is not the case of the A.D.A. that any one of the alleged allottees deposited any amount on or after 18th June, 1983. Paragraph 16 contemplates the execution of two lease deeds b an allottee. The first deed is with respect to the land attached to or appurtenant to the flat and the second deed is with respect to the land under neath the construction. Paragraph 16 contemplates the execution of two lease deeds b an allottee. The first deed is with respect to the land attached to or appurtenant to the flat and the second deed is with respect to the land under neath the construction. The second lease deed is liable to be coverted into a sale deed after the entire amount has been paid by an allottee. It is nobody's case that either of the two lease deeds between the alleged allottees and the A.D.A. came into existence on or after 18th June, 1983. In our opinion, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and having regard to the terms of the norms/conditions of 1970, none of the 14 persons, who are the alleged allottees, acquired n right by virtue of the proceedings held by the A.D.A. on 18th June, 1983. Therefore, it is not incumbent upon the petitioners to implead those persons as respondents. Nothing prevented the alleged allottees to make an application in t is Court for cither being impleaded as a party or for being given an opportunity, of being heard in opposition to the writ petition. 28. In the writ petition, the parties have exchanged affidavits, counter and rejoinder - affidavits and thereafter a series of supplementary affidavits. Though the writ petition had not been formally admitted, we proceeded to hear the same finally with the consent of the parties. 29. This petition succeeds and is allowed in part. The A.D.A. is directed to give to each of the petitioners a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The A.D.A. shall point out to each of the petitioners specific defects in their applications. The A.D.A. shall consider the cases nut forward by each of the petitioners and then give its decision on their eligibility to compete in the selection by draw of lots. We have deliberately refrained from expressing any opinion on the definite averments made by the petitioners that persons, similarly situate as they, have been considered eligible for the competition by the A.D.A. If the petitioners make these allegations before the A.L.V. the authority concerned shall enquire into the same. If the A.D.A. comes the conclusion that all or some or any one of the petitioners are entitled to be considered for the allotment of the fiats in question, it shall initiate fresh proceedings for the allotment in accordance with law. If the A.D.A. comes the conclusion that all or some or any one of the petitioners are entitled to be considered for the allotment of the fiats in question, it shall initiate fresh proceedings for the allotment in accordance with law. If the A.D.A. conies to the con fusion that none of the petitioners fulfill the basic requirements and all of them stand disqualified for being considered for the allotment of the fiats in question, it may give effect to the decision taken by the draw of lots on 18th June. 1983. The A.D.A. shall refrain from giving any effect to the decision arrived at by it by the draw of lots on 18th June, 1983, unless and until it has afforded an opportunity to each of the petitioners of being heard and has given its decision on the individual cases of each of the petitioners. The parties are directed to bear their own costs.