State of U. P. v. Mahendra Nath Singh — 1984 DIGILAW 598 (ALL)

JUDGMENT K.N. Misra, J. - This writ petition is directed against the impugned judgement and order dated 7.12.1979 passed by U.P. Public Services Tribunal No.III (for short Tribunal) by which the claim petition filed by respondent No.1 Mahendra Nath Singh (for short the claimant) against order dated 25.9.1976 passed by the Director of Agriculture dismissing him from services, as contained in Annexure No. 12 to the claim petition, was allowed and it was left open to the Director of Agriculture to order fresh inquiry into the matter and pass necessary orders. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are as follows:- "The claimant was appointed on the post of Assistant Agriculture Inspector by the Director of Agriculture (for short Director) on 6.8.1958. Against him disciplinary proceedings were initiated by the District Agriculture Officer and he was put under suspension by order dated 1.10.1973 passed by him. A charge sheet was served on the claimant on 27.11.1974 to which he had submitted his reply on 17.12.1974. After conducting inquiry, a detailed report dated 6.4.1975 was submitted by the Inquiry Officer. Thereupon show cause notice dated 28.6.1975 was issued by the Director, who was the appointing authority, requiring the claimant to submit his reply within 15 days on the receipt of the notice to show cause why he should not be dismissed from service. Alongwith the show-cause notice, a copy of the inquiry report was also enclosed. The claimant submitted his reply on 17.7.1975. The Director thereupon passed the impugned order dated 25.9.1976, contained in Annexure No.12 to the claim petition. Against that order the claimant filed a claim petition before the Tribunal which was allowed by the impugned judgment and order dated 7.12.1979 on the ground that since the Director was the appointing authority of the claimant, who was appointed in the year 1958, and, as such, the Director alone was empowered to intimate disciplinary proceedings and so the disciplinary proceedings initiated by the District Agriculture Officer were bad in law and the mere fact that the show cause notice was issued by the Director would not alter the position in any manner. By taking this view it was held that the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer and the order of the dismissal passed by the Director would, thus, stand vitiated. By taking this view it was held that the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer and the order of the dismissal passed by the Director would, thus, stand vitiated. It was further held that the dismissal order passed by the Director also stands vitiated on the ground that the Director had only passed the order on the report of the inquiry officer and had not independently recorded a finding on the charge levelled against the claimant after considering the reply to show cause notice submitted by the claimant. It was also held that the punishing authority is bound to express his opinion on the point raised and a non-speaking order does not meet that requirement. The Tribunal also found that the Government order dated 15.1.1961 does not empower the District Agriculture Officer to suspend a person appointed by the Director and the order of suspension is against C.C.A. Rules as well as Subordinate Agriculture Servants Rules which authorises delegation of power regarding suspension to the next lower authority by the appointing authority or by a general or special order issued by the Government. The claim petition was, thus, allowed. It was, however, left open to the Director to order fresh inquiry into the matter and pass necessary orders." 2. Learned state counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners urged that the order passed by the Tribunal is factually and legally incorrect and deserve to be quashed. He urged that disciplinary proceedings initiated by the District Agriculture Officer were perfectly valid and the Tribunal has erred in holding that it stands vitiated on the erroneous ground of lack of power in the District Agriculture Officer to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the members of Subordinate Agriculture Service, Group III to which the claimant belongs. Referring to G.O.No. 3084/XXXV A-129. NES/58 dated June 15, 1961 and G.O.No. A-9529/XII A-1878/61 dated December 25, 1963 (Annexures 3-A and 3-B) learned counsel urged that by said orders the Deputy Directors of Agriculture and District Agriculture Officers have been authorised to initiate disciplinary proceedings against members of Subordinate Agriculture Services Group II and Group III respectively. G.O. dated December 25, 1963 expressly empowered the said officers to initiate disciplinary proceedings against such Group II and Group III officials also who were appointed by the Director of Agriculture. G.O. dated December 25, 1963 expressly empowered the said officers to initiate disciplinary proceedings against such Group II and Group III officials also who were appointed by the Director of Agriculture. The said Government Order expressly provided that they can take all actions (i.e. frame charge sheet, call for the explanation, give personal hearing and issue show-cause notice) which is necessary in disciplinary proceedings, but they cannot pass final order if the proposed punishment is dismissal or removal. Learned counsel, thus, urged that the Tribunal has erred in holding that the District Agriculture Officer could not initiate disciplinary proceedings, against the claimant who was appointed by the Director. 3. In reply learned counsel for the claimant urged that delegation of power to initiate disciplinary proceedings and to pass orders of suspension could be made by the appointing authority only to the next lower authority. He urged that the District Agriculture Officer is not the next lower authority to the Director. Referring to 1st proviso to Rule 49-A of Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules (for short C.S.C.C.A. Rules), learned counsel urged that no delegation could be made to District Agriculture Officer for taking disciplinary proceedings and for passing order of suspension against the claimant. He further contended that the aforesaid G.Os. dated 15.6.1961 and 25.12.1963 are invalid and the District Agriculture Officer by these orders cannot be taken to be clothed with the power to take disciplinary proceeding against the claimant. Thus, the suspension order and the entire disciplinary proceedings stood vitiated in law. 4. I have carefully considered the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties and I find substance in what has been urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The Tribunal in my opinion has erred in holding that the proceedings stood vitiated by taking erroneous view that the District Agriculture Officer had no lawful authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings and to pass suspension order against the claimant. 5. The above mentioned 1st proviso to Rule 49-A is not attracted in the present case as the aforesaid G.O. dated 15.6.1961 and G.O. dated 25.12.1963 and also other subsequent G.O. dated 5.11.1968 cannot be construed to be delegation power of by the appointing authority to the District Agriculture Office for initiating disciplinary proceedings against Group III employees of the subordinate agriculture services. The IInd proviso to Rule 49-A, which is relevant provides that "any other authority empowered by the Governor by general or, special order in this behalf, may place a Government servant under suspension under this sub-rule". Thus, under the IInd proviso any other officer could be empowered by general or special order issued in that behalf under this proviso. The aforesaid G.O. dated 15.6.1961, G.O. dated 25.12.1963 and G.O. dated 5.11.1968 expressly empowered the District Agriculture Officer to initiate disciplinary proceedings against Group III officials, who were appointed by the Director of Agriculture. Thus, in my opinion, the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the claimant and suspension order passed by the District Agriculture Officer cannot be said to be vitiated in law. The disciplinary proceedings appear to have been validly initiated by the District Agriculture Officer and the suspension order passed by him was valid. 6. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shardul Singh, (1970) 1 SCC 108 , similar question cropped up for consideration where a departmental inquiry was initiated against the respondent on the basis of certain charges by the Superintendent of Police, who after holding the inquiry as prescribed by the Central Provinces and Bihar Police Regulation submitted his report to the Inspector-General of Police. The respondent submitted his reply to the show cause notice issued by the Inspector-General of Police, who dismissed the respondent from service. The respondent challenged this order in a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution. The High Court allowed the writ petition holding that inquiry initiated by the Superintendent of Police was without the authority of law and against the mandate of Article 311(1) of the Constitution as he was incompetent to initiate and conduct inquiry held against the respondent having not been appointed by the Inspector General of Police. On these facts it was held that "Article 311 (1) does not in terms require that the authority empowered under that provision to dismiss or remove an official should itself initiate or conduct the inquiry proceeding for the dismissal or removal of the officer or even that inquiry should be done at its instance. But for the incorporation of Article 311 in the Constitution even in respect of matters provided therein, rules could have been framed under Article 309. The provision of Article 311 confer additional right on the civil servants. But for the incorporation of Article 311 in the Constitution even in respect of matters provided therein, rules could have been framed under Article 309. The provision of Article 311 confer additional right on the civil servants. It is not possible to agree with the High Court that the guarantee given under Article 311 (1) includes within itself a further guarantee that the disciplinary proceedings resulting in dismissal or removal of a civil servant should also be initiated and conducted by the authorities mentioned in that Article." 7. Thus in view of what has been said above, I find that the District Agriculture Officer could validly initiate disciplinary proceedings and pass suspension order and the Tribunal erred in holding otherwise. 8. The next question which cropes up for consideration is whether the view expressed by the Tribunal holding that the order of dismissal being a non-speaking order cannot be sustained is legally sustainable or not. Learned counsel for the claimant urged that the Director had passed order merely on the basis of the inquiry report and he has not recorded his own finding on the charge levelled against the claimant after considering the explanation submitted by him. He urged that it was incumbent on the punishing authority to give his own reasons for upholding the findings recorded by the inquiry officer. He urged that it was incumbent on the punishing authority to give his own reasons for upholding the findings recorded by the inquiry officer. Since no independent finding has been recorded by the Director, the punishing authority, and, as such, the impugned order of punishment is not sustainable in law and the Tribunal has been unable to agree with this contention in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Tara Chand Khatri v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, AIR 1977 SC 567 , where in it has been observed that, "Although it may be necessary for the disciplinary authority to record its provisional conclusions in the notice calling upon the delinquent officer to show cause why the proposed punishment be not imposed upon him if it differs from the findings arrived at by the enquiring officer with regard to the change, it is not obligatory to do so in case the disciplinary authority concurs with the findings of the enquiring officer." (Emphasis supplied) It was further observed that, "While it may be necessary for a disciplinary or administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions to state the reasons in support of its order if it differs from the conclusions arrived at and the recommendations made by the enquiring officer in view of the scheme of a particular enactment or the rules made thereunder, it would be laying down the proposition a little too broadly to say that even an order of concurrence must be supported by reasons. It cannot also be laid down as a general rule that an order is a non-speaking order simply because it is brief and not elaborate. Every case has to be judged in the light of its own facts and circumstances." 9. In the present case I find that after considering and concurring with the inquiry report the Director issued show-cause notice to the delinquent employee for showing cause as to why he should not be dismissed from service. A detailed inquiry report was also annexed with the show-cause notice. The claimant in his reply reiterated his case and the stand taken was the same which he had taken in his earlier reply to the charge-sheet. The Director after perusing the inquiry report concurred with it and passed the impugned order of punishment. A detailed inquiry report was also annexed with the show-cause notice. The claimant in his reply reiterated his case and the stand taken was the same which he had taken in his earlier reply to the charge-sheet. The Director after perusing the inquiry report concurred with it and passed the impugned order of punishment. There appears to be no such departmental rule which may require that while passing the final order of punishment, the punishing authority must record its own findings although he may not differ with the inquiry officer. It, thus, does not appear to be necessary that even an order of concurrence must be supported by reasons nor the impugned order of dismissal passed by the Director can be struck down on the ground of its being brief and not elaborate and the Director while concurring with the inquiry report has not recorded his own findings. 10. Thus, in view of the Supreme Court decision in Tara Chand's case I find that the aforesaid view taken by the Tribunal is erroneous and unsustainable. The order of punishment passed by the Director cannot be said to be vitiated merely on the ground urged by the learned counsel for the claimant and I find that the order passed by the Tribunal cannot be sustained and deserves to be quashed. Since the Tribunal has not considered other grounds raised in the claim petition, and, as such, the case deserves to be remanded to the Tribunal for decision on merits on other grounds urged in the claim petition. 11. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 7.12.1979, a certified copy of which has been annexed as Annexure No. 5 to the writ petition is hereby quashed and the case is remanded to the Tribunal for deciding the claim petition on merits on the other grounds urged therein. I, however, direct the parties to bear their own costs.