JUDGMENT Om Prakash, J. - These are the two applications relating to the assessment years 1977-78 and 1978-79 by the assessee u/s 256(2) of the income tax Act, 1961 ('the Act') requiring this Court to direct the Tribunal to refer the following identical questions: "1. Whether the income tax Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that notice u/s 143(2) sent under registered cover could be treated as valid service having regard to the provisions of section 282 of the income tax Act and in absence of any finding that the service was effected on the principal officer or an agent authorised in that behalf by the applicant ? 2. Whether on the facts and in the circum stances of the case, was there any material on the record in support of the finding of the income tax Appellate Tribunal that the applicant has failed to discharge the onus that lay on it that the impugned notice u/s 143(2) was not validly served and the assessment u/s 144 was bad? 3. Whether on the facts and in the circum stances of the case, the income tax Appellate Tribunal was right in placing the burden on the applicant to prove that the service was not validly effected and upholding the service as valid since the notice had been served under registered post? 4. Whether on the facts and in the circum stances of the case, the income tax Appellate Tribunal was right in its view that the assessment made in pursuance to the notice sent under registered cover was valid and whether there was any material in support of such finding? 5. Whether on the facts and in the circum stances of the case, the income tax Appellate Tribunal was right in raising presumption of valid service in respect of the notice sent under registered cover in absence of any finding that the notice was properly addressed and served on the principal officer or any authorised person in that behalf as required by the provisions of section 282 of the income tax Act? 6. 6. Whether the income tax Appellate Tribunal was right in its view that the application u/s 146, which was filed beyond time was not liable to be entertained and the income tax authorities had no inherent jurisdiction to condone the delay in absence of any specific provision in that behalf under the Act?" Orders for the relevant years were passed by the ITO on 2-2-1979 u/s 144 of the Act. For setting aside of the same, the assessee sent applications by registered post u/s 146 of the Act on 24-3-1979 to the ITO, which were received by him on 27-3-1979. They were rejected by him on the ground that they were barred by time. The ITO took the view that the assessment orders and the demand notices having been served on 23-2-1979, the applications u/s 146 should have been made on or before 22-3-1979. In appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) reversed the orders of the ITO holding that the ITO had an inherent power to condone the delay in such matters. On further appeal, the Tribunal took the view that the Commissioner (Appeals) was wrong in holding that the ITO had an inherent power to condone the delay. Also, it was found by the Tribunal that the demand notices and the assessment orders had been properly served on 23-2-1979. 2. Then the assessee made applications u/s 256(1) raising the instant questions but they were rejected by the Tribunal. 3. In our opinion, common question Nos. 1 to 4 do not arise from the Tribunal's order and, therefore, they are rejected. 4. So far as common question No. 6 is concerned, we are of the view that section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, cannot be pressed into service by the assessee in these cases, because the ITO is not the Court within the meaning of section 5 of the Limitation Act. This view is fully supported by a decision of the Supreme Court- Smt. Sushila Devi Vs. Ramanandan Prasad and Others, AIR 1976 SC 177 . The Supreme Court observed: "... The Collector to whom the application was made was not a Court." This is why the Supreme Court took the view that section 5 of the Limitation Act was not applicable to an application made to the Collector. We, therefore, reject the question No. 6 also. 5. The Supreme Court observed: "... The Collector to whom the application was made was not a Court." This is why the Supreme Court took the view that section 5 of the Limitation Act was not applicable to an application made to the Collector. We, therefore, reject the question No. 6 also. 5. Regarding question No. 5, Sri R.A. Gulati, the learned counsel for the assessee, contended that in view of clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 282 of the Act, demand notices and the assessment orders should have been addressed in the case of the assessee, which is a company, to its principal officer, who u/s 2(35), read with the provisions of the Companies Act, may be a director of the company or his agent. He drew our attention to the submissions, made by Sri R.K. Upadhya, the learned departmental representative, before the Tribunal, when he opposed the application u/s 256(1). From the order passed u/s 256(1), it appears that Sri Upadhya stated before the Tribunal that the demand notices and the assessment orders had been sent on the address of the assessee-company and not to the principal officers. As no finding was recorded by the Tribunal that the assessment orders and the demand notices were addressed to the proper person, Sri Gulati argues that the Tribunal was wrong in presuming that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, there was a valid service. His argument is that for having the presumption of valid service, the Tribunal should have recorded a finding on the condition precedent that the postal cover was addressed to the proper person and that the Tribunal was wrong in assuming the basic fact that the postal cover was addressed to the proper person. On the other hand, Sri Bharatji Agarwal, the learned counsel for the revenue, argues that no direction can be given to the Tribunal to refer the question No. 5 as in view of section 292B of the Act, the question whether there was defective service on account of the fact that the orders and the notices were addressed to the assessee, is merely academic. We do not agree with him as the question whether section 292B is applicable to the facts of the case, is itself a question of law. We do not agree with him as the question whether section 292B is applicable to the facts of the case, is itself a question of law. Then he argues that there was no case of the assessee at any stage that the assessment orders and the demand notices were not properly addressed and that being so, the Tribunal cannot be directed to refer a question in this regard. The Tribunal has drawn a presumption of valid service assuming the basic fact that the orders and the notices were properly addressed. But this assumption is not supported by the record, inasmuch as the departmental representative clearly stated before the Tribunal in the proceedings of section 256(1) that the notices had been addressed only to the assessee-company. The Tribunal having recorded a finding, which is apparently contrary to the record, we are of the view that question No. 5 is a question of law and that does arise from the Tribunal's order. Our answer to question No. 5 only as referred in these references is in affirmative and in favour of the assessee. All the assessees are entitled to costs of Rs. 200 each.