ORDER B.N. Sapru, J. - The petitioner, Rahmat Ullah Khan, was employed as a Senior Assistant in Bundelkhand University, Jhansi. He submitted a letter of resignation dated 22-1-1983 addressed to the Vice Chancellor of the University. In this letter it was stated that the petitioner was resigning from his post and requested the Vice Chancellor to speedily accept his resignation. 2. The Vice Chancellor by his order dated 24-1-1983 accepted the letter of resignation. The petitioner was informed accordingly by Sri Vishambhar Nath, the Registrar of the University, through letter dated 24-1-1983. The letter dated 24-1-1983 stated that under the rules the petitioner had to give three months' notice of his resignation. As the petitioner, it added, had not given three months notice, the petitioner should pay a sum of Rs. 2,415-30 to the University. A request was made to the petitioner to pay the same at the earliest. 3. Thereafter the petitioner sent a representation to the Executive Council dated 9-2-1983. In this representation it is stated. inter alia. that the letter of resignation dated 22-1-114K3 he not treated as resignation tendered by the petitioner. In other words, the petitioner withdrew his resignation. 4. The Executive Council considered the matter on 1-3-1983 and by its resolution of that date held that the Vice Chancellor had already accepted the resignation by his letter dated 24-1-1983 and it approved the action of the Vice Chancellor in accepting the resignation of the petitioner. 5. Aggrieved by the action of the respondents, Vice Chancellor and the Executive Council,. the petitioner filed a writ petition in this Court. The writ petition was summarily dismissed by this Court and the petitioner was asked to apply to the Chancellor under S. 68 of the U.P. State Universities Act, 1973, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') 6. The petitioner filed a reference with the Chancellor of the Bundelkhand University. The Chancellor rejected the reference made by the petitioner. Information in this regard was given to the petitioner by letter dated 27-12-1983. The Chancellor in his order stated that the resignation was accepted by the Vice Chancellor in anticipation of the approval of the Executive Council and consequently it became a faith accomplish and the petitioner could not withdraw the same. 7. Aggrieved by the ultimate decision of the Chancellor, the petitioner has.now come up in writ petition. 8. The Chancellor in his order stated that the resignation was accepted by the Vice Chancellor in anticipation of the approval of the Executive Council and consequently it became a faith accomplish and the petitioner could not withdraw the same. 7. Aggrieved by the ultimate decision of the Chancellor, the petitioner has.now come up in writ petition. 8. The first argument on behalf of the petitioner is that the Vice-Chancellor is not his appointing authority. His appointing authority was the Executive Council and as such the Vice-Chancellor had no authority to accept the petitioner's resignation. In support of this argument, Sri S. P. Srivastava appearing on behalf of the petitioner, has drawn my attention to S. 21 which defines the powers and duties of the Executive Council. Sub-sec. (1) of S. 21 reads as under : "(1) The Executive Council shall be the principal executive body of the University and subject to the provisions of this Act, have the following powers, namely (i) to (ii) - - (iv) to appoint officers, teachers and other employees of the University and to define their duties and the conditions of their service, and to provide for the filling of temporary casual vacancies in their posts *** *** *** 9. Sub-section (8) of S. 21 provides that. the Executive Council may, subject to any conditions laid down in the Statutes, delegate such of its powers as it deems fit to a Committee appointed by it. 10. 'The Executive Council has framed rules known as Service Rules for Non -Teaching Employees. The Rules are called the Bundelkhand University. Jhansi. Non -teaching Employees (Terms and Conditions of Service) Rules. Rule 14(1) of the said rules provides that appointment to the posts where it is to be made by selection shall be made by the Executive Council on the recommendation of a Selection Committee to be constituted as per Appendix II. Appendix II-provides that for the posts carrying a scale the maximum of which is Rs. 700/- or above, the Selection Committee shall consist of the Vice -Chancellor, the Registrar, the Finance Officer and one member to be nominated by the Executive Council. The scale on the relevant date of the Senior Assistants was in the scale of Rs. 470-735. Appendix II-provides that for the posts carrying a scale the maximum of which is Rs. 700/- or above, the Selection Committee shall consist of the Vice -Chancellor, the Registrar, the Finance Officer and one member to be nominated by the Executive Council. The scale on the relevant date of the Senior Assistants was in the scale of Rs. 470-735. Thus, it is clear from R. 14(1) read with Appendix II that the post of Senior Assistant which the petitioner was holding, was a post to which the appointment were to be made by the Executive Council. 11. 'I' adjourned the case to enable the learned counsel for the University, Sri R. P. Tiwari to produce any delegation of power which would show that the Executive Council had appointed the Vice-Chancellor to exercise (sic) of Senior Assistants. No such delegation of power has been produced before me. 12. 'Rule 24 of the said Rules provides the resignation by an employee. It reads as under : "24. Resignation : Subject to the acceptance of resignation by the competent authority, a permanent/ temporary employee may, by notice of three months/one month in writing addressed to the appointing authority, resign from the service of the university or by payment of salary in lieu thereof." 13. The learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that since there was no delegation of powers by the Executive Council in favour of the Vice-Chancellor authorising him to accept the resignation of a Senior Assistant, the order of the Vice-Chancellor dated 24-1-1983 is totally without jurisdiction. 14. Here it may be added that in the order of the Chancellor it is mentioned that the Vice-Chancellor had accepted the resignation of the petitioner subject to the approval of the Executive Council. The copy of the order of the Vice-Chancellor filed by the University Authorities contained no reference to the resignation having been accepted by the Vice -Chancellor subject to the approval of the Executive Council. It is possible that the Vice-Chancellor in his comments against the reference under S. 68 of the Act may have said so. Be that as it may, the Vice -Chancellor could not accept the resignation in anticipation of approval by the Executive Council. The Executive Council, however. approved the action of the Vice-Chancellor after consideration but the fact remains that the Executive Council could not endorse an action of the Vice-Chancellor which was without jurisdiction. Be that as it may, the Vice -Chancellor could not accept the resignation in anticipation of approval by the Executive Council. The Executive Council, however. approved the action of the Vice-Chancellor after consideration but the fact remains that the Executive Council could not endorse an action of the Vice-Chancellor which was without jurisdiction. 15. 'Sri R. P. Tiwari appearing for the University, has tried to justify the order of the Vice-Chancellor under the provisions of S. 13(6) of the Act. Section 13(6) of the Act reads as under : '(6) Where any matter is of urgent nature requiring immediate action and the same could not be immediately dealt with by any officer or the authority or other body of the University empowered by or under this Act to deal with it, the Vice -Chancellor may take such action as he may deem fit and shall forthwith report the action taken by him to the Chancellor and also to the officer, authority, or other body who or which in the ordinary course would have dealt with the matter. Provided that no such action shall be taken by the Vice-Chancellor without the previous approval of the Chancellor, if it would involve a deviation from the provisions of the Statutes or the Ordinances : Provided further that if the officers, authority or other body is of opinion that such action ought not to have been taken it may refer the matter to the Chancellor who may either confirm the action taken by the Vice-Chancellor or annul the same or modify it in such manner, as he thinks fit and thereupon, it shall cease to have effect or. as the case may be. take effect in the modified form, so however, that such annulment or modification shall be without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done by or under the order of the Vice-Chancellor : Provided also that any person in the service of University who is aggrieved by the action taken by the Vice-Chancellor under this sub-section. shall have the right to appeal against such action to the Executive Council within three months from the date on which decision on such action is communicated to him and thereupon the Executive Council may confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by the Vice-Chancellor." 16. shall have the right to appeal against such action to the Executive Council within three months from the date on which decision on such action is communicated to him and thereupon the Executive Council may confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by the Vice-Chancellor." 16. This argument is not open to the learned counsel for the University as the order of the Vice-Chancellor does not state that the Vice-Chancellor was taking action on the resignation of the petitioner in his emergency powers contained in S. 13(6). Further the Vice-Chancellor in his affidavit has not said that an emergency had arisen and consequently he used his emergency powers under S. 13(6) of the Act. And lastly the Chancellor in his order has not also said that the Vice-Chancellor had accepted the resignation in his emergency powers. 17. 'The learned counsel for the University has referred me to the First Statute of Bundelkhand University. In Statute 2.06, it is provided that subject to the provisions of the Act and the Statutes, the Registrar shall have disciplinary control over all employees of the University, other than the following, namely : (a) Officers of the University; (b) Deputy Registrars and Assistant Registrars: (e) employees in the University in the Accounts and Audit Section. 18. 'Sub-clause (2) of the Statute 2.06 vests the Registrar with the power of taking disciplinary action as against an employee of the University mentioned in cl. (1) and the power includes the power of termination. 19. The argument of the learned counsel for the University is that the power of termination includes the power of accepting the resignation as the resignation has the effect of terminating the employment of an employee of the University. 20. The learned counsel for 'the University cannot get assistance from Cl. (2) of Statute 2.06 because the power is vested thereunder in the Registrar. In the case of the petitioner the Registrar has taken no action. It is the Vice-Chancellor who has done so and the Vice-Chancellor is not mentioned in Statute 2.06(2). 21. The argument of the learned counsel for the University is that Superintendents and Assistant Superintendents are Senior to the Senior Assistants and since the Vice-Chancellor is their appointing authority under the Uttar Pradesh Universities Assistants Superintendents/Superintendents Service Rules, 1981, and consequently he also becomes the appointing authority of the Senior Assistants and was, therefore. 21. The argument of the learned counsel for the University is that Superintendents and Assistant Superintendents are Senior to the Senior Assistants and since the Vice-Chancellor is their appointing authority under the Uttar Pradesh Universities Assistants Superintendents/Superintendents Service Rules, 1981, and consequently he also becomes the appointing authority of the Senior Assistants and was, therefore. competent to accept the resignation of the petitioner. 22. This argument cannot be accepted because the aforesaid rules do not mention that the rules apply to the Senior Assistants. On the contrary the rules are very clear that they apply to Superintendents and Assistant Superintends. 23. The learned counsel for the petitioner has argued before me that the matter relating to the petitioner's withdrawal of resignation could be considered by the Executive Council. The petitioner has by his letter dated 9-2-1983 withdrawn his resignation and that letter was before the Executive Council. It is urged that if an employee withdraws his resignation before its acceptance by the competent authority. the same cannot he accepted. In this connection Sri S. P. Srivastava. the learned counsel for the petitioner. has relied upon it decision of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Bahori Lal Paliwal v. District Magistrate, Bulandshahr, AIR 1956 All 511 . In that case the Chairman of a Town Area Committee had tendered his resignation but withdrawn it before its acceptance by the District Magistrate. It was held that as the Chairman had withdrawn his resignation before its acceptance by the competent authority, namely the District Magistrate. the District Magistrate could not accept the same. 24. In the case of Raj Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1969 SC 180 it was observed that Para 5 : "Termination of employment by order passed by the Government does not become effective until 'the order is intimated to the employee. But where a public servant has invited by his letter of resignation determination of his employment, his services normally stands terminated from the date on which the letter of resignation is accepted by the appropriate authority and in the absence of any law or rule governing the conditions of his service to the contrary, it will not be open to the public servant to withdraw his resignation after it is accepted by the appropriate authority. Till the resignation is accepted by the appropriate authority in consonance with the rule governing the acceptance, the public servant concerned has locus poenitentiae but not thereafter." The learned counsel for the University has referred me to a decision in the case of Sri Pradeep Kumar Mukerjee v. Managing Committee, Sant Vinoba Degree College, Deoria, 1984 UPLBEC 183 : 1984 Lab IC NOC 95. In that case, the court observed that Chap. XXVII of the First Statutes of the University of Gorakhpur contains provisions regulating conditions of service of teachers of affiliated colleges. Cl. (4) of Statute 17.04 lays down that services of a teacher appointed in temporary or Officiating capacity may he terminated by one month's notice or salary in lieu thereof on either 'side. Cl. 131 of the Statute provides that except as provided by Cl. (4). not less than three months notice for where notice is given after the month of October. then three months' notice or notice ending with the close of the sessions whichever is longer) shall be given on either side for terminating the contract, or in lieu of such notice, salary for three months (or longer period as aforesaid) shall be paid. 25. In the case before the Division Bench Pradeep Kumar Mukherjee had prayed for quashing of acceptance of his resignation. In his letter, he had not given three months' notice. The Bench held that the provision of notice was for the benefit of management and the petitioner could not get advantage of his own default in not giving three months' notice. The Bench referred to another decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Shivraj Singh v. Devji Mal Asha Ram Paliwal, 1982 All LJ 1012 : 1982 UPLBEC 476. Regulation 29 provides that any employee may resign by giving a notice or pay in lieu thereof to which he would have been entitled in case of termination of his services by the management. The employee had tendered his resignation but had not either given notice or pay in lieu thereof. The Bench held that "Now what would be the situation in case an employee may not have indicated either of the modes, i.e. he neither gives payment of three months pay nor expressly gives three months notice. The employee had tendered his resignation but had not either given notice or pay in lieu thereof. The Bench held that "Now what would be the situation in case an employee may not have indicated either of the modes, i.e. he neither gives payment of three months pay nor expressly gives three months notice. In our opinion in such a case where the employee has not exercised his discretion by not actually paying the three months pay or giving 3 months notice of resignation as required by Regn. 29 read with Regn. 26, the resignation cannot be termed as a valid resignation before the expiry of three months from the date of lodging of the resignation letter itself. The resignation would be deemed to be ineffective before the expiry of three months from the date on which the resignation was lodged with the management." 26. It was found by the Bench that the resignation letter was dated 16-10-1971 and three months would expire only in Jan. 1972. It was held that the management could not accept it on 24-10-1971. 27. In the present case the provisions of R. 24 dealing with resignation has been referred to earlier. It required a notice. The period of notice was admittedly three months. In view of the Division Bench's decision the resignation dated 22-1-1983 would become operative only in the month of April 1, 1983 and could not have been accepted either by the Vice-Chancellor on 24-1-1983 or by The Executive Council on 1-3-1983 as it has been withdrawn on 9-2-1983 before the so-called approval of the Vice-Chancellor's action and acceptance of resignation by the Executive Council. 28. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed, the impugned order of the Vice-Chancellor dated 4-1-1983 and the resolution of the Executive Council approving the action of the Vice Chancellor dated 1-3-1983 as also the order of the Chancellor dated 27-12-1983 are quashed. The petitioner will be deemed to be in service throughout and will be entitled to salary and allowances etc. This order will, however, be given effect to only after 10 days as I am informed by the learned counsel for the University that the University propose to file a special leave pet ion against this judgment. There will be no order as to costs.