JUDGMENT K. C. Agarwal, J. 1. These two writ petitions have been preferred against the judgment of the District Judge, Meerut dated 31-5-1982, dismissing the appeals of the two petitioners filed under Section 33 of Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Since the points involved in these two writ petitions are common, the facts of only one of them, namely, writ petition no. 8367 of 1982, would be sufficient to decide the two cases. 2. On October 15, 1976, the petitioner filed a return under sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Act. Thereafter, a draft statement was prepared by the Competent Authority and served upon the petitioner proposing to declare 334683 sq. mts. of land as surplus with the petitioner. The petitioner went up in appeal which was dismissed on 31-5-1982. Hence; the writ. The land in dispute comprises of seven plots. The total area of the aforesaid seven plots came to 5 bighas 14 biswas which was equivalent to 14416.89 sq. mts. In addition, there were two houses 12/A and 12/B in Ashoka Colony covering an area of 147 sq. yards. The share of the petitioner in the aforesaid land, which was l/3rd, came to 4846 83 sq. mts. After giving benefit of 1500 sq. mts. which was the ceiling area of Meerut, the area declared surplus came to 3346.83 sq. mts. Two arguments were addressed before the learned Addl. District Judge as well as before me. 3. The first and the main point is whether the Master Plan which came into force after the draft statement issued under Section 8 by the Competent Authority would be taken into account while determining the nature of land held by the petitioner. 4. Section 2 (o) of the Act defines urban land. District Judge as well as before me. 3. The first and the main point is whether the Master Plan which came into force after the draft statement issued under Section 8 by the Competent Authority would be taken into account while determining the nature of land held by the petitioner. 4. Section 2 (o) of the Act defines urban land. It has two clauses which are as under: (i) any land situated within the limits of urban agglomeration and referred to as such in the master plan; or (ii) in a case where there is no master plan, or where the master plan does not refer to any land as urban land, any land within the limits of an urban agglomeration and situated in any area included within the local limits of a municipality (by whatever name called), a notified area committee, a town area committee, a city and town committee, a small town committee, a cantonment board or a panchayat, but does not include any such land which is mainly used for the purpose of agriculture. For the purpose of this clause an Explanation has been added. Clause (A) of this Explanation provides as to what would "agriculture include". Clause (B) lays down that land shall not be deemed to be used mainly for agricultural purpose unless the qualifications made therein are satisfied. Clause (C) is relevant. It provides: "Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (B) of this Explanation, land shall not be deemed to be mainly used for the purpose of agriculture if the land has been specified in the master plan for a purpose other than agriculture." 5. The petitioner contended that as there was no master plan on 17th February, 1976 on which date the Act came into force, the proceedings had to be decided on the basis of use of land as on 17th February 1976. For appreciating the argument of the petitioner's learned counsel, it may be useful to refer to the objects contained in the preamble of the Act. These objects are : (i) preventing the concentration of urban land in the hands of a few persons; (ii) preventing speculation and profiteering, and (iii) to bring about an equal distribution of land in urban agglomeration. 6. For achieving the objects, the Legislature has imposed a ceiling on vacant land in urban agglomeration. These objects are : (i) preventing the concentration of urban land in the hands of a few persons; (ii) preventing speculation and profiteering, and (iii) to bring about an equal distribution of land in urban agglomeration. 6. For achieving the objects, the Legislature has imposed a ceiling on vacant land in urban agglomeration. Section 3 provides that except as otherwise provided on and from the commencement of this Act, no person shall be entitled to hold any 'vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit in the territories to which this Act applies under sub-section (2) of Section 1. Section 4 (1) (d) imposes ceiling limit where such land is situated in an urban agglomeration. 'Urban agglomeration' has been defined in Section 2(n). It reads as under : "(n) 'urban agglomeration' : (A) in relation to any State or Union Territory specified in column (1) of Schedule I, means: (i) the urban agglomeration specified in the corresponding entry in column (2) thereof and includes the peripheral area specified in the corresponding entry in column (3) thereof." The definition of 'Urban land' has already been noted in the earlier part of this judgment. However, the existence of a master plan is necessary for the applicability of the Act to urban agglomeration. Pointing out the difference the Supreme Court held in Union of India v, Basavaiah, AIR 1979 SC page 1415 at page 1427 : "The only difference is that where there is a master plan, the Act extends to all lands situate within the local limits of municipality or other local authority, and also covers the peripheral area thereof; but where there is no such master plan, its applicability is confined to the municipal limits or the local area, as the case may be." 7. On 17th February, 1976, when the Act came into force, there was no master plan and, as such, the ceiling limit would have been decided in accordance with first part of Section 2 (o) (ii) read with other provisions of the Act. During the pendency of the proceedings before the Competent Authority, the master plan was enforced which fact has not been disputed. Upon the declaration of land as master plan, consequences are different which have been illustrated by the Supreme Court in the quotation extracted above. During the pendency of the proceedings before the Competent Authority, the master plan was enforced which fact has not been disputed. Upon the declaration of land as master plan, consequences are different which have been illustrated by the Supreme Court in the quotation extracted above. The petitioner's case was that since on the 17th February, 1976, there was no master plan, there being no provision in the Act for taking the subsequent fact of coming into force the master plan, the same had to be ignored. The petitioner does not appear to be correct. Section 6 requires every person holding vacant land in excess of the ceiling area to file the statement. Explanation given to Section 6 gives the definition of the words "commencement of this Act." The relevant clause of this Explanation is clause (ii) which is as under :- "(ii) where any land, not being vacant land, situated in a State in which this Act is in force has become vacant land by any reason whatsoever, the date on which such land becomes vacant land." 8. From Explanation (ii), it appears that even where any land is not vacant on the date of the enforcement of the Act but became vacant subsequently, an obligation is caused on the person holding the land to file a statement under Section 6. Rule 3 of the Rules framed under the Act prescribes period of limitation within which a statement by a person holding excess land has to be submitted. This Rule provides that every statement shall be filled within "two hundred twelve days" from the commencement of the Act. The Central Government has also added Explanation to this Rule which reads as under :- "In this rule "Commencement of the Act" shall have the meaning assigned to the expression "commencement of this Act" in the Explanation to sub-section (1) of Section 6." Reading these two provisions together, no doubt is left, that it is not only that the position on the date of the enforcement of the Act, according to which the ceiling has to be determined, but also subsequent events have to be taken into consideration and the rights of the parties be decided in accordance with the same. 9. Explanation (ii) to Section 6 of the Act meets a contingency where initially some land may not have been vacant but became vacant by reason whatsoever on subsequent date. 9. Explanation (ii) to Section 6 of the Act meets a contingency where initially some land may not have been vacant but became vacant by reason whatsoever on subsequent date. As a result of the enforcement of the master plan, even the agricultural area of user given in the master plan is different, that would be covered by this clause. 10. To illustrate the point, reference may be made to Section 19 (1) (iv) of the Act, which runs as under :- "any public charitable or religious trust (including wakf) and required and used for any public charitable or religious purposes." Under this provision, if a piece of land has been left out from being computed and is not used for the purpose left out, it becomes available for ceiling purpose. 11. If we keep the objects of the Act enumerated in the Preamble, into consideration, we would find that any land, which becomes vacant, would be liable to be covered by the Act if it was not available on the date of its enforcement. The objects of the Act viz. to prevent the concentration of urban land in the hands of few persons and its profiteering, cannot be achieved, if it is held that on land becoming vacant on subsequent date, the Act will not apply. The Act is of perennial nature effecting the lands of persons who are to be covered by face on future dates as well. 12. Reliance had been placed on a decision of the Division Bench in Aftab Ahmad v. State, 1979 AWC 644 , by the learned counsel for his submission. In that case, master plan had not enforced upto the date when the petition was being decided. In these circumstances, the bench held that since no master plan, sanctioned and prepared in relation to the land, had become into force, the ceiling area could not be decided on the basis of use given in the draft master plan, which was under preparation. This ruling is clearly distinguishable. The second point argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner was about interpretation of Section 2 (q) (i). This sub-section (i) of Section 2 (q) defines vacant land. This ruling is clearly distinguishable. The second point argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner was about interpretation of Section 2 (q) (i). This sub-section (i) of Section 2 (q) defines vacant land. The relevant provision of Section 2 (q) (i) reads as under :- "(i) land on which construction of a building is not permissible under the building regulation in force in the area in which such land is situated." 13. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner before the learned District Judge as well as before me was that as under the bye-laws of the Municipal Board, Meerut, 33% of the land was to be left open and no construction could be made thereon, therefore, 33% of the total had to be excluded in computing the ceiling area with the petitioner. For this purpose, the learned counsel placed reliance on a decision of this Court in State of U. P. v. Someshwar Prasad, 1982 AWC 442. 14. Challenging, the learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the interpretation placed by the learned Additional District Judge was correct. I am unable to accept the submission. The interpretation of Section 2 (q) (i) came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in State of U.P. v. L. J. Johnson, 1978 AWC 731 . The Division Bench held :- "What is contemplated under Section 2 (q) (i) is that land which is to be maintained as open space like green park, play ground etc. where no construction is permissible at all under any regulations contained in the Master Plan or the law governing the construction of buildings, It does not cover cases where a part of the land is to be left open for beneficial and convenient enjoyment of the building or to satisfy the requirements for town planning and environmental purposes. This is o' vious from Section 2 (q) which prescribes that in an area where there are building regulations, the minimum extent of land required under such regulations to be kept as open space for the enjoyment of such building shall not exceed the limit mentioned in that provision." This judgment of the High Court went up in appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has reversed the judgment of the High Court on interpretation of Section 4 (9) of the Act but so far as the interpretation concerning Section 2 (q) (i) was concerned, the Supreme Court appears to have affirmed it. In view of the decision of the Division Bench, it is only where construction of a building is not permissible under the building regulations that the land taken out of the purview of the Urban Ceiling Act. What is necessary for applying Section 2(q)(i) is legal impermissibility. There should be, in my view, complete prohibition from construction on the land regarding which benefit of Section 2 (q) (i) that, it is under vacant land, is being claimed. The Division Bench further held that this section does not cover cases where part of the land is left open for beneficial and convenient enjoyment of the building under building regulation. 15. It has been followed by the High Court in State of U. P. v. Gurmit Singh, 1981 AWC page 795 and in Writ Petition no. 1563 of 1981, State of U. P. v. Mangal sen, decided on 25-7-1984. The view taken in State of U. P. v. Someshwar Prasad, (supra) supports the contention of the respondent's learned counsel. In this case, the learned Judge held thai if under the bye laws a certain percentage of area is not built upon, as it is to be kept open, that would amount to an implied prohibition. The decision of L. J. Johnson's case was not cited before the learned Judge. 16. Under the Scheme of the Act, in order to find out the surplus land which could be acquired under Section 10 of the Act, it is necessary first to ascertain the total land, held by a person and, thereafter, to determine the vacant land, which could be acquired under the aforesaid Section 10. 16. Under the Scheme of the Act, in order to find out the surplus land which could be acquired under Section 10 of the Act, it is necessary first to ascertain the total land, held by a person and, thereafter, to determine the vacant land, which could be acquired under the aforesaid Section 10. Section 2 (q) which deals with what is vacant land, has three sub-clauses which are as under :- "(i) land on which construction of a building is not permissible under the building regulations in force in the area in which such land is situated; (ii) in an area where there are building regulations, the land occupied by any building which has been constructed before, or is being constructed on, the appointed day with the approval of the appropriate authority and the land appurtenant to such building and; (iii) in an area where there are no building regulations, the land occupied by any building which has been constructed before, or is being constructed on, the appointed day and the land appurtenant to such building; Provided that where any person ordinarily keeps his cattle, other than for the purpose of dairy farming or for the purpose of breeding of live-stock, on any land situated in a village within an urban agglomeration (described as a village in the revenue records) then, so much extent of the land as has been ordinarily used for the keeping of such cattle immediately before the appointed day shall not be deemed to be vacant land for the purposes of this clause." Section 2 (q) (i) neither applicable to a case where lands are lying vacant on the two sides of the building and to the case where certain percentage of land is required to be left for making a construction. In C AIR 1984 Bom. 122 , a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court held :- "There must either be complete prohibition for construction activity by development plan or master plan or there must already be a sanctioned plan or a plan submitted for approval on the date of commencement of the Act on the basis of which land on which a building cannot be constructed under Section 2 (q) (i) could be definitely ascertained. In the absence of any of the above conditions in the case of open land which falls in clause (i) of Section 2 (q), all land in excess of the ceiling limit specified in Section 4 will be taken over by the Government, AIR 1981 Bom. 326 Refd. W. P. No. 1650 of 1979, dated 31-1-1983 (Bom.) Approved of, AIR 1980 Delhi 106, Dissented from." 17. Counsel for the petitioner relied on the following observations of the Supreme Court made in State of U. P. v. L. J. Johnson, 1983 AWC 798 SC and urged that the interpretation would be contrary to these. The observations ? are:- "If certain land is exempted to any land situated in an urban area where the entire area is covered by land on which it is not permissible to raise a building which will not be deemed to be vacant land within the meaning of Section 2 (q). This is because such land is an urban area cannot be used for building purposes but being vacant falls beyond the purview of the Act." 18. In my view, the observations of the Supreme Court, if read in its entirety, would not support the petitioner's contention. The Supreme Court has not laid down that Section 2 (q) (i) applies to cover a case general exclusion of land from the purview of the Act on which no building can be constructed under the relevant building regulations in force in the area under construction. What these observations mean is that if there is a total prohibition from making constructions on a piece of land, such land will not be liable to be treated as vacant under Section 2 (q) (i), hence, would be out of the purview of the Act. At this place it will be useful to quote the observations of the Supreme Court made in connection with the calculation of the ceiling area. These observations are :- "The Scheme of the Act seems to be that if there is a constructed building with a dwelling unit, the structure thereon cannot be treated as open land for the purpose of declaring it as in excess land beyond the ceiling limit. Similarly, the land kept open under the municipal regulations (upto 500 sq. metres) appurtenant to the land would not be available for being declared as excess land beyond the ceiling limit. Similarly, the land kept open under the municipal regulations (upto 500 sq. metres) appurtenant to the land would not be available for being declared as excess land beyond the ceiling limit. The central idea governing this philosophy of putting a ceiling on urban land is that in an urban area none can hold land in excess of the ceiling regardless of whether the land is entirely open or whether there is a structure consisting of a dwelling unit thereon. Where, however, there is a building and a dwelling unit then the area beneath the building and the dwelling unit would have to be excluded while computing the ceiling. Further, if there are any bye-laws requiring a portion of the land to be kept vacant, the land-holder would be allowed to set apart the said land to the maximum extent of 500 sq. metres. He would also be allowed to retain as additional area of 200 sq. mts. for the beneficial use of the building so that he may enjoy the use of a little compound also for various purposes. 19. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the area of 33% of the land on which building cannot be constructed on account of prohibition contained in the building regulations, that area must necessarily be excluded treating the same as not to be vacant land within the meaning of Section 2 (q) (i). LEARNED counsel urged that this would be a case of absolute prohibition. Counsel urged that the land which would be covered by srtips on both sides of a building and which is required to be left at the rear and in the front cannot also be treated as vacant under Section 2(q)(i). 20. The argument of the learned Standing Counsel on behalf of the State was that Section 2 (q) (i) does not permit the interpretation placed by the petitioner's learned counsel. He urged that applying the rule of literal interpretation, the said provision can be applied only when there is an absolute prohibition on making of construction over a piece of land under the building regulations or master plan. If to a case where certain percentage of land is required to be left vacant, Section 2 (q) (i) could not be applied. If to a case where certain percentage of land is required to be left vacant, Section 2 (q) (i) could not be applied. For this purpose, learned Standing counsel also urged that construction placed by the petitioner on the definition of Section 2 (q) (i) would defeat the very purpose of the Act, the purpose of the Act being to achieve the objectives, the details of which have already been given by me in the earlier part of the judgment. Section 2 (q) (i) has been as said above, a subject matter of interpretation before a full bench of the Bombay High Court in Prabhakar Narhar Pawar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1984 Bom. 122 . The full bench found that the land of which a certain percentage is required to be left on both the sides of the building and at the rear and set of in the front under the building regulations, could not be covered by Section 2 (q) (i). In order to apply Section 2 (q) (i), the full bench held : "Now, when a question arises as to whether construction of a building is not permissible under the building regulation enforced, it is possible that there may be an absolute ban or prohibition under the relevant master plan where under no circumstances construction of a building is permissible on a given piece of land. Such piece of land may have been served for a purpose and on such service construction of a building would not at all be permissible. But when we come to an instance case like the present one in which there is an open plot of land which is admittedly a house site on which a building could be constructed, it is difficult to see how any part of the land can be excluded under clause (1) of Section 2 (q) on hypothetical construction.......... Sub-clause (i) of Section 2 (q) does not in our view, contemplate a general exclusion of land from the purview of the Act to the extent of 2/3rd or 1/2 or whatever it may be the extent of land on which no building can be constructed under the relevant building regulations enforced in the area under construction irrespective of whether a building is proposed to be constructed or not, on the date of commencement of the Act." 21. From these observations of the Supreme Court, it is clear that to a case where 500 sq. metres of land is left under Section 2 (g) (i), the owner will not be entitled to get the benefit of Section 2 (q) (i), as conceding to the application of Section 2 (q) (i) would mean double exclusion. 22. From the above it is clear that the contention of the respondent that he was entitled to the exclusion of the land, a certain percentage of which is required under the bye laws to be left open, is not correct. FROM what has been said above by the Supreme Court, it appears to me that the owner will not be entitled to a separate inclusion both under sub-clauses (i) and (ii) because the area under subclause (i) will obviously include the land appurtenant which is referred to in subclauses (i) and (ii). For what 1 have said above, I find that the learned District Judge committed an error in holding that if a certain percentage of land is required to be left open as construction of a building is not permissible then that area should be excluded from the definition of vacant land as mentioned in Section 2 (q) (i) of the Act. The controversy is covered squarely by the decision of the Division Bench in State of U. P. v. L. J. Johnson (Supra). This part of the decision can be treated as having been affirmed by the Supreme Court. 23. It appears that the petitioner was not served with the amended statement after the Act had come into force and the land had been taken under the master plan. IT would be appropriate that the judgments of the District Judge and the Competent Authority are set aside on that limited point and the Competent Authority is called upon to proceed with the determination of ceiling area. 24. For these reasons, both the writ petitions succeed partly and are allowed. The judgments of the District Judge and Competent Authority are set aside and the case is sent back for a fresh decision. There shall be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.