JUDGMENT - WAIKAR M.R., J.: - This is a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India against the non-grant of the period of set off under section 428 of the Criminal Procedure Code (hereinafter called the Code) by the Jail Authorities of the petitioner. 2. In view of the Division Bench Ruling of this Court reported in (Jaswantlal Harijivandas Dholakia v. State of Maharashtra)1, 1979 Cri.L.J. 971, the present contention of this petitioner should stand foreclosed. But the matter has been admitted as the learned Counsel for the petitioner relied upon the contrary views expressed by other High Courts reported in (1) (K.C. Das v. The State)2, 1979 Cri.L.J. 362(Del.) (2) (Gedala Ramulu Naidu v. State of Andhra Pradesh and another)3, 1982 Cri.L.J. 2186(A.P.), (3) (Shabhu and another v. State of Utter Pradesh and another)4, 1982 Cri.L.J. 1757(All.). 3. The present petitioner has been convicted in as many as 11 cases for the offence under section 379 I.P.C. detailed in para 4 of this petition. In the first four cases he was convicted and sentenced to undergo various terms of imprisonment on 30-12-1982 while in rest of the seven cases he was convicted and sentenced on 30-4-1983. The sentences were to run consecutively. He was first arrested on 6-5-1982 in the Criminal Case at Serial No. 9 (Criminal Case No. 260 of 1983) in which he was convicted and sentenced on 30-4-1983. He was in Police Custody remand and Magisterial Custody remand since his arrest. He has already been given a set off under section 428 from 6-5-1982 till 30-4-1983 in Criminal Case No. 260 of 1983 but his contention is that in each of the first four cases he ought to be given a set off from 6-5-1982 to 31-2-1982 and in the rest from 6-5-1982 till 30-4-1983. This prayer has been refused by the Jail Authorities and hence this petition. 4. According to the petitioner if the set off is deducted from the period of substantive sentences as well as default sentences, he sought to have been released long back. In the reported decision of our High Court the accused was granted set off in the first case from 2-5-1973 to 1-10-1973 and in the second case from 4-9-1973 to 21-12-1973. According to the petitioner if the set off is deducted from the period of substantive sentences as well as default sentences, he sought to have been released long back. In the reported decision of our High Court the accused was granted set off in the first case from 2-5-1973 to 1-10-1973 and in the second case from 4-9-1973 to 21-12-1973. It was held that it was wholly uncalled for because the period from 2-5-1973 to 1-10-1973 was already counted while giving set off in the first case and after 1-10-1973 till 21-12-1973 the prisoner was undergoing substantive jail sentence as convict prisoner in the first case. 5. Now section 428 read thus : “Where an accused person has, on conviction, been sentenced to imprisonment for a term, the period of detention, if any, undergone by him during the investigation, inquiry or trial of the same and before the date of such conviction, shall be set of against the term of imprisonment imposed on him on such conviction, and the liability of such person to undergo imprisonment on such conviction shall be restricted to the remainder, if any, of the term of imprisonment imposed on him.” What is observed by our High Court interpreting this section was that from the bare reading of section 428 of the Criminal Procedure Code it is quite obvious that it confers a benefit on a convict reducing his liability to undergo imprisonment out of the sentence imposed for the period which he has already served as an undertrial prisoner in the case concerned. It lays down that the period of detention of an accused as an undertrial prisoner shall be set off against the term of imprisonment imposed on him of conviction. The section only provides for set off. It does not change the nature of detention or sentence imposed. It does not do away with two different kinds of detentions nor it puts them on the same footing for all purposes. The detention contemplated by this section is detention during investigation, inquiry or trial of the case in which the accused person has been convicted. The section makes it very clear that the period of detention which is allowed to be set off against the term of imprisonment imposed on the accused on conviction must be during the investigation, inquiry or trial in connection with the same case in which he has been convicted. The section makes it very clear that the period of detention which is allowed to be set off against the term of imprisonment imposed on the accused on conviction must be during the investigation, inquiry or trial in connection with the same case in which he has been convicted. 6. The High Court of Delhi (supra) interpreted section 428 by giving an illustration. Suppose A was arrested on 1-1-1977 and convicted and sentence on 31-1-1978. In the second case A was again arrested on 1-1-1978 and convicted and sentence on 31-3-1978. In the first case, it was observed, that he would be entitled to a set off from 1-1-1977 to 31-1-1978. In the second case as well he would be entitled to a set off from 1-1-1977 to 31-3-1978. What is observed is - “The statute does not make any distinction between the first case and the second case. The principle is the same. It has to be applied to all cases evenhandedly and uniformly. If the sentences awarded on conviction are to run concurrently section 427 applies. If the sentences in the two cases are not ordered to run concurrently, the remainder of the term of imprisonment after adjustment of the pretrial period already undergone in the second case, shall commence at the expiry of the term of imprisonment in the first case after setting off the pretrial detention period. In both cases he will be entitled to set off.” 7. With respect it is difficult to accept such an interpretation. In the second case if he is apprehended and arrested on 1-1-1978 and when section 428, as it is worded, says “that the period of detention, if any, undergone by him during the investigation, inquiry or trial of the same case..” why the period, from 1-1-977 to 1-1-1978 (prior to his arrest) should be computed as a period of detention undergone during the investigation of the case, passes our comprehension. Secondly after he is convicted on 31-1-1978 in the first case, it is difficult to say that he is an under trial prisoner in another case. The following observations of the Supreme Court appearing in (Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Anne Venkateswara Rao etc.)5, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1096 also render such a new unsustainable. This is what the Supreme Court observed. The following observations of the Supreme Court appearing in (Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Anne Venkateswara Rao etc.)5, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1096 also render such a new unsustainable. This is what the Supreme Court observed. “Section 428 provides that the period of detention of an accused as an undertrial prisoner shall be set off against the term of imprisonment imposed on him on conviction. The section only provides for a “set off”, it does not equate an “undertrial detention or remand detention with imprisonment on conviction.” The provision as to set off expresses a legislative policy, this does not mean that it does away with the difference in the two kinds of detention and puts them on the same footing for all purposes.” 8. By this logic and reasoning of the decision of the Delhi High Court, an accused would be bestowed the benefit of set off even of such period when the concerned offence was never committed and there could be no question of his being arrested and detained for the same. If the set off is to be computed from the earliest date of detention, no matter in respect of which offence, and is to stretch even after he becomes a convict serving his sentence, then the subsequent trials and convictions in most of the cases would be idle and inoperative, the term of sentences being fully covered by the period of detentions and conviction relating to earlier offences even though they are made to run consecutively and not concurrently. 9. The decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court (1982 Cri.L.J. 2186) deals with the case of conviction in two sessions trials wherein the sentences were made to run concurrently. The Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court (1982 Cri.L.J. 1757) in fact, laid down that the period spent by, the accused must be with regard to the same case. What is observed is:- “No set formula can be laid down in that behalf. The Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court (1982 Cri.L.J. 1757) in fact, laid down that the period spent by, the accused must be with regard to the same case. What is observed is:- “No set formula can be laid down in that behalf. If the facts and circumstances of a particular case indicate that a person already detained in one case was also subsequently wanted in another case and he was not formally detained in that other case on account of the negligence of the concerned authorities, and for no fault of his, he can, with all justification, claim that his detention in the earlier case should also be deemed to be his detention for the purpose of the second case. In that event benefit of section 428 Criminal Procedure Code, can be extended to him. On the facts of the case it was found that the accused were all along on bail in the case before the Sessions Judge, they had no preconviction detention period to their credit which could be set off against the sentences ultimately awarded to them in that case. In other crimes they were subsequently involved. They could not claim any benefit of those detentions in a case before the Sessions Judge.” 10. The legislative policy and intent would be clear if sections 427 and 428 are read together. Section 428 is a new provision. Section 427, which also existed before the amendment, deals with computation of substantive sentences on conviction in two or more cases. The substantive sentences can be made to run concurrently or consecutively. In the absence of any express direction they run consecutively. Previously in the absence of any provision like the one under section 428, the pretrial detention of a convict was of no avail. It had to be just ignored and the period of his sentence used to be computed from the date of pronouncement of the judgment. Now if the personal liberty of a person is required by the State for the purpose of investigation of the offence against him, the period of such detention after he is ultimately found guilty and is punished, should be given set off, is the legislative intent and the policy. Now if the personal liberty of a person is required by the State for the purpose of investigation of the offence against him, the period of such detention after he is ultimately found guilty and is punished, should be given set off, is the legislative intent and the policy. This section confers a benefit on the convict and by legal fiction the period of preconviction detention, is reckoned as part of imprisonment, rigorous or simple, as the case may be. The section is absolute in its terms and it contemplates a period of detention of an accused undergone by him during the inquiry, investigation or trial of the same case. It is pertinent to note that the legislation has not used the expression 'any case'. It must, therefore, be the detention during the investigation, inquiry or trial in connection with the same case. Once the accused is apprehended or arrested for a particular offence, his period of detention commences for the purpose of investigation of the case. If he is concerned in more offences than the one already under investigation, though his formal arrest is effected, there is no real or effective detention. Similarly once he is convicted and sentence in any case he no longer remains detenu in other cases followed subsequently while he is serving his other sentences. He is not, therefore, entitled to claim any set off after he becomes a convict undergoing sentence upon the pronouncement of the sentence in other cases. Legislature does not make any provision for making pre-conviction periods in all cases to run concurrently analogous to the provisions of section 427 dealing with the substantive sentences. Therefore, when sentences run consecutively, then in the absence of any specific provision, it cannot be altered to run concurrently by invoking the provisions of section 428. On plain construction of section 428, therefore, we feel that the expression detention appearing in section 428 cannot be confused with arrest, and detention means a real and effective detention, which deprives the accused of his personal liberty. 11. In this view of the matter, we are not inclined to accept the view expressed by the other High Courts and we record our respectful accord to the view already taken by the Division Bench of our High Court. The petition, therefore, is dismissed. Rule is discharged. Petition dismissed. -----