ORDER In this Rule under sub-s. 9 of S. 29B of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act), the petitioner has impeached an order dated 8th August 1683, passed in Ejectment Case No. 11/82 (E.V.C), by the learned Rent Controller, Calcutta and whereby an application made under Order 6 rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure as preferred by the opposite party, was allowed. 2. The petitioner has stated that Shri Puranjan Mukherjee, since deceased, in or about 1970 inducted him as a tenant in respect of the entire ground floor of premises no 18/79, Dover Lane, Calcutta–700029 at a monthly rent of Rs. 300/- payable according to English calendar month. It was his case that the said Puranjan Mukherjee died on or about 25th June 1978 and after his death, the petitioner was informed by Dr. Prodesh Ranjan Mukherjee, the son of the deceased, by the letter of 16th September 1978, that the said Shri Puranjan Mukherjee died intestate and the said Dr. Prodesh Ranian Mukherjee and Smt. Anjali Gangopadhyay were his only heirs and legal representatives. By the said letter, the petitioner has claimed to have been required to pay rent either to one Shri Pradyot Ranjan Mukherjee or in his absence to Borada Prasad Roy. The petitioner has stated that since he had no reason or occasion to suspect any foul play in the letter or also to suspect the bona fide of that letter, he went on paying rent as directed and in return, received rent receipt signed by P. R. Mukherjee. It was his case, that some time at the end of March 1982, he received a Lawyer's letter, written under the instructions of the said Dr. Prodesh Ranjan Mukherjee, claiming himself to be the executor of an alleged will of late Puranjan Mukherjee and thereby, he was for the first time informed that the opposite party, Anjali Gangopadhyay, was one of the legatees of the last will of the said deceased and she reasonably required the premises in question, as occupied by the petitioner. As such, the petitioner was asked to quit and vacate the premises by the expiry of April 1982. As such, the petitioner was asked to quit and vacate the premises by the expiry of April 1982. It has been stated that in the schedule of the concerned letter the extent of the tenancy was described as one flat i.e. entire ground floor except one room, inclusive of privy, kitchen and bath room. It was the petitioner's further case that in spite of such notice, which he claimed to be a purported one, rents as tendered by him were accepted by Shri P. R. Mukherjee on behalf of the estate of late Puranjan Mukherjee, as before and this continued till the month of August 1982. It has been alleged that from September 1982 onwards the representatives as mentioned above, refused to accept rent, whereupon the petitioner addressed a letter on 26th September 1982 to the heirs of his landlord as mentioned above, asking them the reason for such refusal of accepting the rent. It was the petitioner's further case that none of the addressees, even cared to reply to the said letter, although they had duly received such communication. 3. It appears that thereafter, the opposite party herein filed an application under S. 29B of the said Act, which makes provisions for a special procedure for disposal of applications for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement, before the learned Rent Controller, Calcutta, for recovery of khas possession, according to the petitioner, of a portion of the premises nos. 18/79A and 18/79B, Dover Lane, Calcutta claiming them to be held by the petitioner as tenant. From a reference to the concerned application which has been disclosed as Annexure-B to this petition, it would appear that the opposite party has claimed that she had been allotted certain portions of the premises Nos. 18/79A and 18/79B, Dover Lane, Calcutta–700029, as a legatee under the last will and testament of late Puranjan Mukherjee and that her husband Shri M. K. Gangopadhyay, who was an employee under the South Eastern Railway and was occupying a leasehold flat of Eastern Railway, has been asked to vacate the said flat, and the authorities of the Eastern Railway were badly pressing for release of the flats belonging to them and which were in occupation of the officers of South Eastern Railway. Such claim against Shri Gangopadhyay was made on the basis of a claim that he was owning his own house in Calcutta. Such claim against Shri Gangopadhyay was made on the basis of a claim that he was owning his own house in Calcutta. It has also been stated by the Opposite party that her husband was served with a notice for vacating the concerned flat and they would like to have the occupation of the premises which is being held by the petitioner, as they have no other alternative accommodation elsewhere. It was also claimed that in the circumstances as indicated above and more particularly in the application as in Annexure-E to this petition an order of eviction under S. 29B of the said Act, was requited to be passed for evicting the petitioner from the premises under his occupation. It was also claimed that the tenancy of the petitioner was duly determined with effect from 30th April 1982, through the notice dated 23rd March 1982 of the learned Advocate of the executor of the will i.e. Dr. P. R. Mukherjee and which was received by the petitioner. In the schedule to that application under S. 29B, the extent of the tenancy of the petitioner was described as "ground floor flat consisting of three bed-rooms, one drawing room, one dining space kitchen-cum-store room and one covered verandah inclusive of one privy, one bath, one covered utensils cleaning shed and entrance passage and the boundary walls on three sides as described as north, south and west and on east side by Dover Lane." 4. On service of summons, the petitioner has claimed to have been duly entered into appearance and filed an application supported by an affidavit, praying for leave to contest the concerned application under S. 29B of the said Act. On service of summons, the petitioner has claimed to have been duly entered into appearance and filed an application supported by an affidavit, praying for leave to contest the concerned application under S. 29B of the said Act. It has also been stated that as the petitioner was not served with the copies of the documents purported to have been annexed with the said application under S. 29B of the said Act and neither the opposite party herein had filed the probated will nor the certified copy of the same with her application, the petitioner also prayed for leave to file an additional application, after those records were either produced or given inspection of, It was been stated that in fact, the petitioner was served with those records, which included a copy of the purported last will and testament of Puranjan Mukherjee and that too without the plan or map as referred to therein and according to which, there were allotments made to different legatees, including the opposite party. 5. The above non-disclosure of relevant records and documents has been claimed by the petitioner to be a deliberate act on the part of the opposite party for having an order after misleading the Court or the authorities concerned. However, on being granted the necessary leave to contest the application as mentioned above, the petitioner duly filed his written statement contending inter alia amongst others that : – (a) the opposite party was not the sole landlady of your petitioner and as such the proceeding was bad for non-joinder of parties, even assuming that the opposite party had become owner of a portion of the premises No. 18/79, Dover Lane, Calcutta–700029, which fact was, however, denied by your petitioner. (b) petitioner is a tenant in respect of the entire ground floor of the premises No. 18/79, Dover Lane, Calcutta–700 029 and that he was not concerned in any way with the alleged premises No. 18/79A and 18/79B, Dover Lane, Calcutta–700 029. (c) petitioner was unable to make any effective comments on the allegations made in the application due to the fact that the same was lacking in material particulars. (d) the alleged notice was waived by acceptance of rent month by month subsequent to the service of notice. (c) petitioner was unable to make any effective comments on the allegations made in the application due to the fact that the same was lacking in material particulars. (d) the alleged notice was waived by acceptance of rent month by month subsequent to the service of notice. (e) the instant proceeding was not maintainable in law as the opposite party had no right to avail of S. 29B, as she was not a Government employee and was not an allottee of any residential accommodation by the Government. (f) the said Shri M. K. Gangopadhyay, husband of the opposite party does not own any residential accommodation either in his own name or in the name of his wife or any other dependent. (g) no where in the said application was it alleged that the said Shri M. K. Gangopadhyay has been allotted a residential accommodation by his employer. (h) that the opposite party having only limited life interest in a part of the tenancy held by the opposite party, cannot seek remedy provided under S. 29B of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. 6. It would appear that at the hearing, the opposite party was examined as P. W. 1 and her husband as P.W. 2 and the petitioner has claimed that the opposite party in her evidence, categorically admitted that the schedule to the application together with the boundaries as given, was correct. It has been claimed that after the close of the evidence of the opposite party, the petitioner was required to adduce his evidence on a fixed date but on that date, the opposite party filed an application for amendment of her application under S. 29B of the said Act and thereby she wanted to change the schedule of the premises in question. The schedule as sought to be amended now is mentioned hereunder : "The portion is butted and bounded by the East–Partly by premises No. 18/62 and partly by premises No. 18/69, Dover Lane, Calcutta, the West–Dover Lane, Calcutta. The South–18/79, Dover Lane, Calcutta, the North–Partly by premises No. 18/78, Dover Lane and partly by room in occupation of Dr. P. Mukherjee, partly by stair case, partly by privy and partly by passage of premises No. 18/79A, Dover Lane, Calcutta". The South–18/79, Dover Lane, Calcutta, the North–Partly by premises No. 18/78, Dover Lane and partly by room in occupation of Dr. P. Mukherjee, partly by stair case, partly by privy and partly by passage of premises No. 18/79A, Dover Lane, Calcutta". The said application for amendment was not proceeded with and the same was rejected and thereafter, the opposite party filed another application for amendment of her application under S. 29B of the said Act, in which she prayed for the same change in the schedule as in her earlier application and as quoted above. In fact, the learned Advocates appearing before me for the respective parties, agreed that the schedule of the above mentioned two amendment applications were the same. The application for amendment as was later on filed was objected to by the petitioner, claiming amongst others, that the same was not maintainable and was liable to be rejected as the same sought to negate the admission of the opposite party of the concerned schedule to her original application and which was really and correctly described. It was also claimed that by the proposed amendment the opposite party was attempting to circumvent the defect of non-joinder of parties, as pointed out by the petitioner in his written statement. 7. After hearing the matter, the learned Rent Controller, by his order dated 8th August 1983, as impeached in this proceeding, was pleased, to allow the application for amendment, with further liberty to the petitioner to cross-examine the witnesses of the opposite party. The petitioner has of course, stated that the learned Rent Controller, did not however, give any opportunity to file written statement or award costs in his favour, for the belated prayer for amendment. 8. Mr. The petitioner has of course, stated that the learned Rent Controller, did not however, give any opportunity to file written statement or award costs in his favour, for the belated prayer for amendment. 8. Mr. Mukherjee, appearing in support of the Rule, on a reference to the different schedules as indicated hereinbefore and as appeared from the records, claimed and contended and that too on the basis of some admission by the opposite party, that really the tenancy of the petitioner was in respect of the entire ground floor of the premises in question, which belonged also to other landlords along with the opposite party and as such, the point of non-maintainability of the proceeding had great force and substance and really, when the opposite party realised such defect, she wanted to have the concerned amendment, only to fill up the lacuna in her pleadings and this fact, according to Mr. Mukherjee, was completely overlooked by the learned Rent Controller, while making the impugned order. It was also stated by Mr. Mukherjee that rent receipts (Ext. C series), which also proved and established that the tenancy of the petitioner was for the ground floor of the premises in question, were not considered and lastly, since the learned Rent Controller, was not a Court, the powers under order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, could not be exercised. 9. On his submissions on non-application of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, Mr. Mukherjee referred to S. 29(6) of the said Act, which lays down that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall apply to all suits and proceedings referred to in S. 20 excepts suits or proceedings which lie to the High Court. Since reference to S. 20 has been made in S. 29(6), Mr. Mukherjee referred to S. 29(6) of the said Act, which lays down that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall apply to all suits and proceedings referred to in S. 20 excepts suits or proceedings which lie to the High Court. Since reference to S. 20 has been made in S. 29(6), Mr. Mukherjee first placed S. 20 which makes special provisions regarding jurisdiction of Courts for trial of suits for possession and lays down that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, a suit or proceeding by a landlord against a tenant in which recovery of possession of any premises to which this Act applies is claimed shall lie to the Courts, as set out in the First Schedule, and no Court shall be competent to entertain or try such suit or proceeding and secondly to the First Schedule of the Act as reference to the same has been mentioned in the section itself. To substantiate his arguments on non-applicability or non-availability of the provisions of Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure in a proceeding like the concerned one before the learned Rent Controller, reference was firstly made by Mr. Mukherjee, to the case of V. Munusami Naidu vs. A. Kasim Khan, AIR. 1972 Mad 437, where the petitioner's prayer in appellate Court to amend the Eviction petition, so that he could claim relief on the grounds under S. 10(3) (c) instead of under S. 10(3) (a) (i) originally claimed, was refused notwithstanding the fact that all facts needed to plead the new ground were on record. That was a case under the provisions of Madras Building, (lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 and there, the provisions of S. 10(3) (a) (i) and 10(3) (c) were construed and considered. It had been observed in the facts of that case that the provisions of Civil Procedure Code as such would not apply to Rent Control proceedings and the petition for eviction could not be amended under Order 6 Rule 7 of the Civil Procedure Code at the appellate stage especially when it amounted to seeking a review of the adjudication already made by the Rent Controller. Secondly, reference was made by Mr. Mukherjee to the case of The Rayala Corporation (Mad) Ltd vs. Syed Bawkar & Co & Ors AIR 1957 (Mad) 385 . Secondly, reference was made by Mr. Mukherjee to the case of The Rayala Corporation (Mad) Ltd vs. Syed Bawkar & Co & Ors AIR 1957 (Mad) 385 . That was a case were the power of the Rent Controller to summon private witnesses under provisions Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949 and Rules framed thereunder was an issue amongst other and it has been observed that summonses referred to in rule 24 cannot be restricted to summons to the respondents in an application and to public servants under S. 12(E) Rule 24(2) contemplates the issue of summonses to private witnesses at the instance of parties, and sub-rule (2) authorizes the and the production of documents. The expression “require the attendance” In Rule 24(7) is wide enough to include requiring by summoning. Thereafter and thirdly, reliance was placed upon the determinations in the case of N.K. Segu Abdul Khadir v. A.K. Murthy, AIR 1948 Mad 235, a case under the Madras Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949 and where, it has been observed that where the rules of procedure made under the Act have been followed and service which those rules require, is effected, the appellate authority under the Act has no jurisdiction to set aside his order because he is later impressed and accepts that the respondent did not know of the date or the fact of hearing of the appeal. If the material provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure had been made applicable to proceedings under the Control Act, or if there had been a rule corresponding to Order 9 Rule 13 or Order 41 Rule 21 contained in the Control Act Rules then the appellate authority would have had jurisdiction and authority to set aside his order. But in the absence of incorporation of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure in the rules of procedure for the tribunals under the Control Act, there is no justification for the application of the principles of those provisions, as it would mean applying those provisions when they are not made applicable. 10. In support of his submissions that in view of her admission, the opposite party would not be entitled to challenge the extent of tenancy of the petitioner, Mr. Mukherjee referred to the decision in the case of M/s. Modi Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. & anr. 10. In support of his submissions that in view of her admission, the opposite party would not be entitled to challenge the extent of tenancy of the petitioner, Mr. Mukherjee referred to the decision in the case of M/s. Modi Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. & anr. v. M/s Ladha Ram & Co, 1976(4) SCC 320 . In that case, it has been observed that under Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, amendment of written statement will not be allowed when the effect would be to displace the plaintiff’s suit and deprive him or valuable right accrued to him. It has also been observed that an entirely different and new case cannot be substituted by such process. It has also been held that inconsistent and alternative please can be made in pleadings, but by incorporation of such subsequent pleading, admissions, if any, made by the party cannot be sought to be made nugatory. It was also and further contended by Mr. Mukherjee that apart from the above, because of the admitted defence of the opposite party and to the effect that “its evidence from the Xeroxed copy of the will and the original plan shown to the opposite party that the petitioner is allotted only a portion of the ground floor of premised No. 18/79, Dover Lane, Calcutta–700029, of which the opposite party has all along been a tenant and consequently she cannot claim ownership in respect of the ground floor tenancy of the opposite party", as made in the additional written statement dated 2nd May 1983, the opposite party herein would not be entitled to claim any relief in the suit or to have the amendment as asked for incorporated. It was then submitted by Mr. Mukherjee that as the learned Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to entertain the application under Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure and inherent lack of jurisdiction. So, the entertaining of the concerned proceeding by him was void ab initio, without jurisdiction and thus illegal and irregular. In support of such submissions as above, reference was made to the case of Mst Zohra Khatoon v. Janab Mohammad Jane Alam & Ors. So, the entertaining of the concerned proceeding by him was void ab initio, without jurisdiction and thus illegal and irregular. In support of such submissions as above, reference was made to the case of Mst Zohra Khatoon v. Janab Mohammad Jane Alam & Ors. AIR 1978 Cal 133 and more particularly to the observations that the granting an amendment postulates an authority of the court to entertain the suit and make an order for amendment therein, but where the court inherently lacks jurisdiction to entertain the suit, it cannot make any order for amendment to bring the suit within jurisdiction. In that case the Court will be exercising jurisdiction which it has not. 11. Against the submissions of Mr. Mukherjee, that by the proposed amendment, the nature and character of the suit in respect of the premises under the occupation of his client viz. the petitioner herein, was going to be changed and as such, such amendment as asked for, was not permissible, Mr. Das Gupta, appearing for the opposite party claimed and contended that by the proposed amendment, the nature and character of the suit, which was for eviction of the petitioner, was not going to be changed or altered and by the proposed amendment, only the boundary of the suit premises was sought to be changed. It was his specific contentions that the original description of the premises remained the same and only the boundary as mentioned above, has been changed and too for the purpose of correcting the mistake in the description of the tenancy. The amendment as asked for, was claimed to be technical only by Mr. Das Gupta and as such, on the basis of the determinations in Jai Jai Ram Monohor Lal v. National Building Material AIR 1969 SC 1267 , he claimed that the amendment of the plaint in the facts of this case, on application of tile discretion lying with the Court, could not be refused, rather the same was appropriately allowed. In the facts of that case, it has been observed that there is no rule that unless in an application fur amendment of the plaint it is expressly averred that the error, omission or misdescription is due to the bona fide mistake, the Court has no power to grant leave to amend the plaint. In the facts of that case, it has been observed that there is no rule that unless in an application fur amendment of the plaint it is expressly averred that the error, omission or misdescription is due to the bona fide mistake, the Court has no power to grant leave to amend the plaint. The power to grant amendment of the pleadings is intended to serve the ends of justice and is not governed by such narrow or technical limitations. 12. On the question of admissions by the opposite party herein, which was claimed by the learned Advocate for the petitioner, as a bar to the maintainability of the concerned proceedings, it was submitted by Mr. Das Gupta that such admission, if any or it at all, was in respect of the schedule of accommodation and as such, the same could not be a bar as claimed. 13. On the other question of applicability of the provisions of Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in answer to Mr. Mukherjee’s arguments as based on S/ 29(6). Mr. Das Gupta referred to S. 29B(8), which is in Chapter VIA of the Act and lays down that the Controller shall, while holding an enquiry in a proceeding to which this chapter applies, follow the practice and procedure of a Court of Small Causes, including the recording of evidence. Section 29 is in Chapter VI and Chapter VIA was inserted in November, 1976 by S. 3 of West Bengal Act LII of 1976. Since the language in S. 29B(8) as used is “… ………. Court of Small Causes”, so, Mr. Das Gupta claimed that such terms would include either the Presidency Small Causes Courts Act or the Provincial Small Causes Court Act. The relevant provisions of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act is S. 38 and under the Provincial Small Cause Court Act, the corresponding provision is in S. 17. Under S. 48 as mentioned above, all the provisions of Civil Procedure Code, including those of Order 21, will apply to matters provided for in the chapter. The said section also applies the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code to proceeding for recovery of possession of immovable property. Under S. 48 as mentioned above, all the provisions of Civil Procedure Code, including those of Order 21, will apply to matters provided for in the chapter. The said section also applies the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code to proceeding for recovery of possession of immovable property. Under S. 17 of the other Act, the procedure of the Civil Procedure Code 1908 is to be followed ordinarily in Small Cause suits with such exceptions as pointed out in S. 7 of the Code. It was also submitted by Mr. Das Gupta that in the matter of having a pleading amended, the Court or a Tribunal should not go or be guided by technical rules, but amendment must be allowed to have an effective determination of the lis and also to do substantial justice. In support of such submissions, reference was made by him to the case of S. M. Banerji v. Sri Krishna Agarwal, AIR 1960 SC 368 , which was a case under the Representation of Peoples Act, 1951 and where it has been observed that Courts and Tribunals are constituted to do justice between the parties within the confines of statutory limitations and undue emphasis on technicalities or enlarging their scope would cramp their powers, diminish their effectiveness and defeat the very purpose for which they are constituted. It must be made clear that within the limits prescribed by the decisions of the Supreme Court the discretionary jurisdiction of the Tribunals to amend the pleading, is as extensive as that of a Civil Court. The same well settled principles laid down in the matter of amendments to the pleadings in a suit should also regulate the exercise of the power of amendment by a Tribunal. Then, a further reference was also made by Mr. Das Gupta to the case of K. Karuppanna Mudaliar v. Kuttianna Mudaliar, AIR 1976 Mad 5 , where it has been indicated, while considering the question of amendment of plaint under Order 6 Rule 17, that if amendment is asked for to correct the patent mistake in stating the boundary of the plaintiff's property, such amendment would not change the nature and character of the suit in any way. It has also been observed in that case, that where the plaintiff has misstated the real state of affairs and inadvertently filed a plan not revealing the real state of affairs and having come to know the patent mistake wants to correct himself, so that justice may be rendered to the respective parties, amendment though sought at appellate stage cannot be refused and the court cannot shirk its duties because by amendment the pleadings have to be amended and fresh evidence has to be let in. The predominant interest of the court should be to render justice and allow amendments for such purposes in order to determine the real question in controversy between the parties. 14. Section 32 of the Provincial Small Cause Court Act lays down the application of the Act to Courts invested with jurisdiction of a Court of a Court of Small Causes and on a reference to S. 32(1)(c) which postulates that so much of Chapters III and IV as relates to the practice and procedure of Courts of Small Causes, would apply to Courts inverted by or under any enactment for the time being in force with the jurisdiction of a Court of Small Causes so far as regards the exercise of that jurisdiction by these Courts, Mr. Mukherjee claimed the submissions of Mr. Das Gupta to be inappropriate. He also contended that such would also be the position in respect of the submissions of Mr. Das Gupta on the provisions of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, Mr. Mukherjee also referred to S. 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure and also to S. 15 of. Mukherjee claimed the submissions of Mr. Das Gupta to be inappropriate. He also contended that such would also be the position in respect of the submissions of Mr. Das Gupta on the provisions of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, Mr. Mukherjee also referred to S. 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure and also to S. 15 of. the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, which deals with cognizance of suits by Courts of Small Causes and is to the effect that (1) Court of Small Causes shall not take cognizance of the suits specified in the Second Schedule as suits excepted from the cognizance of a Court of Small Causes by which the suit is triable, (2) Subject to the exceptions specified in that Schedule and to the provisions of any enactment for the time being in force, all suits of a civil nature of which the value does not exceed five hundred rupees shall be cognizable by a Court of Small Causes and (3) subject as aforesaid, the State Government may, by order in writing, direct that all suits of a civil nature of which the value does not exceed one thousand rupees shall be cognizable by a Court of Small Causes mentioned in the order, apart from relying on the concerned schedule viz second schedule. 15. In reply and while answering the question put to him as to why in view of the character of the order allowing amendment having been challenged, a determination should at this interlocutory stage, be made either on the merits of the case or on the power of the Court, Mr. Mukherjee submitted that since the order as impeached has been made by an authority having no jurisdiction or there has been inherent lack of jurisdiction, so interference at this stage, would be possible and permissible. In the case of Lt. Col Dr. T. Banerjee v. Sri N. P. Shaw, 1982(2) CHN 3 , the petitioner after retirement from service as a military officer, filed an application before the Rent Controller under S. 29B of the Act for an order for recovery of possession of the premises in question from the tenant on the ground of bona fide requirement for his own use and occupation. After appearance the opposite party filed an application and affidavit praying for leave to contest the prayer for eviction, without disclosing therein the grounds on which he sought to contest the application. Thereafter, the Opposite party filed an application under S. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure praying for leave to file a further affidavit disclosing such facts as would disentitle the petitioner from obtaining an order for recovery of possession on the ground specified in S. l3(1)(ff) of the Act. The Rent Controller allowed the opposite party to file a further affidavit as prayed for. This order was challenged by the revisional application. It was contended that in view of S. 29B(8) of the Act, the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to entertain the application under S. 151 of the Code, since a Court of Small Causes can not exercise inherent power. The Rent Controller is required by the said sub clause (8) to follow the practice and procedure of a Court of Small Causes while holding an enquiry under S. 29B and on such facts it has been held that the proceeding before the Rent Controller under S. 29B is specially meant for disposing of an application as expeditiously as possible in the case of retired military personnel and Government employees and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred in view of the fact that in Civil Court, suits are not disposed of expeditiously and this summary procedure is for the benefit of retired military servant and Government Employees. The Rent Controller can not exercise any inherent power since S. 29B(8) expressly bars the Rent Controller from exercising such power Mr. Mukherjee, in support of his contentions as indicated earlier, referred to the said decisions, apart from making a reference to the case of Bhuramal Agarwal v. Samla Dalurbad Coal Co. (P.) Ltd. & Ors. 1977(2) CLJ 310 , where it has been observed that a defendant will not be permitted to carefully change his defence by an amendment to his Written Statement. An amendment on drivetregation of an admission contained in the original Written Statement will not be allowed. 16. (P.) Ltd. & Ors. 1977(2) CLJ 310 , where it has been observed that a defendant will not be permitted to carefully change his defence by an amendment to his Written Statement. An amendment on drivetregation of an admission contained in the original Written Statement will not be allowed. 16. On consideration of the contentions of the respective parties and the pleadings, so also the record, and the effect of the cases as cited at the Bar, I am of the view that the main purpose and character of the proceeding, which was eviction of a tenant on grounds as specified, would not be changed or altered and really by the amendment as asked for, only the boundary of the tenancy has been sought to be changed and that also for correcting the mistaken description of the tenancy, which was claimed by Mr. Dasgupta, to have crept in due to bona fide mistake of the opposite party herein. Because of such character of the mistake, applying the tests as laid down in the case of Jai Jai Ram Monohar Lal v. National Building Material Supply etc (supra), it can and should be held that the learned Rent Controller had jurisdiction to give leave to amend the plaint and that too for ends of justice and then again, without being too technical. In the case of K. Karuppanna Mudaliar v. Kuttianna Mudaliar (supra), it has been observed that the amendment, asked for to correct a patent mistake in stating the boundary, would not change the nature and character of the suit and the point as settled in that case, can very well and easily be applied in this case, since there are some similarity in the facts of the two cases. 17. There is no doubt that the Courts or authorities must not be hyper-technical in the matter of allowing amendment and amendments at any stage of the proceedings, can and should be allowed, to have and effective determination of the lis and also to secure substantial justice, in case by such process of amendment the nature and character of the concerned proceeding is not changed. The above view gets substantial support from the determinations in the case of S. M. Banerjee v. Sri Krishna Agarwal (supra). The above view gets substantial support from the determinations in the case of S. M. Banerjee v. Sri Krishna Agarwal (supra). As indicated earlier, by the proposed amendment, the nature and character of the suit, which was one for eviction of the petitioner, was not sought to be changed and the change was only in respect of boundary of the suit premises, which again was necessary for the purposes as indicated hereinbefore and for which the Courts are there to see that no miscarriage of justice is done by refusing an amendment. The admission of the opposite party, being in respect of accommodation only, the determinations in Bhuramal Agarwal v. Samla Dalurbad Coal Co (P.) Ltd. & Ors (supra), would not be of any help or assistance to the petitioner and more particularly when, the amendment as allowed has been found and deemed to be relevant and may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties. The Rent receipt Exts B, B(1), B(11) C and C(1) only speak of the tenancy to be comprised of the ground floor of premises No. 18/79 Dover Lane and the notice Ext. 1 describes the tenancy in the concerned schedule, to be comprising of 'one fiat i.e. entire ground floor except one room, inclusive of privy, kitchen and bath room." It has also transpired from the concerned will that the opposite party has been allotted portions of premises No. 18/79A and 18/79B, Dover Lane, claiming them to be held by petitioner as tenant. To have the validity of the claims and counter-claims over the facts as indicated above and so also the admission as claimed of the opposite party, in my view required and necessitated the amendment as allowed, for the purpose of achieving the real objects of a proper determination, the necessary particulars whereof have been mentioned hereinbefore. 18. The submissions of Mr. Mukherjee on the question of applicability of the provisions of Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure and exclusion of the jurisdiction of the learned Rent Controller were based on S. 29(6) of the Act and more particularly, which provision was there in the parent Act. Chapter VIA, which has incorporated provisions for summary trial for some applications, amongst others, contains S. 29B(8) and was introduced and incorporated in the Act in 1976 only. Chapter VIA, which has incorporated provisions for summary trial for some applications, amongst others, contains S. 29B(8) and was introduced and incorporated in the Act in 1976 only. The provisions of the said chapter VIA, which lays down the provisions for summary trial will also have overriding effect and S. 29B would come in aid of a landlord if he can satisfy the necessary tests as indicated in the section. Considering the provisions of chapter VIA, which as indicated above, have an overriding effect along with the relevant provisions of either of the Small Cause Courts Act, it cannot but and should be held that Civil Procedure Code has application to proceedings as in this case and as such, it cannot also be held that the learned Rent Controller was wrong in entertaining the application under Order 6 Rule 17. Mr. Mukherjee was of course right and justified in his submissions that if the determination as made, was absolutely without jurisdiction, then interference by this Court would be possible and permissible. But, as in this case, the learned Rent Controller, in my view had jurisdiction, so such submissions of Mr. Mukherjee Cannot be entertained and the determinations in the case of Lt. Col. Dr. T. Banerjee v. Sri N. P. Shaw (supra), would not also be brought in to the aid of the petitioner, since the said determination was claimed to be made on different premises and facts Chapter VIA confers right on certain landlords to recover immediate possession of their premises and which are in the possession of their tenants. To have the benefits and protection of S. 29B, the landlord must be in occupation of residential premises allotted to him by the Government, he must be asked by order of that Government to vacate the concerned residential accommodation and the ground for such order must be that, he owns a residential accommodation. To have the benefits and protection of S. 29B, the landlord must be in occupation of residential premises allotted to him by the Government, he must be asked by order of that Government to vacate the concerned residential accommodation and the ground for such order must be that, he owns a residential accommodation. There cannot be any dispute or doubt that such a proceeding under S. 29B before the learned Rent Controller is intended to have expeditions disposal of the application, but that would not in my view and for the reasons as indicated above, take away the application of the Civil Procedure Code or the relevant provisions of the same in appropriate cases and that too for rendering justice to the parties, even though by the opening words of Section 29B, an ouster of Civil Courts jurisdictions and power has been suggested. By S. 29, originally, special provisions were made regarding jurisdiction of Courts for trial of suits for possession and provisions of further powers were made in 1976, by the incorporation of Chapter VIA Chapter VII of tile Act deals with penalties and miscellaneous matters or provisions and Rule 10 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Rules, can also be profitably looked into in this case, since the operation of that Rule has not been ousted by S. 29(6) and Chapter VIA. The said Rule postulates that in making enquiries under the Act, the Controller shall follow, as nearly as may be, the procedure laid down (a) in the case of enquiries relating to offences, in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, for the trial of cases and (b) in the case of all other enquiries, in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for the trial of suits, recording a memorandum of the substance only of the evidence and the reasons for his findings as in cases in which no appeal lies. In terms of S. 29(5) the learned Rent Controller, while dealing with proceedings under the Act, should be deemed to be a Court for the exercise of powers under Ss. 151, 152 and Order XLVII of tile Code of Civil Procedure. Thus, even if we agree with the submissions of Mr. Mukherjee that the provisions of Order 6 Rule 17 have no application, there cannot be any doubt, that such authority may pass appropriate order for ends of justice under S. 151 of the Code. 151, 152 and Order XLVII of tile Code of Civil Procedure. Thus, even if we agree with the submissions of Mr. Mukherjee that the provisions of Order 6 Rule 17 have no application, there cannot be any doubt, that such authority may pass appropriate order for ends of justice under S. 151 of the Code. The intention of the Legislature on the basis of the provisions in S. 29B and the relevant Rules under the Act, was not to exclude the application of the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code altogether in a matter like the one under consideration. 19. For the reasons as indicated above, the Rule must fail and the same is thus discharged. There will be no order as to costs. Let the records, if they are here in this Court be sent down at once. The prayer for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court is refused. Rule discharged.