S. B. MAJMUDAR, J. ( 1 ) THREE present special civil applications project the question of constitutional validity of the provisions of clause 3 (2) and clause 4 of the Gujarat Milch and Draught Cattle (Control of Movement) Order 1983 (hereinafter referred to as the Movement Order ). In one of the petitions the question of vires of sec. 4 (1) (b) of the Bombay Essential Commodities and Cattle (Control)Act 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the Control Act) as inserted pursuant to the Gujarat Ordinance No. 8 of 1983 is also on the anvil. ( 2 ) BEFORE we advert to the real nature of the controversy between the parties it would be necessary to note at the outset a few relevant facts that have led to the present proceedings. ( 3 ) I Introductory facts :- The petitioners in special civil application No. 4200 of 1983 and special civil application No. 4112 of 1983 are registered Associations and their respective Presidents who are running salvage farms in different parts of Mehsana and Banaskantha districts while the petitioner in special civil application No. 4217 of 1983 is an individual who is owning and possessing agricultural farm at village Panasar in Sidhpur taluka of Mehsana district. It is the case of the petitioners that all of them import dry buffaloes known as `vasuki Gayeli Bhains from Maharashtra State and they treat these dry buffaloes at their salvage farms situated in the aforesaid districts of the State. They feed them properly with nutritious food and give them treatment for about 6 to 12 months. During this time these dry buffaloes give birth to calves and start giving milk again. At that stage they become salvage buffaloes or wet buffaloes. Once they attain that state of health they are sent back to their respective owners at Bombay in Maharashtra State. The petitioners contend that these dry buffaloes are received by them from Bombay for the purpose of salvage operations only and moment they become wet and milk yielding they are sent back to Bombay. The salvage farms situated in the respective districts of the State continue to be owned by their respective owners. ( 4 ) THE control Act makes a provision for the control and regulation of the production movement supply and distribution of and trade and commerce in certain commodities and the maintenance and movement of cattle. The salvage farms situated in the respective districts of the State continue to be owned by their respective owners. ( 4 ) THE control Act makes a provision for the control and regulation of the production movement supply and distribution of and trade and commerce in certain commodities and the maintenance and movement of cattle. In exercise of the powers vested in the Government under sec. 4 of Control Act an order called the Gujarat Cattle (Export Control) Order 1961 came to be issued by the State of Gujarat. The said order is hereinafter referred to as the Control Order for the sake of brevity. The petitioners contend that as per clause 3 of the said Control Order no person can export cattle from any place in the State of Gujarat except under and in accordance with the terms and conditions issued under clause 4 of the said Control Order. That the members of the petitioners Associations have obtained requisite permits under the Control Order and under these permits they are exporting both salvaged and non-salvaged buffaloes outside the State of Gujarat for taking them to their destination-Bombay in the State of Maharashtra. The case of the petitioners further is that since the introduction of the permit system under the Control Order members of the petitioners Associations were patronising only the railway as a mode of transport for export of the salvaged and or near salvaged buffaloes from the territories of the State of Gujarat for being carried to Bombay. However the members of the petitioners Associations went on encountering considerable difficulties while utilising railway transportation for the purpose of exporting their buffaloes. Consequently according to the petitioners they requested the State authorities to permit them to export their salvaged and non-salvaged bu ffaloes under the requisite permits granted under the Control Order through road transport. That in consideration of the difficulties pointed out by the petitioners by means of various representations addressed to the State of Gujarat ultimately the latter yielded to the requests of the petitioners and passed a resolution in the form of an order dated 27 allowing export of buffaloes by road by a special order issued by the Mamlatdar. That in consideration of the difficulties pointed out by the petitioners by means of various representations addressed to the State of Gujarat ultimately the latter yielded to the requests of the petitioners and passed a resolution in the form of an order dated 27 allowing export of buffaloes by road by a special order issued by the Mamlatdar. The terms and conditions mentioned in the order required that separate application should be made for grant of such special order for export of buffaloes by road and on receipt of such application the special order used to be issued by the Mamlatdar. The petitioners contend that since advent of the special order system members of the petitioners Associations were exporting salvaged and non-salvaged buffaloes by road in truck built to certain specifications approved and verified by the concerned regional transport officers functioning in the districts from which such buffaloes were to be exported. The petitioners contend that since export of salvaged and non-salvaged buffaloes was permitted by utilising road transport some of the members of the petitioners Associations had purchased trucks investing huge amounts thereon and some members made arrangements for hiring trucks from transport companies for the purpose of exporting their buffaloes by road. It is the further case of the petitioners that however somewhere in December 1981 the petitioners learnt that the Government had withdrawn or cancelled its order dated 27 permitting export of buffaloes by road and instead fresh orders were issued by the State of Gujarat permitting export of buffaloes only by railway. Special Civil Application No. 167 of 1982 was filed in this court challenging the aforesaid order of the Government. However a statement was made before this court (Coram: A. M. Ahmadi J.) that road permit system would be resumed by the State. Under these circumstances the said petition was withdrawn. The petitioners further case is that even thereafter the respondent-State issued resolution dated 9-7-1982 imposing certain stringent conditions for enabling export of buffaloes by road. This resolution led to further litigation before this court. Special civil applications Nos. 3422/82 3348 to 3351 were filed in this court challenging the aforesaid resolution. Ultimately before D. C. Gheewala J. a statement was made on behalf of the respondent-State that pending applications for road transport permit would be disposed of at the earliest and that the grievances of the concerned petitioners would be looked into. Special civil applications Nos. 3422/82 3348 to 3351 were filed in this court challenging the aforesaid resolution. Ultimately before D. C. Gheewala J. a statement was made on behalf of the respondent-State that pending applications for road transport permit would be disposed of at the earliest and that the grievances of the concerned petitioners would be looked into. ( 5 ) IN the background of the aforesaid events the petitioners contend that upto 1982 export of buffaloes by road from the territories of Gujarat State to outside States including the State of Maharashtra was not totally prohibited but it was made subject to grant of permit and on the grant of permit the concerned exporters had right to export the buffaloes either by railway transport or by road transport and that detailed provisions were made for the purpose of effectively G. R. 84 checking and stopping illegal export of buffaloes by road and effective machinery was also devised in that connection. That there was no restriction on movement of buffaloes within the State of Gujarat. That such movement was admittedly there and was not regulated or controlled by any permit system. These buffaloes could also be transported by road as well as by rail within the State of Gujarat unhampered by any restrictive system of permit. That permits were required only when buffaloes had to be exported outside the State. ( 6 ) IN the backdrop of the aforesaid factual position the petitioners have challenged the enactment of the Movement Order. By the said Movement Order the respondent-State contend the petitioners have practically totally prohibited export of buffaloes out of Gujarat State by road transport and that only in exceptional circumstances such export is countenanced by the said Movement Order. That the respondent-State pursuant to the said Movement Order insists that all exporters of buffaloes salvaged or unsalvaged have to export their buffaloes by utilising railway transport. This insistence on the part of the respondent-State pursuant to the aforesaid Movement Order submit the petitioners imposes unreasonable restriction on the petitioners fundamental right to carry on business as vendors of milk by milking milch buffaloes at Bombay where these salvaged buffaloes are being carried for the purpose of milking after they are salvaged at the salvage farms situated in different districts of the State as detailed above. On similar ground sec. On similar ground sec. 4 (1) (b) of the Control Act is also challenged in special civil application No. 4217 of 1983. It is also contended that the impugned provisions also offend Article 301 of the Constitution and hence they are void. ( 7 ) II. Rival cases and contentions:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 8 ) III. Points for consideration: In the light of the aforesaid rival cases and contentions as put forward on behalf of the respective parties by their learned counsel following points arise for our consideration: (1) Whether clause 3 (2) and clause 4 of the Movement Order are ultra vires Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution and whether they are saved by Article 19 (6) thereof. (2) Whether sec. 4 (1) (b) of the Control Act is ultra vires Article 19 of the Constitution and whether the said provision is saved by Article 19 (6) thereof. (3) Whether the impugned provisions are ultra vires Article 301 of the Constitution. (4) Whether the provisions of Article 304 can lend any assistance to the impugned provisions for being saved from the operation of Article 301. (5) Whether the impugned Movement Order is ultra vires sec. 4 of the Control Act (6) Whether the impugned Movement Order conflicts with rule 91 framed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and for that reason is repugnant and void. (7) Whether the respondent-State is estopped from enacting and/or enforcing the impugned provisions against the petitioners. ( 9 ) IV. Pointwise findings: (1) The impugned provisions of the Movement Order are not ultra vires Article 19 (1) (g) as they are saved by provisions of Article 19 (6) inasmuch as the petitioners have failed to establish that the impugned provisions impose any unreasonable restriction on their right to carry on business as milk vendors or as exporters of cattle. (2) Sec. 4 (1) (b) of the Control Act is ultra vires Article 19 (1) (g) read with Article 19 (6) of the Constitution on the same ground. (3) The impugned provisions do not attract Article 301 of the Constitution and consequently the question whether they are ultra vires Article 304 does not arise. (4) The question of applicability of Article 304 of the Constitution does not survive. (3) The impugned provisions do not attract Article 301 of the Constitution and consequently the question whether they are ultra vires Article 304 does not arise. (4) The question of applicability of Article 304 of the Constitution does not survive. (5) The impugned Movement order is not ultra vires sec. 4 of the Control Act. (6) There is no repugnancy between rule 91 of the Motor Vehicles Rules on one hand and the impugned Movement Order on the other. Consequently the said Movement Order is not illegal or void on that count. (7) The first respondent is not estopped from enacting and/or implementing the impugned provisions against the petitioners. V. Reasons for our findings: ( 10 ) (A) Statutory settings: Before we proceed to give reasons for our findings. It will be profitable to keep in view the statutory background reading to the impugned provisions. The Control Act 1958 was enacted by the then State of Bombay to provide inter alia in the interest of the general public for the control and regulation of the production movement supply and distribution of certain commodities essential to the life of the community and for the control and regulation of trade and commerce therein and for the maintenance licensing and movement of cattle and the licensing of dealers in such commodities and cattle and for certain other purposes. Sec. 2 of the Control Act is the definition clause and states in sub-clause (a) thereof that cattlemeans `any of the animals specified in part II of the Schedule. When we turn to part It of the Schedule under the caption cattle are found listed 8 types of animals wherein at serial No. 6 are mentioned buffaloes. Sec. 4 of the Control Act empowers the State Government to provide by an order certain regulatory and prohibitory measures if it is found necessary or expedient for maintaining or increasing the supply or for securing the equitable distribution and availability at fair prices of any essential commodity or cattle. After the bifurcation of the bigger bilingual State of Bombay and on the formation of the States of Maharashtra and Gujarat the provisions of the Control Act continued to apply to the territories forming part. of the State of Gujarat and the said Act has continued to operate thereafter all throughout in this State. In exercise of the powers under sec. of the State of Gujarat and the said Act has continued to operate thereafter all throughout in this State. In exercise of the powers under sec. 4 of the Control Act the first respondent State more than two decades back issued Control Order of 1961 whereby the first respondent prohibited export of cattle outside the State of Gujarat except by a permit issued by the appropriate authority and except in accordance with its terms and conditions. The preamble of the said Control Order recited:whereas the Government of Gujarat is of the opinion that for maintaining and increasing the supply in the State of Gujarat of certain cattle hereinafter specified it is necessary and expedient to regulate the movement of such cattle to places outside the State of Gujarat otherwise than across a custom frontier. . . . Thus any and every export of buffaloes whether salvaged or fresh buffaloes was brought within the regulatory net work of permit system as envisaged by the Control Order of 1961. As we have noted earlier in the definition of the word cattle buffaloes are also included. The said Control Order has come to stay since 1961 all throughout till today in this State and it caters to the needs of maintenance and increase of cattle wealth specified in the Control Order of 1961. It may be stated at this Stage that it is not the contention of any of the petitioners that the provisions of the Control Order of 1961 are in any way ultra vires ally of the constitutional rights of the petitioners. Such a contention is advisedly not raised by the petitioners as vires of this Control Order are already upheld by this court in a Division Bench judgment of this court in the case of BACHUMIAN HAMIDHKHAN V. STATE 13 G. L. R. 693 S. H. Sheth J speaking for the Division Bench observed in the aforesaid decision that the Control Order does not totally prohibit trade in cattle. Trade in cattle within the State of Gujarat remains totally unaffected by it. it only affects inter-State trade in cattle only to the extent that they shall not be exported outside the State of Gujarat except under a permit issued by the Collector and the said order is not in ally way arbitrary or unreasonable. Trade in cattle within the State of Gujarat remains totally unaffected by it. it only affects inter-State trade in cattle only to the extent that they shall not be exported outside the State of Gujarat except under a permit issued by the Collector and the said order is not in ally way arbitrary or unreasonable. ( 11 ) BEFORE we part with consideration of the Control Order of 1961 it is required to be noted that the said Control Order nowhere regulates the mode of transport by which the concerned permit holder who is entitled to export his cattle under the permit can carry his cattle outside the authority limits of the State of Gujarat in the course of its export to the neighbouring State of Maharashtra. As wa noticed while considering the introductory facts leading to these petitions the permit holders who were permitted to export their cattle Outside Gujarat State as per the provisions of the Control Order since 1961 substantially utilised rail transport and exported their cattle from different points in the Gujarat State through railway transport. But it was felt over years that the said method of export was inconvenient and that is how on various representations made by the exporters of buffaloes the first respondent veered round to the view of the exporters in 1980 and permitted them to export their buffaloes by road to Bombay. The net work of check posts with a detailed system of ancilliary checks was devised and it was implemented over the years. But with passage of years it was felt by the first respondent-State that the said system was not a foolproof one and permission to export holders to carry their cattle outside the State by road transport was required to be recalled and that is how initially export of salvaged buffaloes and even fresh buffaloes by road was prohibited and then substantially restricted. But that was made by way of executive instructions whereby certain stringent conditions were annexed to the export permit as issued under clauses 3 and 4 of the Control Order of 1961. They had to be subsequently detained pursuant to the developments that took place during the course of various special civil applications filed in this court by concerned exporters as detailed earlier. ( 12 ) AT this juncture. They had to be subsequently detained pursuant to the developments that took place during the course of various special civil applications filed in this court by concerned exporters as detailed earlier. ( 12 ) AT this juncture. we may also note that the first respondent- State in exercise of its powers under clause (f) of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 4 of the Control Act 1958 issued an order named and styled as Gujarat Cattle (Movement Control) Order 1975 By the said order it was provided that no person shall move any cattle from a district in the State to any of the border districts of Valsad Bharuch Surat and Banaskantha in the State except under and in accordance with the terms and conditions of the permission issued by the Collector of that district in which the place where the cattle is intended to be moved is situated. the purport of the aforesaid Movement Order was to see that no one would move his cattle in the border districts without permission of the concerned collector. It may be appreciated that there is no prohibition against movement of cattle within the territories of the Gujarat State from one district to another district and the Control Order of 1961 would not cover or control Such movement. Under these circumstances it was likely That persons might remove their cattle without any restriction to the border districts and then clandestinely remove them beyond the border districts to the adjoining territory of the neighbouring State. That was obviously likely to impede the smooth working of the Control Order of 1961. To plug that tendency and loophole the aforesaid Movement Control Order of 1975 was promulgated. ( 13 ) WE may as well refer to one more order issued by the first respondent-State called Gujarat Cattle (Import Control) Order 1982 in exercise of its power conferred by clause (f) of sub-sec. (2) of see. 4 of the Control Act 1958 The said Import Control Order was issued for maintaining the supply of cattle in the State. A system of permit was introduced by the said import Control Order for regulating control of import of cattle in the territories of The Gujarat State. Clause 3 of the said import Control Act provided that No person shall import cattle except under and in accordance with the terms and conditions of a permit issued to him under this clause. A system of permit was introduced by the said import Control Order for regulating control of import of cattle in the territories of The Gujarat State. Clause 3 of the said import Control Act provided that No person shall import cattle except under and in accordance with the terms and conditions of a permit issued to him under this clause. Sub-clause (2) of said clause 3 provided that where any person desires to import any cattle he shall make an application for the same to the Collector of the district in which the cattle is to be imported and the Collector may after taking into consideration the availability of fodder and water in the district either issue or refuse to issue an import permit to such person. We are not much concerned with the aforesaid import Control Act as the petitioners have not made any grievance regarding the same. On the contrary they have contended that they have fully complied with the aforesaid import Control Order while importing dry buffaloes from time to time for the purpose of salvage from Maharashtra State to this State and that they have followed all the requirements of such import permits. We have mentioned this order in passing with a view to pointing out that import of buffaloes within the State of Gujarat from outside as well as their export from the Gujarat State to other States have remained controlled on account of the aforesaid statutory provisions of the export control and import control orders issued under the said parent provisions of sec. 4 of the Control Act 1958 ( 14 ) NOW is the time for us to notice one more statutory provision. But Gujarat Ordinance No. 8 of 1983 sec. 4 of the Control Act 1958 came to be amended and for the then existing clause (b) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 4 the following sub-section carne to be substituted :for regulating or prohibiting movement supply and distribution of or trade and commerce in or for regulating the maintenance of cattle. We may profitably reproduce at this stage the earlier unamended provision. With a view to highlighting the change effected by the said amendment. (1) of sec. 4 the following sub-section carne to be substituted :for regulating or prohibiting movement supply and distribution of or trade and commerce in or for regulating the maintenance of cattle. We may profitably reproduce at this stage the earlier unamended provision. With a view to highlighting the change effected by the said amendment. Sec. 4 of the Control Act 1958 as it stood prior to its amendment in 1983 read as under : (1) If the State GOVERNMENT is of opinion that it is necessary or expedient so to do for maintaining or increasing the Supply or for securing the equitable distribution and availability at fair prices of any essential commodity or cattle it may by order provide. x x x x x x x x x x (b) for regulating the maintenance movement supply and distribution of or trade and commerce in cattle. For the aforesaid clause (b) new clause (b) came to be substituted pursuant to the Gujarat Ordinance No. 8/83. The result of the substitution is that now the first respondent is armed with the power to enact an order for not only regulating but also prohibiting movement of cattle. Earlier clause (b) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 4 gave power to the first respondent to enact orders only for regulating movement and not for prohibiting movement of cattle. It is obvious that regulation of movement would not include within its fold total prohibition of movement. The said lacuna in conferment of power for making orders as found in the then existing provisions of sec. 4 (1) (b) of the Control Act came to be plugged by substitution of the new clause which armed the first respondent with statutory powers to frame orders even for totally prohibiting movement of cattle in public interest as contemplated by the provisions of sec. 4 (1) of the Act. The Gujarat Ordinance No. 8 of 1983 while enacting the aforesaid substituted clause (b) in sub-sec. (1) of sec. 4 narrated the statement of objects underlying the aforesaid substitution as under :it has come to the notice of the Government that a large number of cattle are exported to other States on the basis of the permit issued under the Gujarat Cattle (Export) Control Order 1961 and that some of these cattle which are milch cattle are slaughtered in other States on their becoming dry. Similarly a large number of draught animals which are not allowed to be slaughtered in this state are clandestinely taken out to other States for slaughter. Thus there is a severe drain of milch cattle and draught animals from this state. In order to prevent the aforesaid drain it is necessary to prohibit export of certain cattle. The Bombay Essential Commodities and Cattle (Control) Act 1958 does not empower the Government to impose total prohibition of export either by rail or road. Hence it is considered necessary to amend the said Act. It is to be appreciated that armed with such power emanating from sec. 4 (1) (b) as substituted the first respondent State promulgated the impugned Movement Order of 198 3/08/1983. We now turn to the consideration of the said Movement Order 1983 ( 15 ) THE said order as noted earlier is issued by the first respondent in exercise of its powers under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 4 of the Control Act 1958 It was issued on 9-8-1983. As the question of constitutionality of the relevant provisions of the Movement Order are on the anvil before us it would be necessary for us to advert to these provisions in details. The preamble of the Movement Order provides that:whereas on account of occurrences of unprecedented cyclone in the month of November 1982 and on account of unprecedented downpour of rains as well as occurrence of floods in the month of June 1983 in certain parts of the State a part of the cattle wealth of the State has been destroyed; and whereas the Government of Gujarat is of the opinion that it is necessary and expedient so to do for maintaining the movement of milch and draught cattle in the State. The Movement order has been enacted in exercise of the powers under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 4 of the Control Act. The Movement Order of 1983 provides for control of movement both of milch and draught cattle. Clause 2 of the Movement Order is the definition clause. Sub-clause (a) defines buffalo to mean a buffalo which gives milk or which has ceased to give milk but is likely to give milk and include heifer. 4 of the Control Act. The Movement Order of 1983 provides for control of movement both of milch and draught cattle. Clause 2 of the Movement Order is the definition clause. Sub-clause (a) defines buffalo to mean a buffalo which gives milk or which has ceased to give milk but is likely to give milk and include heifer. Draught cattle is defined by sub-clause (c) of clause (2) to mean bullocks used for the purpose of draught and includes male calves whether castrated or not; while `milch cattle are defined to mean cows which give milk or which have ceased to give milk but likely to give milk and includes heifers. The said definition is provided by sub-clause (d ). Sub-clause (e) defines permit holder to mean a person who holds a permit issued under clause 4 of the Gujarat Cattle (Export Control) Order 1961 Then follows clause 3 of the movement order and closely on its heels follows clause 4. Legality and constitutionality of both these clauses were hotly debated before us. Consequently it is worthwhile to reproduce these clauses in extenso as under :3 (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Gujarat Cattle (Export Control) Order 1961 no person shall move or attempt to move by rail road sea or any other means any milch or draught cattle from any place within the State to any place outside the State for a period of one year commencing from the date of this Order. (2) No permit holder shall move or attempt to move by road sea any buffalo from any place within the State to any place outside the State except under and in accordance with transport permit granted under clause 4. 4 (1) The competent authority may issue a transport permit to any permit holder who desires to move a buffalo (in pursuance of a permit granted under the Gujarat Cattle (Export Control) Order 1961 from any place within the State to any place outside the State permitting him to move such cattle by road or sea under any of the following Circumstances namely. (a) Where the competent authority is of the opinion that there is such disruption of rail traffic as to prevent such person from moving such cattle by rail; (b) where the competent authority is of the opinion that railway wagons are not available for a period of not less than twenty days. (a) Where the competent authority is of the opinion that there is such disruption of rail traffic as to prevent such person from moving such cattle by rail; (b) where the competent authority is of the opinion that railway wagons are not available for a period of not less than twenty days. (c) where the buffalo is to be moved from a place within the State to a place outside the State for the purpose of participating in any exhibition sponsored by the Central Government. A mere look at the aforesaid provisions of clauses 3 and 4 will show that before a permit holder who is armed with an export permit issued to him under the Export Control Order 1961 can export his buffaloes from any place within the State to any place outside the State he has to obtain a further permit which is styled as transport permit as per the requirements of clause 4 of the Movement Order. Under the earlier Export Order 1961 all that an exporter of buffalo had to do was to obtain an export permit and once he was armed with the export permit he could transport his buffaloes either by rail or by road subject of course to the conditions of the permit at his sweet will and choice. However by the provisions of the Movement Order 1983 further fetter is imposed on such exporter. Even if he is armed with an export permit under the Control Order of 1961 he has to take transport permit as envisaged by clause 4 read with clause 3 (2) of the Movement Order. A conjoint reading of clause 3 (2) and clause 4 of the Movement Order leaves no room for doubt that an exporter of buffaloes in order to export his buffaloes outside the Gujarat State from any place in Gujarat even though armed with export permit under the Control Order of 1961 cannot export his buffaloes even though covered by the export permit by road or sea except under a further transport permit as provided by clause 4 of the Movement Order. For such an export permit holder the mode of export of his buffaloes by utilising railway transport is available in an unhampered manner. For such an export permit holder the mode of export of his buffaloes by utilising railway transport is available in an unhampered manner. But if he wants to export his buffaloes by road transport or sea transport he has to obtain further transport permit as per clause 4 (1) of the Movement Order. The grievance of the petitioners springs from the operation of the provisions of sub-paras (a) and (b) of clause 4 (1) of the Movement Order. According to the petitioners the competent authority can give transport permit to enable exporters to export their buffaloes by road only in specified and limited contingencies. Thus for all intent and purposes there is a total prohibition imposed on the exporters to export cattle by road. These provisions in the contention of the petitioners impose an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental rights of the petitioners to carry on their business and trade as vendors of buffalo milk and as salvage farm owners. ( 16 ) BEFORE we conclude our resume of the relevant statutory provisions spread over years we may mention one more provision which was enacted by the first respondent on 11-5-1983 in exercise of powers vested in it by clause (f) of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 4 of the Control Act 1958 The first respondent enacted the order called the Gujarat Cattle (Export Control) (Amendment) Order 1983 By the said amendment in existing sub-clause (3) of clause 4 of the Control Order 1961 the following proviso was added which reads as under :provided that where a permit is to be issued to a person for export of such head of cattle as is earlier imported under an import permit issued to him under clause (3) of the Gujarat Cattle (Import) Control Order 1982 for the purpose of salvage no fee shall be payable by such person in respect of such permit. As per the provisions of the aforesaid proviso importer of salvaged cattle who had paid import fee of Rs. 20. 00 had not to pay any export fee for the same imported buffalo which had to be exported after treatment in the salvage farm situated in the Gujarat State. ( 17 ) WE may proceed to consider the points posed for our decision in the background of the aforesaid statutory scheme spread over more than two decades. 20. 00 had not to pay any export fee for the same imported buffalo which had to be exported after treatment in the salvage farm situated in the Gujarat State. ( 17 ) WE may proceed to consider the points posed for our decision in the background of the aforesaid statutory scheme spread over more than two decades. (B) Pointwise consideration : (1) Constitutional validity of clauses 3 (b) and 4 of the Movement Order of 1983 :- The petitioners have contended that they import dry buffaloes in this State for the purpose of treatment in their salvage farms and after these dry buffaloes become impregnated and deliver calves and when they become milch buffaloes they are required to be exported to Bombay where owners of these buffaloes utilise them in milk business. Thus the petitioners mainly represent that class of owners of milch animals who operate as milk vendors in Bombay and who send their dry buffaloes for the purpose of salvage in Gujarat State and then get them re-exported after they become milch animals. The petitioners contended that there are not enough and economically affordable facilities at Bombay to keep dry buffaloes during the time they do not yield milk and are simply to be maintained as unfruitful animals. They therefore bring them to this State under import permits for the purpose of salvage. Large and convenient salvage farms are available to the petitioners in northern Gujarat where they can conveniently and economically treat these dry buffaloes and once they become wet and milch buffaloes they can be exported to their place of destination Bombay where they can once again become a stock in trade in milk business of their owners. The petitioners also represent cases of salvage farm owners in Gujarat who do not own these buffaloes but who merely give them treatment in their farms and after dry buffaloes become salvaged buffaloes they export them to Bombay where owners of these buffaloes might again re-employ them in their milk business. The petitioners contend that while exporting buffaloes by road minimum time is taken from the points of export to the point of destination and at the highest it takes 24 hours for a motor truck carrying salvaged buffaloes to travel from any point in north Gujarat to any point within the municipal limits of the Bombay Municipal Corporation which is the place of destination. If such export by road transport is prohibited and if the petitioners are compelled to export their cattle only by rail transport the petitioners fundamental rights to carry on business as milk vendors would be adversely affected. That is how the petitioners have invoked Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. Now it is once noticed that none of the petitioners is a dealer in cattle that is one who is purchasing and selling cattle. All the petitioners are involved in the movement of salvaged cattle from the Gujarat State to Maharashtra State. Some of the petitioners who are owners of dry buffaloes import these buffaloes within the Gujarat State and keep them in salvage farms and after they become milch buffaloes. carry them as salvaged buffaloes to Bombay. So far as such petitioners are concerned they do not submit that the Movement Order in any way directly restricts their right to own such buffaloes. The Movement Order does not purport in any way to restrict ownership rights of such petitioners over their salvaged buffaloes. however these petitioners contend that the impugned provisions by requiring the petitioners to undertake a lengthier and more inconvenient mode of transport of their salvaged buffaloes from Gujarat State to Maharashtra State by railway adversely affect the right of the petitioners to carry on business as milk vendors because salvaged but which are milch buffaloes can be directly utilised by the petitioners at Bombay for providing milk which can be sold by the petitioners in Bombay market. The salvaged buffaloes which take 24 hours to reach Bombay by road from any point in North Gujarat can obviously yield milk within few hours of their reaching Bombay by road and that milk can be sold by the petitioners in Bombay market. If such buffaloes instead are required to be exported by a goods train which may take 20 days to reach Bombay the petitioners milk income from such buffaloes say Rs. 30. 00per day which would have been available to the petitioners if such buffaloes were transported by road would be lost upto a period of 20 days from the date of their export from the Gujarat territories. Thus the petitioners income from milk of such buffaloes gets deferred over number of days spent in railway transit and for that purpose lost for these days. Thus the petitioners income from milk of such buffaloes gets deferred over number of days spent in railway transit and for that purpose lost for these days. It is in that light that the petitioners contend that the Movement Order restricts the right of the petitioners to carry on their business of selling milk obtained from milch buffaloes owned by them. So far as other classes of the petitioners who are merely carrying on business of giving treatment to dry buffaloes in their salvage farms without claiming any ownership over these buffaloes are concerned their grievance would stand on a different footing. They submit that at the direction of the owners of salvaged buffaloes they send them to their place of destination either by train or by road. If it is by train it taken more time and consequently the concerned buffaloes might get physically hurt or their hygiene might suffer. Instead if they export them by road responsibility of the salvage farm owners would be much less as it would be for maximum 24 hours. To that extent their right to carry on business as salvage farm operators is also affected by the Movement Order. The petitioners further contend that the restrictions imposed by the impugned provisions are in no way reasonable and they are excessive and consequently these provisions are required to be struck down. ( 18 ) IN order to highlight the grievances of the petitioners various factual contentions have been canvassed by the petitioners in the light of the averments made in the petitions. These contentions have been combated by the respondents by filing affidavits-in-reply. All the relevant affidavits have been filed in special civil application No. 4200 of 1983 which has been treated as the main petition by consent of the parties and the various affidavits filed by the petitioners and respondents in support of their respective cases in this petition have been treated to be the common data for deciding all the three petitions. ( 19 ) A conjoint reading of the impugned provisions of clause 3 (2) and clause 4 (1) of the Movement Order leaves no room for doubt that any exporter who wants to export his buffaloes whether salvaged or fresh buffaloes has in addition to the export permit which has been obtained by him under the existing Control Order of 1961 to obtain transport permit under the Movement Order. The competent authority who has been charged with the statutory obligation of issuing such transport permit has been clearly directed by the provisions of clause 4 of the Movement Order to grant such permit to enable the exporter to move his cattle by road or sea only in the contingencies Provided by paras (a) (b) and (c) of clause 4 (1 ). It is therefore clear that if an exporter wants to export his salvaged buffaloes by road or by sea and if he applies for transport permit the competent authority will not grant him any such permit unless it is shown that the railway traffic has been disrupted or that railway wagons are not available for not less than 20 days. We are not concerned with the contingency contemplated by para (c) herein cattle are being exported for participation in any exhibition sponsored by the Central Government. Hence we do not dilate on the same. However so far as paras (a) and (b) are concerned it is obvious that there is no discretion with the competent authority to grant any transport permit to the exporter of the cattle by road or sec. in any other cases not covered by situations envisaged by paras (a) and (b) viz. that there is disruption of railway traffic or that railway wagons are not available for a period of not less than 20 days. It therefore logically follows that exporter has first to make efforts to obtain railway wagons and to transport his cattle by railway and if he cannot get railway wagon for 20 days then only he can ask for transport permit for transporting his cattle by road or sea. In the present case we are not concerned with the transport by sea as none of the petitioners has made any grievance regarding any restriction imposed on him while transporting cattle by sea and it is not their contention that they propose to transport their cattle by sea. But so far as the road transport is concerned they contend that the impugned provisions clearly impose total restrictions on their right to get their cattle exported by road in all cases not covered by the contingencies contemplated by paras (a) and (b) of clause 4 (1) of the Movement Order. But so far as the road transport is concerned they contend that the impugned provisions clearly impose total restrictions on their right to get their cattle exported by road in all cases not covered by the contingencies contemplated by paras (a) and (b) of clause 4 (1) of the Movement Order. Thus there is total prohibition of export of cattle by road in all cases save and except in the following two contingencies: (i) disruption of railway traffic and (ii) non-availability of railway wagons for not less than 20 days. It is therefore easy to visualise that by itself prohibiting export of cattle by road in all other cases and requiring exporter to wait till 20 days for allotment of railway wagons and only then permit him to get transport permit from the competent authority would constitute a restriction on the right of the concerned person to move his cattle from the Gujarat State to any other State. So far as the petitioners who are carrying on their milk business in Bombay are concerned they can legitimately say that delay in carrying their salvaged buffaloes from Gujarat to Maharashtra beyond the period of 24 hours which is available in road transport would prima facie constitute a restriction on their business of vending milk in Bombay. It cannot be said that the provisions impose no restriction whatsoever on the business of these petitioners. So far as salvage farm owners are concerned it is also their trade and business to treat the buffaloes in their salvage farms in the Gujarat State and then to export them to Bombay for being utilised by their owners at Bombay. Even that trade and business gets in a way restricted or hampered on account of the impugned provisions by which they are compelled to wait till number of days to enable them to load in railway wagons their buffaloes consigned to their care by their owners residing in the Maharashtra State for the purpose of treatment and to get them ultimately off-loaded at Bombay the point of their ultimate destination. it is also averred by some of the petitioners that this type of delay in transit affects their earning as salvage farm owners as the owners of the salvaged buffaloes reduce the remuneration payable to the salvage farm owners on account of such delay in transit of salvaged buffaloes from the export point in Gujarat to import point in Bombay. That affects their earning from the salvage business. It is therefore obvious that those petitioners who are carrying on business of selling milk in Bombay get adversely affected on account of loss of income from milk business during the time the salvaged buffaloes remain in railway transit for more than 24 hours from the time of their booking for export from stations in Gujarat till they ultimately reach by railway wagons their point of off-loading at Bombay. The said period may extend to 7 or 10 days as the case may be as admitted by respondents themselves in their reply-affidavits. During all this period milk income from the salvage buffaloes is lost to their owners. Thus from the point of view of owners of salvaged buffaloes as well as from the point of view of owners of salvage farms who by themselves do not claim any ownership rights over the buffaloes the impugned provisions do impose restrictions on the business of the concerned petitioners. It is not therefore possible to agree with the extreme contention canvassed by Mr. Vin for the respondents that the impugned provisions do not impose any restriction on the right of the petitioners to carry on business or trade as guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. Mr. Vin submitted that none of the petitioners is a dealer in buffaloes and that the petitioners are not taking their salvaged buffaloes to Bombay for sale as such and consequently any delay in transit of such buffaloes by railway cannot be said to impose any restriction on the right of the petitioners to carry on business of selling milk That adverse impact on income from selling milk of these salvaged buffaloes is merely an indirect or incidental effect and not the direct effect of the impugned provisions and hence Article 19 (1) (g) itself does not apply. This extreme contention of Mr. This extreme contention of Mr. Vin is not capable of being accepted for the simple reason that the impugned provisions have direct impact on the income of the petitioners who are carrying on milk business by selling milk of milch salvaged buffaloes belonging to them as shown above. These provisions also have a direct impact on the right of salvage farm owners who transport salvaged cattle to Bombay after treatment as the impugned provisions have an adverse effect on their earnings from that business as seen earlier. It must therefore be held that the impugned provisions do impose a restriction on the fundamental rights guaranteed to the petitioners by Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. ( 20 ) HOWEVER the moot question which crops up for consideration is whether these restrictions are reasonable or not. It is true that the petitioners have averred by filing various affidavits in support of the petitions that railway transport involves number of inconveniences and difficulties to them. Timewise the transport of cattle by road takes only 24 hours while the transport by rail admittedly takes atleast 7 to 10 days as stated even by the respondents in their concerned affidavits which are referred to by us earlier. It is obvious that during that time cattle are confined in railway wagons. Their health is likely to be affected adversely. Hygiene problem will arise. Expenses will have to be incurred for the number of days these buffaloes are to be maintained in transit. Cattle keeper who has to travel with them has to be paid and in addition to this there is loss of income suffered by the buffalo-owner during the period milk-yielding buffalo is not made available to him at Bombay on account of the delay in transit. However the question whether these restrictions are reasonable or not will have to be decided in the light of the data available on record of these cases and in the background of the settled legal position. We will therefore examine this question after having a quick glance at the settled legal position as reflected by various decisions of the Supreme Court. In the case of SREENIVASA GENERAL TRADERS V. STATE OF A. P. A. I. R. 1983 S. C. 1246 Sen J. while considering the constitutional validity of the provision of sec. We will therefore examine this question after having a quick glance at the settled legal position as reflected by various decisions of the Supreme Court. In the case of SREENIVASA GENERAL TRADERS V. STATE OF A. P. A. I. R. 1983 S. C. 1246 Sen J. while considering the constitutional validity of the provision of sec. 7 (6) of the A. P. (Agricultural Produce and Livestock) Markets Act 1966 has laid down the following test for determining the reasonableness of a restriction imposed upon the right guaranteed by Article 19 (1) (g):in order to determine the reasonableness of a restriction imposed upon the right guaranteed by Art 19 (1) (g) the court must have regard to the nature and the conditions prevailing in that trade it is obvious that these factors must differ from trade to trade and no hard and fast rules concerning all trades can be laid down. In other words the pursuit of any lawful trade or business may be made subject to such conditions and restrictions as may be deemed essential by the legislature to be in the interest of the general public. It is obviously in the interests of the producers of agricultural produce that they can get the best competitive prices in an open market and that they have not to pay the middlemen. Sale or purchase of agricultural produce in such a market under the supervision and control of the market committee is likely to be in ready cash and therefore advantageous to the producers and the use of standard weights must eliminate the possibility of his being victimized by malpractice. Supervision of the operations in the notified market area can be more conveniently done if business is carried on in a specified area or areas intended for that purposein the case of P. P. ENTERPRISES V. UNION OF INDIA A. I. R. 1982 S. C. 1016 the Supreme Court was concerned with the constitutional validity of clause 5 of the Sugar (Control) Order 1966 In the light of Article 19 and (6) of the Constitution R. B. Misra J. made the following pertinent observations in this connection:a person has a right to carry on any occupation trade or business and the only restriction on the unfettered right is the authority of the State to make a law imposing reasonable restrictions under clause (6) of the Art. 19. The expression reasonable restrictions signifies that the limitation imposed on a person in enjoyment of that right should not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature beyond what is required in the interest of the public. We may in this connection refer to an earlier decision of the Supreme Court in the case of MD. FARUK V. STATE OF M. P. A. I. R. 1970 S. C. 93 which was heavily relied upon by Mr. K. S. Nanavati learned Advocate for the petitioners. Mr. Nanavati placed strong reliance on the following observations of Shah J. in the aforesaid decision:when the validity of a law placing restriction upon the exercise of fundamental rights in Article 19 (1) is challenged the onus of proving to the satisfaction of the court that the restriction is reasonable lies upon the State. A law requiring that an act which is inherently dangerous noxious or injurious to public interest health or safety or is likely to prove a nuisance to the community shall be done under a permit or licence of an executive authority it is not per se unreasonable and no person may claim a licence of permit to do that act as of right. . . . . . . . . The impugned notification though technically within the competence of the State Government directly infringes the fundamental right of the petitioner guaranteed by Article 19 (1) (g) and may be upheld only if it be established that it seeks to impose reasonable restrictions in the interest of the general public and a less drastic restriction will not ensure the interest of the general public. The court must in considering the validity of the impugned law imposing a prohibition on the carrying on of a business or profession attempt an evaluation of its direct and immediate impact upon the fundamental rights of the citizens affected thereby and the larger public interest sought to be ensured in the light of the object sought to be achieved the necessity to restrict the citizens freedom the inherent pernicious nature of the act prohibited or its capacity or tendency to be harmful to the general public the possibility of achieving the object by imposing a less drastic restraint and in the absence of exceptional situations such as the prevalence of a state of emergency-national or local-or the necessity to maintain essential supplies or the necessity to stop activities inherently dangerous the existence of a machinery to satisfy the administrative authority that no case for imposing the restriction is made out or that a less drastic restriction may ensure the object intended to be achieved. (emphasis supplied) so far as the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court is concerned it may be noted that necessity to maintain essential supplies as underlined by us in the extracted portion of the judgment is considered to be an exceptional situation in which the need to place restrictions on fundamental right to carry on business is taken to be a weighty circumstance to tilt the balance between individual interest and public interest in favour of the latter. . ( 21 ) WE may also in this connection refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in VIKLAD COAL MERCHANT V. UNION OF INDIA A. I. R. 1984 S. C. 95 wherein the Supreme Court speaking through D. A. Desai J. considered the question of constitutional validity of sec. 27a read with sec. 28 of the Railways Act whereby priority was given to the Central or State Governments to carry their coal consignments by rail as compared to other private consignors of coal. While considering the question whether sec. 27a read with sec. 28 of the Railways Act whereby priority was given to the Central or State Governments to carry their coal consignments by rail as compared to other private consignors of coal. While considering the question whether sec. 27a of the Railways Act was violative of Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution in the light of the grievances made by the coal merchants who had to be pushed back in queue as compared to the consignors whose goods were to be given priority for transhipment by railway transport the Supreme Court observed as under:coal merchants who are dealers in coal and for the purpose of carrying on of business at a certain place they are required to transport coal from the colliery sidings to their place of business obviously their business is not transport of coal. Transport is merely incidental to their business namely trade in coal. Assuming that the Railways have wholly banned transport of coal offered by the petitioners by wagons it cannot be said that the action of the Railways would violate Art. 19 (1) (g) in relation to them. Prima facie the petitioners business or trade as coal merchants is in no way interfered with by the railways by not being able to provide transport facility. There are other means of transport by which the coal can be transported by the petitioners to their respective place where they carry on their business as the coal merchants. Even assuming that the direct impact of the policy laid down by the railway administration pursuant to the orders of the Central Government under sec. 27a results in denial of allotment of wagon to the petitioners the restriction will nonetheless be reasonable because petitioners are not wholly denied the allotment of wagons. Planned regulated movement of coal to meet priority needs if it results in denial of that facility to non-priority sector could not be rejected as placing an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental freedom to carry on trade or business. And that is the object underlying sec. 27a. It is therefore idle to contend that the section being violative of Art. 19 (1) (g) is unconstitutional. ( 22 ) IN the light of the aforesaid settled legal position the validity of the impugned provisions will have to be decided on the touchstone of Article 19 (1) (g) and (6) of the Constitution. 27a. It is therefore idle to contend that the section being violative of Art. 19 (1) (g) is unconstitutional. ( 22 ) IN the light of the aforesaid settled legal position the validity of the impugned provisions will have to be decided on the touchstone of Article 19 (1) (g) and (6) of the Constitution. As we have shown earlier the impugned provisions do impose restrictions on the fundamental rights of the petitioners guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (g ). However these provisions in our view especially in the light of the data available on the record of these cases stand the test of Article 19 The restrictions which they impose are shown to be in the public interest. We have already dealt with in detail the stand of the first respondent-State underlying enactment of the impugned provisions. Two natural calamities in quick succession in a span of one year viz. in November 1982 and June 1983 resulted in severe drain of cattle wealth of this State. More than 2 0 0 of cattle heads perished in the cyclone of November 1982 and further 83000 and odd cattle heads were lost due to floods in June 1983. The result was severe drain of the cattle wealth in the State. Looking to the existing need of the milch cattle in the State when such a large scale erosion of cattle wealth resulted due to the natural calamities consideration of the public interest certainly enjoined the first respondent State to devise proper methods for safeguarding against further drain of cattle wealth. It is to be noted at this stage that the aforesaid facts are not in dispute. The petitioners in their number of affidavits-rejoinder and sur-rejoinder have not been able to controvert these tale-tell facts. What they have controverted is the allegation on behalf of the first respondent that large number of cattle were being illicitly exported out of the Gujarat State. So far as that stand of the petitioners is concerned the respondents by facts and figures have clearly shown that the existing system of check posts through which the goods in transit pass by road has failed to serve its purpose and there is consistent clandestine export of cattle by road. That situation existed prior to the impugned order and even subsequent thereto by taking resort to the device of passing on Gujarat cattle as Rajasthan cattle. That situation existed prior to the impugned order and even subsequent thereto by taking resort to the device of passing on Gujarat cattle as Rajasthan cattle. The case putforth by the respondents in support of the impugned provisions on the touchstone of Article 19 (6) is two-fold: (i) Tendency of the export permit holders to transport by road large number of fresh cattle under the guise of salvaged cattle and (ii) by misusing the permit large number of fresh cattle are being exported in excess of the number mentioned in the export permits. So far as the aforesaid two contentions are concerned it may be noted that whether cattle carried are salvaged cattle or fresh cattle if they are carried as per the permit legally issued under the Control Order of 1961 na exception can be taken by the respondents. But the real difficulty seems to be springing from the fact that over years the system of export control while considered in the light of what happens as a stark practical reality at the check posts when goods are carried by road has failed to provide a foolproof system of checks and balances. It is trite to say that apart from the highway leading from Gujarat to Bombay there would be number of by roads through which exporters carrying their cattle by trucks may reach Maharashtra border. It cannot be disputed and it is not in dispute that geographically the Maharashtra State border flanks a number of border districts of Gujarat viz. Surat Valsad Dangs and Broach. It is true that river Narmada intervenes between the land mass of central Gujarat and south Gujarat and any one who wants to carry any goods by road to Maharashtra has at any point got to cross river Narmada as submitted by Mr. Vakharia for the petitioners. It is also true that there are three bridges over river Narmada for utilisation by road transport; viz. two bridges near Broach one being the Golden Bridge which is an old railway bridge subsequently opened to vehicular traffic the second bridge being a newly constructed bridge a few kilometres away from the said bridge upstream and the third bridge over Narmada river having been recently constructed near Garudeshwar connecting Baroda district with Bharuch district. These facts are not disputed by the learned Advocates of the respective parties. Mr. These facts are not disputed by the learned Advocates of the respective parties. Mr. Vakharia for the petitioners submitted that enough check posts can be kept near these bridges so that any clandestine illegal export of buffaloes can get detected at these points. Mr. Vin however joined issue on this point and submitted that even after crossing these bridges the Gujarat State territory would intervene consisting of southern part of Broach district Surat district Valsad district and Dangs district and as there is no prohibition against movement of cattle within the Gujarat territories any one without being inhibited by any system of permits can carry his cattle in any part of these districts. But once he goes there he may cross the Maharashtra border through any unauthorised or unspecified exit point by taking resort to by-roads or feeder roads and carry his cattle without being subjected to any checking at the final check post. Mr. K. S. Nanavati for the petitioners in this connection rejoined by inviting our attention to 1975 Movement Order which we have noted earlier which lays down restriction on movement of cattle from any district to the border districts of Valsad Bharuch Surat and Banaskantha and provides that no person shall move any cattle from a district in the State to any of the border districts of Valsad Bharuch Surat and Banaskantha in the State except under and in accordance with the terms and conditions of the permission issued by the Collector of that district in which the place where the cattle is intended to be moved is situated. Mr. Vins answer to this submission was two-fold. He submitted that so far as the aforesaid Control Order of 1975 is concerned it merely lays down obtaining of permit from the Collector of the concerned district where the cattle are to be moved. Once that permission is obtained there will be no further safeguard to check whether cattle which are moved in the border districts remain there or whether they are further clandestinely smuggled out or illegally taken out by any branch or feeder road to the adjoining territories of the Maharashtra State the land mass of which flank all the borders of these districts spread over number of kilometers and it would be physically impossible for the first respondent to keep check posts at all relevant points on these territories spread over hundreds of kilometers. The second answer given by Mr. Vin was that the said Order nowhere refers to Dangs district which also adjoins substantial part of the territories of Nasik district of Maharashtra State. The aforesaid answers given by Mr. Vin so far as the contention of Mr. Nanavati based on the Movement Order of 1975 is concerned are unassailable. It is therefore found that the then existing machinery of control and check over movement of road traffic in the light of the Control Order of 1961 left much to be desired. Many loopholes were detected in the working of the said provisions. Exporters had tendency to clandestinely and illegally export large number of cattle viz. salvaged buffaloes or even fresh buffaloes under given permits. It is trite to observe that persons on the check posts might be duped or won over. The result would be that on the basis of the same permit large number of cattle could get exported illegally. It is true that no one has alleged that the present petitioners were involved in such smuggling out of the buffaloes How. ever the result of the working of the Control Order of 1961 over years so far as export by road was concerned based on facts and figures to which we have made a detailed reference in earlier part of this judgment while referring to the case of the respondents can certainly be taken as affording a proper yardstick for the respondent State to enable it to devise more stringent restrictions with a view to plugging these loopholes in public interest. The object sought to be achieved is to preserve the cattle wealth of the State. It is certainly of a paramount public interest. In order to sub-serve such interest if steps are taken by the State to plug the existing loopholes and for that purpose to impose stringent restrictions on transport of cattle by road and even to prohibit such transport to certain extent it cannot be said that these measures impose unreasonable restrictions on the petitioners right to carry on trade or business. These impugned restrictions have a rational nexus to the public object sought to be achieved i. e. to preserve cattle wealth of this State. These impugned restrictions have a rational nexus to the public object sought to be achieved i. e. to preserve cattle wealth of this State. On the data available on the record of this case it is not possible for us to give a finding that the restrictions imposed by the impugned provisions are in any way excessive in nature or that there is a possibility of imposing less stringent restrictions. It must be noted that there is no via media or any third alternative as compared to the export of cattle by toad and export of cattle by rail. The learned couns el for the petitioners were agreed to this position. They readily submitted that it is not their contention that there would be any equally convenient method of transport of cattle by sea or any other mode. They therefore agreed that export of cattle can either be by rail or by road and in their contention the transport by road can be effectively checked by having stringent checking on the check posts and that would subserve the public purpose required to be ensured by the impugned provisions. Once on facts it is found on the basis of experience derived from the working of the Control Order over years that the export of cattle by road involved number of loopholes which were required to be plugged in the absence of any other better alternative the railway transport would obviously afford the only acceptable alternative and this is precisely what was sought to be done by the first respondent by enacting the impugned provisions. It is easy to visualise that so far as rail transport is concerned there is sufficient check at the stage of loading of buffaloes in the allotted railway wagons. There will be enough record available at the loading. There will be sufficient record at the transhipment point to detect thefts or pilferage on way when the cattle are to be transhipped from metre gauge wagons to broad gauge wagons and there will be enough record available at the stage where consigned cattle are off-loaded at the point of termination of their transit viz. at Bombay. It is also obvious that once number of cattle mentioned in the export permit are loaded in the railway wagons permit gets exhausted and sufficient reliable record is kept of such exhausted permits at the place of loading. at Bombay. It is also obvious that once number of cattle mentioned in the export permit are loaded in the railway wagons permit gets exhausted and sufficient reliable record is kept of such exhausted permits at the place of loading. Such permits would not obviously be utilised again. This safety valve is not available so far as transport by road is concerned. There is possibility of misuse of the same permit under which number of cattle can be exported again and again by using the same permits as in the very nature of things existing check posts would not yield a foolproof method of checking for obvious reasons and that apart road traffic can get defused by using feeder roads leading to Maharashtra State over vast open territories forming borders between various districts of Gujarat State and Maharashtra State. So far as rail transport is concerned there is no such apprehension. Buffaloes loaded in railway wagons have to reach their place of destination only by one well defined way over rails. In transit there are sufficient checks all throughout from station of loading to station of unloading. There is also no possibility of same wagon getting reloaded by new buffaloes on way at any intermediate station while as discussed earlier such a possibility does exist in case of carriage of buffaloes by road transport. At this stage we may also note certain salient features emerging on record. It is not the contention of any of the petitioners that any of their buffaloes died or suffered any physical injury during railway transit due to inconvenient mode of railway transport. It is also an admitted position that one attendant is permitted to travel with every six consigned buffaloes carried in railway wagon. This attendant milks these buffaloes on way so that they may not get over loaded with milk and that their health may not deteriorate and that their milk yield per day may not fall. These facts are not in dispute. If that is so merely because railway transport takes 7 to 10 days as compared to maximum 24 hours taken by road transport. These facts are not in dispute. If that is so merely because railway transport takes 7 to 10 days as compared to maximum 24 hours taken by road transport. to carry consigned buffaloes from their place of loading in Gujarat State to their destination place of unloading at Bombay it cannot be said with any emphasis that restriction imposed on export of buffaloes by road transport is in any way excessive keeping in view the paramount public interest of preserving the cattle wealth of this State. It is also pertinent to note that as mentioned by the respondents in their affidavit-in-reply railways have agreed to give C priority to consignments of buffaloes for export from Gujarat. It is also shown by the respondents by producing relevant facts and figures that on demand railway wagons for the aforesaid purpose are being made available to consignors within one or two days of the concerned requisitions for such wagons and that in some cases available and allotted railway wagons are not being utilised by loading buffaloes therein for being sent to Bombay. Under these circumstances the grievance of the petitioners that railway wagons would not be available for number of days does not seem to be justified. It is true that railway journey take atleast 7 to 10 days from the date of loading to the date of delivery at the place of destination. Even during that time milk income from salvaged buffaloes is not totally lost as the attendant is admittedly required to milk these buffaloes to preserve their health and milk yielding capacity. It is possible that owners of the buffaloes might not be given full account of milk yield from these buffaloes in transit by the concerned attendants who might themselves pocket substantially the receipts from the sale of milk obtained from the buffaloes in their charge during transit. To that extent net loss of income from milk yield would be suffered by the owners of salvaged buffaloes who carry on their milk selling business at Bombay. It is not shown on the record of this case that the consigned buffaloes during their transit by railway transport adversely suffer in health or hygiene till they reach their place of destination at Bombay. It is not shown on the record of this case that the consigned buffaloes during their transit by railway transport adversely suffer in health or hygiene till they reach their place of destination at Bombay. Consequently the delay in railway transit has the only adverse effect on the owners of these buffaloes to the extent they lose income from their milk yield during the transit for a few days. These are the adverse effects suffered by owners of the buffaloes due to the impugned provisions. These restrictions will have to be balanced against the public interest of preserving the milk yielding cattle wealth of the State for the entire population residing in this State for ensuing which the impugned provisions have been enacted. Once such an exercise is gone into the result becomes obvious. Slight inconvenience and cut on the pockets of milk vendors of Bombay has to give way to larger interests of the population of Gujarat State which can be subserved by preserving the cattle wealth of this State. From that point of view the impugned provisions will remain fully protected by the provisions of Article 19 (6) of the Constitution of India. When the rival interests of individual exporters of buffaloes carrying on milk vending business at Bombay on the one hand and the public interest of meeting the milk requirements of residents of the State on the other are put in scales it cannot be said with any justification that on facts of the present case the public interest subserving the needs of the entire population of the State should not outweigh the private interest of exporters who might suffer some financial strain on account of loss of milk income for a few days during the time their stock-in-trade namely the salvaged buffaloes remain in transit over rails from Gujarat enroute to Bombay. It can safely be said that of necessity the public interest permeating the impugned provisions must eclipse the interests of the private exporters. We find that the impugned order is meant to serve as a complementary measure to the scheme of export control envisaged by the Control Order of 1961 and is meant to make the said scheme of export control wholesome more effective and foolproof. We find that the impugned order is meant to serve as a complementary measure to the scheme of export control envisaged by the Control Order of 1961 and is meant to make the said scheme of export control wholesome more effective and foolproof. Such a safety measure is not shown to be in any way obnoxious or excessive in nature and character so as to take it out of the protective provisions of Article 19 of the Constitution of India. Under these circumstances the restrictions imposed by the impugned provisions have to be held to be quite reasonable. ( 23 ) BEFORE we part with the consideration of this point we must refer to a decision of the Supreme Court on which strong reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the petitioners. In STATE OF MYSORE V. S. SANJEEVAH A. I. R. 1967 S. C. 1189 the Supreme Court was concerned with the validity of provisos (1) and (2) of rule 2 of the Mysore Forest Rules framed under Mysore Forests Act of 1300 whereby movement of forest produce between 10 p. m. and sun-rise was totally prohibited. The petitioners who were dealers in forest produce challenged the said provisions on the ground that they were violative of Article 301 (1) of the Constitution. While accepting the aforesaid contention of the petitioners the Supreme Court held that between 10 p. m. and sun-rise there was total prohibition against removal of forest produce. The said provision was not regulatory but restrictive in nature and it was therefore hit by Article 301 (1 ). It is difficult to appreciate how this decision can be of any assistance to the petitioners. Reasons are obvious. In the first place it must be noticed the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case was concerned will the grievance of the petitioners who were dealers in forest produce. Para 2 of the report at page 1190 clearly brings out this position. If the petitioners were dealers in forest produce and if they are totally prohibited from removing timber for the purpose of their basiness for a given period thes aid prohibition can fly in the face of Article 301 (1 ). However the facts of the present cases are entirely different. The petitioners are not dealers in cattle. Regulation regarding transport of cattle has nothing to do with the petitioners business as dealers in cattle. However the facts of the present cases are entirely different. The petitioners are not dealers in cattle. Regulation regarding transport of cattle has nothing to do with the petitioners business as dealers in cattle. It is not the case of the petitioners that they are exporting buffaloes from Gujarat for selling them in Maharashtra. On the contrary they export these salvaged buffaloes for milking them in Bombay and thereafter they desire to sell their milk in Bombay market. Thus they seek to sell milk that is produce from the buffaloes and not buffaloes themselves in the Maharashtra State. For export of such cattle no assistance can be derived from Article 301 (1 ). While dealing with the independent argument of the petitioners based on Article 301 (1) which we shall presently proceed to do we will highlight this aspect in greater details. Suffice it to say for the present that the Supreme Court was not concerned with the impact of restrictions imposed by Mysore Forest Rules on the rights of the petitioners under Article 19 (1) (g) nor had the Supreme Court any occasion to consider the question about the reasonableness of these restrictions on the touchstone of Article 19 (6 ). Such a question was never posed for consideration of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment and hence obviously it was not answered by the Supreme Court. Consequently the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court cannot be of any assistance to the petitioners to support their contention among the violation of Art. 19 (1) (g) read with Art. 19 (6 ). . . . . . . . . . ( 24 ) (3) So far as contention regarding applicability of Article 301 of the Constitution is concerned it is to be stated to be rejected. The said Article enjoins as under :subject to the other provisions of this Part trade commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India shall be free. Before any challenge can be based on Article 301 it must be shown that any restriction is imposed by the impugned provision on the free flow of trade commerce or intercourse between different States comprised in the territory of India It is obvious that the Gujarat and Maharashtra are comprised in the territory of India. Before any challenge can be based on Article 301 it must be shown that any restriction is imposed by the impugned provision on the free flow of trade commerce or intercourse between different States comprised in the territory of India It is obvious that the Gujarat and Maharashtra are comprised in the territory of India. But before the petitioners can effectively invoke Article 301 they must show that the impugned provisions of the Movement Order restrict in any way their trade commerce or intercourse with any one in Maharashtra State. As we have already seen earlier the petitioners are carrying their own cattle from Gujarat State to Maharashtra State. None of the petitioners is a dealer in cattle or is trying to sell his buffaloes to any one in Maharashtra State. So far as salvage farm owners are concerned they are not concerned with trade or commerce with any one in Maharashtra State. They merely treat the salvaged buffaloes of owners residing in Maharashtra State at their salvage farms in Gujarat and having treated them they send them back to their owners. They are merely bailees of buffaloes for treatment purposes. Consequently no question of trade commerce or intercourse between the petitioners on the one hand and persons residing in Maharashtra State on the other hand arises for consideration on the facts of the present case. Even otherwise Article 301 cannot be of any assistance to the petitioners for the simple reason that as well settled Article 301 guarantees freedom of trade commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India but regulatory measures or measures imposing compensatory taxes for the use of trading facility are outside the purview of Article 301 (Vide MINAKSHI V. STATE OF KARNATAKA A. I. R. 1983 S. C. 1283 ). It is not the contention of the petitioners that the impugned provisions in any way try to restrict free flow of commerce trade or intercourse between the Gujarat State and Maharashtra State. Once the impugned provisions are found to be imposing reasonable restriction on the petitioners rights guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (g) by parity of reasoning. it can certainly be held that the restriction which they impose would be regulatory in nature. Once such restrictions are regulatory in nature they do not get voided by Article 301 of the Constitution. Once the impugned provisions are found to be imposing reasonable restriction on the petitioners rights guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (g) by parity of reasoning. it can certainly be held that the restriction which they impose would be regulatory in nature. Once such restrictions are regulatory in nature they do not get voided by Article 301 of the Constitution. It is for this reason that Article 301 will not be of any assistance to the petitioners. However there is a third hurdle in the way of the petitioners in invoking Article 301. It is well settled that before any restriction can be treated to be impeding the free flow of trade commerce or intercourse between different States it has to be shown how the impugned provision has a direct and immediate effect of restricting such trade commerce or intercourse (Vide STATE OF KERALA V. A. B. ABDUL KADIR and OTHERS A. I. R. 1970 S. C. 1912 ). It is obvious that merely by regulating export of milch cattle and buffaloes by road and subjecting such transport to certain conditions it cannot be said that the impugned provisions directly impede free flow of trade commerce and intercourse between the State of Gujarat and the State of Maharashtra. All that the petitioners have been able to show in this connection is that by requiring their salvaged cattle to spend 7 to 10 days in transit during the railway journey the petitioners income from the milk of these milch cattle during the intervening period would be substantially lost. That would be obviously an indirect effect and not a direct and immediate effect of the impugned provisions qua petitioners trade or business. Even otherwise it has to be noted that the petitioners are selling milk obtained from their own buffaloes and they are not selling buffaloes to any one in Maharashtra. But even leaving aside that aspect and even assuming that the petitioners are trading in milk carried on four legs by means of their salvaged buffaloes even then the restriction imposed by the impugned provisions is indirect and not direct and consequently Article 301 will not get violated in any manner by the impugned provision. It must therefore be held that the impugned provisions are not in any way hit by Article 301. ( 25 ) (6) So far as point No. 6 for consideration is concerned Mr. It must therefore be held that the impugned provisions are not in any way hit by Article 301. ( 25 ) (6) So far as point No. 6 for consideration is concerned Mr. Momin submitted that rule 91 of the Bombay Motor Vehicle Rules framed under sec. 133 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 read with secs. 21 41 and 68 of the said Act conflicts with the provisions of the impugned Movement Order and to that extent the Movement Order would be repugnant to the said Act and hence it would be void. It is difficult to countenance the aforesaid contention of Mr. Momin. All that rule 91 provides is that no cattle shall be carried in a goods vehicle in a public place unless- (ii) in the case of any other cattle requisite floor area as enjoined by the rule is maintained in the goods vehicle. It is true that explanation to rule 91 (1) shows that cattle would include goat sheep buffalo bull etc. for the purpose of the said sub-rule. This rule has nothing to do with the question whether a particular consignment of cattle can be permitted to be carried by road or not. In case such consignment is legally permitted to be carried by road what safety measures are required to be followed while availing of such transport by road through a goods transport vehicle is all that is contemplated by rule 91. In other words the said rule regulates the manner of transport of cattle by goods vehicle. But it has nothing to do with the further question whether such cattle can at all be permitted to be transported by goods vehicles. Such a question is outside the scope and ambit of rule 91. Hence it cannot be said that the Movement Order in any way conflicts with rule 91 of the Motor Vehicle Rules or sec. 4 of the Control Act or clause 3 (2) and clause 4 of the Movement Order. These later provisions travel on entirely a different field not touched upon by rule 91 of the Motor Vehicle Rules. As these provisions operate in different fields of their own and there is no question of their colliding with each other at any stage or conversing even partially on the same field. The question of any repugnancy between them therefore does not arise at all. . . . . . As these provisions operate in different fields of their own and there is no question of their colliding with each other at any stage or conversing even partially on the same field. The question of any repugnancy between them therefore does not arise at all. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 26 ) VI. Conclusion :-As a result of the aforesaid discussion on various points canvassed before us for our consideration and the findings reached thereon it must be held that the petitioners are not entitled to any reliefs in these petitions and rules issued in these petitions are therefore ordered to be discharged. In the facts and circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs in each of them. Civil Application No. 4354/83 in special civil application No. 4200/83 does not survive as the only prayer therein was to grant interim relief to the petitioners. When the main petition is dismissed the question of interim relief does not survive. The Civil application therefore) stands dismissed with no orders as to costs. ( 27 ) AT the time when this judgment was pronounced in open court the learned counsel for the petitioners made oral applications for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 133- (1) read with Article 134 of the Constitution of India. We do not think that in the present petitions any substantial question of law of general importance which is required to be decided by the Supreme Court arises for consideration. Hence the oral applications for leave are rejected. Petition dismissed: Leave to appeal refused. .