JUDGMENT K.N. Misra, J. - This writ petition is directed against the order dated 25.7.1981 passed by the District Judge, Bahraich by which the appeal filed by the petitioner has been dismissed being timebarred by limitation. Petitionerappellant had moved an application under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal against the order dated 12th January, 1981 passed by the Prescribed Authority (Ceiling) by which land measuring 18.416 acres belonging to the appellant was declared as surplus. The memo of appeal along with application for condonation of delay u/s 5, Limitation Act, was presented in the court of the District Judge, Bahraich on 12th of January, 1981. The limitation for filling appeal had expired on 17th March, 1981. The petitioner had, therefore, prayed for condonation of delay urging that he was not aware about the order passed by the Prescribed Authority (Ceiling). It was further averred in the application that the petitioner was under the impression that the choice given by him has been accepted by the Prescribed Authority (Ceiling). The petitioner feeling aggrieved by the order passed by the Prescribed Authority had preferred appeal which has been dismissed by the learned District Judge as barred by limitation. He refused to condone the delay, as according to him sufficient cause seeking condonation of delay was not shown by the appellant. 2. I have perused the impugned order passed by the District Judge and I find that on the facts and circumstances of the case the delay deserved to be condoned and the appeal deserved to be disposed of on merits, instead of rejecting it being time barred by limitation. 3. It is not disputed that the appellant had appeared in the case before the Prescribed Authority (Ceiling) on 2nd of February, 1981, through his counsel. The case was adjourned to 4th of February, 1981. That day none had appeared on his behalf but the case was adjourned to 12th of February, 1981 and was fixed for judgment. The Prescribed Authority (Ceiling) passed, the order in the case on 12th of February, 1981 declaring 18.418 acres of land of the appellant as surplus. When the petitioner came to know of the order, he applied for its copy on 11th June, 1981 which was delivered to him the next day and on that very day he filed appeal without losing any time. 4. When the petitioner came to know of the order, he applied for its copy on 11th June, 1981 which was delivered to him the next day and on that very day he filed appeal without losing any time. 4. The above facts do indicate that on the date when the judgment was pronounced petitioner had not put in appearance. A date earlier to it, none had put in appearance on his behalf. Thus, the petitioner's allegation that he was not aware about the judgment and order, appears to be absolutely correct and delay in filing the appeal deserved to be condoned and the appeal deserved to be heard and decided on merits. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a lenient view deserves to be taken while considering the application for condonation of delay. In a recent decision in re. Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another v. Mst. Katiji and others ( AIR 1987 SC 1353 ) (July Part) : 1987 (5) LCD 309 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed: The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting S. 5, of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression sufficient causes employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends; of justice that being the lifepurpose for the existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realised that: 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. Every day's delay must be explained does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. Every day's delay must be explained does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a nondeliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of malafides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. 5. This court has also in several decisions laid stress upon taking liberal view in the matters of condoning the delay so as to advance justice between the parties and not to shut put hearing on merits. The application for condonation of delay deserves to be rejected only if there are grave unexplained laches and lack of bonafides on the part of the applicant seeking condonation of delay. A court should always be keen for doing substantial justice between the parties by deciding the case on merits after hearing the parties so that injustice be not caused to a party who is not guilty of deliberate laches and lack of bonafides on his part in prosecuting the case. 6. In the present case I find that the appellant had sufficiently explained the delay in filing the appeal which deserved to be condoned. Learned District Judge has thus committed a manifest error in dismissing the appeal a& time barred by refusing to condone the delay. 7. In the result the writ petition succeeds and is hereby allowed and the order dated 25.7.1981 passed by the District Judge, Bahraich is quashed and the case is remanded back to the learned District Judge for deciding it according to law. 8. 7. In the result the writ petition succeeds and is hereby allowed and the order dated 25.7.1981 passed by the District Judge, Bahraich is quashed and the case is remanded back to the learned District Judge for deciding it according to law. 8. It has been brought to my notice that in view of the recent amendment in the Ceilings Act, the appeals against the order of Prescribed Authority (Ceiling) will now be heard and disposed of by Commissioner of the Division. Learned District Judge will consider the amendment in the Act and pass appropriate order for the transfer of the appeal to be heard and disposed of on merits. No order as to costs.