JUDGMENT B. D. Agarwal, J. 1. This writ petition and the connected second appeal gave rise to certain interesting questions. 2. Petitioner had been tenant of a portion of House No. 5, Crosthwaite Road, Allahabad, Jagan Nath Shukla (since dead)-the landlord applied to the District Magistrate, Allahabad, under Section 3 of the U. P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act (U. P. Act III of 1947) for permission to sue for ejectment of the tenant. The permission was granted on April 17, 1967, by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Allahabad, providing that it shall be operative after August 17, 1967, and in the meantime the tenant, could find another accommodation for himself. The revision filed by the tenant against this order was dismissed by the Commissioner on August 29, 1967. The representation made to the State Government under Section 7-F of the 1947 Act dismissed also on December 8, 1967. The petitioner then took the matter to a writ petition before this Court, which was dismissed on February 27, 1969. On July 14, 1967, Jagan Nath Shukla the landlord instituted Original Suit No. 570 of 1967 for eviction against the petitioner in the Court of the Munsif West, Allahabad, on the basis of the permission granted under section 3 aforesaid and he also relied, in the alternative, upon the ground of default incurred by the tenant in payment of rent. The arrears of rent besides damages for use and occupation were also claimed. The tenancy had been determined by notice given by the landlord under registered cover dated September 30, 1966. The trial court was of the view that the permission relied by the landlord was invalid since it was in respect of only a portion of the accommodation under tenancy and the notice was also defective on that ground. The suit was moreover held to be premature in so far as the relief for eviction is concerned. On this ground the suit was dismissed for eviction under the decree dated July 23, 1971. That decree was passed for recovery of rent for the period of February 1967 to June 1967. Jagan Nath Shukla having died during the pendency of the suit, this was pursued by his legal representative impleaded as respondent no. 2 in the present writ petition. Against the dismissal of the suit for eviction, the landlord filed civil Appeal No. 224 of 1971. Jagan Nath Shukla having died during the pendency of the suit, this was pursued by his legal representative impleaded as respondent no. 2 in the present writ petition. Against the dismissal of the suit for eviction, the landlord filed civil Appeal No. 224 of 1971. The lower appellate court reached the finding that the permission relied by him was in respect of the entire accommodation under tenancy and hence it was not invalid on this account. The validity of the notice was also upheld. It was affirmed, however, that the suit for eviction in so far as based upon the permission under section 3 was pre- mature. The tenant bad not incurred default in payment of rent and hence the eviction could not be had on that ground either. In the result, the appeal was dismissed on September 1, 1975. Second Appeal No. 223 of 1976 was thereafter presented in this Court on February 3, 1976, by the landlord and this was admitted at the preliminary hearing on November 29, 1976. 3. The landlord made an application under Section 21 (1) (b) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U. P. Act XIII of 1972) against the petitioner before the Prescribed Authority, Allahabad, on ground of bona fide requirement for himself and his wife. The application listed as Case No. 196 of 1972. was rejected by the prescribed Authority on August 16, 1973. An appeal filed against this order under section 22 of the Act XlII of 1972 was dismissed on May 29, 1975. The application under section 1 read with section 43 (2) (rr) of the 1972 Act was made thereafter by the landlord respondent no. 2 before the prescribed Authority on or about October 1, 1980. This was registered as Case No. 112 of 1980. The basis for this application was the permission granted to the landlord under Section 3 of the old Act dated April 17, 1967, which had become final with the rejection of the representation by the State Government on December 8, 1967. This application was allowed by the prescribed Authority under the impugned order dated October 22, 1981. 4. Aggrieved the tenant has preferred the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution wherein he seeks writ of certiorari to quash the order of the prescribed Authority dated October 22, 1981. viae Annexure 3. This application was allowed by the prescribed Authority under the impugned order dated October 22, 1981. 4. Aggrieved the tenant has preferred the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution wherein he seeks writ of certiorari to quash the order of the prescribed Authority dated October 22, 1981. viae Annexure 3. The second appeal filed by the landlord is against the decree of the lower appellate court dated September 1, 1975, in Original Suit No. 570 of 1967, whereby the relief for eviction was denied to him on ground that the suit was premature. The petition and this second appeal have been heard together with the consent of counsel for the parties. Admittedly Panna Lal Sonkar (hereinafter referred to as the 'petitioner') had been the tenant in the building in dispute for and on behalf of Jagan Nath Shukla deceased. Upon the death of the landlord, his son Yogendra Chandra shukla has been substituted as the legal representative. The then landlord applied for permission under Section 3 of the U. P. Act III of 1947 on ground that he required the permission for an Aushadhalaya to be run by his daughter-in-law. The permission was granted on April 17, 1967, by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Allahabad. The operative portion of the order reads : "In view of my above findings, I am fully satisfied that the need of the appellant, Sri Jagannath Prasad Shukla, the landlord of House No. 5, Crosth-waite Road, Allahabad, for the accommodation in dispute which is in the tenancy and occupation of Sri Panna Lal Sonkar, the opposite-party, is genuine and pressing. I, therefore, grant permission to the applicant-landlord under Section 3 of the Act to file a civil suit for ejectment of his tenant Sri Panna Lal Sonkar, opposite party." "This order will be operative after 17-8-67 and in the meantime the opposite party find out some other accommodation in the city of Allahabad." 5. Sri R. N. Tripathi learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the permission could be operative only subsequent to August 17, 1967, and, therefore, the Original Suit No. 570 of 1967 instituted by Jagan Nath Shukla, the landlord, in the civil court on July 14, 1967, was pre- mature. The trial court, it is submitted, did not acquire initial jurisdiction to entertain or try the suit. The trial court, it is submitted, did not acquire initial jurisdiction to entertain or try the suit. As mentioned above this is the ground which has in substance appealed to the lower appellate court as appearing from the judgment dated September 1, 1975, leading to the dismissal of the suit for eviction. I feel unable to be persuaded to this line of reasoning. The permission applied for by the landlord was neither declined nor deferred under the order dated April 17, 1967. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer expressed his satisfaction in the matter in unqualified terms and acceded to the permission. In order to enable the tenant to search out alternative accommodation if he could there was some additional time granted and the actual partition of the permission postponed for a limited period. Upon the expiry of the specified period, the permission granted to the landlord became operative on its own force without the need of any other order in this behalf from the concerned authority. Since the permission envisaged under Section 3 of the U. P. Act III of 1947 had, in fact, been granted to the landlord, he was within his rights in instituting the suit for ejectment in the civil court. The adjudication in the suit came to be made much later and in any event the permission became operative after August 17, 1967, when the suit was pending still. The court, in my opinion, is competent to take notice of the maturity of the suit subsequent to its institution. In Ram Niwas v. Om Kary, AIR 19s3 Alld. 310 the agreement to sell provided that the defendant no. 1 would execute a sale deed in favour of the plaintiff within one month of the decision of the partition suit and its Amaldaramad in the revenue record. Preliminary decree in the partition suit determining the share in the area of defendant no. 1 was passed on April 30, 1969. The suit by the plaintiff for specific performance of the agreement to sell had been instituted on October 7, 1968, prior to the preliminary decree for partition. On the date of the institution, therefore, the suit was premature. The Division Bench was of the view that this aspect lost its importance and became academic when during the pendency of the suit, the partition suit was decided and the share of the defendant no. 1 was finally determined. On the date of the institution, therefore, the suit was premature. The Division Bench was of the view that this aspect lost its importance and became academic when during the pendency of the suit, the partition suit was decided and the share of the defendant no. 1 was finally determined. After this the suit could not be dismissed on the technical ground that it was premature. In Pursottam Das v. Smt. Raj Mani Devi, 1968 ALJ 1023 the landlord instituted the suit on October 14, 1961 on the basis of the permission granted by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer under Section 3 (1) of the old Act dated October 11, 1961. The Commissioner revoked this permission to Institute the suit. The State Government, however, acting under Section 7-F set aside the Commissioner's order on March 30, 1963, and gave leave to the landlord to file the suit with effect from July 30, 1963. The Supreme Court observed that the landlord had thus an effective permission to institute the suit under Section 3 (1) on the expiry of four months from March 20, 1963. The decree in the suit was passed on March 2, 1964. On that date the landlord had a valid permission to institute the suit and the suit was, therefore, maintainable. The fact thus that the permission granted under Section 3 had not become operative when the suit was brought may not be claimed to effect adversely the jurisdiction of the Court to take cognizance thereof. 6. The other contention of Sri Tripathi, the learned counsel, is that the permission granted to the landlord was exhausted with the institution of the suit on the basis thereof and hence it may not be availed for the purpose of proceeding under Section 43 (2) (rr) read with Section 21 (1) (a) of the U. P. Act XIII of 1972. The U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972, as originally enforced, did not contain clause (rr). Through clause (r) it was provided that any suit for the eviction of tenant instituted with the permission referred to in Section 3 of the old Act or any proceedings arising out of such suit pending immediately before the commencement of the Act may be continued and concluded as if the Act had not been passed. Clause (rr) was introduced through the U. P. Civil Laws Amendment Act No. 37 of 1972. Clause (rr) was introduced through the U. P. Civil Laws Amendment Act No. 37 of 1972. This clause read as follows :- "Where any permission referred to in Section 3 of the old Act has been obtained on any ground specialised in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 21, and has become final, either before the commencement of this Act, or in accordance with the provisions of this sub-section, after the commencement of this Act and a suit for the eviction of the tenant has not been instituted the landlord may apply to the prescribed authority for his eviction under Section 21 and thereupon the prescribed authority shall order the eviction of the tenant from the building under tenancy, and it shall be necesary for the prescribed authority to satisfy itself afresh as to the existence of any ground as aforesaid, and such order shall be final and shall not be open to appeal under Section 22." This provision came into force with effect from September 20, 1972, this being the date notified by the State Government under Section 1 (3) of the U. P. Act 13 of 1972. Under the above provision an application under clause (rr) could be moved only if suit for eviction had not already been instituted. This clause did not prescribe any period of limitation for moving the application. Later clause (rr) was amended though the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulations of Letting, Rent and Eviction) (Amendment) Act 28 of 1976. Through this amendment the word 'and a suit for the eviction of the tenant has not been instituted' were replaced by the words, "whether or not a suit for the eviction of the tenant has been instituted". It was further provided that the words substituted shall be deemed always to have been substituted. The amending Act further adds two provisos to the clause. It was further provided that the words substituted shall be deemed always to have been substituted. The amending Act further adds two provisos to the clause. The provisos are as follows and in respect thereof also it was provided that they shall be deemed always to have been inserted :- "Provided that no application under this clause shall be maintainable on the basis of a permission granted under Section 3 of the old Act, where such permission became final more than three years before the commencement of this Act :- "Provided further that in computing the period of three years, the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence any civil proceeding whether in court of first instance or appeal or revision shall be excluded." 7. The expression "whether or not a suit for the eviction of the tenant has been instituted" appearing in clause (rr) came up for interpretation before a Division Bench in Jagjit Prakash v. Prescribed Authority, Bulandshahr, 1981 ARC 541. It was held that the intention of the Legislature, as is manifest from the amendment made by the U. P. Act No. 28 of 1976 with retrospective effect, is that an application under clause (rr) would be maintainable whether or not a suit has been instituted. If the institution of the suit is irrelevant for the maintainability of the application under clause (rr), it does not stand to reason that pendency of the suit for eviction would have any effect. The institution of a civil suit for the eviction of the tenant in other words is immaterial and in spite of a civil suit having been instituted an application under clause (rr) will be maintainable. The Legislature has in this manner provided an alternative relief or remedy to a landlord, who has obtained permission under Section 3 of the old Act. The fact, therefore, that acting on the permission granted to him the landlord instituted the suit, which is now pending in this Court in the form of a second appeal cannot be said to have exhausted the permission so as to disentitle the landlord to invoke clause (rr). The fact, therefore, that acting on the permission granted to him the landlord instituted the suit, which is now pending in this Court in the form of a second appeal cannot be said to have exhausted the permission so as to disentitle the landlord to invoke clause (rr). In view of the specific provision contained in this clause, the institution of the suit is not decisive, in Abdul Moeed v. Prescribed Authority, Lucknow, 1980 ARC 586 the contention was that the parties had earlier filed an ejectment suit which was unsuccessful and on that account the permission granted under Section 3 of the old Act had exhausted itself. A Division Bench repelled this argument relying on another Division Bench decision in Prahlad Das v. Ganga Saran, AIR 1958 Alld. 774. This was also the view taken in Rameshwar Dayal v. Smt. Mohania, 1963 ALJ 1998. These were followed by a learned single Judge in Mohammed Swalleb v. III Additional District Judge, 1978 ARC 507. The purpose of the permission was to enable the landlord to evict the defendant from the premises. As long as that purpose was not fulfilled the permission could not obviously exhaust itself. Whereas in the present the dismissal of the suit has not become final and the issue is alive still in the pending second appeal, the case stands even on higher footing. 8. Allied to this is the submission of the petitioner's counsel that in view of second proviso to clause (rr) reproduced above the remedy sought by the landlord is barred by time. Under the first proviso the limitation prescribed is three years commencing from the date when the permission became final. The second proviso says, however, that in calculating this period the time daring which the applicant had been prosecuting with due diligence in a civil proceeding whether in a court of first instance or appeal or revision shall be excluded. In the present case the permission granted under Section 3 of the old Act became final on February 27, 1969, when the writ petition brought by the petitioner-tenant against the order of the State Government made under Section 7-F dated December 8, 1967, was dismissed. The application u/clause (rr) giving rise to the impugned order was made on or about October 1, 1980. The application u/clause (rr) giving rise to the impugned order was made on or about October 1, 1980. In computing the limitation, however, the time taken in pursuing Original Suit No. 570 of 1967 filed on July 14, 1967, and decided on July 23, 1971 as well the Civil Appeal No. 224 of 1971 decided on September 1, 1975, has to be excluded. Further it may not be overlooked that the second appeal before us was presented within limitation on February 3, 1976, and it has been pending till this date. In the absence of any indication that the landlord has not prosecuted the civil proceeding in accordance with law and with due diligence, there is no ground for not excluding this entire period in computing the limitation (see also B. C. Joshi v. Civil Judge, Mohan Lal Ganj, Lucknow, 1982 (2) Supplementary ARC 409 at page 412). The submission of Sri Tripathi then is that the application under clause (rr)read with Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act No. 13 of 1972 as Case No. 112 of 1980 is barred by the res judicata because earlier an application by the landlord under Section 21 (1) (a) was rejected by the Prescribed Authority on August 16, 1973, and the Miscellaneous Appeal No. 577 of 1973, filed against that order was dismissed also on May 29, 1975. Sri S. U. Khan learned counsel for the respondent-landlord urged that the bar of res judicata cannot be invoked because clause (rr) proceeds on a different basis-the same being the permission granted under Section 3 of the old Act and that stands independently of the relief which the landlord sought under Section 21 (1) (a) by making the application registered as Case No. 196 of 1972. It is not clear whether that application was made prior to September 20, 1972, when clause (rr) was first introduced by the U. P. Act 37 of 1972 or subsequent thereto. Assuming that this was subsequent to September 20, 1972, there can be no denial that that was founded upon a cause of action different from that envisaged under clause (rr). Clause (rr) provides in essence for execution of the permission granted under Section 3 of the old Act. Assuming that this was subsequent to September 20, 1972, there can be no denial that that was founded upon a cause of action different from that envisaged under clause (rr). Clause (rr) provides in essence for execution of the permission granted under Section 3 of the old Act. It lays down that upon such an application being made it shall not be necessary for the Prescribed Authority to decide afresh as to the existence of any ground referable to Section 21. The expression "It shall not be necessary" means in the context "It shall not open." This is the Interpretation made of this clause by the Full Bench in Bansi Lal Sahu v. The Prescribed Authority, Allahaba,d 1980 AWC 148 . The conditions for the application of clause (rr) are :- (a) Permission under Section 3 of the old Act has been granted and has become final; (b) The permission has been granted on any ground specified in subsection (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 21 of this Act. 9. Indisputedly in the present the permission was granted to the landlord which has become final. The ground on which the permission was granted is of the nature specified in Section 21 (1) (a) of the new Act. The landlord claimed that he required the building bonafide for occupation by himself and the members of his family. For invoking clause (rr), the landlord does not have to re-establish before the Prescribed Authority the existence of the ground mentioned in Section 21(1) (a). The Prescribed Authority has indeed no jurisdiction in proceeding under clause (rr) to re-open the question and satisfy itself afresh that the grounds specified in sub-section (1) or (2) of Section 21 exist. In this respect the order granting permission under Section 3 of the old Act is final and conclusive. The proceeding being in the nature of execution vide Bansi Lal Sahu, 1980 AWC 148 Full Bench (supra), Sri Kasturi Lal Dhingra v. P. A. Meerut, etc. 1979 ARC 146; D. K. Soni v, P. K. Mukerji, 1983 (1) ARC 506 the Prescribed Authority has herein only to see that the grounds on which permission was granted under the old Act are such as answer the description of the grounds mentioned in sub-section (1) or (2) of Section 21. 1979 ARC 146; D. K. Soni v, P. K. Mukerji, 1983 (1) ARC 506 the Prescribed Authority has herein only to see that the grounds on which permission was granted under the old Act are such as answer the description of the grounds mentioned in sub-section (1) or (2) of Section 21. In disposing of an application under Section 21 (1), on the other hand, it has additional jurisdiction to decide whether the grounds established by the landlord require eviction from the whole or part of the building. In regard to Section 3 of the old Act their Lordships of the Supreme Court laid down in Qudrat Ullah v. Municipal Board, Bareilly, (1974) 1 SCC 202 at p. 214 Section 3 is only a procedural restriction and does not create a substantive right. All that Section 3 therein laid down was that : "No suit shall, without the permission of the District Magistrate, be filed in any civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds......" "It is more a procedural disability that is cast, not a substantive cause of action that is created. 10. The cause of action for an action to evict the tenant following the grant of permission consists of a valid determination of tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, as K. C. Agrawal, J. points in Mohd. Swalleh, 1978 ARC 507 (supra). In contrast Section 21 (1) of the U. P. Act 13 of 1972 confers a substantive right upon the landlord to secure release of the building under tenancy upon the fulfilment of certain conditions. In a proceeding under that prevision the Prescribed Authority has to be satisfied of the existence of bonafide requirement of the landlord and of the balance of comparative hardship being in his favour. In a case under this provision there does not have to be the determination of tenancy by notice under Section 106 Transfer of Property Act. In a proceeding under that prevision the Prescribed Authority has to be satisfied of the existence of bonafide requirement of the landlord and of the balance of comparative hardship being in his favour. In a case under this provision there does not have to be the determination of tenancy by notice under Section 106 Transfer of Property Act. Rule 18 (1) of the Rules framed under the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972, referred to above by the petitioner's counsel reads J "Where an application of a landlord against any tenant for permission to file a suit for eviction under Section 3 of the old Act, on any ground mentioned in Section 21 (1) has been finally allowed or rejected on merits either before or after the commencement of the Act, whether by the District Magistrate or on revision by the Commissioner or the State Government or under clause (1) or clause (m) of Section 43 (2) by the District Judge, and the landlord instead of filing a suit for eviction makes an application under Section 21 on the same grounds within a period of six month from such decision or from the commencement of the Act, whichever is later, the Prescribed Authority shall accept the findings in those proceedings as conclusive ; Provided that the period during which the operation of any permission as aforesaid is stayed by order of any court or authority shall be excluded in computing the said period of six months." 11. This provision is clearly not attracted whereas in the present case the landlord filed a suit for eviction on the basis of the permission obtained under Section 3 of the old Act. Rule 18 (1) may be invoked where the landlord instead of filing a suit for eviction makes an application under Section 21 on the same ground within the specified period. In the case before us an application under Section 21 was made by the landlord but that was independently of the permission secured under Section 3 of the old Act and moreover the suit for eviction on the basis of that permission was also filed which now constitutes the subject-matter of the second appeal. The bar of res-judicata against the land-lord may not, therefore, be said to arise. 12. Having regard to the discussion made in the above, the second appeal succeeds and is allowed. The bar of res-judicata against the land-lord may not, therefore, be said to arise. 12. Having regard to the discussion made in the above, the second appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and decree of the court below dismissing Original Suit No. 570 of 1967 for ejectment of the respondent No. 1 is set aside. In view of Section 43 (2) (rr) read with Section 21 (1) (a) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, the eviction of the respondent no. 1 shall be made in case no. 112 of 1980 in terms of the order of the Prescribed Authority dated October 22,1981. The writ petition fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances, the parties shall bear their own costs.