The petitioners impugn the order dated 6.1283 of the Chief Judicial Magistrate (Central), Manipur taking cognizance of a complaint under Section 500 IPC and issuing process against the petitioners in Criminal (Complaint) Case No. 787 of 1983, and also prays for quashing of the proceeding under the following facts and circumtances. 2. The first petitioner, Shri Hidangmayum Dwijasekhar Sharma is the eldest, and the second petitioner, Shri Hidang­mayum Chandrasekhar Sharma, is the third son of the first respondent, Shri Hidangmayum Dwijamani Deb Sharma. The 1st petitioner is a Professor of a Government College while the 2nd petitioner is a Government servant and both reside near the 1st respondent. On 21.11.83 the petitioners, being apprehen­sive of further alienation of property by the 1st respondent, filed an application purported to be under Section 148 (A) C.P.C. in the Court of the S.D.C. (I.W. Centre) Imphal stating the subject as " Objection to any mutation case sought by Dwijamani Dev Sharma on twin grounds of senility (unsound mind) due to his octogenarian age-status and also of plot No. IM/64 not being a self-acquired property ". It was stated in the petition that the 1st respondent, aged about 84 years attempted to have shop site plot No. IM/64 transferred or mutated in favour of daughters and a few sons, and prayed that such endeavour be stayed until (a) the soundness of his mental health is not duly certified by a competent doctor (instances of his mental infirmity can be substantiated during hearing); and (b) the said shopsite plot be proved by Shri Sharma to the satisfaction of the court that it is his self-acquired property, which he could distribute only to such parties he chooses. It was further stated that earlier another dag had been muta­ted in favour of two deities and hence it was prayed that any further attempt for mutation be disposed of only after notice to the petitioners. 3. The 1st respondent lodged a complaint on 5.12.83 in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate (Central), Manipur stating that the aforesaid application of the petitioners con­taining defamatory words was filed in order to defame him and to harm his reputation and to lower his prestige in the estimation of the general public and thereby they committed an offence punishable under Section 500 IPC where for they should be punished. The complainant's statement was recorded wherein he stated that the petitioners characterised him as of unsound mind which was very much defamatory and it lowered his prestige and reputation in the estimation of the public, that defamatory words were intentionally used to hurt his feeling; and that he received a copy of the said application. 4. By the impugned order dt. 6.12.83 cognizance of the offe­nce under Section 500 IPC was taken and Criminal (Complaint) case No, 787 of 1983 was registered and summons issued and the petitioners surrendered in response thereto. Hence this petition. 5. Mr. Th. Priyananda Singh, the learned counsel for the petitioners impugns the order as well as the proceeding on ground that neither the complaint petition nor the statement of the 1st respondent-complainant discloses any offence under Sec. 500 IPC since the petitioners have not made any positive assertion that the 1st respondent is mad or of unsound mind and, as such, the learned Magistrate could not have taken cognizance under S. 500 IPC and the proceeding is, therefore, liable to be qua­shed. He further contends that even assuming, but not admitting that the words were defamatory those would be excepted by the Eighth and Ninth Exceptions of Section 499 IPC and he relies on the decisions in AIR 1963 SC 1317 , AIR 1954 Mad. 741 , AIR 1952 Cal. 228 , AIR 1961 Patna 164, AIR 1938 Mad 904 , AIR 1943 Mad 350 , AIR 1956 All 267 , AIR 1959 Orissa 141 and (1982) I SCC 466. 6. Mr. M. Charugopal, the learned counsel appearing for the 1st respondent, counters submitting that the statements in the petitioners' application are clearly defamatory and were made with a view to defame the 1st respondent and to lower him in the estimation of the public, inasmuch as it described him as senile, of "unsound mind," suffering from mental infirmity, and of unsound mental health. 7. This being an application for setting aside of the impug­ned order and for quashing of the proceeding, the only question is whether the complaint and the initial statement at all disclose the ingredients of the offence punishable under Section 500 IPC. 7. This being an application for setting aside of the impug­ned order and for quashing of the proceeding, the only question is whether the complaint and the initial statement at all disclose the ingredients of the offence punishable under Section 500 IPC. Defamation has been denned in Section 499 IPC as under : "Whoever by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible representations, makes or publi­shes any imputation concerning any person intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such person, is said, except in the cases hereinafter excepted, to defame that person. Eighth Exception-Accusation preferred in good faith to authorised person : It is not defamation to prefer in good faith an accusation against any person to any of those who have lawful authority over that person with respect to the subject-matter of accusation. Ninth Exception-Imputation made in good faith by per­son for protection of his or other's interest : It is not defamation to make an imputation on the character of another provided that the imputation be made in good faith for the protection of the interest of the person making it, or of any other person, or for the public good". According to the 1st respondent the words "Senility (unsound mind) due to his octogenarian age-status", " soundness of his men­tal health", and " mental infirmity" are defamatory. 'Unsound' according to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, when spoken of persons, means not mentally sound or normal, not sane. Unsound ', according to Black's Law Dictionary, " A person of unsound mind is one who from infirmity of mind is incapable of managing himself or his affairs. The term, therefore, includes insane persons, idiots, and imbeciles." Unsound mind comprehends imbecility as well as lunacy or natural alien­ation resulting from disease. Emperor, vs. Husan 5 Bom. 362, Cowsjee vs. Beramjee. 7 Bom. 15, but not weakness of intellect. 4 Cal. L. J. 115. The test of legal insanity is whether the person is inca­pable of understanding the business concerned or its implications. Mere eccentricity is not such an unsoundness of mind as will amount to testamentary incapacity. Pilkington vs. Gray, (1899) A.O. 401 Senile' refers to diseases etc. peculiar to the aged exhibiting weakness of old age. Senility means condition of being senile, old age or infirmity due to old age. Mere eccentricity is not such an unsoundness of mind as will amount to testamentary incapacity. Pilkington vs. Gray, (1899) A.O. 401 Senile' refers to diseases etc. peculiar to the aged exhibiting weakness of old age. Senility means condition of being senile, old age or infirmity due to old age. Infirmity is a condition of being infirm; weakness or want of strength; inability. Mental infirmity would mean mental weakness, feebleness of mind, resulting from same defect, disease or old age. 8. Understood in their different shades of meanings, the above words, under the facts and circumstances of the case, may or may not prove to be defamatory. It cannot be said that the above words could not be defamatory under any circ­umstances. Publication of an imputation of mental infirmity, unsoundness of mind and mental disease with reference to nor­mal persons without having reasonable cause to believe him or them to be so, intending to harm such person/persons would harm his or their reputation. To be excepted under the Eighth Exception one has to prove that the accusation was preferred in good faith to any of those who had lawful authority over that person with respect to the subject matter of accusation. To bring it under the Ninth Exception one has to prove that the imputation was made by him in good faith for protection of his or others interests. Tae essence of the offence of defamation is to be of imputation with knowledge that it will harm the reputation of the person defamed. In imputation when made by words intended to be read it is to be seen whether it was read. In the instant case the petitioners' application bef­ore the SDC was acted upon which implies that it was read and, as such, the imputation was published. There cannot be defamation unless defamatory statement is published or comm­unicated to a third party. In the instant case there is no doubt that the imputation was communicated to the S. D. C. who acted upon it. Mr. Priyananda Singh submits that the petitioners did not make any positive assertion but only expressed their suspicion for which they had reasonable cause in view of the earlier alienation made by the 1st respondent in favour of two deities and a prior civil suit. Mr. Priyananda Singh submits that the petitioners did not make any positive assertion but only expressed their suspicion for which they had reasonable cause in view of the earlier alienation made by the 1st respondent in favour of two deities and a prior civil suit. He further submits that the state­ments were contained in an application made to the S. D.C who was a revenue court who had jurisdiction in the matter of mutation regarding transfer of land and the suspicion was based on good faith in view of the 1st respondent having been of the age of 84 years and, as such, those would squarely be covered by the Eighth and Ninth Exceptions. 9. The point of difference between the Eighth and Ninth Exceptions, as was he'd in Kanwal Lal vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 1317 , is that where is in the former the person to whom the complaint is made must have lawful authority to deal with the subject matter of the complaint and take proceedings against that person, there is no such requirement in Exception Nine where it is sufficient if a communication is made to a person for the protection of one's own interest in which the other also has an interest. In the instant case can it be said that the S. D. C. has lawful authority to deal with the subject matter of the complaint namely, attempt to transfer due to unsoundness of mind and take proceeding in respect there of against the 1st respon­dent to bring it within the Eighth Exception? Was the imputa­tion made in good faith to S.D.C. for protection o the petitioners' own interest in which the 1st respondent also had interest? Imputa­tion ordinarily implies accusation or something more than suspicion. Expression of suspicion for example to police may amount to accusa­tion. To bring a case under the Eighth and Ninth Exceptions, when a person was in lawful authority in case of the former, and good faith and absence of prima facie material for malice must be shown. Exception 9 covers proof of good intention and exercise of care and caution. Good faith implies honest effort to reach truth. Mere subjective belief without objective basis will not be sufficient under the Ninth Exception. Unnecessary aspersion in indicative of want of good faith. Exception 9 covers proof of good intention and exercise of care and caution. Good faith implies honest effort to reach truth. Mere subjective belief without objective basis will not be sufficient under the Ninth Exception. Unnecessary aspersion in indicative of want of good faith. To prove good faith one has to establish that he acted in exercise of due care and attention. As was held in Harbhajan Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1969 SC 97, to prove a case under the Ninth Exception good faith and the protection of the interest of the person making it or of any other person have both to be established. Failure to prove good faith would exclude the application of the Ninth Exception even if the requirement of protection of interest is satisfied. Whether or not good faith has been proved by an accused person who pleads in his defence the Ninth Exception under S. 499 IPC to a charge of defamation under S. 500 IPC is a question of fact. 'Good faith' is denned in S. 52 IPC as also in Sec­tion 3(22) of the General Clauses Act, 1897. In the definition of the Penal Code the element of honesty which is introduced by the definition prescribed by the General Clauses Act, is not introduced. The nature and scope of the onus to prove, which an accused has to discharge in seeking protection of Exception 9 of Section 499 IPC, have been formulated in that case. Evidence has to be led to show that he acted in good faith. It is immaterial whether the truth of the allegation is proved. It must be shown that the impugned statement had a rational basis and was not just a blind simple belief. It is not possible to lay down any rigid test bat the question has to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case. Absence of per­sonal malice may be a relevant fact in dealing with the accused's plea of good faith. The accused will have to show that he acted in good faith in absence of personal malice. 10. For adjudication of this application we have only the complaint and the initial statement. Is it possible to decide whether or not these materials disclose the ingredients of the offence of defamation without more? The accused will have to show that he acted in good faith in absence of personal malice. 10. For adjudication of this application we have only the complaint and the initial statement. Is it possible to decide whether or not these materials disclose the ingredients of the offence of defamation without more? I find it difficult to hold that they do not disclose any of the ingredients without further evidence at this stage. In R.P. Kapur vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866 some of categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction to quash proceedings can and should be exercised, have been stated. Where the allegations in the FIR or in the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and acce­pted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the FIR to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. Where the allegations made against the accused person do constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. In dealing with this class of cases it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where there is legal evidence which on its appreciation may or may not support the accusation. In exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 it is not permissible for the Court to embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. This is the function of the trial Magistrate, and ordinarily it would not be open to any party to invoke the High Court's inherent jurisdiction and contend that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence the accusation made against the accused would not be sustained. This is the function of the trial Magistrate, and ordinarily it would not be open to any party to invoke the High Court's inherent jurisdiction and contend that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence the accusation made against the accused would not be sustained. In Jehan Singh vs. Delhi Administration, AIR 1974 SC 1146 , it has been held that where at the date of filing the petition under Section 561A of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, no charge-sheet or complaint has been laid down in Court and the matter is only at the stage of investigation by Police, the Court cannot, in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 561A, interfere with the statutory powers of the Police to investigate into the alleged offence, and quash the proceedings. Even assuming that the allegations in the FIR are correct and constitute an offence so as to remove the legal bar to institute proceedings in Court, the Court cannot at that stage proprise the evidence collected by Police in their investigation. Any peti­tion under Section 561A at such a stage is, therefore, pre­mature and incompetent. Where it appears that the proceeding is only to harass the accused and there are no materials on record on which any Tribunal could reasonably find the accused guilty, quashing of the proceeding under Section 482 may be justified, as was held in 7977 Cri. L. J. 1125 (SC) and AIR 1977 SC 1489 . As was held in L. V. Jadhav vs. Shankarrao, AIR 1983 SC 1219 : 1983 Cri. L. J. 1501, the inherent powers under Section 482 should be used sparingly and with circums­pection when there is reason to believe that process of law is being misused to harass a citizen. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Ramkishan, AIR 1983 SC 67 , it has been reiterated that the inherent power under Section 482 can be exercised only when no other remedy is available to the litigant and no specific remedy is provided by the statute. Further the power being an extra-ordinary one it has to be exercised sparingly. Both the old Section 561A and the present Section 482 con­fers an independent power on the High Court alone to pass order 'exdebito Justitiae' in cases where grave and substantial injustice has been done and where process of the Court has been seriously abused. Further the power being an extra-ordinary one it has to be exercised sparingly. Both the old Section 561A and the present Section 482 con­fers an independent power on the High Court alone to pass order 'exdebito Justitiae' in cases where grave and substantial injustice has been done and where process of the Court has been seriously abused. It is not merely a revisional power made to be exercised against the orders passed by the subordinate courts. 11. Mr. Charugopal submits that the order taking cognizance and issuing process is an interlocutory order. Besides, according to him, there are sufficient materials for taking cognizance and for issuing of process. This submission is tenable in view of the materials available till that stage. In State of Punjab vs. Devinder Kumar, AIR 1983 SC 545 , the High Court was held to have committed a serious error in quashing the criminal proceedings (food adulteration cases) in different Magistrates Courts at a premature stage in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr. P. C. It was observed that those were not cases where it could be said that there was no legal evidence at all in support of the prosecution. The prosecution had still to lead its evidence. It was neither expe­dient nor possible to arrive at a conclusion at that stage on the basis of the materials before the Court. While there was no doubt that the onus of proving the case was on the pro­secution, it was equally clear that the prosecution should have sufficient opportunity to adduce all available evidence and the High Court should not have interfered at that interlocutory stage. 12. The cases relied on by Mr. Th. Priyananda Singa were cases decided after production of evidence at the trial and, as such, any they be relevant or refer-able' to the trial court but not so to this Court at this stage. Whether there has been defamation will, therefore, depend on the facts and circumsta­nces of the case as proved by evidence before the trial court. At this stage it cannot be held that the materials available at this stage can never disclose the ingredients of the offence. 13. For the reasons discussed above this petition is found to be without merit and it is accordingly dismissed. The Rule is discharged. The stay order dated 19.4.84 passed in Criminal Misc. Case No. 2 of 1984 stands vacated. 13. For the reasons discussed above this petition is found to be without merit and it is accordingly dismissed. The Rule is discharged. The stay order dated 19.4.84 passed in Criminal Misc. Case No. 2 of 1984 stands vacated. Send down the records forthwith. 14. The parties were allowed time for settling the dispute out of Court. They have not done it so far. They may so compound before the trial Court.