JUDGMENT K. P. Singh. J. 1. This is tenant's writ petition arising out of an application under Section 21-A of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 for release of shop No. 45/1 situate in Moti Bazar Hathras, District Aligarh. 2. The landlady, opposite party No. 3 in the present writ petition, wants release of the shop in question on the ground that her son Radhey Shyam did not take interest in the studies and wanted to start a general merchandise business hence the necessity for the shop in question. She had also alleged that her another son Sita Ram also did not pursue his studies and wanted to establish himself in the business in the books, hence a separate release application against the other tenants had been filed. According to the landlady the tenant petitioner had four more shops hence he was not to suffer any hardship and the release application deserved to be allowed. The tenant petitioner contested the release application on the ground that Radhey Shyam was a boy of bad habit and he really did not need any shop for business and that the .income of the landlady and her husband was enough to support the family and that the husband of the land lady demanded higher rent hence the application for release on incorrect facts. 3. The Prescribed Authority through its judgment dated 25-9-81 rejected the release application on the finding that the need of the landlady was not bonafide. Aggrieved by the judgment of Prescribed Authority the landlady had preferred an appeal which was allowed by the lower appellate court through its judgment dated 28-5-1982. Against the judgment of the lower appellate court the tenant petitioner has approached this court under Article 226 of Constitution. 4-a. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended before me that during the pendency of the writ petition the landlady has succeeded in getting the shops released and since she has got possession over two shops and subsequent events during the pendency of the writ petition can be taken into account, the impugned judgment of the appellate court should be quashed and the appellate court should be asked to reconsider the claim of the petitioner. 4. 4. The second contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that the appellate court has failed to compare the needs of the tenant and that of the landlady in accordance with law and the rulings of this Court, hence its judgment should be quashed and the appellate court should be asked to redetermine the question strictly in accordance with law. The third contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that the lower appellate court has failed to consider the provisions of Rule 16 (2) (b) of the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 and has also failed to meet the relevant reasonings and findings of the Trial Court while reversing the judgment of the Prescribed Authority, hence fits judgment suffers from patent error of law and deserves to be quashed. 5. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite party has submitted in reply that the lower appellate court has considered the materials before it and has arrived at correct conclusions that the need of the landlady was genuine and bonafide, and that in case of rejection of release application the landlady would suffer greater hardship. Since the findings of the lower appellate court are findings of fact based on evidence on record, they do not require any interference by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution; 6. The second submission made on behalf of the contesting opposite party is that the tenant has failed to lead necessary evidence to demonstrate that he would suffer greater disadvantage if the release application is allowed. In such a circumstances greater burden cannot be thrown upon the landlady to prove that the tenant would suffer lesser disadvantages. The third submission made on behalf of the landlady is that the lower appellate court has indicated that the defendant-petitioner had other shops where he could shift his business, hence the impugned judgment should not be quashed. 7. The learned counsel for the opposite party has cited the rulings reported in Amir Ullah v. Illrd Additional District Judge, Pilibhit, 1979 ARC 204, Ramesh Chand v. Madan Lal, 1982 ARC 196, Lachman Swarup v. II Addl. District Judge, Muzaffarnagar, 1983 ARC 516, Karan Singh v. 1st Addl. 7. The learned counsel for the opposite party has cited the rulings reported in Amir Ullah v. Illrd Additional District Judge, Pilibhit, 1979 ARC 204, Ramesh Chand v. Madan Lal, 1982 ARC 196, Lachman Swarup v. II Addl. District Judge, Muzaffarnagar, 1983 ARC 516, Karan Singh v. 1st Addl. District and Secs Judge, 1978 ACJ 117 and other rulings to justify the submissions that the need of the landlady was rightly found as bonafide by the lower appellate court He has also invited my attention to the rulings reported in Chiranji Lal v. Vlth Addl. District Judge, Meerut, 1978 ARC 544, Mst. Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahad Khan, 1979 SC 272 and Sanwal Das Bans v. Ill Additional District Judge, Faizabad, 1982 ARC 24 to emphasise his submissions that the tenant petitioner had alternative accomodation and that he had failed to lead any evidence that he would suffer greater disadvantages hence the finding recorded by the lower appellate court on the question of hardship should be accepted. 8. It has also been emphasised that when the tenant petitioner has failed to lead necessary evidence, an adverse inference should be drawn against him and in this connection the ruling reported in Megh Raj Kapur v. Vth Additions Sessions Judge, Kanpur, 1979 UP RCC 124. I have noted the submissions made by the counsel for the parties and referred the cases cited at the bar. I have examined the contentions raised by the counsel for the parties and I have gone through the judgments attached with the writ petition. In my opinion the finding recorded by the lower appellate court while considering the question of hardship between the landlady and the tenant is not happy. The lower appellate court has expressed itself as below: "Thus from the consideration of the documentary and oral evidence the irresistible conclusion would be that the landlady Smt. Kamla Devi had a better genuine need as compared to the need of Ved Prakash tenant. Further the comparative greater hardship would also be suffered by the landlady as her son Radhey Shyam was sitting unemployed, and she required the shop to settle her son. At the last the tenant would be required to pay the more rent to occupy another shop on rent in the town of Hathras. Therefore, the comparative hardship would be caused to the landlady and not to the tenant. At the last the tenant would be required to pay the more rent to occupy another shop on rent in the town of Hathras. Therefore, the comparative hardship would be caused to the landlady and not to the tenant. Learned Prescribed Authority had erred in rejecting the release application for release of the disputed shop no. 45/1". 9. It is well known by now that subsequent events can be taken into account which have come into existence during the pendency of the writ petition in this Hon'ble Court. In the present case it has not been disputed that during the pendency of the writ petition the landlady opposite party has got possession over the shop in possession of one Baij Nath. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite party has suggested that the aforesaid shop in possession of Baij Nath was needed for the need of the landlady's son named Sita Ram. It has also come to my notice that the accommodation in possession of one Hamid was also released in favour of the landlady opposite party no. 3 in the present writ petition. The suggestion of the learned counsel for the contesting opposite party that those accommodations were needed for Sita Ram another son of the landlady, hence the subsequent events relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner would not affect the finding recorded by the lower appellate court. I think that the suggestion made by the learned counsel for the contesting opposite party is not quite correct. IT needs investigation by the appellate court while determining the question of hardship between the tenant petitioner and the landlady opposite party no. 3 in the present case. If the landlady succeeded in getting two accommodations during the pendency of the release application giving rise to the present writ petition, their effect should be considered by the lower appellate court while determining the question of hardship between the tenant petitioner and the landlady opposite party. 10. In the circumstances of the present case after hearing the counsel for the parties I find that the need of the landlady is no doubt bonafide, and the finding recorded by the lower appellate court does not suffer from any manifest error of law. 10. In the circumstances of the present case after hearing the counsel for the parties I find that the need of the landlady is no doubt bonafide, and the finding recorded by the lower appellate court does not suffer from any manifest error of law. Even if the lower appellate court has not considered the petitioner's affidavit or it has wrongly observed here that that would not affect its ultimate conclusion because there are other materials to uphold the finding of lower appellate court on the question of landlady's bonafide need. In law the landlady would succeed only when she is likely to suffer greater hardship in case of rejection of her application ;for release, then the hardship of the tenant which might occur in case of allowing the release application. No doubt the lower appellate court has observed as below: ".........Therefore, there was sufficient alternative accommodation with the tenant respondent Ved Prakash to shift his business from shop no. 45/1 in question. Besides that Ved Prakash could arrange some other shop in this vicinity for his sons Suresh Pal and Prem Pal to carry their shoe business. " 11. According to rule 16 (2) (b) of the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 it is necessary for the court of fact to record a finding that the tenant could shift his business without substantial loss, 12. In the present case there is no categorical finding that the tenant petitioner could shift his business without substantial loss. This aspect of the matter appears to have escaped notice from the lower appellate court. Due to the circumstances that the landlady has got possession over the two accommodations during the pendency of the release application giving rise to the present writ petition and its effect has not been considered by the court while determining the question of hardship between the landlady and the tenant. I think that its judgment deserves to be quashed The ends of justice demand that the lower appellate court be asked to compare the needs of the tenant and the landlady again in the light of the subsequent events coming into existence during the pendency of the writ petition as well as in the light of the provisions of Rule 16 (a) (b) of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972. 13. 13. In view of my above-conclusions it is not necessary to deal with the cases cited by the bar and other contentions raised on behalf of the parties. The parties shall be free to canvass their points before the appellate court when the case goes before it hereafter. 14. In the result the writ petition succeeds and the impugned judgment of the lower appellate court dated 28-5-82 is hereby quashed and the appellate court is directed to re-examine the question of hardship between the landlady and the tenant in the light of the observations made above in this judgment. Parties are directed to bear their own costs. Petition allowed.