JUDGMENT K. P. Singh, J. 1. This is a tenant's writ petition arising out of proceedings under Section 21 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972) and it has been directed against the judgment of the 4th Additional District and Sessions Judge, Kanpur, dated 5-9-1981 in Rent Appeal No. 337 of 1980 Bansbidbar Pal and three others v. Mohammad Yaqub. 2. Brief facts giving rise to the present writ petition are that the contesting opposite parties Banshidhar Pal and others wanted the release of the shop in occupation of the petitioner as tenant on the ground that Surya Prakash and Gyani Prakash have not taken interest in studies and they have stopped their studies, hence the necessity arose for setting them in a business, therefore, the contesting opposite parties needed the shop in occupation of the tenant-petitioner and filed an application ;for release of the shop under Section 21 (1) (a) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The tenant-petitioner contested the claim of the contesting opposite parties on the allegations that the need of the landlord was not genuine and bonafide and that they wanted the shop only with a view to let out the same on enhanced rent and various other pleas were taken as is evident from Annexure I-A attached with the writ petition. It has been emphasized that the tenant-petitioner has been doing hair cutting business in the aforesaid shop and that the hair-cutting business is the only source of their livelihood. It was also suggested that the landlord had let out some other shop recently, hence the need of the landlord was not genuine and bonafide. It was also pleaded that the tenant-petitioner had a large number of dependents and that he was doing business in the shop in question since the year 19S4 and that if he was evicted it would work greater hardship upon the tenant petitioner. 3. The prescribed authority in its order dated 9-9-1980 did not accept the claim of the landlord regarding the genuine and bonafide need of the shop in question and also found that the tenant-petitioner would suffer greater hardship in case of eviction. Therefore, be rejected the application of the landlord (see Annexure II attached with the writ petition). 4. 3. The prescribed authority in its order dated 9-9-1980 did not accept the claim of the landlord regarding the genuine and bonafide need of the shop in question and also found that the tenant-petitioner would suffer greater hardship in case of eviction. Therefore, be rejected the application of the landlord (see Annexure II attached with the writ petition). 4. Aggrieved by the judgment of the prescribed authority, the landlord preferred an appeal which has been allowed by the appellate court through its judgment dated 5-9-1980. Against the judgment of the appellate court the petitioner has approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended before me that the findings recorded by the lower appellate court are based on surmises and conjectures and that the lower appellate court has failed to consider the hardship of the tenant-petitioner in the light of the allegations and evidence on record, hence its judgment suffers from patent error of law and deserves to be quashed. 6. It was also contended that the landlord had let out several shops to other persons, hence the finding of the lower appellate court about genuine and bonafide need regarding the shop in question also stands vitiated in law and deserves to be quashed. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite party has submitted in reply that the findings of fact recorded by the lower appellate court do not suffer from any patent error of law, hence they are immune from being challenged in writ jurisdiction. According to the learned counsel for the opposite party, the lower appellate court has applied its mind to the allegations in the pleadings and evidence on record and it has arrived at conclusions which even erroneous, cannot be interfered with by this court in the exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. According to him the finding recorded by the lower appellate court cannot be termed as perverse or unreasonable or without basis in evidence, hence he supported the impugned judgment and suggested that the same could not be interfered with. 7. I have considered the contentions raised on behalf of the parties and I have gone through the judgments of the courts below. In my opinion, the lower appellate court has arrived at a correct conclusion about the need of the landlord being bonafide in the circumstances of the present case. 7. I have considered the contentions raised on behalf of the parties and I have gone through the judgments of the courts below. In my opinion, the lower appellate court has arrived at a correct conclusion about the need of the landlord being bonafide in the circumstances of the present case. The learned counsel for the petitioner invited my attention to the findings recorded by the prescribed authority and contended that the landlord had let out some of the shops to different persons, hence the findings recorded by the lower appellate court suffered from patent error of law. The lower appellate court has discussed the relevant circumstances and evidence on record as is evident from the discussion in paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 of the impugned judgment. The learned counsel for the petitioner has failed to satisfy me that different shops were let out by the landlord after the necessity for the shop in question arose to them. On materials on record, I am not prepared to hold that the lower appellate court has patently erred in arriving at the conclusion that need of the landlord was genuine and bonafide. 8. As regards the contention that the lower appellate court has failed to consider the hardship of the tenant petitioner in the light of the allegations and evidence led by the petitioner, it is proper to quote the findings recorded by prescribed authority as below :- The lower appellate court in paragraph 11 of its judgment has observed as below :- "Tenant Mohd. Yaqub denies that he carries on his profession of barber as a hawker, even if it is held that he carries on his profession regularly in the shop itself, he can take another shop for that purpose if additional accommodation is required by both the landlords and tenant, the tenant should seek some other shop as the landlord cannot get another accommodation on tenancy. Moreover, the profession of a barber can be carried on even as a hawker whereas the propsed business of Surya Prakash can be carried on only in a shop. Considering all these facts I am of the view that the need of the landlords is greater than that of the tenant". 9. The lower appellate court has not examined the question of hardship to be sustained by the tenant petitioner in the light of his allegations and evidence on record. Considering all these facts I am of the view that the need of the landlords is greater than that of the tenant". 9. The lower appellate court has not examined the question of hardship to be sustained by the tenant petitioner in the light of his allegations and evidence on record. It has failed to meet the reasoning of the prescribed authority categorically. 10. Rule 16 (2) (a) of U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972 reads as below :- "While considering an application for release under clause (a) of subsection (1) of section 21 in respect of a building let out for purposes of any business the prescribed authority shall also have regard to such facts as the following J- (a) the greater the period since when the tenant opposite party, or the original tenant whose heir the opposite party Is, has been carrying on his business in that building, the less the justification for allowing the application." In 1982 ARC 440 (SC) Bishan Chand v. Vth Addl. District Judge, Bulandshahr their Lordships of the Supreme Court have made the following observation .........Apart from this, it does appear that Rule 16 (2) of U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972 has not been considered at all by the appellate court. Such an order has been confirmed by the High Court. We, therefore, set aside the High Court's order and send the case back to the District Judge for disposal of the appeal in accordance with law with a direction to consider the question of comparative hardship in the light of the aforesaid Rule 16 (2)." 11. In the present case the tenant petitioner has been doing business in the shop in question since the year 1954 and this aspect of the matter has- not been taken into account by the lower appellate court in its impugned judgment, hence its judgment suffers from patent error of law, The ends of justice demand that the impugned judgment of the appellate court dated 5-9-1981 in Rent Appeal No. 337 of 1980 Banshidhar Pal v. Mohammad Yaqub be quashed and the appellate court be directed to redetermine the question of hardship in the light of the Rule and the ruling mentioned above. 12. 12. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and the impugned judgment of the appellate court contained in Annexure III is hereby quashed and the appellate court is directed to determine the question of hardship between the landlord and the tenant in the light of the observations made above. Parties are directed to bear their own costs.