JUDGMENT J. N. Dubey, J. - This writ petition has been filed for quashing arbitration proceedings pending before the Deputy Registrar (Central) Co-operative Societies, Lucknow under section 70 of the U.P. Co-operative Societies Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The petitioner took a loan of Rs. 16,000/- from the U.P. Cooperative Bank Limited, Lucknow (hereinafter referred to as the Bank) on 27th October, 1960. Subsequently there arose some dispute regarding repayment of the loan and as such the matter was referred to arbitrator under section 70 of the Act on 20-5-1966. The arbitrator gave his award on 30th November, 1966 for a sum of Rs. 15,949-76 against the petitioner and his surety. However, the award was not executed and at the instance of the Bank the matter was again referred to the arbitrator on 20th June, 1975. The petitioner has come up to this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the second arbitration proceedings. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the dispute between the parties was finally adjudicated upon by the arbitrator on 30th November, 1966 and the second arbitration proceedings with respect to the same dispute were barred by the principle of res judicata. On the other hand, learned counsel for the opposite parties contended that as the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to the arbitration proceedings, the question of second arbitration proceedings being barred by the principle of res judicata did not arise. It is true that Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to the arbitration proceedings and as such principle of res judicata as contained in section 11 thereof have no application. However, in our opinion, second arbitration proceedings between the same parties on the same matter in controversy are barred by the general principle of res judicata. It is true that Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to the arbitration proceedings and as such principle of res judicata as contained in section 11 thereof have no application. However, in our opinion, second arbitration proceedings between the same parties on the same matter in controversy are barred by the general principle of res judicata. It is now well settled that the provisions of section 11 C.P.C. are not exhaustive with respect to an earlier decision operating as res judicata between the same parties on the same matter in controversy in a subsequent suit or proceedings, on general principles of res judicata, any previous decision on a matter in controversy, decided after full contest or after affording fair opportunity to the parties to prove their case by a Court competent to decide it, will operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit or proceeding. In Ram Kripal Shukul v. Mussumat Rup Kauri (XI Indian Appeal No. 37), the Privy Council held :- "The matter decided by Mr. Probyn was not decided in a former suit, but in a proceeding of which the application in which the orders reversed by the High Court were made was merely a continuation. It was as binding between the parties and those claiming under them as an interlocutory judgment in a suit is binding upon the parties in every proceeding in that suit, or as a final judgment in a suit is binding upon them in carrying the judgment into execution. The binding force of such a judgment depends not upon section 13, Act X, of 1877, but upon general principals of law. If it were not binding there would be no end to litigation." The decision in Ram Kripal Shukul v. Mussumat Rup Kaur (supra) was followed by the Privy Council in Sheoparsan Singh and others v. Ramnandan Prasad Narayan Singh and others (AIR 1916 PC 78), G. H. Hook v. Administrator General of Bengal and others (AIR 1921 PC 11), T.B. Ramchandra Rao and another v. A.N.S. Ramchandra Rao and others (AIR 1922 PC 80), Kalipada Deo and others v. Dwijapada Dass and others (AIR 1930 PC 22) and Mt. Bhagwati v. Ram Kali (AIR 1939 SC 133) to hold that earlier decisions in probate, administration and land acquisition proceedings etc. would operate res judicata in a subsequent suit with respect to the rights of the parties. Bhagwati v. Ram Kali (AIR 1939 SC 133) to hold that earlier decisions in probate, administration and land acquisition proceedings etc. would operate res judicata in a subsequent suit with respect to the rights of the parties. The question of applicability of the general principles of res judicata was considered by the Supreme Court in Srimati Raj Lakshmi Dasi and others v. Banamali Sen and others ( AIR 1953 SC 33 ). The Supreme Court approved the decisions of Privy Council in G. H. Hook v. Administrator General of Bengal and others, T.B. Ram Chandra Rao and another v. A.N.S. Ram Chandra Rao and others and Mt. Bhagwati v. Ram Kali (supra) and held that the previous decision in land acquisition proceedings will operate as res judicata in the subsequent suits between the parties. In M. S. M. Sharma v. Dr. Shree Krishna Sinha and others ( AIR 1960 SC 1186 ), the Supreme Court applying the principle of res judicata in writ petitions under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution observed :- "This Court has laid it down in the case of 1953 SCR ( AIR 1953 SC 33 ) that the principle underlying res judicata is applicable in respect of a question which has been raised and decided after full contest, even though the first Tribunal which decided the matter may have no jurisdiction to try the subsequent suit and even though the subject-matter of the dispute was not exactly the same in the two proceedings. In that case the rule of res judicata was applied to litigation in land acquisition proceedings. In that case the general principles of law bearing on the rule of res judicata, and not the provisions of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, were applied to the case. The rule of res judicata is meant to give finality to a decision arrived at after due contest and after hearing the parties interested in the controversy." The Supreme Court again examined the question of applicability of the principle of general res judicata in Daryao and others v. State of U.P. and others ( AIR 1961 SC 1457 ) and held as under : "But, is the rule of res judicata merely a technical rule or is it based on high public policy ? If the rule of res judicata itself embodies a principle of public policy which in turn is an essential part of the rule of law then the objection that the rule cannot be invoked where fundamental rights are in question may lose much of its validity. Now, the rule of res judicata as indicated in Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure has no doubt some technical aspects, for instance, the rule of constructive res judicata may be said to be technical; but the basis on which the said rule rests is founded on considerations of public policy. It is in the interest of public at large that a finality should attach to the binding decisions pronounced by Courts of competent jurisdiction, and it is also in the public interest the individuals should not be vexed twice over with the same kind of litigation. If these two principles form the foundation of the general rule of res judicata they cannot be treated as irrelevant or inadmissible even in dealing with fundamental rights in petitions filed under Article 32. If a judgment has been pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction it is binding between the parties unless it is reversed or modified by appeal, revision or other procedure prescribed by law. Therefore, if a judgment has been pronounced by the High Court in a writ petition filed by a party rejecting his prayer for the issue of an appropriate writ on the ground either that he had no fundamental right as pleaded by him or there has been no contravention of the right proved or that the contravention is justified by the Constitution itself, it must remain binding between the parties unless it is attacked by adopting the procedure prescribed by the Constitution itself. The binding character of judgments pronounced by courts of competent jurisdiction is itself an essential part of the rule of law, and the rule of law obviously is the basis of the administration of justice on which the Constitution lays so much emphasis." In L. Janakirama Iyer and others v. P.M. Nilakanta Iyer and others ( AIR 1962 SC 633 ), however, the Supreme Court observed :- "Where section 11 is thus inapplicable it would not be permissible to rely upon the general doctrine of res judicata. We are dealing with a suit and the only ground on which res judicata can be urged against such a suit can be the provisions of section 11 and no other.". In Devilal Modi v. Sales Tax Officer, Ratlam and others ( AIR 1965 SC 1150 ) and Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh v. State of Gujarat ( AIR 1965 SC 1153 ), the Supreme Court explained its earlier decision in L. Janakirama Iyer and others v. P.M. Nilakanta Iyer and others (supra) and held :- "... We are of opinion that the provisions of section 11, C.P.C. are not exhaustive with respect to an earlier decision operating as res judicata between the same parties on the same matter in controversy in a subsequent regular suit and that on the general principle of res judicata, any previous decision on a matter in controversy, decided after full contest or after affording fair opportunity to the parties to prove their case by a Court competent to decide it, will operate as res judicata in a subsequent regular suit. It is not necessary that the Court deciding the matter formerly be competent to decide the subsequent suit or that the former proceeding and the subsequent suit have the same subject-matter. The nature of the former proceeding is immaterial." In Jodhan V. Board of Revenue U.P. Allahabad ( AIR 1967 All. 442 ) a Division Bench of this Court considering the effect of the two decisions of the Supreme Court in Daryao and others v. State of U.P. and others and L. Janakirama Iyer and others v. P.M. Nilakanta Iyer and others (supra) held - "Section 11 C.P.C. is applicable only to cases where both the earlier proceeding and the later proceeding and which is said to be barred by the earlier one are civil suits, whereas in other cases, in which neither of the two proceedings or only one of them is a civil suit, the general doctrine of res judicata, short of the limitation imposed by section 11, is to be applied.". In Govindan Gopalan v. Raman Gopalan (AIR 1978 Kerala 217) a Full Bench of Kerala High Court held - "The result is that the decision of the Land Tribunal as to the existence of a tenancy will be res judicata in a subsequent civil suit or proceedings and will be a bar for a further decision on the same point by the Land Tribunal or a court in a subsequent suit or proceedings.". In Seth Kerorimall v. Union of India (AIR 1964 Calcutta 545) and Jiwanani Engineering Works Private Ltd. v. Union of India (AIR 1978 Calcutta 228), the Calcutta High Court held :- "... the same dispute once referred and embodied in an award could not be subject-matter of a fresh reference and to that extent rule of res judicata applied to arbitration proceeding." In this view of the matter the first application award dated 30-11-1966 will clearly operate as bar in the second arbitration proceedings. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The second arbitration proceedings in Arbitration Case No. 133 of 1975 pending before the Deputy Registrar (Central) Co-operative Societies, Lucknow are quashed. The petitioner shall be entitled to his costs. Petition allowed.