JUDGMENT S.C. Mathur J. (Agreeing with K.N. Goyal, J.) - The present petition is directed against the posting of Sri. P. K. Misra, respondent 2 (for short Misra), a member of the Provincial Civil Service of the State of U.P., as Chief General Manager in the Hindustan Commercial Bank Limited, a private Banking Company, respondent 3, (for short Bank), on deputation. The facts about which there is practically no dispute may now be stated. 2. The first petitioner, namely, U.P. Bank Employees Union (for short Union) is a registered Trade Union and the second petitioner Sri Har Mangal Prasad (for short Prasad) is Assistant General Secretary of the said Union's State Unit. Prasad was working in the Meston Road Branch Office of the Bank at Kanpur. He is also a share-holder in the Bank. The Bank is a non-nationalised Banking Company in which the State of U.P. does not hold any share. The banking operations of the Bank are regulated by the provisions of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. The Reserve Bank of India which has effective control in respect of the functioning of the Bank has its nominee on the Board of Directors of the Bank. The Bank had 134 branches in the entire country out of which 72 branches were located in the State of U.P. On 26th August, 1981 the Board of Directors of the Bank adopted a resolution that the Government of the State of U.P. be requested to spare the services of Misra so that he could be appointed on deputation as Chief General Manager in the Bank. It was stated in the resolution that this would be in public interest as with the background of his job experience in the State Government he would be in a position to tactfully seek co-operation from all the Banks in Uttar Pradesh, nationalised as well as no-nationalised, Reserve Bank of India, and the State and Central Governments, for achieving all round growth in the Bank's activities. At this time Misra was posted in the State Government as Deputy Secretary and Deputy Director Institutional Finance. A copy of this resolution is annexure A-2 to the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State of Uttar Pradesh. In pursuance of this resolution Sri. At this time Misra was posted in the State Government as Deputy Secretary and Deputy Director Institutional Finance. A copy of this resolution is annexure A-2 to the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State of Uttar Pradesh. In pursuance of this resolution Sri. M. D. Dalai, Chairman of the Bank, wrote to the then Chief Secretary Sri Tribhuwan Prasad, on 7-9-1981, requesting him that favourable orders for Misra's deputation may be passed. A copy of the resolution was also attached to this letter. Relevant portion from the resolution was also reproduced in para 2 of the letter. A copy of this letter is Annexure-A-2 to the States counter-affidavit. The request of the Bank was processed at different levels in the State Government and finally the Chief Secretary, Minister of State for Appointment, Finance Minister and the Chief Minister concurred with the view that it will be in the interest of the State and in public interest if an officer of the State was sent on deputation to the Bank as requested. In paragraph 9 of the writ petition the petitioners have stated that they have definite information that States Appointment Secretary and Special Secretary Finance opposed the deputation of Misra and expressed the opinion that such appointment will not be in public interest besides being illegal. They are also alleged to have stated that such a deputation was unheard of in the history of the State. In other words, they stated that there was no precedent for such a deputation.The averments made in paragraph 9 of the writ petition have been replied to through paragraph 9 of the States counter-affidavit. In the counter affidavit there is no denial of the fact that the Appointment of Secretary and the Special Secretary opposed the deputation of Misra to the Bank. Therefore, it may be accepted that the two officers opposed the request of the Bank for Misra being relieved from State Service for being appointed as Chief General Manager in the Bank. In paragraph 9 of the writ petition it has also been stated that to the objection raised by the Appointment of Secretary and the Special Secretary Finance that there was no precedent for such a deputation, the State Minister Sri Rajendra Tripathi observed that examples are created by making examples. In paragraph 9 of the writ petition it has also been stated that to the objection raised by the Appointment of Secretary and the Special Secretary Finance that there was no precedent for such a deputation, the State Minister Sri Rajendra Tripathi observed that examples are created by making examples. It has also been alleged that Misra got his appointment made, on account of the favour expressed by Sri Tripathi. Then it is alleged that the order of deputation was passed on extraneous considerations. In paragraph 9 of the States counter-affidavit it has been stated that there is nothing on record to substantiate the petitioners plea that Sri Rajendra Tripathi made the observations attributed to him. Thus it is denied that the order of deputation is passed on extraneous considerations. On 10-2-1983 a D.O., was issued on behalf of the State Government by Sri Babu Lal Singh, Joint Secretary in Appointment (2) Department placing Misra on deputation with the Bank. This deputation was for a period of one year. A copy of this D. O. letter has been annexed as Annexure A-3 to the State, counter-affidavit. Thereafter on 1-3-1982 Misra joined the Bank as Chief General Manager. On 21-5-1982 Government Order was issued containing the terms and conditions of Misras deputation. A copy of this Government Order has been annexed as Annexure A-4 to the States counter-affidavit. When the period of one year was due to expire, the State Government extended the deputation for another period of two years by its order dated 25-2-1983. These facts are enough for deciding the legal questions which have arisen for determination. 3. The petitioners contend - (1) the deputation of Misra with the Bank is contrary to the provisions of Fundamental Rule 111 and consequently Misra has no right to hold the post of Chief General Manager. It is alleged that the decision to send Misra on deputation to the Bank was not taken on the basis of the requirements of Fundamental Rule 111 (a) but on extraneous considerations. It is alleged that the decision to send Misra on deputation to the Bank was not taken on the basis of the requirements of Fundamental Rule 111 (a) but on extraneous considerations. According to the petitioners Fundamental Rule 111 (a) requires objective consideration regarding the Public reason for which alone a Government servant may be sent on deputation but in the present case such objective consideration was not made; (2) in appointing Misra as, Chief General Manager in the Bank, requirements of Section 35-B (i) (b) of the Banking Regulation Act 1949 were not complied with and, therefore, his appointment is invalid. It is pleaded that under the provision approval of the Reserve Bank of India was required to be taken which was admittedly not taken. The provision is-claimed to be mandatory; (3) petitioner No. 1 claims that it has locus standi to maintain the petition as it represents the workers of the Bank who are vitally interested in seeing that the Bank is not managed by an unauthorised person and also in seeing that the Bank does not do anything which may expose it to action by the Reserve Bank of India; (4) petitioner No. 2 claims that he has locus standi to maintain the writ petition as he is a share-holder in the Bank. 4. All the three respondents, namely, the State of Uttar Pradesh, Sri P.K. Misra and the Hindustan Commercial Bank Limited have contested the writ petition and filed separate counter-affidavit. They have also engaged separate Advocates to represent them in the writ petition. Apart from asserting that the deputation of Misra does not contravene the provision of Fundamental Rule 111 and the Banking Regulation Act, they submit that the matter is purely administrative in nature and, therefore, is not justiciable. They further plead that neither of the petitioners has locus standi to challenge the deputation of Misra and his appointment as Chief General Manager in the Bank. 5. The petition came up for hearing before a Division Bench composed of U. C. Srivastava and K. N. Goyal, JJ. They differed on material legal issues arising in the case and also on the ultimate result of the writ petition. While U.C. Srivastava, J., was of the opinion that the writ petition deserved to be allowed. K. N. Goyal, J. came to the conclusion that it was liable to be dismissed. They differed on material legal issues arising in the case and also on the ultimate result of the writ petition. While U.C. Srivastava, J., was of the opinion that the writ petition deserved to be allowed. K. N. Goyal, J. came to the conclusion that it was liable to be dismissed. In view of the difference of opinion between the two learned Judges, Hon'ble the Chief Justice nominated me as the Third Judge. This is how the matter has come up before me. 6. I have heard Sri P. K. Khare learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri Brijesh Kumar, Sri G. K. Mehrotra and Sri P.N. Mathur appearing respectively for the State of U. P., Sri P. K. Misra and the Bank. 7. Before taking up the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties may briefly indicate the opinions expressed by the two learned Judges. U. C. Srivastava, J., was of the opinion that the petitioners had locus standi to maintain the writ petition. According to him the complaint of the petitioner was against a legal wrong done to the employees of the Bank as a whole and a Trade Union being the custodian of the rights, interest and welfare of the workers, whom it represents, is entitled to bring action under Article 226 of the Constitution. According to the learned Judge the impugned action affected the qualitative interest of the share-holders also and, therefore, petitioner No. 2 as a share-holder also had the right to maintain the petition. In coming to this conclusion the learned Judge relied upon these authorities:- 1. Gadde Venkateswara Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1966 SC 828 . 2. Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 564 ; 3. Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmad, AIR 1976 SC 578 ; 4. Akhil Bhartiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 298 : (1980 Lab IC 1325); 5. Fertilizer Corporation Kamagar Union v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 344 : (1980 Lab IC 1367); 6. S.P. Gupta v. President of India, AIR 1982 SC 149 : 1981 (Supp) SCC 87. 7. People's Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India, (1982) 3 SCC 235 : (1982 Lab IC 1646). Fertilizer Corporation Kamagar Union v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 344 : (1980 Lab IC 1367); 6. S.P. Gupta v. President of India, AIR 1982 SC 149 : 1981 (Supp) SCC 87. 7. People's Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India, (1982) 3 SCC 235 : (1982 Lab IC 1646). In regard to the petitioners grievance that the appointment of Misra was in violation of Section 35-B of the Banking Regulation Act, the learned Judge held that Chief General Manager was also a Manager within the meaning of the said section and, therefore, approval of the Reserve Bank was required for Misra's appointment in the Bank. According to the learned Judge since approval was admittedly not taken, Misra's appointment as Chief General Manager in the Bank was illegal and invalid and was, therefore, liable to be quashed. It was then held that a Government servant could be sent on deputation to a commercial concern but the deputation must be based on objective considerations and not subjective considerations. It was further held that the dispute was justiciable and was not beyond the jurisdiction of the Courts. The learned Judge observed that the State Government had not produced the records to substantiate that the decision to send Misra on deputation was taken on objective considerations and that it was in public interest to lend him to the Bank. The learned Judge, therefore came to the conclusion that the decision to send Misra on deputation was based on extraneous considerations. As a corollary it was held that the conditions prescribed in Fundamental Rule 111 for sending a public servant on deputation to a foreign service were not fulfilled and, therefore, the deputation of Misra was violative of Fundamental Rule 111. It was then held that further extension of the period of deputation by two years was illegal inasmuch as there was no evidence to indicate that the State Government considered the question that services of Misra were needed for a further period of two years for consolidating the gains achieved in one year. After recording these findings U. C. Srivastava, J., observed that the plea of public interest and public reason was not required to be gone into. 8. As against the above findings of U. C. Srivastava, J., K. N. Goyal, J., held that the petitioners had no locus standi to maintain the writ petition. After recording these findings U. C. Srivastava, J., observed that the plea of public interest and public reason was not required to be gone into. 8. As against the above findings of U. C. Srivastava, J., K. N. Goyal, J., held that the petitioners had no locus standi to maintain the writ petition. The learned Judge observed that workers could not insist on the management being conducted by a person of their choice just as the management could not insist that the workers shall be represented by a person of their choice. The learned Judge negatived the right claimed by petitioner No. 2. In recording the finding on the question of locus standi the learned Judge has referred to most of the' decisions referred to by U. C. Srivastava, J., and has distinguished them wherever necessary. It was observed that it was not necessary to decide the question whether Section 35-B (1) (b) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 was attracted or not. The learned Judge was of the opinion that even if approval from the Reserve Bank was required, it was to be obtained by the Bank and on account of this failure on the part of the Bank the State Governments order of deputation could not be faulted. It was then observed that the post of Chief General Manager was not a public post and, therefore, neither a writ of quo warranto could be issued nor it had in fact been claimed and, therefore, appointment of Misra by the Bank as Chief General Manager was not open to challenge. Regarding the petitioners plea of violation of Fundamental Rule 111, K. N. Goyal, J., observed that its violation could not be challenged by the petitioners and that if at all it could be challenged by the Government servant concerned or by any other persons in Government service who could be a rival of the Government servant for whose benefit the order has been passed. It was observed that it was not open to person outside Government service to challenge the validity of the deputation order passed under the Fundamental Rule 111. 9. I will first take up the petitioners' plea of violation of Fundamental Rule 111 (a). Fundamental Rule 111 (a):- 10. Service on deputation in administrative jargon is known as `foreign service'. Rules regarding foreign service are contained in Chapter II of the Financial Hand Book Vol. 9. I will first take up the petitioners' plea of violation of Fundamental Rule 111 (a). Fundamental Rule 111 (a):- 10. Service on deputation in administrative jargon is known as `foreign service'. Rules regarding foreign service are contained in Chapter II of the Financial Hand Book Vol. II Parts II to IV issued by the Authority of the Government of U.P. The rules contained in this Chapter are called Fundamental Rules. Rule 110 (a) says that no Government servant may be transferred to foreign service against his will. The rule is expressed in negative terms and it places restriction on the right of the Government to transfer a Government servant outside the service of the Government. The proviso, however, relieves the rigor of Clause (a) by providing that the said clause will not be applicable when the transfer is made to a body which is wholly or substantially owned or controlled by the Government. It is in pursuance of this power that the State Government sends its officers to public Sector Undertakings and Statutory Bodies like the Municipal Corporation and the Municipal Board. The rule does not contain any restriction against transfer of a Government servant to a private body, institution or undertaking. Clause (a) of Fundamental Rule 111 provides guidelines as to when the Government servant may be transferred to a foreign service. It says:- "A transfer to foreign service is not admissible unless:- (a) the duties to be performed after the transfer are such as should. for public reasons be rendered by a Government servant, and (b) ........................" The above rule also does not debar the Government or its delegate from transferring a Government servant to a private body, undertaking or institution. Below the rule is reproduced the Governors order under Rule 111, para. 2 of which reads as follows : "2. The principles of this rule should be applied most rigorously to a proposal to lend the services of a Government servant to a private undertaking. In general such a loan should be regarded as a very exceptional case requiring special justification". From the above portions of the Governors order it is apparent that a Government servant may be transferred to a private body, institution or undertaking. In general such a loan should be regarded as a very exceptional case requiring special justification". From the above portions of the Governors order it is apparent that a Government servant may be transferred to a private body, institution or undertaking. The condition contained in the Governors order is that the transfer to a private undertaking should be made in very exceptional cases and there should be special justification for such transfer. The combined effect of the provisions contained in Fundamental Rules 110 and 111 and the directions contained in the Governors order may be summarised thus:- (1) A Government servant can be transferred to a body, institution or undertaking, whether incorporate or not, which is wholly or substantially owned or controlled by the Government and for such transfer the consent of the Government Servant concerned is not required; (2) A Government servant may also be transferred to a private body, institution or undertaking but for such transfer his consent will be required; (3) in either case before making the order of transfer the authority concerned will consider whether in the transferred service the Government servant will perform duties which for public reason should be performed by a Government servant; (4) this consideration should be made more rigorously when a Government servant is sought to be transferred to a private undertaking; (5) transfer of a Government servant to a private undertaking should be made very exceptionally and only when special justification exists for such transfer. 11. Now the petitioners allege that the State Government did not apply its mind to the rigors prescribed by the rules and the order of deputation was manoeuvred by Misra with the help of State Minister Sri Rajendra Tripathi. In the States counter-affidavit it has been stated that the Banks request was examined by different Departments of the Government at various levels, including the Appointment of Secretary and the Chief Secretary and finally the Chief Minister, the Minister for State for Appointments, Finance Minister and the Chief Minister concurred with the view that it will be in the interest of the State and in public interest if an officer of the State was sent on deputation to the Bank as requested. It has also been pointed out that the Banks request was made through letter dated 7-9-1981, but it was only on 10-2-1982 that the order of deputation was issued. It has also been pointed out that the Banks request was made through letter dated 7-9-1981, but it was only on 10-2-1982 that the order of deputation was issued. There is nothing on record which may belie the claim of the State, rather it finds support from the petitioners own averment made in paragraph 9 of the writ petition where the petitioners have admitted that the matter was placed before the Appointments of Secretary and Special Secretary Finance. These officers may have recorded their opinions against the transfer but that cannot be said to be the last word on the subject. Higher functionaries like the Chief Secretary, State Minister, the Finance Minister and the Chief Minister were fully competent to overrule them. From the mere fact that the State Government did not place the relevant record before this Court, it cannot be inferred that the consultations mentioned in paragraph 9 of the counter-affidavit were not made. Again from the mere fact that two officers of the State Government expressed their opinion against the deputation, it cannot be concluded that the order was passed on extraneous considerations. I am, therefore, unable to accept the petitioners submission that the deputation of Misra was ordered without taking into account the requirements of Fundamental Rule 111 (a). 12. The petitioners, however, contend that the consideration of "Public reasons" mentioned in Fundamental Rule 111 (a) is illusory inasmuch as no public interest is served by sending a Government servant on deputation to a private commercial establishment. According to the learned counsel it serves only the interest of the concerned private commercial establishment and not of the public and, therefore, the deputation could not be ordered. In the first place I am of the opinion that "public reason is not equivalent to "public interest". The former term covers a wider ambit. Secondly, even if the action is to be judged on the touch-stone of "public interest" there is ample justification for it which has been given through the averments made in para. 7 of the States counter-affidavit wherein the following statement has been made:- "In the present situation, the bank industry plays an important role in the economy of the State. Secondly, even if the action is to be judged on the touch-stone of "public interest" there is ample justification for it which has been given through the averments made in para. 7 of the States counter-affidavit wherein the following statement has been made:- "In the present situation, the bank industry plays an important role in the economy of the State. With the increasing stress on co-ordination between Government agencies and the banks (Nationalised or non-nationalised) lending the services of a P. C. S. Officers on deputation to the Hindustan Commercial Bank would certainly be in the interest of the State. It is further submitted that the commercial banks, whether in the nationalised or non-nationalised sector, deal in public fund their mobilisation and deployment for development. In this regard, they have to be distinguished from other private undertakings. Under the existing structure of the bankings in the country, there is practically no difference between nationalised or non-nationalised banks, so far as their regulation, supervision and control is concerned. The credit policies, monetary policies, interest rate structures on deposits and lendings etc., are equally applicable to both nationalised and non-nationalised banks, which are governed and regulated under the provisions of Banking Regulation Act, 1949. In order to ensure compliance of the above policies and guidelines, a nominee of the Reserve Bank of India is also placed on the Board of Directors of Nationalised Banks. The justification runs thus: In actual practise there is no difference between a nationalised and a non-nationalised banks because both are engaged in the same type of activity, namely, obtaining deposits from the public and investing them. The larger the investment of such deposits within the State, the better for the economic health of the State. Co-ordination between the Government agencies and Banks may result in larger investment of such deposits within the State. Such co-ordination is achieved better by sending an officer of the State on deputation to the Bank. Since the essential activity of all Banks, whether in the public sector or in the private sector, is almost identical, it is immaterial whether the deputation is made to a nationalised bank or to a non-nationalised Bank. Can any flaw be found with this justification? In my opinion the answer will have to be in the negative. Since the essential activity of all Banks, whether in the public sector or in the private sector, is almost identical, it is immaterial whether the deputation is made to a nationalised bank or to a non-nationalised Bank. Can any flaw be found with this justification? In my opinion the answer will have to be in the negative. Goyal, J., has accepted the States justification in these words:- "But even a non-nationalised Bank is subject to social control of the State which is exercised through the Reserve Bank. It is very much the concern of the State Government to have its leverage with Banks, both in public sector as well as in the private sector. Deposit mobilisation is well-known device of containing inflation. The longstanding complaint of relatively backward States like U.P. is that the Banks divert a substantial portion of the deposits raised from the people of the State to industries, commerce etc., outside the State. The State Governments try to ensure by influencing all the Banks, that the Banks extend their activities in the rural sector and tap all possible savings and further that they invest as much as possible within the State. There was thus nothing illegitimate in the State Government trying to secure its foothold even in the private Banking sector in the State through its officers."? I entirely subscribe to the above view. 13. On the touch-stone of "public reason" the justification is still more sound. The Banks, both in the public as well as private sector deal with money belonging to the citizens. Money is property. It is the duty of the State to protect the property of the citizens. By having its own officer in the Bank the State will be able to see that the money belonging to the citizens is not misutilised and also to see that it is so utilised that it brings greater benefit to the depositor and other members of the public by regulating the policy of credit and investment. In my opinion, therefore, it cannot be said that in the Bank, Misra will not be performing a duty which should "for public reasons be rendered by a Government servant". The duty hereinbefore mentioned is directly related to one of the essential functions of the State. 14. Instances are not wanting of services of Government servants being lent to Governments of foreign countries. The duty hereinbefore mentioned is directly related to one of the essential functions of the State. 14. Instances are not wanting of services of Government servants being lent to Governments of foreign countries. If such a deputation can be justified, no fault can be found against the deputation of a State Government servant to an institution within the State and that too to an institution which is intimately associated with the welfare of the people or public. 15. With reference to Baldev Raj Chadha v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 70 : 1980 Lab IC 1184 the learned counsel argued that the courts cannot supply justification for the action and that the State has to place material before the Court in justification of its action. According to the learned counsel the State has failed to place before this Court any material on the basis of which it could be said that the action was in public interest or for public reason and, therefore, it is not possible for the Court to hold that the action was such. Particular reliance was placed by the learned counsel on the following observations (Para 8):- "When an order is challenged and its validity depends on its being supported by public interest the State must disclose the materials so that the Court may be satisfied that the order is not bad for want of any material whatever which to a reasonable man reasonably instructed in the law, is sufficient to sustain the grounds of "public interest" justifying forced retirement of the public servant. Judges cannot substitute their judgment for that of the Administrator but they are not absolved from the minimal review well-settled in administrative law and founded on constitutional obligations. The limitations on judicial power in this area are well-known and we are confined to an examination of the material merely to see whether a rational mind may conceivably be satisfied that the compulsory retirement of the officer concerned is necessary in public interest." This was the case of an Accounts Officers who was promoted to the post on 30-12-1961 and was retired on 27-8-1975 under Fundamental Rule 56 (j) (i). If he had been allowed to run his full course, he would have continued in service up to April, 1980. The order was challenged on the ground that no public interest was involved in the retirement of the appellant. If he had been allowed to run his full course, he would have continued in service up to April, 1980. The order was challenged on the ground that no public interest was involved in the retirement of the appellant. It was held by their Lordships that the onus was on the administration to show that the impugned action was taken in public interest. It was further held that the authority concerned must form the opinion regarding existence of public interest not on subjective consideration but objective and it should be bona fide and based on relevant material. It may, however, be observed that their Lordships have not observed that the particular file in which orders regarding the action are contained must in all cases be produced before the Court. In the present case if the petitioners had so insisted and if this Court had deemed it necessary, the record could have been summoned. As pointed out above the State has indicated the relevant material on the basis of which the action was taken. The relevant averments made in the counter-affidavit have been reproduced here in above. It is on the basis of those averments that I have come to the conclusion that public reason and public interest are amply served by the impugned action of the State Government. 16. It is also submitted that public interest or public purpose may be served if a person possessing specialised qualifications in Banking is appointed to the post but the said purpose will not be served if a person not possessing these qualifications is appointed. According to the petitioners Misra does not possess any specialised qualification in Banking. In the first place I do not accede to the submission made by the learned counsel that specialised educational qualification was required for appointment to the post in question. Instances are not wanting of persons not possessing specialised educational qualifications in a particular field but acquitting themselves creditably in that field. Members of the Civil Services have occupied administrative offices in Electricity Board and other commercial nationalised organisations. Members of the Civil Service are generalists and they are supposed to be suited for various appointments including appointments in institutions involved in activities of technical nature. Further Misra has indicated his experience in regard to banking in paragraph 7 of has counter-affidavit. Members of the Civil Services have occupied administrative offices in Electricity Board and other commercial nationalised organisations. Members of the Civil Service are generalists and they are supposed to be suited for various appointments including appointments in institutions involved in activities of technical nature. Further Misra has indicated his experience in regard to banking in paragraph 7 of has counter-affidavit. He has pointed out that he had worked on the Board of Directors of two Regional Rural Banks at Sultanpur and Bareilly; these banks were in the public sector sponsored by the Bank of Baroda (a nationalised Bank) in collaboration with Central and State Governments. Then he has pointed out that he was Deputy Secretary and Deputy Director of Institutional Finance U.P. Government and in connection with this office, he had been occupying other important offices intimately connected with Banking. His other qualifications are mentioned in Annexure I to the writ petition. Annexure I indicates that he had been an Alum-nus of the Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad (IIMA)- 1978. Further qualifications are mentioned in paragraph 10 of Annexure No. 1 and they are as follows:- "Attended various Courses (From 7 days to one month) in Business Management, Financial Management, Corporate Finance and Planning, Management of Long Term Capital (Term lending) and Management of Sugar Industry sponsored by Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad (II MA) Administrative Staff College of India (ASCI) Hyderabad, Management Development Institution (MDI of IFCI), National Productivity Council (UPC) and Institute of Management Development, U.P. (IMCUP)". From the above qualifications it would appear that he is not a stranger to banking business. In the circumstances I am of the opinion that in the first place specialised educational qualification in banking was not required for Misra's appointment to the post in question and further he possessed sufficient experience of banking to qualify him for appointment in question. 17. The petitioners submit that banking is not included in the State list of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution but is included in the Union List at Entry 45 and therefore, decision in respect of Misra's deputation could be taken only by the Central Government and not by the State Government. The argument is devoid, of merit. 17. The petitioners submit that banking is not included in the State list of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution but is included in the Union List at Entry 45 and therefore, decision in respect of Misra's deputation could be taken only by the Central Government and not by the State Government. The argument is devoid, of merit. By sending Misra on deputation to the Bank, the State Government has not taken any legislative or executive action in respect of the Bank but it has taken the decision in respect of a member of State Public Service and the action is relatable to entry 41 of List II (State List) of the said Schedule. Under this Article the State Legislature is competent to legislate in respect of "State Public Services". It is also to be noticed that an order of deputation has to be passed by the employer. The employer of a P. C. S. Officer is the State Government and not the Central Government. Therefore, it would not be competent for the Central Government to pass an order of deputation in respect of Misra. Such an order could be passed only by the State Government. 18. The respondents learned counsel submitted that reliance on the Union List and State List in the Seventh Schedule is misconceived as by sending Misra on deputation to the Bank, the State has not made any law within the meaning of Article 246 (3) of the Constitution. The petitioners learned counsel applies Article 246 (3) by reference to Article 162, which provides that the executive power of the State shall extend to the matters with respect to which the Legislature of the State has power to make laws. In view of my finding that the action is relatable to entry 41 of List II, it is not necessary to go into this controversy. Section 35-B (i) (b) of Banking Regulation Act. 19. After assailing the order of deputation the petitioners assailed also the appointment of Misra in the Bank. They contend that the said appointment is violative of Section 35-B (i)(b) of the Banking Regulations Act, 1949 which provides as follows :- "35-B (i) In the case of a banking company:- (a) ............ Section 35-B (i) (b) of Banking Regulation Act. 19. After assailing the order of deputation the petitioners assailed also the appointment of Misra in the Bank. They contend that the said appointment is violative of Section 35-B (i)(b) of the Banking Regulations Act, 1949 which provides as follows :- "35-B (i) In the case of a banking company:- (a) ............ (b) No appointment or reappointment or termination of appointment of a chairman, a managing or whole-time director, manager or chief executive officers by whatever name called, shall have effect unless such appointment, reappointment or termination of appointment is made with the previous approval of the Reserve Bank................." According to the learned counsel the language of the above provision is peremptory, and therefore, where an appointment is made in violation of the provisions, it is absolutely invalid. It is not disputed between the parties that no approval was obtained from the Reserve Bank of India. The question for consideration is whether an approval was required at all and if it was required whether the lack of such approval renders the appointment invalid. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 35-B applies to appointment of the topmost executive of the Bank and did not apply to any other post or office. It is submitted that the key to the interpretation of the clause is contained in the words "Chief Executive Officer by whatever name called." In view of these words, the learned counsel argues, the terms "Managing or whole-time Director, Manager or Chief Executive Officer" have to be read ejusdem generis with the word "Chairman". According to him where, in a Banking Company there is already a Chairman, he will be the topmost executive and only for his appointment approval of the Reserve Bank will be required. It is submitted that undisputedly in the Bank in question there is already a Chairman, the the said office at the relevant time being held by Shri M. D. Dalai. It is pointed out that if the term "Manager" is interpreted to mean all officers designated as Managers, practical functioning of the Bank will become difficult, apart from the fact that the Reserve Bank of India will be flooded with a work in which it will have no direct interest. It is pointed out that if the term "Manager" is interpreted to mean all officers designated as Managers, practical functioning of the Bank will become difficult, apart from the fact that the Reserve Bank of India will be flooded with a work in which it will have no direct interest. My attention has been drawn to the fact that all over the country there are hundreds of Banks having thousands of branches, each branch having a Manager. Reserve Bank of India cannot be expected to deal with the appointment of these thousands of Managers. Some of these Managers may have to be appointed in the villages in remote areas. Each branch of a Bank may have its own problems obviously the local Bank will be in a better position to identify the officer who will be able to deal with the said problem and, therefore, fit to be appointed Manager of that branch. These Managers will have to control day, to day functioning of the Bank or its branches. The Reserve Bank of India does not control the day to day functioning of the Bank. It only regulates policy matters and for this it has to deal only with the top brass of the Bank. In view of this I agree with the submission of the learned counsel that Section 35-B (1) (b) requires the approval of the Reserve Bank of India only in the case of appointment of the topmost executive of the Bank. 20. I am further of the opinion that the mere lack of approval of the Reserve Bank does not render the appointment invalid. This is apparent from the provisions contained in sub-section (3) of Section 35-B which runs as follows:- "No act done by a person as chairman or a managing or whole-time director or a director not liable to retire by rotation or a manager or a chief executive officer by whatever name called, shall be deemed to be invalid on the ground that it is subsequently discovered that his appointment or reappointment had not taken effect by reason of any of the provisions of this Act; but nothing in this sub-section shall be construed as rendering valid any act done by such person after his appointment or re-appointment has been shown to the banking company not to have had effect. (Emphasis supplied) From the above provisions it is apparent that the Act of an officer appointed without the approval of the Reserve Bank of India is rendered invalid only after the Bank has been informed of the invalidity of the appointment. In other words the appointment becomes invalid only when the Reserve Bank comes to the conclusion that such appointment should not be recognised and informs the Bank in that behalf. Although under Clause (b) previous approval of the Reserve Bank is required but in view of the provision contained in sub-section (3) of Section 35-B, the appointment is not automatically rendered invalid. In the present case the petitioners do not allege that the Reserve Bank of India has not recognised the appointment of Misra and that it has informed the Bank in that behalf. In the circumstances I am of the opinion that the appointment of Misra is not in violation of Section 35-B of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. Mala fides of the petitioners: 21. Now the Bank and Misra say that the petitioners have not approached this Court for vindication of a right or to seek redress of a genuine grievance. According to them the petitioners have approached this Court to put pressure upon Misra and Bank to exonerate petitioner No. 2 from the charges of misconduct which are being enquired into. In other words they say that the Petition has been filed with oblique motive. In paragraph of his counter affidavit Misra has stated that as disciplinary and punishing authority for the employees of the Bank he had taken action against those workmen who were found to be guilty of indiscipline and grave misconduct. In regard to petitioner No. 2 he has stated that he indulged in various acts of serious misconduct and for that disciplinary action, including suspension and charge-sheeting was taken against him. He stated that in view of the disciplinary action taken against him, petitioner No. 2 has filed the present petition with a view to bring undue pressure upon him so that he may succumb to this pressure and exonerate him from the charges of misconduct which are being enquired into. In paragraph 12 it has been stated that petitioner No. 2 was facing prosecution under Section 36-AD of Banking Regulation Act in the court of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Kanpur on a complaint filed by the Bank. In paragraph 12 it has been stated that petitioner No. 2 was facing prosecution under Section 36-AD of Banking Regulation Act in the court of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Kanpur on a complaint filed by the Bank. It has also been stated that petitioner No. 2 has violated the prohibitory injunction order issued by the Civil Court against him. The prohibitory injunction issued by the Civil Court prohibits petitioner No. 2 from committing disorderly acts within the premises of the Bank. The Bank has made more detailed allegations regarding the action taken against petitioner No. 2. These detailed allegations have been made in paragraphs 14, 15 and 16 in the following terms: "14. That the petitioner No. 2 is an employee of the Bank, but he had been indulging in the acts of serious misconduct and violations in the course of his employment. He has been acting in an irresponsible manner and has created law and order problems not only in Hindustan Commercial Bank Ltd., but also in all other Banks in Kanpur during the last 25 years. He was charge-sheeted and placed under suspension under an order dated 12-11-1982 for acts of serious misconduct which are given below:- (a) Riotous/disorderly/indecent behaviour on the premises of the Bank. (b) Committing acts prejudicial to the interests of the Bank. (c) Committing nuisance on the premises of the Bank. (d) Marked disregard of ordinary requirements of decency. (e) Conduct likely to cause and which did cause breach of peace endangering the life/safety of the employees and destruction of Banks property. (f) Committing and indulging in illegal criminal acts within the Bank premises, threatening intimidating and coercing the management personnel; and use of impolite, insulting and abusive language against the Chairman and other management personnel within the Bank premises. (g) Committing offences punishable under Section 36-AD of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. (h) Damage to the Banks status in community and conduct which violates the common decency of the community and brings the Bank into disrepute." "15- That the police has registered several cases of criminal acts against the petitioner No. 2. Police Station Kakadeo, Kanpur registered case No. 326 under Sections 147/452/347/348/504/506 I. P. C and Section 7 of the Criminal Laws Amendment Act against him. The said police station also registered case No. 327 under the same sections on 2-11-1982. Police Station Kakadeo, Kanpur registered case No. 326 under Sections 147/452/347/348/504/506 I. P. C and Section 7 of the Criminal Laws Amendment Act against him. The said police station also registered case No. 327 under the same sections on 2-11-1982. He also committed offences punishable under sec.- 36-AD of the Banking Regulations Act, 1949, and criminal case No. 7940 was registered against him in the court of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate at Kanpur on 4-11-1982. He is on bail and the case is still continuing." "16. That the injunction granted by the Civil Court against the petitioner No. 2 requiring him not to commit disorderly acts within the Banks premises was violated by him and the contempt Proceedings are also pending against him in the Court of the Second Civil Judge, Kanpur." 22. The petitioners have not filed any rejoinder-affidavit to rebut the allegations made by Misra and Bank. The allegation of oblique motive thus stands substantiated. Maintainability of Writ Petition against Bank : 23. The Bank and Misra have also pressed that the action of the Bank which is admittedly in the private sector cannot be challenged through a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. According to these opposite parties the Bank being in the private sector, it is not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court and they further assert that the post of Chief General Manager in the Bank is not a public office and, therefore, the right of Misra to hold the post, cannot be challenged by claiming a writ of quo warranto. Both the submissions are well founded. Perhaps conscious of this position the petitioners have not made any prayer for quashing the order of Misras appointment as Chief General Manager in the Bank. In fact no prayer in any form has been made in respect of this post, the only substantial relief claimed being to quash the order of deputation and the order extending the period of deputation. In the grounds of the writ petition also the entire challenge is directed against the action of the State lending the services of Misra to the Bank. Petitioner's Locus Standi; 24. Misra and Bank have also questioned the locus standi of the two petitioners to maintain the writ petition. In the grounds of the writ petition also the entire challenge is directed against the action of the State lending the services of Misra to the Bank. Petitioner's Locus Standi; 24. Misra and Bank have also questioned the locus standi of the two petitioners to maintain the writ petition. Since the petitioners have not questioned the action of the Bank nor prayed for quashing the orders passed by it, the locus standi of the petitioners is required to be considered with regard to the petitioners grievance against the State. The only impugned action of the State is lending the services of Misra to the Bank. Now who will be aggrieved by this action? Only a person who was a rival candidate for deputation. Such a candidate may have a right to challenge the action, but none else. In representative capacity it may be conceded to an association of Government servants. But it can, by no stretch of imagination, be extended to a person who is neither a Government servant nor a representative of Government servants. Despite clear averments in the counter-affidavit of Misra and bank that the petitioners have no locus standi to maintain the writ petition, the petitioners did not indicate the basis of their standing. As already pointed out, they did not file any rejoinder-affidavit to these counter-affidavits. The State also in paragraph 17 of its counter affidavit took the plea that the petition was not maintainable at the instance of petitioners. To these the following reply has been given through paragraph 17 of the rejoinder-affidavit:-- "17. That the contents of para 17 of the counter-affidavit are also misconceived. The petitioners have interest in the activities of the bank and have, therefore, a right to challenge the action of the State which is unconstitutional."............... From the above it would be seen that the standing is claimed because the petitioners have interest in the activities of the Bank and not because they have interest in protecting the rights of the Government servants. For protecting the interest of the Bank the petitioners may have the right to challenge the action of the Bank but not of the State Government. In the writ petition, as originally filed, there was no assertion that the Bank committed violation of any law. For protecting the interest of the Bank the petitioners may have the right to challenge the action of the Bank but not of the State Government. In the writ petition, as originally filed, there was no assertion that the Bank committed violation of any law. It was only through paragraph 9A, added through amendment, that it was pleaded that the appointment of Misra in the Bank was in violation of the Banking Regulation Act. But even after adding this paragraph neither the portion of the writ petition dealing with the grounds of challenge was amended nor the relief clause. However, since I had heard arguments regarding the alleged violation of the said Act, I have dealt with it herein-above, and, therefore. I will consider the question of standing with reference to the grievance made against the Bank also. 25. The petitioners learned counsel argues that the question of locus standi is no longer of importance because the concept has undergone radical change and now, whenever a statutory provision is violated, a writ petition may be maintained by a person who may not be personally aggrieved by the said violation. In support of the proposition he has relied upon the following authorities:- 1. Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 564 ; 2. Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, AIR 1976 SC 578 ; 3. Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 298 : (1980 Lab IC 1325); 4. Fertiliser Corporation Kamagar Union v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC. 344 : (1980 Lab IC 1367); 5. S. P. Gupta v. President of India, AIR 1982 SC 149 ; 6. Peoples Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 1473 : (1982 Lab IC 1646); 7. National Textile Workers Union v. P.R. Ramkrishnan, AIR 1983 SC 75 ; 8. D.S. Nakara v. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 130 : (1983 Lab IC 1); 9. An Article by Justice Guman Mal Lodha of the Rajasthan High Court published in the Journal part of All India Reporter 1983 at page 75 (September Part). I have gone through these authorities and in my opinion none is helpful to the petitioners. In none of the authorities it has been laid down that a writ petition may be filed even when there is no aggrieved person. I have gone through these authorities and in my opinion none is helpful to the petitioners. In none of the authorities it has been laid down that a writ petition may be filed even when there is no aggrieved person. In none of the cases it has been laid down that a writ petition may be filed merely because a statutory provision has been violated even though such violation has not affected any one. According to the authorities there must be a person aggrieved and only then a writ petition may be filed. Once the aggrieved person has been identified, the writ petition may be filed by the person aggrieved personally or by some one on his behalf. The material question, therefore, to be seen in the present case is whether there is a person aggrieved in the present case. 26. I have already observed hereinabove that the action of the State Government sending Misra on deputation to the Bank could cause grievance to a rival candidate for the deputation post and such rival would be the person aggrieved. It is not the case of the petitioners that there was any one else in Government service who was also anxious for this deputation to the post. Therefore, in respect of the action of the State Govt. of sending Misra on deputation to the Bank, there is no aggrieved person whose case could be spoused by the petitioners. Now it may be examined whether there is any aggrieved person in respect of the action of the Bank appointing Misra in the Bank. 27. According to the petitioners the action of the Bank is violative of S. 35-B of the Banking Regulation Act. The relevant clauses of Section 35-B of the Banking Regulation Act have been extracted above. From these clauses, as discussed earlier, it is apparent that the appointment made without obtaining previous approval of the Reserve Bank becomes invalid only when the Reserve Bank decides to treat it so and informs the concerned Bank of this decision. In the present case it has not been shown that any such decision was taken by the Reserve Bank much less communicated to the Bank. At this stage, therefore, even the Reserve Bank of India does not fall in the category of aggrieved person. In the present case it has not been shown that any such decision was taken by the Reserve Bank much less communicated to the Bank. At this stage, therefore, even the Reserve Bank of India does not fall in the category of aggrieved person. It may fall in that category only when it decides to treat the appointment of Misra as invalid and communicates its decision to the Bank and the Bank even thereafter continues to retain Misra on the post. Therefore, the present petitioners cannot claim to vindicate even the right conferred under Section 35-B of the Bank Regulation Act upon the Reserve Bank. 28. R.C. Coopers case ( AIR 1970 SC 564 ) (supra) was not a case of petition being filed by a person who was not personally aggrieved by the impugned action. Cooper who filed petition under Article 32 of the Constitution claimed to be a share holder in the Central Bank of India as also the Director on its Board of Directors. He also claimed to have current and fixed deposits in the Bank. His claim was that by acquiring the Banking business of the Central Bank of India through the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act No. 22 of 1969, the value of his investment in shares had been substantially reduced and his right to receive dividend from his investment had ceased. It was his further case that he had been deprived of the right as shareholder to carry on business through the agency of the Banking Company, namely, the Central Bank of India. It was this individual right claimed by Cooper on the basis of which their Lordships negatived the Attorney General's preliminary objection against the locus standi of the petitioner to maintain the writ petition. Their Lordships observed:- "The petitioner seeks in this case to challenge the infringement of his own rights and not of the Banks of which he is a shareholder and a director and with which he has accounts-current and fixed deposit." 29. Their Lordships observed:- "The petitioner seeks in this case to challenge the infringement of his own rights and not of the Banks of which he is a shareholder and a director and with which he has accounts-current and fixed deposit." 29. In J.M. Desais Case AIR 1976 SC 578 (supra) the appellants, before their Lordships, filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Gujarat to challenge the grant of `no objection certificate' under Rule 6 of the Bombay Cinema Rules, 1954 by the District Magistrate, in favour of the respondents on the ground that it suffered from defect of jurisdiction. The High Court held that the petitioner had no locus standi to challenge the grant of certificate. Upholding the judgment of the High Court their Lordships observed in paragraph 39 at p. 586 thus:- ".........The Act and the Rules with which we are concerned, are not designed to set norms of moral or professional conduct for the community at large or even a section thereof. They only regulate the exercise of private rights of an individual to carry on a particular business on his property. In this context, the expression 'person aggrieved must receive a strict construction." So far as the right of a person to maintain a writ is concerned, their Lordships held that the petitioner must be an aggrieved person. With regard to the meaning of this term their Lordships observed in paragraph 12 at page 581 as follows:- "......The expression `aggrieved person" denotes an elastic, and, to extent, an elusive concept. It cannot be confined within the bounds of rigid, exact and comprehensive definition At best, its features can be described in a broad tentative manner. Its scope and meaning depends on diverse, variable factors such as the content and intent of the statute of which contravention is alleged, the specific circumstances of the case, the nature and extent of the Petitioners interest, and the nature and extent of the prejudice or injury suffered by him................" After examining a number of authorities their Lordships categorised an applicant for a certiorari in three classes (i) person aggrieved, (ii) stranger, and (iii) busy body of meddle-some interloper. In regard to the third category their Lordships observed that the High Court would do well to reject the applications of such busy bodies at the threshold. In regard to the third category their Lordships observed that the High Court would do well to reject the applications of such busy bodies at the threshold. The petitioners in the instant petition do not pass the tests prescribed by their Lordships. Admittedly the Bank in question is in the private sector, the Central and the State Governments holding no share therein The right to appoint employee in the Bank is the private right of the Bank. Section 35-B of the Banking Regulation Act only regulates the exercise of this private right by the Bank, the regulation being that previous approval of the Reserve Bank will be obtained. With reference to the content and intent of the Banking Regulation Act of which contravention is alleged, it may be reiterated that even under the terms of Section 35-B, the appointment is not ipso facto rendered invalid, some action is required by the Reserve Bank to render it invalid, which action has not been shown to have been taken so far. The Banking Regulation Act sets norms of conduct to be observed by the Banking Companies in relation to the Reserve Bank of India. It is not designed to set norms of moral or professional conduct for the community at large or even a section thereof. In the circumstances the provisions of Section 35-B are to be strictly construed. On strict construction, as pointed out above, there is neither violation of Section 35-B nor creation of a right which may be asserted by any one, beside the Reserve Bank of India. 30. In Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sanghs case (1980 Lab IC 1325) (SC) (supra) the respondents challenged the right of an unregistered union of employees to approach the Court. Their Lordships negatived the plea observing that even an unregistered union could approach the Court. This authority is of no assistance to the petitioners. 31. In Fertiliser Corporation Kamagar Unions case (1980 Lab IC 1367) (SC) (supra) the union of the workmen challenged the legality of sale by a Government undertaking of its certain plant and equipment. On behalf of the management of the Government undertaking it was pressed that the workers had no interest in the subject-matter of the dispute and, therefore, they had no locus standi to maintain the petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. On behalf of the management of the Government undertaking it was pressed that the workers had no interest in the subject-matter of the dispute and, therefore, they had no locus standi to maintain the petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. The majority judgment in this case was delivered by Hon'ble the Chief Justice who did not express final opinion on the matter but did make this observation;-. "............If public property is dissipated, it would require a strong argument to convince the Court that representative segments of the public or at least a section of the public which is directly interested and affected would have no right to complain of the infraction of public duties and obligations. Public enterprises are owned by the people and those who run them are accountable to the people. ....... We are not too sure if we would have refused relief to the workers if we had found that the sale was unjust, unfair or mala fide." Krishna Iyer, J., who delivered separate but concurring judgment, expressed himself more positively by saying that if the sale was found to be unjust, unfair or mala fide it could be assailed on behalf of the workers. It would be noticed that the observations were made by their Lordships in respect of a public enterprise. These observations cannot be applied to a private enterprise which the Bank in question admittedly is. 32. In S.P. Gupta's case ( AIR 1982 SC 149 ) (supra) the petitioners were lawyers who challenged the Government policy of transferring Judges of the High Court from one High Court to another. They also challenged the non-extension of the term of service of Judges on the expiry of the term for which they had been appointed. This petition raised an issue which was of vital importance to every Indian citizen and specially the lawyers. Every Indian citizen and specially lawyers are interested in the independence of the judiciary. The petitioners who were lawyers cannot, therefore, be said to be not persons aggrieved. This, therefore, is not a case where the petition was filed by a person who was not aggrieved by the action of the State. Every Indian citizen and specially lawyers are interested in the independence of the judiciary. The petitioners who were lawyers cannot, therefore, be said to be not persons aggrieved. This, therefore, is not a case where the petition was filed by a person who was not aggrieved by the action of the State. Learned counsel for the petitioners, however, placed reliance on the observations made by Bhagwati, J., at page 187 which are in the following terms: ".............Similarly, where a transaction is entered into by the Board of Directors of a company which is illegal or ultra vires the company, but the majority of the shareholders are in favour of it and hence it is not possible for the company to sue for setting aside the transaction, any shareholder may file an action impugning the transaction. " On the basis of these observations it is claimed that petitioner No. 2 who is a shareholder in the Company has locus standi to challenge the action of the Bank. In relation to a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution these observations have to be confined to a Government Company and not to a Company in the private Sector. Therefore, from the observations reproduced here in above, the petitioners cannot claim locus standi to maintain the present petition. 33. People's Union for Democratic Rights (1982 Lab IC 1646) (SC) (supra) was a case of public interest litigation. The petitioner was an association of persons. It did not claim personal injury to itself or to any of its members. It complained that the provisions of various labour laws were not being observed in relation to workmen employed in the construction of various projects connected with the Asian Games. When a litigation' would be a public interest litigation and against whom it may be launched will be launched from the observations made at page 1477 (of AIR): (of p. 1651 of Lab IC) which are in the following terms:- "Public interest litigation, as we conceive it is essentially a co-operative or collaborative effort on the part of the petitioner, the State of public authority and the Courts to secure observance of the constitutional or legal rights, benefits and privileges conferred upon the vulnerable section of the community and to reach social justice to them. The State or public authority against whom public interest litigation is brought should be as much interested in ensuring basic human rights, constitutional as well as legal, to those who are in a socially and economically disadvantaged position as the petitioner who brings the public interest litigation before the Court............." It is apparent from these observations that public interest litigation is brought against the State or public authority. As observed earlier, the Bank being in the private sector is not a public authority and therefore, the present petition cannot fall in the category of public interest litigation so as to entitle the petitioners to maintain it under Article 226 of the Constitution. 34. In National Textile Worker's Union ( AIR 1983 SC 75 ) (supra) their Lordships recognised the right of the workers to oppose the winding up of a Company. In the first place it may be pointed out that the question arose before their Lordships through an appeal arising out of a winding up petition under the Companies Act. It did not arise from Proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. Further the principle behind the recognition of the right of the workers to oppose the winding up of the Company is apparent. If the Company is wound up, the workers lose employment. It is this right to remain in employment which creates interest in the workers to oppose the application for winding up. In the present case no such consideration arises so as to entitle the petitioners to maintain the present petition. 35. In D.S. Nakara's case (1983) Lab IC (1) (SC) (supra) the case of pensioners who were denied the benefit of liberalised pension rules was espoused by a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. The locus standi of this society was challenged on behalf of Union of India. However, on behalf of the Union of India, it was not claimed that the cause espoused by the society fell beyond the purview of its objects. Consequently their Lordships negatived the challenge raised on behalf of Union of India and held that the society could challenge the States action on behalf of pensioners represented through the society. 36. In his article "Home delivery system of Justice Justice Guman Mal Lodha (supra) identified the areas in which action may be brought about by a person other than the person personally aggrieved. 36. In his article "Home delivery system of Justice Justice Guman Mal Lodha (supra) identified the areas in which action may be brought about by a person other than the person personally aggrieved. In view of my finding that there is no aggrieved person who may be entitled to bring action before this Court, it is not necessary to reproduce in this judgment the areas identified by the learned Author. 37. The petitioners have, however, claimed right to maintain writ petition by pointing out the prejudice caused by the impugned actions to the State and to the Bank. The prejudice to the State has been mentioned in paragraph 6 of the writ petition as follows:- ".........It is submitted that assumption of an office by an officer of a cadre of Provisional Civil Service is also detrimental and disadvantageous to the interest of the State and its people inasmuch as a considerable public money is spent for the recruitment of such an officer and thereafter training in the State Training College. The officers who are recruited for such a cadre are also paid due emoluments during their training period............" The prejudice that is indicated by the petitioners is that the State has incurred expense in the training of Misra and now that he has been trained, the services of Misra are being denied to the State. I have already held above that the State is benefited by the lending of services of Misra to the Bank. Therefore, the disadvantage pointed out by the petitioners is illusory. Further, as is apparent from the counter-affidavit of Misra, he was recruited to the Service in the year 1961. He had already served the State Government for 21 years before being sent on deputation to the Bank. Thus Misra has given sufficient return for the investment made by the State in imparting training to him. It may also be noted that Misra had the right to resign from the service and the State Government could not perhaps reject his letter of resignation merely on the ground that the State had incurred expense on his training. The interest, therefore, claimed by the petitioners on account of the prejudice to the State is entirely unsubstantial. 38. It may also be noted that Misra had the right to resign from the service and the State Government could not perhaps reject his letter of resignation merely on the ground that the State had incurred expense on his training. The interest, therefore, claimed by the petitioners on account of the prejudice to the State is entirely unsubstantial. 38. In paragraphs 7 and 11 of the writ petition the petitioners have indicated the prejudice which is caused to the Bank by Misra coming on deputation to the Bank on the basis of which they claim interest in maintaining the writ petition. In paragraph 7 it has been mentioned that prior to the appointment of Misra the Bank did not face any lockout or strike. The functioning of the Bank was absolutely smooth and the industrial relations between the management and the workmen were excellent. Then in paragraph 11 it has been stated that since the very induction of Misra into the Bank the industrial relations between the employees of the Bank and the Bank continue to deteriorate and there have been numerous strikes and suspension of work by the members of the staff. It is also asserted that Misra indulged in arbitrary actions with a view to suppress the workmen in disregard of labour legislation and the constitutional provisions which seek to encourage the workmen to share responsibility with the management. These averments have been dealt with both by Misra and on behalf of the Bank. In Clause (vii) of paragraph 7 of his counter-affidavit Misra has stated that it is incorrect to say that prior to his joining the Bank there were no strikes or lockouts in the Bank. He has also stated that the industrial relations between the management and the employees prior to his joining the Bank were strained. In paragraph 4 of the affidavit dated 13-4-1983 filed by Sri M. D. Dalal on behalf of the Bank in opposition to the petitioners application for leave to amend the writ petition, the advantages to the Bank by the induction of Misra therein have been indicated. In Clause (c) of this paragraph it has been stated that settlements between the Bank and the registered trade union arrived at since 1971 were terminated by the Bank and negotiations were started with the representatives of workmen in March 1982, soon after Misra joined the Bank on deputation. In Clause (c) of this paragraph it has been stated that settlements between the Bank and the registered trade union arrived at since 1971 were terminated by the Bank and negotiations were started with the representatives of workmen in March 1982, soon after Misra joined the Bank on deputation. The Management team in the negotiations was headed by Misra and the petitioner No. 2 was also one of the chief participants in the team representing the workmen of the Bank in the said negotiations. It is further asserted that after protracted bilateral discussions, the negotiations culminated into the signing of a memorandum of statement on 5-7-1982 between the Bank, and its workmen represented by All India Hindustan Commercial Bank Employees Federations. It has been pointed out that petitioner No. 2 is also a signatory to the said settlement as Vice-President of the said Federation. The terms of the settlement relate to matters connected with the service conditions of the workmen. It has further been stated that some other important issues of the workmen were discussed by the representatives of the workmen including the petitioners with Misra on 26-3-1982 and they were mutually settled. In Clause (e) it has been stated that Misra has been able to inculcate a measure of confidence in the various unions functioning in the Bank by settling industrial disputes of the workmen in conciliation/adjudication. It has further been asserted that there has been a marked improvement in discipline in the offices/branches of the Bank after the joining of Misra resulting in greater efficiency, productivity and better customer service in the Bank. Beside, assertion has been made that in fact there has been a visible improvement in the industrial relations. No rejoinder-affidavit has been filed by the petitioners to controvert the averments made on behalf of the Bank. It is, therefore, established that the induction of Misra in the Bank has resulted in better industrial relations between the Bank and its employees. The Bank has also indicated through Clauses (a) and (b) of para. 4 of the said affidavit the improvement in deposits and advances under priority sector and integrated Rural Development Programme, after the induction of Misra in the Bank. The petitioners assertion, therefore, that the induction of Misra in the Bank has operated to the prejudice of the Bank is entirely false and incorrect. 39. 4 of the said affidavit the improvement in deposits and advances under priority sector and integrated Rural Development Programme, after the induction of Misra in the Bank. The petitioners assertion, therefore, that the induction of Misra in the Bank has operated to the prejudice of the Bank is entirely false and incorrect. 39. Again the petitioners have tried to indicate that Misra manipulated his appointment in the Bank. In paragraph 7 of the writ petition it has been stated that while serving in the Provincial Civil Service, Misra himself approached for being taken on deputation and appeared for an interview without prior permission or knowledge of the State Government. This allegation is sought to be supported through Annexure No. 1 to the writ petition. In his counter-affidavit Misra has denied the allegation and has explained that Annexure-1 to the writ petition is not an application seeking appointment in the Bank but is his bio-data. He has pointed out in paragraph 7 of his counter affidavit that his bio-data is available with every Bank because he is a member of the Guest faculty of most of the major nationalised Banks. In his affidavit filed on behalf of the Bank M. D. Dalai has also denied the petitioners allegation that Misra approached the Bank for being appointed to the post, in question. He has also denied that Misra appeared at any interview allegedly held by the Bank for selecting candidates for making appointment to the post in question. It has been positively asserted in paragraph 8 of the counter-affidavit that Misra never submitted any application to the Bank for being considered for appointment in the Bank. The assertions made in the counter-affidavits have not been controverted through rejoinder-affidavit. The said averments, therefore, stand uncontroverted and they established that Misra did not manoeuvre his appointment in the Bank. The petitioners assertion, therefore, that Misra manoeuvred his appointment in the Bank is based on factually incorrect statement. 40. Through paragraph 7A of the amended writ petition the petitioners have tried to point out the benefits which Misra has derived from the Bank on his appointment as Chief General Manager. It has been pointed out that he was provided with residence which was renovated and furnished by incurring substantial expense. It has also been stated that he has been provided with a vehicle on the repairs of which a sum of Rs. 8000/- was spent. It has been pointed out that he was provided with residence which was renovated and furnished by incurring substantial expense. It has also been stated that he has been provided with a vehicle on the repairs of which a sum of Rs. 8000/- was spent. It has also been stated that during the short period of one year Misra drew travelling allowance amounting to Rs. 20,000/-. There is no material before me to hold that Misra was not entitled to residential accommodation or furnishing thereof. There is also no material before the Court to hold that he was not entitled to a vehicle. If he was entitled to a vehicle and an amount was required to be spent for making the vehicle serviceable the spending of the amount cannot be said to be unreasonable. Also there is no material to hold that the tours made by Misra, which entitled him to draw the travelling allowance of Rs. 20,000/-, were not required to be made in the interest of the Bank. In any case on the basis of these facilities provided by the Bank to one of its employees, the action cannot be held to be mala fide, illegal or improper specially when the said action is not of a Bank in the public sector but of a Bank in the private sector. 41. From the above discussion it is apparent that the petitioners approached this Court not in vindication of any genuine grievance but with oblique motive to put pressure upon the management in respect of the disciplinary action initiated against the in disciplined sections of the employees, including petitioner No. 2. It is also established that the petitioners made incorrect and false statements and raised imaginary grievances. The petitioners also suppressed material facts. The petition was vexatious to the knowledge of the petitioners. The petition as a whole is devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed. In the circumstances each of the opposite parties is entitled to separate set of compensatory costs. 42. In view of the above the petition is dismissed with separate costs to each of the three opposite parties. Apart from the costs taxable under the Rules of the Court each of the three opposite parties will be entitled to receive from the petitioners Rs. 500/- as compensatory costs. 42. In view of the above the petition is dismissed with separate costs to each of the three opposite parties. Apart from the costs taxable under the Rules of the Court each of the three opposite parties will be entitled to receive from the petitioners Rs. 500/- as compensatory costs. It would be open to the opposite parties to recover costs from either of the two petitioners. The interim order, if any, shall stand discharged.