Judgment V.S. KOTWAL, J.:---Faithfully serving the nation for nearly 23 years and fighting the litigation against the Government after retirement is the lot of a naval officer. ""Acrepolis"" located in Colaba area of this metropolis is one of the trio of apartments, the other two being ""Heliopolis"" and ""Petropolis"" which were taken on hire vis-a-vis flats in the said three buildings by the Union of India. Ministry of Defence, through M/s. Garrison Engineers, for the residence of defence personnel who were to be stationed at Bombay. ""Acrepolis"" figures prominently and the seven flats in that building were thus taken on hire in the year 1942-43. All the said three buildings and flats therein however, have been clubbed together due to the formation of co-operative society and thus became the property of the said society known as ""Madhav Co-operative Housing Society"" which has been registered under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act. This pertains to the first category. In the second category falls the first respondent herein, who had also assumed the capacity of first plaintiff. He had joined the Navy sometime in the year 1947 and served at various places. It was in April or May 1968 that he was transferred to Bombay from Port Blair and he was allotted a flat in Acrepolis in April 1968 in pursuance of which he started residing therein with his family. The scheduled date of his retirement was sometime in March 1977 though he opted for premature retirement well in advance, which event occurred as and from 4th July, 1970 from which day he was relieved of his duties and his plea for premature retirement was accepted. Soon after the formation of Co-operative Housing Society he applied for the membership in September 1968 and in due course he was allotted five shares and an agreement was executed between him and the society in March 1970 under which the flat. In question, which is Plot No. 7 in which he was already residing as an allottee, continued to be in his occupation on his having been admitted as member of the Society, and thus he staked his claim over the said flat in the capacity as owner. Along with it he also staked his claim as a landlord vis-a-vis the premises and vis-a-vis the Union of India and Garrison Engineers, who had already taken said flat on rental basis. Along with it he also staked his claim as a landlord vis-a-vis the premises and vis-a-vis the Union of India and Garrison Engineers, who had already taken said flat on rental basis. The tenancy rights were attorned in his favour by the society, who supported his cause and assumed the character as plaintiff No. 2. In the third category are placed the Union of India, which are the original defendants and the petitioners in the main petition. Accepting the historical part, they asserted that the said officer had never acquired the status of landlord as according to them it was only the society, who continued to be the landlord and they were willing to pay the rental amount to the society. They, however, felt that the acquisition of the said property by the said Officer was in violation of the Rules and Regulation known as ""Navy (Discipline and Miscellaneous Provisions) Regulation of 1965 under which the said officer was enjoined to take prior permission of the higher-ups before acquiring this property, if it was not so acquired through proper authority and in any event they were not aware of the acquisition and thus keeping them in dark the said flat has been acquired by the Officer and consequently the said acquisition is bad in law. They, therefore, refused to accept the acquisition as well as the Officer's claim and persisted in contending that the flat did not change its character as Public Premises within the meaning of Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1958 and also that the concerned officer continued to be in unauthorised occupation thereof since the flat was allotted to him only by reason of his employment and after it was terminated the continued occupation became unauthorised. 2. In view of the controversy having been generated through record, the said officer issued a notice to the respondents for vacating the suit premises wherein two counts were canvassed, one being that the premises are bona fide and reasonably required by him for his personal occupation and that the Government has been in rental arrears for more than six months commencing from 1st May, 1970. The record reveals that issuance of the notice was repeated for more than once, on some occasion it was individually by the said Officer while thereafter the society also joined him and a joint notice was issued under section 12(2) of the Rent Act when a notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure also came to be issued. That is how the officer and the society joined the cause and issued the notice terminating the tenancy of the respondents, non-compliance of which ultimately necessitated the filing of R.A.E. Suit No. 288/1785 of 1971 by the said two plaintiffs against the two respondents, the first being M/s. Garrison Engineers and the second being Union of India (Ministry of Defence), in the Small Causes Court at Bombay for a declaration that the first defendant or in the alternative both the defendants are tenants of the first plaintiff i.e. the concerned Officer vis-a-vis the suit premises and also for possession of the said flat along with rental arrears amounting for the period between May 1970 and March 1971. 3. The suit was resisted on behalf of the defendant on all counts. In substance the status of the first plaintiff as the landlord was challenged. Further it was also canvassed that it would be the provision of Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1958 that would be attracted since the premises continued to be public premises and that the occupation of the first plaintiff was unauthorised for which purpose the penal proceeding was initiated by the respondents against him for eviction, which proceeding by reason of an order recorded at an earlier occasion by this Court has been stayed. It was also contended that the manner in which the flat has been acquired by the first plaintiff would amount to violation of concerned rules and regulation and as such the transaction was illegal. It has been also submitted that some of the documents and in particular the agreement between the two plaintiffs under which the first plaintiff was made a member and allotted the said flat has no legality since proper stamp duty has not been paid and also since it suffers from the vice of non-registration. It has been also submitted that some of the documents and in particular the agreement between the two plaintiffs under which the first plaintiff was made a member and allotted the said flat has no legality since proper stamp duty has not been paid and also since it suffers from the vice of non-registration. The plea of bona fide and reasonable requirement of the first plaintiff has been denied and it was indicated alternatively that greater hardship would be caused to the defendants in case a decree for eviction is passed in view of the fact that such flats are required to be reserved for defence personnel, who would be stationed in Bombay. The validity of the notices is also placed under challenge so also the quantum of rental arrears. In that behalf it was submitted that the rent that was being paid earlier and which continued to be so paid was less than the one demanded in the notice and further the rent for at least two months was already paid and as such the respondents cannot be deemed to be in rental arrears for six months or more and in any event the circumstances suggest that they have been always ready and willing to pay the rent. On these and other counts the respondents pleaded for non-suiting the plaintiffs. 4. The learned trial Judge on the basis of the material placed before him recorded findings on all the issues against the respondents holding that the first plaintiff assumes a lawful status of landlord and that the respondents were his tenants. His personal requirement was also accepted as bona fide and reasonable and the issue of comparative hardship also titled in his favour. According to the learned trial Judge in so far as the rental arrears are concerned the respondents were in arrears for more than six months and since the amount demanded in the notice having not been remitted in one month nor any application for fixation of standard rent having been filed within the stipulated period the case would fall under section 12(3)(a) of the Rent Act. Consequently the learned trial Judge held that the plaintiffs are entitled to possession on both the counts. 5. Being dissatisfied the respondents carried an appeal being Appeal No. 101 of 1979, before the Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court against the said decree. Consequently the learned trial Judge held that the plaintiffs are entitled to possession on both the counts. 5. Being dissatisfied the respondents carried an appeal being Appeal No. 101 of 1979, before the Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court against the said decree. More or less the same contentions were canvassed on that forum by the parties. The Appellate Bench found no reason whatsoever to disagree with the finding of the trial Court almost on all the issues except the one under section 12(3)(a). In effect they endorsed all the findings that the first plaintiff is the landlord while respondents are his tenants and his requirement was established as being bona fide and reasonable and the issue of comparative hardship was also answered in his favour. All the contentions arising out of the Public Premises Act, 1958 were also negatived. The respondents faced a strong criticism in both the courts below on the grounds that the first plaintiff was not treated in a fair manner in comparison to the other allottees, who on their respective flats have been accepted as landlords by the respondents. The validity of the acquisition of the flat in the society was upheld, which did not violate any rules or regulations as such more so when a finding was recorded that the respondents had full knowledge about the proposed acquisition and in fact one authority had recommended the same in favour of the first plaintiff. In effect, therefore, the decree for eviction was upheld on the said count under section 13(1)(g) read with section 13(2) of the Act. However, disagreeing with the finding recorded by the trial Court, the learned Judge of the Appellate Bench held that the respondents could not be said to be in rental arrears for six months or more and in any event they could not be said to be not ready and willing to pay the rent and as such the case was not attracted by Clause 3(a) of section 12 and since regular payments have been made thereafter no question would arise under Clause 3(b) of that section and consequently the decree recorded on that count was not endorsed. However, this did not affect the ultimate order and outcome when a decree for eviction was recorded and confirmed in favour of the first plaintiff when the appeal was thus dismissed on July 22, 1982. 6. However, this did not affect the ultimate order and outcome when a decree for eviction was recorded and confirmed in favour of the first plaintiff when the appeal was thus dismissed on July 22, 1982. 6. The respondent original defendant No. 2 put the said decree under challenge in Writ Petition No. 245 of 1983 while the first plaintiff challenged the same partially vis-a-vis the finding of the lower Appellate Court under section 12(3)(a) in Writ Petition No. 4286 of 1983. For obvious reasons both are being disposed conveniently by common judgment. 7. Shri Govilkar, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, Union of India, Ministry of Defence, raised multifold contentions most of which had been canvassed in the courts below. However, more prominence has been given to some features as according to the learned Counsel, the provisions of the Rent Act did not apply to the facts of the instant case. Further notwithstanding all these developments the premises continued to be public premises and, therefore, the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1958 would be applicable and the corollary of all these contentions is that the provisions of the said Act would prevail over the provisions of the Rent Act. It is then contended that the purchase of the flat by the first plaintiff is in violation of the service conditions and the regulations of Navy (Discipline and Miscellaneous Provisions) Rules since no prior permission of the concerned authority was taken and alternatively no knowledge could be attributed to the authorities before hand. Non-registration of the agreement between the two plaintiff's and its impact invalidating the said document was also pressed into service. In addition, a contention was raised on facts that there is no bona fide and reasonable requirement of the respondent plaintiff vis-a-vis the flat in question and lastly even assuming otherwise the greater hardship would be caused to the petitioner if a decree for eviction is recorded. A generalised contention was also raised which would embrace some of these prominent contentions which are rather overlapping to the effect that under the concept of society under the Maharashtra Co-operative Society Act the plaintiff cannot be said to be owner of the flat in question. A generalised contention was also raised which would embrace some of these prominent contentions which are rather overlapping to the effect that under the concept of society under the Maharashtra Co-operative Society Act the plaintiff cannot be said to be owner of the flat in question. Shri Dudhat, the learned Counsel, while countering these contentions adopted the reasoning assigned by the courts below, and he disputed the correctness of each of these contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner. Quite a bitter criticism was levelled against the manner in which the plaintiff respondents was discriminated and given a treatment not on par with his colleagues vis-a-vis such flats which was not in consonance with the policy of the Government. It was submitted that the concerned officers had full knowledge before hand about the proposed transaction and in fact his case was recommended to the higher officers. A serious grievance is made that some of these contentions, which are now being canvassed in the form as they are, were never advanced in courts below while some of the contentions were not even inferentially reflected in the written statement and as such the learned Counsel submits that the petitioner should not be allowed to canvass any of such points for the first time on this forum. It was also equally strenuously submitted that having regard to the limitation under Article 227 of the Constitution of India no interference could be justified when there is concurrent finding by the courts below. As regards the companion petition which is in the nature of cross-petition levelling challenge only to the finding under section 12(3) the learned Counsel Shri Dudhat submits that the lower Appellate Court was wrong in holding that the petitioners were not in default of rent for more than six months and that assuming that some amounts were sent the plaintiff was justified in refusing the same as it did not comply with the demand in the notice as it being short payment, and as such the petitioners are bound to come under the clutches of section 12(3)(a) so as to suffer a decree. This last aspect in turn has been disputed by Shri Govilkar, the learned Counsel, who supported that finding on the ground that in reality there was no rental default for six months or more and that the petitioners were otherwise ready and willing to pay the amount. 8. This last aspect in turn has been disputed by Shri Govilkar, the learned Counsel, who supported that finding on the ground that in reality there was no rental default for six months or more and that the petitioners were otherwise ready and willing to pay the amount. 8. For obvious reasons the petitioners would stumble at the threshold across a formidable hurdle when jurisdiction under Article 227 is being invoked, which carry with it obvious limitations in the event of concurrent finding recorded by both the courts below substantially on the process of appreciation of evidence. These limitations have been reiterated time and again and have now been high-lighted in (Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim and others)1, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 38 when it has been observed as :--- ""A mere wrong decision without anything more is not enough to attract the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227. The supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution is limited 'to seeing that an inferior Court or Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority', and not to correct an error apparent on the face of the record much less an error of law. In exercising the supervisory power under Article 227, the High Court does not act as an Appellate Court or Tribunal. It will not review or re-weigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior Court or Tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of law in the decision."" 9. It is manifest that the courts below have practically considered each and every facet of the situations and the learned Judge of the Appellate Bench refreshingly exhibited quite a substantial degree of industry which in turn unmistakeably exhibited full application of mind to all the features. In fact every bit of contention has been very elaborately considered and finding has been recorded on all points, which is supplemented by quite cogent reasons and which reasons in turn are fully supported by material on record. An amulgam of this process leads to the outcome of the proceeding as concluded by the two courts below. In the face of this situation it would be impermissible to this Court to justify interference with the impugned decree on any count within the limited jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. The petitioners would therefore, fail at the threshold itself on this count. 10. In the face of this situation it would be impermissible to this Court to justify interference with the impugned decree on any count within the limited jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. The petitioners would therefore, fail at the threshold itself on this count. 10. Even otherwise, on merits the findings and decree are fully justified which thus would be an additional ground not justifying any interference. In order to ward off any possibility of miscarriage of justice, I have examined the relevant material with the assistance of the learned Counsel for both sides in the context of rival contentions and I have no reservation to endorse the findings and the conclusion arrived at by the courts below. In view of this, since there is elaborate discussion by the courts below and in particular by the lower Appellate Court, and since the same is being endorsed, it may not be necessary to restate all these features equally elaborately and as such reference thereto in a frame-work would suffice. 11. In resolving the controversy it may be convenient to catalogue certain events which are either not controverted or are established in evidence, and which would serve as a backdrop for assessing the merits of the rival contentions. The suit building is one of the trio when the petitioner had taken seven flats on hire in the said buildings in the year 1943. This would mean that the flats were not requisitioned under Requisition and Acquisition of Immoveable Property but created only tenancy rights which would have its own relevance. The suit premises is one of such hired flats. The first respondent plaintiff joined defence service in 1943 and served the Navy all through. He was transferred to different places during his tenure and ultimately applied for allotment of the Government Quarters, which were earmarked as Army Officers residential quarters, though the application was in the month of June 1963 the actual allotment was made in the suit premises on 26th April, 1968 in his own name and since then he occupied the suit premises. While the said lease in favour of the petitioner continued there came into formation a co-operative housing society viz., the second respondent herein, which is registered under the Co-operative Societies Act, which has thus obtained several flats in the said three buildings. While the said lease in favour of the petitioner continued there came into formation a co-operative housing society viz., the second respondent herein, which is registered under the Co-operative Societies Act, which has thus obtained several flats in the said three buildings. The main object of the formation of the society was for providing housing accommodation to their members. That is how since the year 1962 the respondents society has become the owner landlord of the suit premises and significantly the petitioners accepted that they are the tenants of the said society since 1962. The first respondent after having occupied the suit flat in the year 1968 applied for the membership of the second respondent society in September 1968 whereafter on or about November 15, 1968 his application having been granted he was allotted allotment of the suit premises. Further formalities followed when the first respondent thus on becoming a member had undertaken to pay the valuable consideration to the tune of nearly Rs. 49,500/- for the purchase of the said flat whereafter share certificates for membership were issued in his favour in May 1970. Formal agreement came to be executed between the two plaintiffs on 31st March, 1970. As regards the consideration, the first instalment of Rs. 25,000/- was paid and the balance was to be paid by further prescribed instalments. The first plaintiff on assuming this status requested the petitioner to release or de-hire the suit flat in April 1970 whereafter the society attorned to the first respondent-plaintiff the petitioner for the rental of the suit premises with effect from 1st May, 1970. The first respondent-plaintiff was in normal course to retire in September 1976. However, he opted for premature retirement mainly on the ground of indisposed state of health of his wife which request was granted and thus he retired from Armed Forces as and from July 4, 1970. Then came into existence issuance of notice jointly or individually by the two plaintiffs under section 12(2) of the Rent Act as also under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The first was issued on 20th July, 1970 which was followed by notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure on 5th September, 1970. Then came into existence issuance of notice jointly or individually by the two plaintiffs under section 12(2) of the Rent Act as also under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The first was issued on 20th July, 1970 which was followed by notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure on 5th September, 1970. It is thereafter that there came to be issued a notice jointly by the two plaintiffs on 20-10-1970 terminating the tenancy of the petitioner-defendant, which was followed by yet another notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure on 15th January, 1971. It can be observed at this juncture itself that this state of a joint notice by the two plaintiffs came into existence only after the petitioner-defendant had issued a notice to the first plaintiff under section 4 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1958 on 19-9-1970 for his eviction from the suit premises on the ground that since his retirement his continued occupation becomes unauthorised. It is ultimately that the non-compliance of the demand notice resulted in filing of the suit in 1971. 12. Some of the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner being overlapping need not be considered almost in separate compartments so as to not only appreciate their thrust but to adjudicate upon the same. As stated, among the multifold contentions some seek challenge to the applicability of the provisions of the Rent Act as also maintainability of the proceeding in view of the provisions of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1958, whereas some aspects are based on certain regulations and purported breach thereof in the matter of acquisition of the said flat by the first respondent-plaintiff. These aspects really would be in the forefront so as to decide the fate of this proceeding and as indicated the courts below have properly addressed themselves to these aspects and have reached the correct conclusion. Realising this difficulty, a different tinge was sought to be pasted on some of these contentions on this forum by Shri Govilkar, the learned Counsel for the petitioners, which however, cannot be upheld even on merits whereas it is fairly reflected from the record that significantly some of these aspects were not even canvassed in the courts below, much less argued. This last category created a serious hurdle as rightly submitted by Shri Dudhat, the learned Counsel for the respondents that the same cannot be allowed to be agitated on this forum for the first time under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Even otherwise their assessment on merits without restricting to the maintainability would not advance the petitioners' case. 13. The flat in question was not acquired under the Acquisition Act but was the subject matter of a normal transaction of creating tenancy rights from the inception in the year 1943 since when the petitioner became the tenant. It is thereafter that the flat along with other flats used to be allotted to different Officers of the Armed Forces, who were stationed in Bombay essentially as those were ear-marked as ""Married Officers' Quarters'. Admittedly since June 1968 the said flat has been allotted in favour of the first respondent, who started his occupation and continued to be in occupation even on the date when he issued the notice and he filed the suit and even continues to be so this day. In between the society stepped in after its formation and having been registered. Furthermore, there is evidence as reflected in the correspondence that the society attorned to the first plaintiff the petitioner for the rent of the suit premises with effect from 1st May, 1970. It is significant to note that from the date of entry till the attornment rental was being paid by the first defendant to the society. Even after retirement which was premature as from 4th July, 1970 the occupation of the flat was never lost by the first respondent. Further admittedly the first respondent by then was allotted membership and this flat in question under an agreement executed between the parties, on 31st March, 1970 in pursuance of which partial payment was made and share certificates were issued thereby conferring membership of the society on the first respondent plaintiff. 14. The attack on this agreement was initially two-fold. The first, on the ground that it was not on the payment of requisite stamp duty and secondly, it was not registered. So far as the first count is concerned, it is expressly abandoned in both the courts below and it is also not pressed into service on this forum. Thus remains in the field the only other ground of non-registration. So far as the first count is concerned, it is expressly abandoned in both the courts below and it is also not pressed into service on this forum. Thus remains in the field the only other ground of non-registration. The lower Appellate Court has exhaustively dealt with this aspect. It is clear that the society was never in physical possession of the suit premises since 1968 and thus not even on the date of execution of the agreement in 1970, whereas the petitioners were in actual possession as lessee first of the predecessor in title of the society and thereafter of the society, itself since 1962. The first respondent-plaintiff was admittedly put in possession by the defendant. On that basis the lower Appellate Court found that the society had only symbolic owner's possession of the suit premises and it was this concept that was available to the society for making it over to the first plaintiff. It was also observed that the first plaintiff, who was actually in physical possession though as allottee of the defendant could be said to be transformed into owner's possession on account of the agreement. No doubt the lower Appellate Court held that the document by its non registration would be hit by section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act and may be that the alternate mode of sale by delivery of possession was not available as the value of the suit premises was not below Rs. 100/-. While considering the question as to whether inspite of all these features and assuming that the tenant-member is not the absolute owner or superior owner of the flat the petitioner can defeat the right, title and interest of the first plaintiff to the ownership of the suit-flat, reliance has been placed by the lower Appellate Court on the provisions section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act on the doctrine of ""part performance"" on which basis it was held that even an unregistered contract of sale can be a valid one if the transferee in part performance of the contract continues to be in possession of the property. It is rightly observed that the first plaintiff was already in physical possession of the suit premises though initially as the allottee of the petitioner and thereafter in his own right as transferee of the suit premises in part performance of the agreement or contract of sale of the year 1970. On the basis of the consideration of relevant provisions of the Indian Registration Act, various clauses of the agreement were examined and it was observed that over all effect of this agreement is that the member plaintiff No. 1 was allotted that suit premises flat from the date of the agreement and his liability to pay the taxes on lands and buildings commenced irrespective of plaintiff No. 1 taking the possession of the allotted flat, though the liability of the plaintiff No. 1 as to the items of works in the flat was to commence on his obtaining the possession from the society. It is on that basis having regard to various clauses of the agreement it was observed that the said agreement does not contemplate transfer of actual physical possession but only a symbolic possession and thus the first plaintiff, who was actually in physical possession was allowed to continue in possession as member-tenant of the society under the said agreement. 15. In that context the provisions of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act were also considered. It appears that the first plaintiff was actually elected as the President of the Society since 1968. It is borne out by the evidence of the Administrator Shri Deshpande and the Estate Manager of the said Society that first respondent not being the permanent resident of Bombay did not create any hurdle in accepting him as a member since he intended to settle in Bombay. The evidence clearly establishes that the society is in complete favour of perusing cause of the first plaintiff when the other side of the coin is that there was actually no dispute between the society and the member. In view of this position it was felt unnecessary to consider elaborately the provisions of the said Act. 16. Reliance was placed by Sri Govilkar, the learned Counsel, on the provisions of section 4 of the Rent Act on which basis it was strenuously contended that the Government being the tenant of the suit premises the provisions of the Rent Act are not applicable at all. 16. Reliance was placed by Sri Govilkar, the learned Counsel, on the provisions of section 4 of the Rent Act on which basis it was strenuously contended that the Government being the tenant of the suit premises the provisions of the Rent Act are not applicable at all. In support thereof reliance was sought from the ratio in (Union of India v. M/s. Everest Advertising (Pvt.) Ltd.)2, 63 Bom.L.R. 365. Shri Dudhat, the learned Counsel, at the threshold takes strong exception to this line of reasoning on the ground that it was being canvassed for the first time on this forum which was not permissible and which was equally not fair to both the courts below. This submission is fully justified and borne out by the record. This point was never canvassed in courts below atleast in the form it is being framed, and therefore, there was no occasion for adjudicating upon the same since there were no pleadings nor there was any occasion for their conclusion since there were no arguments advanced before them. Except contending that it is a question of law no other effective answer has been supplied on behalf of the petitioner for this serious omission. Even that ground can hardly be a justification to allow the request in the limited jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Really speaking Shri Dudhat's contention, therefore, must prevail. However, on assessment on merits also there is no substance in that contention raised on behalf of the petitioner. The fallacy lies in the fact that a generalised and specious construction is sought to be placed on the provisions of section 4(1) of the Act. If the said provisions are analysed properly the break up would indicate that it would fall in three parts. The first part pertains to the premises belonging to Government or local authority. The second part pertains as against the Government to any tenancy or any licence so created by a grant from the Government in respect of the premises taken on rent by the Government. According to Shri Govilkar since the premises are taken on lease by the Government or by officer on behalf of the Government on the basis of tenancy, the provisions of Rent Act would not apply having regard to the proviso thereunder. According to Shri Govilkar since the premises are taken on lease by the Government or by officer on behalf of the Government on the basis of tenancy, the provisions of Rent Act would not apply having regard to the proviso thereunder. However, the third part negatives this construction in view of the positive mandate therein making applicable the provisions of the Rent Act in respect of the premises let out to Government. All the clauses, therefore, will have to be read together in proper context for a harmonious achievement of the legislative object under which certain protection was undoubtedly sought to be bestowed on the Government. However, not making application of the Rent Act to the premises which are let out to the Government would really speaking be snatching the protection sought to be given to the Government and, therefore, the construction sought to be placed by Shri Govilkar would really be against the interest of the petitioner. Third clause obviously serves as a proviso. Sub-clause (2-A) of section 13 also furnishes a clue though it restricts to the premises in the Cantonment Area under which the operation of provisions of section 13(1)(g) are excluded if the premises are of Central Government and used by the Armed Forces or Defence Personnel. This would also be relevant while considering the other issue of bona fide and reasonable requirement. A support was sought to be obtained from some of the observations in Everest Advertising's case (supra) which had relied the observations of the Supreme Court in (Bhatla Co-operative Society v. Patel)3, 55 Bom.L.R. 199 S.C. when the provisions of section 4 of the Rent Act cropped in for consideration. A support was sought to be obtained from some of the observations in Everest Advertising's case (supra) which had relied the observations of the Supreme Court in (Bhatla Co-operative Society v. Patel)3, 55 Bom.L.R. 199 S.C. when the provisions of section 4 of the Rent Act cropped in for consideration. The analysis of the said provision was in the context of certain terms of the agreement and it is that particular term that prompted the Court to hold that the case would not fall within third part of section 4-A detailed discussion is unnecessary except quoting observations which really lend support against the petitioner's case as :--- ""...............In view of the observation of the Supreme Court in the above case regarding the purpose of enacting section 4 and reading third and second parts together it appears to me that though the word 'premises' is used in the third part, it was intended to apply to the cases where the question arises between the Government as tenant and any one else as the landlord."" 17. As stated the Court concluded that since the condition was not satisfied that is only on that count that the Act was held not applicable meaning thereby, as the converse proposition, that if the question arises between the Government as tenant and any one else as the landlord it would govern the term ""premises"" as used therein which impliedly indicates the application of the provisions of the Rent Act. The facts in the instant case clearly fall in that category and, therefore, it is inevitable to negative the contention raised by Shri Govilkar on the basis of the provisions of section 4 of the Rent Act. 18. In addition to all these features there are two formidable circumstances which really speaking clinch the issue against the petitioner in his context. The foremost is to the effect that it has been unequivocally accepted by the petitioner in the written statement as also in the evidence of their officer that defendant No. 2 acting through defendant No. 1 became the tenant of the plaintiff society in the suit premises since 1963. The written statement thus unmistakably proceeds on the footing couched in express terms accepting the relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff society on one hand and petitioner on the other. The written statement thus unmistakably proceeds on the footing couched in express terms accepting the relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff society on one hand and petitioner on the other. If this is the position, there is hardly any reason to justify as to why this should not apply to the first plaintiff. Even assuming every thing in so far as the first plaintiff is concerned, still it is very clear from the record that only there was joint issuance of notice by the two plaintiffs but even the second plaintiff society has impleaded itself as co-plaintiff claiming possession of the suit premises under section 13(1)(g) of the Rent Act. This read in the context of the admission of the defendant accepting the society as the landlord since 1963, it is not open for the defendant even to ostensibly contend non application of the provisions of the Rent Act. Furthermore, it is borne to by the record that the petitioners were offered by the society superior rights of ownership of the said flats which were taken by them on hire, but surprisingly the petitioners for some reasons which are quite obscure declined that offer and thus rest contended by accepting the inferior rights as tenant of the suit premises. This must have its own repercussions. It is further borne out by record that there has been attornment of the tenants defendants by original owner plaintiff No. 2 to the present member plaintiff No. 1 which is reflected in letter Exh. C. Letter Exh. L confirms the allotment of the said premises by the society to the first plaintiff. Then on the record are the joint notice at Exhs. F and G issued by the society and the first plaintiff to the defendants, which are in addition to the individual notice issued by the first plaintiff. As stated, it is explicit that the society had not remained as a silent spectator but has entered the arena quite actively and has jointed itself as co-plaintiff right from the beginning by issuing notice and the society has also asked for eviction of the defendants. As stated the petitioner had accepted the society as a landlord and in fact the written statement expressly proceeded on that footing. As stated the petitioner had accepted the society as a landlord and in fact the written statement expressly proceeded on that footing. In the face of this situation when the society is also impleaded pursuing its own cause for eviction as plaintiff and when the tenancy has been conceded there is hardly any substance left over in the contention of the petitioner, for not suffering a decree for eviction, if otherwise on merits it would be passed. In addition the first plaintiff stands on the same footing or perhaps a little higher, then the complexion changed after he was bestowed a fresh capacity as member of the society and flat was allotted in his favour; he has paid consideration. This is reflected by the society's conduct in informing the petitioner to pay rental thereafter to the first plaintiff who would be accepted as member. Significantly there is yet another letter Exh. Q issued by the authority of the petitioner to the plaintiff-society on 5th May, 1971 under which it was communicated that if the transaction between the two plaintiffs in question had been communicated to the defendants they themselves would have paid to the purchaser i.e. to the first plaintiff. There recitals again are strong pointer in favour of the contention raised by Shri Dudhat, the learned Counsel that the express willingness to accept the first plaintiff as the purchaser of the suit premises and they would have made payments to him thus has its won relevance. Similar letter is addressed on behalf of the petitioner to the first plaintiff in February 1971 at Exh. E. Though it raises certain other disputes it impliedly accepts the rights, title and interest vesting in the first plaintiff on his purchasing the flat and when the petitioner made it clear that they were willing to consider the purchase of his right, title and interest in the said society vis-a-vis the said flat. 19. There is yet another telling circumstance which goes a long way to demolish the case of the petitioner. There is an unequivocal statement made on oath by one Shri Tapeshwarnath Laxmandas, who was working then as Superintendent in the office of Military Estate Office when he asserted as :-- ""......Five more flats in the same building were purchased by the officers and our office is paying rent to them. There is an unequivocal statement made on oath by one Shri Tapeshwarnath Laxmandas, who was working then as Superintendent in the office of Military Estate Office when he asserted as :-- ""......Five more flats in the same building were purchased by the officers and our office is paying rent to them. Formerly we were paying rent to the society....."" This thus very strongly supports the case of the first plaintiff that he had become the landlord and the circumstances unmistakably further show that there is hardly any distinguishing of feature between the first plaintiff and other officers, who have admittedly purchased the flats in the same building under identical circumstances after they were allotted on their being stationed in Bombay. In their case the petitioners have accepted each of them without any demur as their landlord and they started paying the rent to them. The first plaintiff stands on the same platform. This aspect was obviously pursued and same witness tried to suggest some reason as to why it was done as according to him ""five officers who have purchased those flats have accepted the rent at the same rate at which it was being paid at the time of the purchase."" This leaves the door open for the inference that it was only on that count that perhaps the first plaintiff's case was sought to be differentiated. If that be so it is really an apology for justification, inasmuch as the foundation that the purchaser has become landlord and accepted by the petitioner remains intact throughout. The quantum of rent is absolutely of secondary character and in any event it would not govern the facts of main question about the relationship between the parties. This lurking doubt has been fully exposed in the further admission given by the same witness, which runs as : "".....To my knowledge except the reason that the excessive rent was demanded, there was no other reason for not accepting the plaintiff No. 1 as the landlord....."" This hardly requires any further comments since this statement clinches the issue against the petitioner and in favour of the finding that there came into existence the relationship of landlord and tenant between the first plaintiff and petitioner after second plaintiff accepted the first plaintiff as a member and purchaser of the flat and attorned him the petitioner. It is against that backdrop that the admitted position about the title of the respondent society as landlord and owner was never in dispute. Further aspect that the other flats purchased by the other officers on identical terms and conditions of the agreement and that the same process of attornment of rent in identical form and accepting them as landlords by the petitioner became extremely relevant. Out of the said seven officers atleast four were already staying in the premises which makes their situation on par with the first plaintiff. It does appear and even accepted in the evidence that six out of those seven were recognized as new landlords and their respective flats were de-hired in their favour with the only exception of the first plaintiff. In fact the case of those other officers was accepted without demur, and the petitioners started making regular payments of rent to them. As stated, there is absolutely no challenge to the title of the first plaintiff by the petitioner at any time as reflected in any of the correspondence before filing of the written statement in the suit. It is important to note the admission given by the said witness Shri Tapeshwarnath, who is the same person who filed the written statement on behalf of the petitioners. It is quite relevant to note that in the written statement there is an unequivocal statement as :--- ""On the expiry of the notice period defendant No. 2 becomes statutory tenant of the said flat......."" In the further portion of written statement the recital reads as :--- "".....Defendant No. 2 are entitled to protection under the Bombay Rent Act......"" This really concludes the Chapter and seals the fate of the petitioners. 20. The amulgam of all these features would lead to a safe and equally inescapable conclusion endorsing the finding of the courts below that the first plaintiff would obviously acquire status of the landlord of the suit premises vis-a-vis the petitioners, which coupled with further fact that the society, who was already accepted as the landlord by the petitioners has also asked for eviction and consequently the suit instituted jointly by the two plaintiffs for the said relief would obviously be maintainable. The necessary corollary would be that the provisions of the Rent Act are obviously applicable for the reasons already assigned. The necessary corollary would be that the provisions of the Rent Act are obviously applicable for the reasons already assigned. The lower Appellate Court has rightly observed that the definition of landlord within the meaning of the Rent Act is wide enough to embrace the case of the first plaintiff. His becoming the member of the society on purchasing the flat and attornment by the society making him entitled to receive rent coupled with other features make his status as landlord abundantly clear. The effect of non-registration of the agreement in question has also been rightly considered by the courts below having no impact on the validity of the agreement, relationship between the parties and maintainability of the suit. All these features are, therefore, obviously additional to the basic infirmity that the pleadings are very much lacking in that behalf against the petitioner and some of these aspects were not even inferentially canvassed in the courts below. 21. As regards the contention about the applicability of the provisions of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1958 and the said Act prevailing over the Rent Act, the petitioner faces similar impediment. It is apparent that this point was never raised much less canvassed at any time in the trial Court or before the learned Appellate Judges. It would therefore, be not proper to allow canvassing of this point for the first time by the petitioner. Shri Dudhat, the learned Counsel, has rightly contended that apart from this, prejudice to his client, is apparent inasmuch as if it was so raised at any time he could have been put on guard and perhaps would have pursued other remedies if so advised and if so found necessary. Some of the recitals in the written statement are already quoted hereinabove. To recapitulate petitioner's claim to be protected tenant under the Rent Act thereby expressly accepting the applicability of the provisions of the Rent Act and their status as statutory tenant after notice of termination is also expressly accepted therein. 22. There is yet another circumstance which is also quite relevant. To recapitulate petitioner's claim to be protected tenant under the Rent Act thereby expressly accepting the applicability of the provisions of the Rent Act and their status as statutory tenant after notice of termination is also expressly accepted therein. 22. There is yet another circumstance which is also quite relevant. As stated, in the midst of issuance of notices by the two plaintiffs, the defendant had served the first plaintiff with a notice of eviction under section 4 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1958 on 3rd July, 1970 vis-a-vis the flat in question on the footing that it was allotted to him while he was in active service and therefore, his retention of the said flat after retirement was unauthorised. The first plaintiff placed the said notice under challenge in Misc. Petition No. 477 of 1979 by invoking the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Two things very harmoniously flow out of this proceeding. The first is that though it was the most opportune time for the petitioner herein to agitate in that proceeding about the non-applicability of the provisions of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1958 prevailing over the other statute still even inferentially it was not so done. The necessity becomes more elequent when we find that it was clearly agitated by the first plaintiff therein that he had already filed a suit for eviction under the Rent Act where the society has joined him and it was contended that the notice itself was unsustainable as any recourse to the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1958 was not maintainable. However, except maintaining that his occupation was unauthorised after his retirement nothing has been canvassed by the petitioners though it was obviously permissible to canvass all these aspects especially in the context of the pendency of the suit under the Rent Act being brought in issue. This Court felt that the first plaintiff, who was petitioner in that proceeding would get an opportunity to show cause to that notice. However, this Court made some observations which thus pertains to the second aspect negativing the contention sought to be raised by the petitioner this proceeding with reference to the provisions of Public Premises Act. Thus negatively speaking no such contention was raised about the non-applicability of the Rent Act. However, this Court made some observations which thus pertains to the second aspect negativing the contention sought to be raised by the petitioner this proceeding with reference to the provisions of Public Premises Act. Thus negatively speaking no such contention was raised about the non-applicability of the Rent Act. Positively speaking the contention of the provisions of Public Premises Act overriding the other statute impliedly has been overruled. It would, therefore, not burden the record if the said observations are quoted verbatim, as : ""Ordinarily, therefore, I would have discharged the Rule simpliciter and allowed the respondents to proceed with the hearing pursuant to the notice dated 3rd July, 1971 after giving to the petitioner sufficient time to put in a pleading. In this case however the petitioner as a co-plaintiff has already filed a suit in the Court of Small Causes and it is desirable that the said suit should be disposed of before proceeding further with the notice under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1958. It is clear to me, though this opinion must be regarded as prima facie that if in the said suit it is held that the legal tenancy of the defendants to the said suit has been duly determined and defendants are not entitled to continue to remain in possession, even as statutory tenants, then the respondents would not be entitled to maintain the proceeding under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act. Therefore, logically the said suit must first be disposed of and then the proceeding under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act continued. I accordingly give the following directions which will be incorporated as directions at the time of discharging the Rules....."" 23. In view of this event it really is unnecessary to dilate any further on all these aspects. I accordingly give the following directions which will be incorporated as directions at the time of discharging the Rules....."" 23. In view of this event it really is unnecessary to dilate any further on all these aspects. I may incidentally observe that in the context of all the attendant features including the change of situation by reason of the first plaintiff though in occupation of the flat having assumed the character of the purchaser of the flat and being member of the said society, the society accepting him in that capacity, both of them accepting the first plaintiff as the landlord and communicating the same to the petitioner and the conduct of the parties including that of the petitioner by impliedly accepting the status of the two plaintiffs and the relationship between the parties and actually claiming the protection under the Rent Act read in the context of their accepting the other six persons similarly situated as landlords of the premises on the purchase of their respective flats cumulatively wipe out the contention of the petitioner about the provisions of the Public Premises Act overriding and prevailing over those of the Rent Act. At the cost of repetition it must be reiterated that the premises were not acquired under the Acquisition Act but were hired on rental basis by the petitioner right from the beginning and the relationship of the landlord came into existence from the inception and continued throughout, which is practically accepted by the petitioner. It is, therefore, really futile to contend that the character of the premises does not change as it continues to be the Public Premises and on that basis it is equally futile to contend that the occupation of the first plaintiff becomes unauthorised after his retirement and in turn it is fallacious to contend on that foundation that the first plaintiff is liable to be evicted and as such the provisions of the Public Premises Act prevailed. In the context of all these features prescribed elaborately the submission canvassed behalf of the petitioners really moves in a circle. It was sought to be suggested that there is a conflict between the two status and it is one of the grounds on which one ought to prevail over the other. In the context of all these features prescribed elaborately the submission canvassed behalf of the petitioners really moves in a circle. It was sought to be suggested that there is a conflict between the two status and it is one of the grounds on which one ought to prevail over the other. It was then argued that the premises do not seize their character as Public Premises merely by the virtue of acquisition of the first plaintiff even after the notice of ejectment. The learned Counsel further submits that the possessory right of the Government still continues and as such they have right to proceed against the unauthorised occupants making Public Premises Act applicable. It is rightly contended by Shri Dudhat the learned Counsel in reply to this contention by the petitioner that the facts and the circumstances of the instant case did not warrant any such conclusion. The applicability of the provisions of the Rent Act and existence of relationship of the landlord and tenant are both abundantly established. The other Act obviously does not provide for any dispute between the landlord and tenant nor does it provide for settlement of such dispute nor could it adjudicate upon the question of rental default or the question of bona fide and reasonable requirement of landlord and comparative hardship of the parties and the said Act at the most essentially restricts to the dispute between the Government and it purported to unauthorised occupation which by itself cannot take away effective applicability of provisions of the Rent Act once it comes up on the surface in the form of relationship of the landlord and tenant and the existence of dispute between the two with the relief for eviction being sought for. Though it was endeavoured to suggest though faintly about the lack of jurisdiction for the Small Causes Court, the same is devoid of any substance since on plain reading of the pleadings, the existence of jurisdiction in favour of Small Causes Court and applicability of the provisions of Rent Act are manifestly apparent. Though it was endeavoured to suggest though faintly about the lack of jurisdiction for the Small Causes Court, the same is devoid of any substance since on plain reading of the pleadings, the existence of jurisdiction in favour of Small Causes Court and applicability of the provisions of Rent Act are manifestly apparent. The Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act as to proceed on a particular channel only whereas the facts and circumstances embrace entirely a different channel for the reasons already assigned and therefore, it should be the Rent Act which would be attracted to follow that track whereas the Public Premises Act would obviously fall entirely on a different track. It is unnecessary to consider the other track of submission on behalf of the petitioner in the same context with reference to certain items in various lists containing the items within the exclusive domain of the Central Acts. 24. Having read to all these features there is not even an ostensible validity to the said contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner and the same deserve to be negatived which are negatived even on merits though not undermining the serious infirmities of not raising that contention at any earlier stage. This aspect, therefore, need not detain us any further. 25. There is yet another branch of contentions raised by the petitioner though in different context but still endeavouring to achieve the same object about the defective title and ownership of the first plaintiff vis-a-vis the flat. In this category essentially three items were pressed into service. The first is that acquiring of flat has been achieved by clear infringement of rule 5 of Navy (Discipline and Miscellaneous Provision) Regulations, 1965 while other two counts pertained to the contention that under the Co-operative Societies Act the first petitioner cannot be deemed to be the owner and that unregistered document does not bestow any ownership or title. These last two items have been already considered and restating the same is unnecessary. It is, therefore, necessary to consider only the first item which also embrace the other items about the policy of the Government which has been every elaborately considered by the courts below. Rule 5 is clubbed in item ""A"" relating to acquisition, sale etc. of immovable property and it reads as :--- ""5. It is, therefore, necessary to consider only the first item which also embrace the other items about the policy of the Government which has been every elaborately considered by the courts below. Rule 5 is clubbed in item ""A"" relating to acquisition, sale etc. of immovable property and it reads as :--- ""5. Officers and sailors are forbidden to acquire or dispose of any immovable property by lease, mortgage, purchase, sale or gift either in their own names or in the name of any member of their family except with the prior knowledge, and where the transactions conducted otherwise than through a regular or reputed dealer with the prior permission of the superior Naval authority."" The contention raised by Shri Govilkar, the learned Counsel is to the effect that neither any knowledge was posted with the authorities about the said transaction between the society and the first plaintiff much less any permission was taken before hand to undergo that exercise. The necessity to have a permission of the superior Naval Authority is contemplated in the event of transaction that is conducted otherwise than through a regular or reputed dealer. The whole idea of enacting this provision appears to be that the transaction though a reputed dealer may be got through provided the authorities had prior knowledge so that if they suspect any nefarious dealings they may decline or atleast start any further enquiry or scrutiny which is obviously for safeguarding against sham or bogus transaction being enacted which should also give an opportunity to the authorities to enquire about the financial status of the officer which may lead to further enquiry if necessary. This in short is the other underlying feature. However, if it is not through the reputed dealer then mere knowledge any not be enough, for prior permission will be required so that there should be a stricter and closer scrutiny. However, the undercurrent of both these clauses would make it very clear about the intention that there is no outright prohibition in acquiring such immovable property while the officer is in service but the only safeguard in the interest of both the sides could be that the Naval authorities should not be kept in dark so as to ward off any dubious transaction. In the instant case there is clear evidence that at the relevant time the Society was managed and conducted by the Administrator appointed by the State Government and it is at that time that the transaction came to be effected. In the face of this accepted position it would squarely fall within the concept of the transaction having been carried through reputed dealer and which cannot carry with any shade of dubious dealing. Consequently no question of first plaintiff requiring prior permission of Naval Officer arose. Thus survives the only question of knowledge being referable to the Naval Officer about the proposed transaction. There is abundant evidence on record to substantiate the contention of the first plaintiff about imputing knowledge about the proposed transaction to the concerned authorities. 26. Reference to the policy chalked out by the Government in that behalf ay not be out of place and which is borne out by the record. According to the plaintiff, the policy was in order to settle its members after the retirement and as such to encourage purchase of premises by such retired members on concessional and economic prices from the landlords and to achieve the same policy it was decided to release or get de-hired flats in favour of members of the Armed Forces by considering their case. According to the first plaintiff all the flat in the said property were purchased by the seven officers in pursuance of the said policy of Government. Out of them four flats were purchased by the allottees occupants while three by non-allottee non-occupants. The suit premises is one out of the said flats, the first plaintiff being the allottee occupant and according to him, the said Government policy was in vogue and not only that but under the said policy benefit was made over to six other Officers by de-hiring the said flats and recognizing those Officers purchasing the said flats as landlords being entitled to receive the rent for the said flats from the Government. This is fully borne out by the material on record including the statement of Shri Deshpande giving evidence on behalf of the society and supported by assertion on oath by Shri Nath, Officer of the petitioner, which evidence is already discussed. This is fully borne out by the material on record including the statement of Shri Deshpande giving evidence on behalf of the society and supported by assertion on oath by Shri Nath, Officer of the petitioner, which evidence is already discussed. The lower Appellate Court has, therefore, rightly posed a question as to how and why abruptly and that too equally arbitrarily the first plaintiff was segregated and singled out for not granting benefit of the said policy which was liberally granted to the other six colleagues. He has appended a list of those six Naval Officers, who enjoyed the said policy of the Government and there is no serious challenge to that aspect. A faint attempt was made by Shri Govilkar to submit that this may be because the policy was also to the effect that the process of de-hiring would be done as per the time element inasmuch as the flats taken on hire first in point of time would be de-hired first in point of time and then would be in the queue and would be de hired on the opportune time. However, there is no basis on the record to substantiate this contention and it has been only argued for the first time in this Court. 27. It is clear from the record that the notice was issued by the plaintiff's Advocate to the defendants' Advocate at Exh. D on 6th April, 1978 to produce the correspondence between the hires including the list of defence and Naval Officers. Several documents were sought for to be produced which however, were not done by the defendants though their custody with them has not been denied and therefore, certain copies have been produced. Exh. CC dated 24-12-1971 reflects the policy of Government to de-hire the flats in favour of the members of the Armed Forces. The main condition annexed thereto being that the said member should not have any other house for residence and he also would be retiring from the Government service. This policy under the title of de-hiring of houses was thus prevailing at the period of the suit transaction in the year 1970. The first plaintiff is thus substantially corroborated by the documentary evidence. This policy under the title of de-hiring of houses was thus prevailing at the period of the suit transaction in the year 1970. The first plaintiff is thus substantially corroborated by the documentary evidence. The flats in another building Dhanraj Mahal were de-requisitioned in reference to different flats all being in consonance with the Government policy under which between 1971 to 1979 there has been de-hiring or de requisitioning of the premises already occupied by the members of the Armed Forces to enable them to purchase those very flats from the landlords on economic prices in order to settle themselves the officers would deserve that benefit after putting in long duration of duty in service to the nation. The policy no doubt underwent some change when de-hiring was reduced to 10% from the additional accommodation which was available at particular station and it was to be implemented on the formula indicated earlier that the flat taken on hire earlier would be de-hired first. It is clear that the suit premises were taken on hire as back as in 1943 and as such it was not difficult to de-hire the suit premises if there was adequate additional accommodation available in Bombay to house the personnel from the Armed Forces. The lower Appellate Court has rightly held having regard to the community interest between the change of the policy and the one prevailing at the relevant time that the Government policy as reflected in the documents Exhibits CC ad GG would prevail over the Government policy which appears in a Circular Exh. V which contains the said Clause 5. However, it would be presently pointed out that even assuming that Clause 5 becomes operative, even then there has been substantial compliance with the same and as such it is not permissible for the defendants to contend about its infringement. 28. The first plaintiff is, therefore, fully justified when he contends that it is this policy which was then prevailing which promoted him to invest such a large amount especially when he had fully satisfied all the conditions for purchase of said flat and denial of the benefit to him in such an arbitrary manner with not even a semblance of justification has obviously to be discountenanced. All this apart, even on the legal plain there is enough compliance of provisions of Rule 5 of the said Circular when it is fully established that the said transaction was carried through by the first plaintiff with full knowledge of the Naval authorities and it was absolutely a sale transaction with no dubious tinge. Some of the circumstances as also documents fully support the plaintiffs' case about the transaction having been effected not only with the full knowledge but almost with the concurrence which may be atleast tacit. It is on record that one of the seven flats in question was purchased by the son of the then Chief of Staff, Admiral Shri Nanda and this flat so purchased by him was released in his favour in pursuance of the said Government policy. Exh. B dated 10th August, 1975 reflects the payment of rent by the petitioners to the officer Suresh, son of Admiral Shri Nanda in respect of the flat in the suit property and it pertains to the amount of Rs. 410-75 being the rent for the month of July 1975. This flat in fact is located in the same building being flat No. A-8 and the amount is styled as payment of rent. The first plaintiff in his substantive evidence asserted that in fact Admiral Ershnu and Admiral Nanda had assured him verbally that the suit flat would be similarly released by de-hiring him in pursuance of the said Government policy and by recognizing the plaintiff as the landlord of the suit premises he would entitled to receive the rent. Then there is on record letter Exh. EE dated 20th May, 1970 signed by Vice Admiral Krishnan and addressed to the Chief of Naval Staff. It refers to the application by the first plaintiff for release of the flat, which has been forwarded for favourable consideration. The entire recitals are being reproduced as :--- ""The Chief of the Naval Staff, Naval Headquarters, New Delhi, RELEASE OF FLAT---BOMBAY An application from Cdr. M. Ghosh, who is on leave pending retirement is forwarded to Naval Head Quarters for favourable consideration 2. By end of 1970 it is expected that the accommodation situation in Bombay would have eased considerably Moreover, the majority of Naval Officers prefer to stay in Government built accommodation. M. Ghosh, who is on leave pending retirement is forwarded to Naval Head Quarters for favourable consideration 2. By end of 1970 it is expected that the accommodation situation in Bombay would have eased considerably Moreover, the majority of Naval Officers prefer to stay in Government built accommodation. Under the circumstances the release of No. 6 Acropolis will not have any adverse effect on the overall accommodation situation. 3. The release of flat to Cdr. M. Ghosh is therefore strongly recommended. Sd. N. Kishan Vice Admiral."" 29. It is thus manifest that the substantive evidence of the first plaintiff gets reinforcement by this corroborate on as reflected in this document. The timing is material as it was at about the same time when the transaction was effected. The concerned officer had strongly recommended the application of the first plaintiff and the title of the letter is mentioned as ""Release of the Flat."" Further more it also makes it clear that the accommodation situation in Bombay by that time would have eased considerably and as such it would not have any adverse effect on the overall accommodation situation. This latter part is relevant in the context of the earlier rule or policy when the existent accommodation situation was held to be relevant. Therefore, in that behalf also since the situation was not stringent, the recommendation indicated that the release of the said flat would not create any difficulty in housing the other stationed officers. The first part as also the entire tenor of that letter unmistakably establishes that the proposed transaction was brought to the notice of the Naval authorities and in fact it was forwarded to the higher authorities with a strong recommendation in his favour. In the face of this letter it is futile for the first petitioner to contend that they had no knowledge about the transaction. Synchronising of this letter being dated 20th May, 1970 has its own relevance as being in the vicinity of the proposed transaction. A faint but unsuccessful attempt was made by Shri Govilkar, the learned Counsel, to submit that this application is different from the application for loan and this does not necessarily mean that the first plaintiff was intending to purchase the said flat. However, even a cursory perusal of the said letter in its entirety would negative any scope of that contention. However, even a cursory perusal of the said letter in its entirety would negative any scope of that contention. It was the release of this flat which could be only on the basis of intended purchase of the same by the first plaintiff. There is no escape from this conclusion which in turn entails further inevitable conclusion that this sufficiently posted the petitioners with the knowledge about the proposed transaction. It does appear that it was in pursuance of this favourable inclination as disclosed thereto the verbal assurance which was then reflected in this recommendation that the first plaintiff was prompted to apply for loan in order to pay the contribution of Rs. 49,500/- for the purchase of the said flat obviously with the confident hope that the Government would honour the policy and de-hire the premises in his favour as recommended and accept him as landlord and thereby making entitled to receive the rent. Thus the policy and the transaction being in consonance with the policy coupled with the posting of enough knowledge to the authorities is fully established. The first plaintiff has categorically asserted that he had applied for loan and that application was also recommended to the higher authorities. Shri Govilkar, the learned Counsel submits that the said application is not referred. It is, however, submitted by Shri Dudhat, the learned Counsel, that this letter Exh. EE, which refers to the application of the first plaintiff would also impliedly refer not only the release of the flat but also for getting loan from the Government, since both fall in same category because the purchase of the flat would have direct nexus with the prayer for release of the same. This submission is difficult to be ignored and deserves to be accepted. However, apart from this, the record does reveal that the first plaintiff has called upon the defendants to produce various documents as per the notice given and those documents included the said application, which in spite of the said notice have not been produced by the defendants and, therefore, it would not be fair for the defendants to challenge the very existence of such a document under the circumstances. The positive assertion made by the first plaintiff in his evidence is not racked during the cross-examination. The circumstances including the letter Exh. EE supported him and, therefore, his assertion can safely be accepted. 30. The positive assertion made by the first plaintiff in his evidence is not racked during the cross-examination. The circumstances including the letter Exh. EE supported him and, therefore, his assertion can safely be accepted. 30. As stated earlier, the evidence of the Administrator, Shri Deshpande refers to the seven flats which were acquired by the petitioner, were offered to them for sale which they declined and hence those were sold to respective buyers including the first plaintiff and the petitioners have been paying rent to the said six purchasers but made an exception only in respect of the first plaintiff. It is pertinent to note that seven flats were taken on hire by the Government in the year 1943 when the society in question was not even is existence. The lower Appellate Court has rightly expressed a doubt for the reasons assigned by the officer of the Government that the first plaintiff was not accepted as owner only because he had demanded higher rent. This is more so since there was no material whatsoever to support that reason and, therefore, the said Court felt that there was some undisclosed reason which was perhaps inconvenient for the petitioner to bring on record. The camouflage of rent being excessive can be unmasked on a short premise that difference of rent disputed is marginal since the demand is for Rs. 434/- per month whereas before claim it was Rs. 414/-. All this makes the petitioners position quite vulnerable in every respect. It is interesting to note that letter Exh. E. which is already considered indicates that the petitioner offered to purchase right, title and interest of the first plaintiff after receiving the notice from him, which however, was issued not without prejudice and that offer was reiterated whereas the letter Ex. Q offers willingness to pay rent to the first plaintiff but at the same time reflects a very lame excuse that it would not be done so since the purchase transaction was done without knowledge. Curiously this letter found its way for the first time after the institution of the suit. Q offers willingness to pay rent to the first plaintiff but at the same time reflects a very lame excuse that it would not be done so since the purchase transaction was done without knowledge. Curiously this letter found its way for the first time after the institution of the suit. It is suggested by the first plaintiff that he had proceeded on leave preparatory to retirement as and from 5th January, 1970 and he had purchased the flat under the agreement on 31st March, 1970 while in commercial employment and he recommendation was at the time while he was still on leave. 31. Thus on the material placed on record it is fully established that the purchase of the flat by the first plaintiff was not in violation of any Rules and Regulations but in fact was in pursuance of the Government policy; that the authorities had prior knowledge about the proposed transaction which was obviously not dubious but was entered into through reputed dealer and that the application for loan as also one for release of the flat have strongly recommended in favour of the first plaintiff and further more the Naval Officers similarly situated have been extended benefit of the said policy whereas for no apparent reason the first plaintiff has been differentiated which differentiation was not justified on any premise. Consequently it must follow as a corollary that the contention that the acquisition being unauthorised the first plaintiff gets no title or ownership or even any interest must fail. 32. All this apart, it is apparent that this aspect even assuming otherwise would not affect the validity of the transaction of purchase of the flat in any manner in favour of the first plaintiff for obvious reasons that if at all there was any infringement of any Rules and Regulations or the policy it would be the matter entirely restricting within the frame-work of the department out of which may flow any of the consequences such as levying penalty etc. as would be lawfully permissible, but this would not be confused to mean that such infringement would entail into consequence of invalidating the transaction. This deduction is inescapable and therefore, it would be an additional ground to negative the contention raised by Shri Govilkar, the learned Counsel, in that behalf. 33. as would be lawfully permissible, but this would not be confused to mean that such infringement would entail into consequence of invalidating the transaction. This deduction is inescapable and therefore, it would be an additional ground to negative the contention raised by Shri Govilkar, the learned Counsel, in that behalf. 33. Reliance is placed by Shri Govilkar, the learned Counsel, on the decision in (Krishnaraj Jamnadas Modi v. Colaba Land Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. and others)4, 1970 Mh.L.J. 841 in support of the ratio that the member in such a co-operative society does not become owner of the that in question though he gets only a right to occupy and it is on that basis that the learned Counsel submits that the first plaintiff gets no right to demand eviction from the petitioner. The said ration no doubt enunciates the proposition sought to be canvassed when it is observed as :--- ""A member of a Tenant Co-partnership Housing Society by virtue of his complying with all the requirements of the society gets a right to occupy the premises allotted to him irrespective of whether the premises are vacant or not......... The right to occupy which comes to be vested in a member the moment premises are allotted to him can be enforced by the ember against the society as soon as the premises become available for occupation. The legal ownership of the property in a Tenant Co-partnership Housing Society vests in the society and the society has always the right of property in the premises whether they are tenanted by third parties or allotted to the members of the society. On allotment what is transferred to the member is the right to occupy the premises......"" It is further observed as :--- ""The right to occupy which vests in the member on allotment can be enforced by him against the society as soon as the premises become available for occupation. The society cannot deal with or dispose of the premises without the consent of the member and cannot refuse to give possession when available for occupation..."" 34. The society cannot deal with or dispose of the premises without the consent of the member and cannot refuse to give possession when available for occupation..."" 34. Though it is true that the ration lays down that the property in the premises or the ownership of the flat in question in such a society continues to remain with the society and does not vest in the member though the latter gets only a right to occupation and therefore, assuming that the first plaintiff does not become member of the flat in question in that sense, still it would hardly change the complexion of the situation for more than one reason. In the first place the definition of a landlord under section 5(3) of the Rent Act is wide enough to embrace the case of the first plaintiff under the circumstances even accepting his limited status as laid down in the said ratio. The second aspect is that though he may not become owner in that sense, still not only he gets a right of occupation but he can enforce such a right against the society as soon as the premises are available for occupation. The society also cannot deal with or dispose of the premises without his consent and it also cannot refuse to give possession. This also indicates the concept of his right even with reference to the occupation of the premises which he can not only insist but he can proceed for its enforcement if possession is to given to him. It is his consent which would be necessary to deal with the said flat in any manner. The third aspect, however, accepted under the ratio of the said case furnishes a complete answer to the point canvassed by Shri Govilkar, the learned Counsel. Several questions have been posed by the learned Judge in the said case out of which two are very relevant for this proceeding viz. whether the society holds such premises for the benefit of the member within the meaning of sub-clause (g) of Clause (1) of section 13 of the Rent Act and if so whether the society can adopt proceeding for recovery of possession of such premises under those provisions on the ground that the premises are reasonably and bona fide required by the member to whom such premises are allotted. Both these questions are answered in the affirmative after taking survey of the relevant provisions as also the ratios in some judicial pronouncements. The learned Single Judge then observed as :--- ""As on allotment of premises to a member of the tenant Co-partnership Housing Society the member gets a right to occupy, the society must be held to hold the premises for the benefit of the member within the meaning of section 13(1)(g), Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act and the society can sue the tenant to recover possession on the ground of bona fide requirement of the member. The fact that the society has disposed of similar accommodation will not come in the way as the member gets a right to occupy the specific premises allotted to him. The fact that the society has asked the tenant to attorn to the member or the fact that the member himself brings a suit for eviction will not alter the position as the ownership vests in the society and not in the member."" The learned Single Judge has analysed the provisions of section 13(1)(g) of the Rent Act and relying on the second part it is held that the requirement thereunder is that the plaintiff must hold the suit premises for the benefit of another person. Proceeding on this footing it was then held that as on the date of allotment the member gets a right to occupy the premises as against the society which right he can enforce against the society as soon as the premises are vacant and then the society can not deal with the premises otherwise than in accordance with his desire then it follows that ""on and from the date of allotment, the society continues to hold such premises for the benefit of the member"". In the ultimate analysis it was held that the society can successfully maintain a suit for eviction under section 13(1)(g) on the ground that the suit premises are reasonably and bona fide required for the occupation of its member and if such requirement is established then the decree for eviction would follow. In the ultimate analysis it was held that the society can successfully maintain a suit for eviction under section 13(1)(g) on the ground that the suit premises are reasonably and bona fide required for the occupation of its member and if such requirement is established then the decree for eviction would follow. The total effect of this ratio, therefore, as reflected in the affirmative answer to those questions posed therein would make it very clear on its application of the facts of the instant case that the society i.e. plaintiff No. 2 can successfully maintain a suit against the petitioner under section 13(1)(g) of the Rent Act on the ground that its member i.e. the first plaintiff reasonably and bona fide required the suit premises. Significantly notices are issued also by the society and the suit is filed not only by the first plaintiff but also by the second plaintiff society claiming possession from the petitioner. Therefore, in the first instant for the reasons already assigned, the first plaintiff-member himself can maintain such a suit on his own on acquiring status of a landlord, which would be notwithstanding his not acquiring status as an owner in the strict sense on the basis of the said ratio. However, even assuming otherwise, the society at least is fully competent to maintain such a suit under section 13(1)(g) and that is precisely what has been done by the society in the instant case. The said contention raised by Shri Govilkar, the learned Counsel, therefore, deserves to be negatived. 35. Some reliance was placed on the ratio in (Ramesh Himmatlal Shah v. Harsukh Jadhavji Joshi)5, 77 Bom.L.R. 549 when the Supreme Court elaborating the concept of right of member observed that the right or interest to occupy the flat in a tenant co-partnership housing society is liable to attachment and sale in execution of decree against a member in whose favour or whose benefit the same has been allotted by the society and this right or interest to occupy such a flat is a special of property. This ratio has been considered by the learned Single Judge in Colaba Tenant Co-partnership Housing Society's case cited (supra) and this need not detain us since it does not change the complexion of situation. 36. This ratio has been considered by the learned Single Judge in Colaba Tenant Co-partnership Housing Society's case cited (supra) and this need not detain us since it does not change the complexion of situation. 36. Shri Govilkar, the learned Counsel, then sought to rely on the ratio in (S.R.B. Gaikwad v. The Union of India and others)6, A.I.R. 1977 Bombay 220 mainly in support of his proposition that the premises in question do not lose their character as public premises and a faint endeavour was made to expand this proposition further to submit that only the provisions of the Public Premises Act would be applicable and thereby to the exclusion of the provisions of the Rent Act. It is true that the petitioner therein, could fall in the same category as that of the present first plaintiff and facts and circumstances in which the flat came to be allotted to him can be termed as similar to those at hand. The petitioner therein was also serving in Armed Forces and he was allotted a flat in a building, which was taken out on lease by M/s. Grison Engineering by the Defence Department on behalf of the Governor General. The petitioner was then allotted a flat in the said building when he was posted in Bombay. A similar situation arose when the buildings were purchased by Housing Co-operative Society named as Colaba Land Co-operative Housing Society Limited. There also the society had offered for sale all the flats to the Central Government, which held those as tenant but the offer was declined. The petitioner was re-employed after retirement and it is in the meanwhile even before retirement that he was allotted the flat in question. Though by that time he had applied for membership of the society vis-a-vis the same flat, which was accepted after his retirement but equally after he was re-employed. The rental was being said to the society. A motion after was made by the petitioner to de-hire the said flat in consonance with the policy which is on the same footing as in the instant case. Thereafter he resigned from the service. By reason of change of the policy, the allotment of flat in question was cancelled and he was called upon to vacate the premises. A motion after was made by the petitioner to de-hire the said flat in consonance with the policy which is on the same footing as in the instant case. Thereafter he resigned from the service. By reason of change of the policy, the allotment of flat in question was cancelled and he was called upon to vacate the premises. Though to retaliate, the society and the petitioner as also his wife all issued notice terminating the tenancy of the said tenant. However, a show cause notice was issued as to why order of eviction should not be passed against the petitioner under the Public Premises Act, which was followed by a fresh show cause notice in view of the amendment to the Act and in that proceeding ultimately an order of eviction was passed against the said officer when he was unsuccessful in his appeal before the City Civil Court, and it is that order that was challenged in this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. 37. No doubt some of the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner therein did not find favour with the Court and it is equally correct that this Court in terms held that notwithstanding all these features including the purchase of the flat by the petitioner and the formation of the society, the character of the premises as to be public premises very much continued and it was also further observed as a corollary that the right to possession acquired by the Central Government on taking the said flat on lease does continue to exist and is protected though his lease interest and the estate comes to an end. It was further observed that the loss of contractual security and substitution thereof by the cover of the statutory protection does not affect, at any rate, the kernel i.e. the possessory right which also was the creature of the contractual lease. It was, therefore, held that the premises did not cease to be public premises in spite of the determination of lease since the possessory right created thereunder continued to be vested in the Government. It was, therefore, held that the premises did not cease to be public premises in spite of the determination of lease since the possessory right created thereunder continued to be vested in the Government. It was in that context that it was in the ultimate analysis held and observed as: ""Holding of these possessory rights even in their limited extent by the Government in our opinion, is enough to ensure the continuance of the premises as ""public premises"" within the meaning of section 2(e) of Public Premises Act."" 38. Shri Dudhat, the learned Counsel, however, submits with enough justification that in the first instance the ratio stops at that and what is more important is that the channel in which the proceeding was initiated is entirely different. It is apparent that though the tenancy of the Government was terminated by the society as well as the member, the proceeding that came before this Court did not flow out of any eviction suit filed by both or either of them against the Government and in fact no suit was filed. It was entirely on a different track when a proceeding under the Public Premises Act was initiated, heard, proceeded with and ultimately concluded holding that the petitioner therein was liable to be evicted on account of his unauthorised occupation since he was not entitled to occupy after his retirement. It is in the context of these facts that the germane question about the nature of the premises in the light of the provisions of the Public Premises Act were considered holding that the flat continued to be Public Premises notwithstanding the termination of the tenancy and that was essentially on the ground that the possessory rights did not come to an end. Even accepting this principle, still there is a fundamental difference in the facts of the instant case inasmuch as not only there has been a notice terminating the tenancy but the society as well as the member both have filed a suit for eviction on the ground under section 13(1)(g) of the Rent Act and the Court of competent jurisdiction under section 28 of the Rent Act not only entertained the suit but accepted the reasonable and bona fide requirement as also the issue of comparative hardship in favour of the plaintiff and actually passed a decree for eviction which decree was confirmed in appeal and it is through that channel that the decree is being challenged. This will have to be read in the context of the clear observation of the learned Single Judge cited supra in the earlier petition under which the proceeding under the Public Premises Act has beed stayed and not only that when it was clearly indicated that the fate of the proceeding under the Rent Act would really govern the fate of the said show cause notice under the other Act. It is, therefore, not as if that the Government has sought to recover possession of the premises under the said Act but the possession has already been directed to be given to the two plaintiffs under the provisions of the Rent Act. Therefore, reading the said ratio in such a partial sense would hardly convey the exact purport thereof. Shri Dudhat, the learned Counsel, is therefore, justified in submitting that in view of this differentiating feature the ratio holding the premises as public premises would not affect the validity of the decree in question. 39. However, the learned Counsel has also rightly pointed out that this very ratio in terms makes it explicit that in such cases the provisions of the Rent Act would be squarely applicable. This has been made abundantly clear from various observations as :--- ""............. The contract of lease no doubt gives rise to the estate and interest of the lessee in the property, bare right to possession being only a part of such estate and interest. The determination of the lease, no doubt, puts an end to the contract and such interest and the estate. That must be the necessary consequence and effect of such notice. The determination of the lease, no doubt, puts an end to the contract and such interest and the estate. That must be the necessary consequence and effect of such notice. However, provisions of the Rent Act, afford some protection to the tenants against eviction and prevent such determination of lease from having its full effect............. In spite of the determination of such lease and incapacity of the tenant and the landlord to enforce the terms of the contract, the ex-tenant actually happens to enjoy still, what once was the fruit and the product of the same contractual lease........."" The further part of the observation is more relevant and which reads as :--- ""............. In other words, the entire interest covered by the possessory right created by the contract does not come to an end with determination of the lease, but part of it at any rate i.e. the bare right to remain in possession still survives and is protected by the statute......."" 40. It is not necessary to reproduce all such observations which are more less on the same pattern. It would thus be manifestly clear that it is only on the basis of the continuation of the possessory right that the character of the premises has been held to be public premises even after determination of the tenancy, though it has been made clear that this right to possess the premises is fully protected by the Rent Act, which impliedly indicates that but for any proceeding under the Rent Act, such right would remain intact with the counter part that if a proceeding is initiated under the Rent Act such right can came to an end if the plaintiff is entitled on merits to a decree for possession. This ratio, therefore, if read in proper perspective supports the case made out by the plaintiffs rather than the petitioner. In any event the said contention advanced by Shri Govilkar, the learned Counsel, in this behalf also deserves to be rejected. 41. In support of the contention that any alleged deficiency in the agreement between the society and the member vis-a-vis purchase and allotment of the flat and certain rights being bestowed on the member would not render the said transaction illegal or void, Shri Dudhat, the learned Counsel, inferentially relied on the ratio in (Mahomad Hussain Kasambhai Mansuri v. J.K. Trivedi)7, 54 Bom.L.R. 659. No doubt the question there pertained to the provisions of section 6 of the Bombay Land Requisition Act under which it was necessary to intimate the Government before creating any tenancy. However, in that behalf it has been observed that failure to give such intimation or failure to get permission from the Government though would amount to contravention of that provision would not make the transaction void since it only penalises the action of the landlord in creating tenancy without permission of the Government, which however, does not mean that no such right is created between the parties. The contention challenging the validity of the transaction on account of the infringement of such provision was thus negatived on which basis it is reiterated by Shri Dudhat, the learned Counsel, that any such deficiency of the transaction between the society and the member cannot invalidate the said transaction. However, more reliance is placed on this ratio to substantiate the other claim that even assuming that there is breach of Rule 5 on the assumption that the flat has been purchased without permission or without knowledge of the Naval Officer still it would not invalidate the said transaction, as at the most it may incur into other consequences on per with levying penalty. The contention in that behalf, therefore, even on the assumption that there is infringement of the said rule must be upheld. This aspect has been elaborately dealt with earlier. 42. In support of his contention on the question of the effect of non-registration of the agreement between the society and the member, Shri Dudhat, the learned Counsel, relied to some extent on the ratio of the Full Bench decision in (Mulshankar Kunverji Gor other v. Juvansinhji Shivubha Jadaja)8, 1979 Gujarat L.R. (Vol. XX)878. This according to him, lays down proposition that such a document did not require compulsory registration. It is submitted that this document in the wake of the controversy between the parties should not be treated as a conveyance in deciding the title of the landlord but can be conveniently treated as the document establishing the factum of allotment of flat to the first petitioner on his being admitted as a member. The society in question admittedly falls in the category as co-partnership housing society. The society in question admittedly falls in the category as co-partnership housing society. The question referred to the Full Bench in the said decision was whether any registered document is necessary in favour of any transferee for transferring the superstructure standing on the land allotted by any co-operative society in favour of any of its member. The Court indicated an affirmative answer if the land and the structure belong, in the eye of law, to the co-operative society and in the negative if both or any one belong to the particular person. However, it was observed that in such cases in the matter of transfer of shares compulsory registration is not necessary on account of exemption in Clause (a) of section 42 and it is further observed that in the case of tenant co-operative partnership society a transfer of shares which necessarily carries within the transfer of member's interest in the property allotted can be brought about without a registered instrument because section 2(a) carves to an exception to the rule emaciated in section 17(1) of Registration Act. According to Shri Dudhat, the learned Counsel, even as per the contention of the petitioner the first plaintiff is not owner of the flat in question as the ownership vests and continues to vest only in the society. The society had purchased the building that was already constructed on the plot. Consequently in case of such a society and the member, any agreement between the two would not require any registration as such. It is strenuously submitted by Shri Dudhat, the learned Counsel, which is indicated earlier, that significantly the six owners who fall in the same category have been recognized with their right to receive rent from the petitioner and were accepted as landlords though the first plaintiff was made an exception and all this was done under one Resolution only for which there is obviously no rational. However, the thrust of the submission is that the agreement between those six officers, who were allotted those flat and the society, were equally not registered and even then no protest was made at any time and the transaction was accepted, which apart from the bias and discrimination, also indicates that the petitioner accepted that no registration is necessary. All these submissions, therefore, deserve to be upheld. Shri Govilkar's contention in that behalf must topple down. 43. All these submissions, therefore, deserve to be upheld. Shri Govilkar's contention in that behalf must topple down. 43. The survey of all these features and the findings on those aspects being recorded against the petitioner would thus clear the way to consider the residuary aspect about the plaintiffs' properly making out case on merits under section 13(1)(g) and 13(2) of the Rent Act. In fact once all these features are answered in favour of the plaintiffs, those residuary ones hardly pose any difficulty since the facts are so glaring which could equally hardly admit of any debate. The first plaintiff has asserted that he has settled down in Bombay and he has no other residential accommodation. Both these aspects are not controverted by the petitioner in any manner. That he has retired from the Navy and has thus settled down in Bombay is fully borne out by record and also by fact that even prior to retirement, on the even of and even thereafter he has continued to occupy the flat in question, is indicative of the said fact and this is reinforced by further aspect that he has been accepted as member in the society under the bye-laws. That he has no other accommodation is an assertion, which has remained unchallenged. Consequently therefore, no oblique motive can be attributable, though Shri Govilkar, the earned Counsel, made a faint attempt to suggest that the first plaintiff may be inclined to sell the flat and thereby make monetary gain. There is hardly any foundation to substantiate this suggestion and in fact this aspect is not seriously agitated and, therefore, can be safely ignored. Thus, the first plaintiff required the said premises for his personal occupation is more than adequately established. That his requirement is reasonable and bona fide also cannot admit of any debate since it is also fully established on record particularly when the assertion of oath at the trial has prosaically gone unchallenged. It is also clear that this officer after retirement has invested substantial amount of his savings, which obviously was to meet the basic requirement of residential premises in the city. The evidence also discloses that first plaintiff's wife is keeping indisposed health and she requires bare minimum comforts of a modest residential quarter. The family has also children. It is also clear that this officer after retirement has invested substantial amount of his savings, which obviously was to meet the basic requirement of residential premises in the city. The evidence also discloses that first plaintiff's wife is keeping indisposed health and she requires bare minimum comforts of a modest residential quarter. The family has also children. Even the policy of the Government to which reference is already made is in consonance with the transmontane to which reference is already made is in consonance with the transformation of possession from the status of allottee to that of owner of landlord. This aspect, therefore, hardly requires any further elaboration and in fact the fulfilment of requirement of section 13(1)(g) has not been seriously challenged on behalf of the petitioner in any of the courts below and also not on this forum. It also cannot be overlooked that there is a concurrent finding of fact on this issue flowing out of the process of appreciation of evidence, which is thus an additional factor to uphold the claim of the first plaintiff in that behalf. It is needless, therefore, to refer to various ratios on the concept of bona fide and reasonable requirement since those are based on the settled principles, one such being that the assertion of the landlord in that behalf should not be viewed at the threshold itself with any distrust but on the contrary it can be accepted as genuine one unless the circumstances destroy the same. The concept of family unit also cannot be allowed to be disrupted. It is impossible even to inferentially contend that the claim is fanciful or imaginary. Both the courts below, therefore, are fully justified in holding the claim being established under section 13(1)(g) of the Rent Act, which is not seriously controverted even on this forum. 44. The only aspect, therefore, pertains to the issue of comparative hardship as envisaged by section 13(2). Both the courts below even on that count, have recorded a firm finding in favour of the first plaintiff holding that between the two greater hardship would be caused to the plaintiffs, if the decree for eviction is refused. This concurrent finding of fact also is not available for reassessment in this limited jurisdiction. This apart, on merits also it is fully justified. This concurrent finding of fact also is not available for reassessment in this limited jurisdiction. This apart, on merits also it is fully justified. Shri Govilkar, the learned Counsel, no doubt tried to suggest that Government is in capacity as a tenant and when it claims that it requires this flat for accommodating the officers the issue of hardship should normally be titled in favour of Government rather than a citizen. Such a generalised proposition cannot be upheld since its validity depends on facts of each case. It is suggested by the first plaintiff that having regard to the material it was apparent that there was no shortage of accommodation, which he has stated on the basis of the strength of the officers and the probable accommodation in constructions being available. This suggests that increase in the strength of this cadre has been well met with proportionate accommodation having been provided for. It is asserted by the first plaintiff that several flats have been de-hired during this period and in spite of the notice being issued the petitioners have not produced the record in that behalf. Most of the hired flats are located in this city ad de-hiring of many of those would be a pointer to negative the petitioner's claim that de-hiring of first plaintiff's flat only would cause hardship to the other officers. As stated, under identical conditions those other flats of the said officers have been desired in their favour making exception only in respect of the first plaintiff. Even some of the flats, which have been requisitioned have been de-requisitioned or de-hired. The petitioners have not produced adequate material to substantiate their claim in this behalf with reference to the officers waiting in the queue and the accommodation available. It is asserted by the plaintiff that apart from the Government policy several flats have been de-hired almost in arbitrary manner. The evidence of Commander Malhotra has been tendered in that behalf though it does not substantiate the claim of the petitioner. Though according to him since 1972 about 52 flat have been constructed for Naval Officers in Bombay and which are located mostly in South Colaba locality and since then there were actually 252 flats under construction as being earmarked for Married Officers' Accommodation Quarters and which construction would complete by year 1979, he qualifies that the strength of the Naval Officers was increasing. The suit is instituted in the year 1970 while decreed was passed by the Court of first instance in 1978. The so-called change in the policy of Government was effected in the year 1978. The letter Exh. EE has already been referred to which makes it very clear that the recommendation of the proposal to de-hire the flat of the first plaintiff was also pressed on the assessment of the concerned officer that there would be no shortage of accommodation for the Naval Officers. It is indicated in the evidence that large amounts are being spent for such constructions to accommodate the Officers and in the context of process of de-hiring several flats coupled with their own assessment that de-hiring of those flats would not affect the accommodation problem. It is difficult to spell out any hardship in favour of the petitioners. The abrupt change in policy has also no rationale. Thus considered even making allowance having regard to the peculiar fact that it is the Government who are tenants, the issue of comparative hardship must tilt in favour of the first plaintiff, who would be practically thrown on the street in case decree for eviction is refused, whereas having regard to the prevailing situation, there would hardly be any inconvenience much less hardship to the petitioner, especially when there is enough accommodation to house the Armed Force Officers. As observed in the (State of Maharashtra v. Ashmabai Udata and others)9, 1977 U.C.R. (Bom.) 160 : 1979 Bombay Rent Cases 18, it would not be very difficult for the Government to find other accommodation and the question of hardship can be legitimately decided in favour of the landlord. This is more so when the material on record fully justifies that in fact no hardship would be caused to the Government by losing this flat. The observations of the courts below, therefore, can be safely endorsed in this category. Consequently this issue also must unmistakably tilt in favour of the plaintiff. 45. This is more so when the material on record fully justifies that in fact no hardship would be caused to the Government by losing this flat. The observations of the courts below, therefore, can be safely endorsed in this category. Consequently this issue also must unmistakably tilt in favour of the plaintiff. 45. Apart from all these features, the additional one is to the effect, which has ben already indicated though in the other context the society has also joined itself as the plaintiff and on the basis of the judicial pronouncements referred to earlier, it is clear that the society can ask for the possession of the flat for the benefit of its member and from that point of view the requirements of section 13(1)(g) are fully established since it is the obligation of society to give possession of the flat or to allow the member to continue its possession if already allotted as member can enforce that right again the society. Form that point of view, therefore, the society being of the plaintiffs its bona fide and reasonable requirement stands established independently and on its own. The same would apply to the question under section 13(2) about the comparative hardship, though member's hardship would impliedly be engulfed in that category. The society obviously cannot provide for any other accommodation to its member. This additional aspect therefore, would conclude the chapter against the petitioner. 46. Shri Dudhat, the learned Counsel, also endeavoured to press into service the ground of delay and laches on the part of the petitioner and enumerated some such items therein. Thus for instance, the petition was not filed without any delay and some vague statements were made with reference to the receipt of certified copies. Some wrong statements purported to have been made at times as regards the notice issued by the plaintiff. A grievance was made that notice under section 4 of the Public Premises Act was cancelled by the petitioner though it was duly replied and even after the hearing no order was passed. It was also contended that the petitioners made incorrect statement about there being no proceeding initiated under the Public Premises Act in this Court in order to obtain an ex parte order of injunction. It was also contended that the petitioners made incorrect statement about there being no proceeding initiated under the Public Premises Act in this Court in order to obtain an ex parte order of injunction. A grievance was also made that deliberate wrong statements were made to confuse the issue suggesting that the first plaintiff had all the intention to dispose of the property which is indicated from the fact that he had withdrawn the undertaking given to this Court in the other petition. It is unnecessary to multiply these illustrations some of which are relied upon to suggests suppression of certain facts. All these contentions are countered by Shri Govilkar, the learned Counsel, on merits stoutly denying that there has been any suppression. About the delay it has been stated that having regard to the procedural formalities as the matter has to be tossed from one office to another some time was bound to be consumed. Since the plaintiffs are succeeding on the substantial points, this aspect really would not change the complexion of situation either way and, therefore, it is necessary to probe into the same and to decide it one way or the other. It would, however, be legitimate to observed that so far as the suggestion based on the withdrawal of the undertaking by the first plaintiff, there is hardly any substance as contended by Shri Govilkar, because the said undertaking was only during the pendency of the petition and it got itself exhausted by virtue of disposal of the said petition. This cannot be twisted to be interpreted against the plaintiffs. All these features, therefore, are really incidental. 47. Having considered and examined all these features in proper perspective, I have no reservation to hold that the validity of the decree is not open to any challenge at all and the same deserves to be endorsed on all counts. Consequently, the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 245 of 1983 must fail. 48. As regards the companion Writ Petition No. 2486 of 1983, which is preferred by the first plaintiff raising challenge it the finding only on the question of rental default, it is difficult to upset the finding recorded by the lower Appellate Court, which is more cogent in preference to that of the trial Court. 48. As regards the companion Writ Petition No. 2486 of 1983, which is preferred by the first plaintiff raising challenge it the finding only on the question of rental default, it is difficult to upset the finding recorded by the lower Appellate Court, which is more cogent in preference to that of the trial Court. As stated, the trial Court held that the petitioner were in rental default or more that six months and since the amount was not remitted within one month after the notice nor any application for fixation of standard rent was preferred within the said period a decree under section 12(3)(a) was followed. This has not been accepted by the lower Appellate Court on the ground that the petitioners were not in arrears for more than six months or more and in any event they cannot be said to be not ready and willing to pay the rental amount. Since this aspect, in view of the finding on the other issue entailing into a decree for eviction in favour of the plaintiffs, becomes more academic and, therefore, a detailed discussion is unnecessary. The plaintiffs have claimed rental arrears with effect from 1st May, 1970 at the rate of Rs. 430-11/- per month. It is in evidence that the petitioners had tendered the said amount to plaintiff No. 2 Society, which latter had declined and insisted that it must be paid to the first plaintiff. I does appear that both the plaintiffs, who claimed joint interest in the cause of action in the suit thus could not claim this default as a ground when the petitioners have tendered the rent in full to plaintiff No. 2 Society, who had by then declined to accept the rent, though the Society had attorned the tenancy to the first plaintiff, by their notice dated 27th June, 1970, which attornment was to take effect from 1st May, 1970. It also cannot be overlooked that in between, the petitioners in September 1970 called upon the first plaintiff to vacate the premises under the provisions of Public Premises Act it is only thereafter that a joint notice was issued by both the plaintiffs. It is fully borne out by the record that plaintiff No. 2 society had actually received the rent for the months of May and June 1970 from the petitioners as is clear from letter Exh. It is fully borne out by the record that plaintiff No. 2 society had actually received the rent for the months of May and June 1970 from the petitioners as is clear from letter Exh. A dated March 13, 1970 addressed by the Society to the petitioner, though the society returned the cheque which had covered the rent for the period of two months. It also appears that plaintiff No. 2 in turn after the receipt of the said amount had tendered it to the first plaintiff, who on this own refused to accept the same on the ground that it should have been directly paid to him. This refusal was prior to the issuance of the termination of notice dated 30th November, 1970. The plaintiffs' claim in the notice was for the period of seven months out of which the rent for two months was already tendered which under the circumstances could not be said to be invalid tender. The lower Appellate Court, therefore, has rightly held that the petitioners were in fact not in arrears of rent for six months or more. The correspondence produced on record and which is discussed elaborately by the lower Appellate Court makes it very clear that the petitioners were always ready and willing to pay rental amount to plaintiff No. 2 though the insistence was that it should be directly paid to plaintiff No. 1. This is to be read in the context of the petitioner's claim that they had challenged the status of the first plaintiff though they had acceded to the status of the society end were willing to pay the society. No doubt, the petitioner had taken a stand that the demand of rent at the rate of Rs. 430.11 is excessive and the courts below have held that it was not so. It is true that in the year 1965 to 1967 the rent was at the rate of Rs. 414-50 but, however, there have been permitted increase since about 1968 onwards and, therefore, it was really not open for the petitioner to claim that the said rent of Rs. 430-10/- per month was excessive. It is true that in the year 1965 to 1967 the rent was at the rate of Rs. 414-50 but, however, there have been permitted increase since about 1968 onwards and, therefore, it was really not open for the petitioner to claim that the said rent of Rs. 430-10/- per month was excessive. However, the record reveals that after filing of the suit as per the orders of the Court the petitioners have been depositing regularly all the amounts even at the rate as demanded and as directed by the Court and their has been no default as such. Even examining the tender at the rate of Rs. 404-93/- it cannot be said that there was no readiness or willingness on the part of the petitioner to pay the rent or that they have been wilful defaulters within the meaning of section 12 of the Rent Act. Consequently even accepting that the rent demanded at particular rate was not excessive it would not change the complexion of the situation. 49. The combined result of this discussion would be that under the circumstances the case would not fall under either of the two Clause (a) or (b) of sub-section (3) of section 12 of the Rent Act and, therefore, the finding recorded by the lower Appellate Court is fully justified on merits. Consequently the petitioner in the said writ petition, who is the first plaintiff in the suit, must fail. 50. It would not burden the record if a note with a lingering thought is appended that having regard to all the shades of the material it would have been more in the fitness of things and fairness carrying with it fragrance of grace if the Government had not agitated this proceeding right upto this forum allowing a Naval Officer who had thus faithfully served the nation for several years to settle down in the premises and to modestly enjoy the fruits without carrying any anxiety for further days in the midst of his family members. Writ Petition No. 245 of 1983. Rules discharged with cost. Then decree recorded by the trial Court and confirmed by the lower Appellate Court endorsed. Writ Petition No. 4286 of 1983. Rule discharged with no order as to costs. -----