JUDGMENT : S. J. Hyder, J. - Plaintiff-opposite party no. 1 filed the suit, out of which this revision arises, for eviction of the defendants. It was based on multiple grounds permissible for such a suit under section 11 of Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Plaintiff states that defendant no. 1 is his tenant and he has unlawfully sublet it to defendant no. 2. It was also disclosed in the plaint that the building was needed bona fide by the plaintiff for personal use and occupation. 2. Defendant no. 1 appeared before the trial court on October 10, 1983 and filed his written statement. Time had been granted to defendant no. 2 to file his written statement by October 24, 1983. On that date he made a motion that time so granted for filing written statement may be extended. On the said date the trial court realised that one of the grounds alleged in the statement of claim filed by the plaintiff-opp. party no. 1 was her personal necessity. By its ORDER :dated October 24, 1983, it directed that since defendant no 1 had not obtained any permission to contest the suit on the said ground in accordance with sub-section (4) of Section 14 of thy Act, defendant no. 1 will be deemed to have accepted the correctness of the ground alleged by the plaintiff/opposite party no. 1. In the said ORDER :the trial court also observed that it will be open to defendant no. 1 to contest the suit in respect of other grounds. At the same time, the trial court granted time to defendant no. 2 to file a written statement. 3. The present revision is directed against the ORDER :of the trial court dated October 24, 1983. The validity of the said ORDER :has been strongly assailed on behalf of defendant no. 1. In short, the argument advanced on behalf of the defendant-applicant is that two procedures cannot be followed in one and the same suit. It is pressed upon me that it is not possible to apply the procedure contained in Section 14 of the Act in respect of the grounds mentioned in clauses (c) and (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the Act and a different procedure in relation to other grounds mentioned in subsection (1) of Section 11 of the Act. 4. 4. In ORDER :to appreciate the controversy in this revision certain developments in law concerning eviction of tenants of buildings may be noticed. The general law governing tenancy including those of buildings is confined in Chapter V of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The law of tenancy contained in the said Act is one sided and is loaded in favour of the landlord. State enactments apart, all that a landlord the Transfer of Property Act is required to do, is to institute a suit for ejectment of a tenant after giving him 15 days clear notice terminating his tenancy with the expiry of the month of tenancy. 5. A process of change was set in motion even by the Raj. It was realised that some relief to tenants against threat of eviction from buildings was necessary. In the beginning relief as given to the tenants by ORDER :s passed under the Defence of India Act and the Rules framed thereunder by the District Magistrates. The solution of problem was found to be inadequate. After 1947, State Legislature had to enact different legislations protecting tenants from arbitrary ejectment, enhancement of rent and other incidental matters. This position continued to subsist for sufficiently long time. The State enactments which were mostly temporary in nature were found to be inadequate to deal with the problem. 6. It may be stated that the protection given to the tenants by the different State enactment gave a pretext to some tenants to prolong their occupation through diverse proceedings in the courts. Some of these legislations were so patently defective to cope with the problem that the apex court was compelled to observe that they provided a merry go round of litigation. 7. It gradually came to be realised that right was not always on the side of the tenant. It further dawned upon the authority that in all cases it could not be said that tenants were always "have not" and the landlords could not in all cases be characterised as "haves". Often cases came before the courts in which a desperate landlord was prevented by a cunning tenant from obtaining possession over his building during his own lifetime. The clamour for simplifying, the law relating to letting of buildings, therefore, increased. The Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act (XVI of 1977) lapsed on March, 31, 1981. Often cases came before the courts in which a desperate landlord was prevented by a cunning tenant from obtaining possession over his building during his own lifetime. The clamour for simplifying, the law relating to letting of buildings, therefore, increased. The Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act (XVI of 1977) lapsed on March, 31, 1981. After sometime the legislature remained inactive until Ordinance 63 of 1982 was promulgated by the Governor of Bihar which was to act retrospectively from April 1, 1981. The Bihar Ordinance 53 of 1983 was replaced by the Act of 1982. This Act not only repealed the Ordinance but also operated retrospectively from April 1, 1982. This Act of 1982 which is practically a replica of Ordinance 63 of 1982. Minor difference between the two enactments are of no relevance for the decision of this revision. 8. The Bihar Legislature for the first time sought to give relief to landlords in certain matters, The State Legislature could not remain in impervious to the current of thought in legal circles and, thus, enacted the provisions now contained in Sections 13 and 14 of the Act for the first time under the Act (or the Ordinance 63 of 1982). However, before dealing with the subject matter of Sections 13 and 14 of the Act it would be proper to make a short survey of the law contained in Section 11 of the Act. 9. The above section begins within non obstante clause and lays down that no decree in a suit for ejectment of a tenant shall be executed unless the same had been obtained on one or more of the grounds mentioned in subsection (1) of Section 11 of the Act. In so far buildings are concerned, the grounds on which a tenant can be evicted is confined to clauses (a) to (f) of sub-section (1) of section 11 of the Act. Ordinarily the procedure in a suit to enforce one of the grounds mentioned in clauses (a) to (f) of sub-section (1) section 11 of the Act against a tenant may be considered to be governed by the provisions contained in the Code of Civil Procedure. This, as I will presently show, is not so. 10. Ordinarily the procedure in a suit to enforce one of the grounds mentioned in clauses (a) to (f) of sub-section (1) section 11 of the Act against a tenant may be considered to be governed by the provisions contained in the Code of Civil Procedure. This, as I will presently show, is not so. 10. The Legislature in its wisdom has prescribed a different procedure for enforcing a claim of ejectment in relation to the ground contained in clauses (c) and (e) of section 11 (1) of the Act. A claim for eviction of a tenant on anyone of these two grounds can be enforced through the machinery of law contained in the provisions of section 14 of the Act. 11. Before proceeding further in the matter it would be proper to set out the relevant portion of clauses (c) and (e) of sub-section (1) of section 11 of the Act. "(c) Where the building is reasonably and in good faith required by the landlord for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the building is held by the landlord : Provided that where the Court thinks that the reasonable requirement of such occupation may be substantially satisfied by evicting the tenant from a part only of the building and allowing the tenant to continue occupation of the rest and the tenant agrees to such occupation, the Court shall pass a decree accordingly, and fix proportionately fair rent for the portion in occupation of the tenant which portion shall henceforth constitute the building within the meaning of clause (b) of section 2 and the rent so fixed shall be deemed to be the fair rent fixed under section 5 : xx xx xx xx "(e) in case of a tenant holding on a lease for a specified period, on the expiry of the period of the tenancy". 12. Now Section 13 of the Act lays down that the provisions of law contained in section 14 or of any rule made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained elsewhere in the Act or in any other law for the time being in force. It will be in the fitness of things to reproduce the Section 14 in extenso. I am adopting this course in ORDER :to highlight the matters which arise in resolving the controversy before me in this revision. It will be in the fitness of things to reproduce the Section 14 in extenso. I am adopting this course in ORDER :to highlight the matters which arise in resolving the controversy before me in this revision. Section 14 of the Act reads as under:- "14. Special procedure for disposal of cases for eviction on ground of bonafide requirement: (1) Every suit by a landlord for the recovery of possession of any premises on the grounds specified in clause (c) or (e) of sub-section or of Section 11 shall be dealt with in accordance with the procedure specified in this section. (2) The Court shall issue summons in the prescribed form in every suit referred in sub-section (1) without delay. (3) (i) The Court shall in addition to, and simultaneously with, the issue of summons for service on the tenant or tenants, also direct the summons to be served by registered post with acknowledgement due, addressed to the tenant or his agent empowered to accept the service at the place where the tenant or his agent actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain and may, if the circumstances of the case so require also direct the publication of the summons in the official gazette or in the newspaper circulating in the locality, in which the tenant is last known to have resided or carrying on business or personally worked for gain. (ii) When an acknowledgement purporting to be signed by the tenant or his agent is received back with an endorsement purporting to have been made by postal employee to the effect that the tenant or his agent has refused to take delivery of the registered article, the Court may declare that there has been a valid service of summons. (4) The tenant on whom summons is duly served (whether by ordinary mail or by registered post) shall not contest the prayer for eviction from the premises unless he files an affidavit stating the ground on which he seeks to make such contest and obtain leave from the Court as hereinafter provided; and in default of the appearance in pursuance of the summons or his obtaining such leave the statement made by the landlord in the suit for eviction shall be deemed to be admitted by the tenant and the landlord shall be entitled to an ORDER :for eviction on the ground aforesaid. (5) The Court shall give to the tenant leave to contest the suit if the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an ORDER :for eviction on the grounds specified in clauses (c) and (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 11. (6) When leave is granted to the tenant to contest the suit, the latter may, within fifteen days from the date of the ORDER :, pray after filing the requisite court fee required for a written statement that the affidavit may be treated as the written statement or if he chooses to file a separate written statement he may do so within fifteen days of the grant of leave to contest the suit and if he does not file the written statement within the period he shall not be allowed to do so later. The Court shall thereafter commence the hearing of the suit as early as practicable. (7) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908) or any other law, the Court while hearing a suit under this Section shall follow the practice and procedure of a court of Small Causes including the recording of evidence. (8) No appeal or second appeal shall lie against an ORDER :for the recovery of possession of any premises made in accordance with procedure specified in this section: Provided that on an application being made within sixty days of the date of the ORDER :of eviction. the High Court may, for the purpose of satisfying itself that an ORDER :under the section is according to law, call for the records of the case and pass such ORDER :in respect thereto as it thinks fit. (9) Where an application has been made to the High Court in revision as laid down in sub-section (8) above, the Court, which passed the ORDER :for eviction may exercise the powers of review in accordance with the provisions of ORDER :XLV 11 of the first Schedule in the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (V of 1908) : Provided that no such review shall be made unless an application is filed for the same within ninety days of the date of ORDER :of eviction." 11. A bare perusal of Section 14 of the Act goes to show that it applies to a suit for eviction filed by a landlord only on two of the grounds mentioned in Section 11. A suit based on the remaining grounds contained in sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the Act is not subject to the provisions of Section 14 of the Act. Moreover the procedure prescribed in Section 14 of the Act is more stringent and summary in nature than the procedure prescribed for the trial of the suits under the Code of Civil Procedure. The proceeding in a suit governed by this Section commences on the basis of a summon issued to the defendant in the prescribed form. Moreover, the defendant is required to obtain leave of the court to defeat the claim of ejectment and, for this purpose, he is required to file an affidavit. The court mayor may not grant leave to the defendant to defend the suit. If he omits to obtain the leave of the court within the stipulated time, the defendant is deemed to have admitted the claim of the plaintiff. A decree in a suit governed by Section 14 is not appellable and only a revision lies against the said decree to the High Court. In other respect also the defendant in a suit governed by section 14 of the Act has been placed in a straight jacket from which it is difficult for him to wriggle out and delay the ultimate outcome of the suit. There is thus, no doubt that Section 14 of the Act prescribes a more speedy remedy to a landlord to achieve his ultimate goal of seeking the eviction of a sitting tenant. The procedure in a suit governed by the Code of• Civil Procedure is of more detailed nature. It is more time consuming. 12. It has already been pointed out that Section 14 covers only the suits for eviction filed against a tenant on the ground specified in clauses (c) and (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the Act. The question which calls for consideration is what happens if a suit is filed by a landlord on multiple grounds inclusive of one or both the grounds mentioned in clauses (c) and (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the Act. The question which calls for consideration is what happens if a suit is filed by a landlord on multiple grounds inclusive of one or both the grounds mentioned in clauses (c) and (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the Act. On behalf of the defendant-applicant it has been contended that such a suit will be governed by the ordinary procedure and the procedure prescribed under Section 14 of the Act shall not be taken into account while deciding the suit. Learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff-opposite party, however, does not accept the contention. He submits that the adjudication of the grounds for eviction not covered by clauses (c) and (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 14 would be governed by the ordinary procedure. According to him the procedure in relation to the grounds contained in clauses (c) and (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the Act will be regulated by the procedure prescribed by Section 14. In this view of the matter, where a suit is based on clauses (c) and (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the Act and in respect of one or more remaining clauses of subsection (1) of Section 11 of the Act will be required by a composite procedure. A part of such suit will be governed by the summary procedure contained in section 14 of the Act whereas the other part will be regulated by the procedure prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure. It is for this Court to pronounce the correctness of rival contention of the parties. 13. It may be stated that similar provisions are contained in Section 25B of the Delhi Rent Control Act (Act 59 of 1908). During arguments that have been addressed to me on behalf of the parties, no case has been brought to my notice which may have some bearing on the controversy which I am called upon to resolve. I have, therefore, to charter my course without the help of any rudder or compass. Nevertheless I shall try to seek assistance from the general principles of law which I shall call in aid in coming to a satisfactory conclusion of the controversy. 14. Before proceeding further with the discussions of the matter I may notice an extreme submission made on behalf of the learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff-opposite party. Nevertheless I shall try to seek assistance from the general principles of law which I shall call in aid in coming to a satisfactory conclusion of the controversy. 14. Before proceeding further with the discussions of the matter I may notice an extreme submission made on behalf of the learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff-opposite party. He has contended that it is not for the court to add words in a statute which it is called upon to construe. He submitted that sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the Act applies to all suits based on the grounds specified in clauses (c) and (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the Act and that it would not be proper to construe Section 14 of the Act in a manner so as to add the word 'only' before the words "on the ground specified in clauses (c) and (e)". Learned counsel pressed upon me that in case it has been the intention of the Legislature that the procedures prescribed in Section 14 of the Act was to be followed in respect of suits based on the two grounds alone than the use of the word 'only' was imperative. According to him since this word does not find place in sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act, the procedure prescribed in Section 14 would be followed in a suit based on one and more of the grounds contained in clauses (c) and (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the Act, even though the plaint contains other grounds for ejectment of the tenant. I have given anxious consideration to the submission of the learned counsel but do not feel inclined to agree. On the view propounded by him it would be necessary to substitute the word 'inclusive' before the words "on the ground specified in clauses (c) and (e) of subsection (1) of section 11 of the Act". In my opinion, effect should be given to the words as they stand in sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act. If a suit for recovery of possession is based on the grounds specified in clauses (c) and (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the Act only then the special procedure provided for in Section 14 of the Act has to be followed. If a suit for recovery of possession is based on the grounds specified in clauses (c) and (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the Act only then the special procedure provided for in Section 14 of the Act has to be followed. If the plaintiff of a suit includes additional grounds prescribed by law for the eviction of the tenant then in such an event Section 14 of the Act cannot be called in aid and the special procedure prescribed therein cannot be followed. This conclusion is inescapable from the words implied in Section 14 of the Act. The extreme submissions urged by the counsel must, therefore, fail. 15 Section 14 of the Act has been enacted for the benefit of the landlord in two cases mentioned above. He can avail of this benefit only if he confines his claim to the permissible grounds. In case he elects to add grounds other than those specified in clauses (c) and (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the Act, he foregoes the privilege of the summary procedure prescribed in Section 14 of the Act. I do not see any incongruity in this proposition. A person is entitled to forego the benefit of a statute passed for his protection and conferring benefits upon him in his personal capacity. If a landlord is not sure that a building is bonafide required by him for his personal need or that the tenant was holding a lease for a specified period which has expired, he may add other grounds mentioned in sub-secti0n (1) of Section 11 of the Act to his statement of claim seeking ejectment of the tenant. In such a situation the plaintiff foregoes the benefit which the law confers upon him under the provisions of Section 14 of the Act. 16. A person may be charged of multiple offences committed in the same course of occurrence. Some of the offences with which he is charged may be triable as a summons case whereas the others may be triable as a warrant case. In such a situation two parallel proceedings will not go on against the accused. 16. A person may be charged of multiple offences committed in the same course of occurrence. Some of the offences with which he is charged may be triable as a summons case whereas the others may be triable as a warrant case. In such a situation two parallel proceedings will not go on against the accused. It will be futile to suggest that he will be tried under the procedure prescribed for trial by summons cases in relation to offences triable as such whereas the procedure prescribed for warrant cases will be followed in relation to those charges which are to be tried as warrant cases. The trial has to be one single and indivisible trial and the warrant procedure has to be followed in relation to all the offences with which the person in a case is charged. To take another instance, a suit may be filed against a defendant claiming a number of reliefs based on the same cause of action. Some of the reliefs may be triable by the Small Causes' Court whereas the other reliefs may be granted in a regular suit. The law does not envisage that the suit should be split up although based on the simple cause of action. It is not possible to contend that the relief cognizable by a court of Small Causes shall be granted by such court alone whereas the suit shall continue as a regular suit before the Munsif or the Subordinate Judge, as the case may be in respect of the remaining reliefs. 17. Sub-section (8) of Section 14 of the Act enjoins that no appeal or second appeal shall lie against a decree for recovery of possession of any premises passed in accordance with the procedure specified in the section. But the High Court may for the purpose of satisfying itself that the ORDER :is in accordance with law, may call for the records of the case and pass such ORDER :as it deems fit. But the High Court may for the purpose of satisfying itself that the ORDER :is in accordance with law, may call for the records of the case and pass such ORDER :as it deems fit. If a suit is filed against a tenant in respect of a building on the two grounds in respect of which the suit is maintainable under Section 14 of the Act and on additional grounds permissible under Section 11 of the Act and the suit is decided one way or the other, it is not possible to urge that a revision will lie to the High Court against part of the decree and an appeal shall be preferred against the other part. In Binod Kumar v. Narayan Devi (A.I.R. 1980 Supreme Court 2012), the Supreme Court did not feel itself persuaded to subscribe to the view that a revision would lie at the instance of the tenant but an appeal at the instance of the landlord. In that case the Supreme Court was considering the provisions of law contained in Section 25B of the Delhi Rent Control Act 59 of 1980. To me it seems obvious and impracticable that two parallel procedures should be followed in one and the same suit. The entire suit has to be governed either by the special procedure or by the procedure prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure. I do not feel persuaded to countenance the position that a part of the decree passed by the trial court will be amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court sitting as a revisioinal court whereas the same decree will be the subject matter of appeal before a different court. May be that the grounds of revision and the grounds of appeal are different. In either case it is not possible to conceive of a situation where a lease between the parties is terminated by separate decrees passed by different tribunals. 18. Finally, and this is the most important aspect of the case, the effect of the impugned ORDER :is that the defendant-applicant is presumed to have admitted that the building is reasonably and in good faith required by the plaintiff-opposite party for her own use. As a result of this assumption a decree for ejectment of the defendant-applicant must necessarily follows. Finally, and this is the most important aspect of the case, the effect of the impugned ORDER :is that the defendant-applicant is presumed to have admitted that the building is reasonably and in good faith required by the plaintiff-opposite party for her own use. As a result of this assumption a decree for ejectment of the defendant-applicant must necessarily follows. The direction that the defendant-applicant is at liberty to proceed with the case on the ground of illegal sub-letting is wholly futile. The interest of the tenant is to save his tenancy and to escape the consequences of ejectment. In the instant case defendant-applicant has already lost the battle by the impugned ORDER :. The contest on the question of alleged illegal sub-letting will be purely academic. Courts are concerned with pragmatic solutions. They are not forums meant for academic discussions which do not resolve any practical controversy and in which they cannot pass effective decree concerning the rival claims. 19. Shortly stated I am of the view that the ground of bona fide personal necessity as well as the ground of the tenant holding over after the expiry of the lease which is for a specified period may be combined in a suit for eviction along with the other grounds contained in sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the Act. However, to such a suit the provisions of Section 14 of the Act would not apply and the same shall have to be disposed of in accordance with the ordinary procedure prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure. Since I have reached this conclusion, it is not possible for me to sustain the ORDER :passed by the Munsif on October 24, 1983. 19. The result is that this revision succeeds and is hereby allowed. The ORDER :passed by the Munsif on October 24, 1983 is set aside. The defendant will contest the suit for eviction filed by the plaintiff and the said suit shall proceed according to the ordinary procedure prescribed by (Torn). There shall be no ORDER :as to costs.