JUDGMENT K.P. Singh, J.- This writ petition arises out of a suit under Section 229-B of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. 2. The petitioner had claimed co-tenancy right on the allegations that the opposite party No. 2 got his name recorded over the disputed land taking undue advantage of the minority of the plaintiff and had also fraudulently obtained the entry during the consolidation operation, hence the suit for declaration of the plaintiff's titled. 3. The contesting opposite party No. 2 in the present writ petition had the claim of the petitioner on the allegations that the petitioner was not son of Mewa Ram and that the suit was barred by Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act and various other pleas were taken. 4. The trial court through its order dated 21-2-1972 accepted the claim of the petitioner as is evident from Annexure I attached with the writ petition. The appellate court also confirmed the judgment of the trial court as is evident from Annexure II but in second appeal the petitioner has lost and the claim of the petitioner has been negatived on the ground that the suit was barred by Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. 5. Aggrieved by the judgment of the second appellate court the petitioner has approached this court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that bar of Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act could not be attracted to the facts and circumstances of the case involved in the present writ petition. He has placed reliance upon the ruling reported in 1983 R.D. page 196 & 195. 6. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite party has submitted in reply that the impugned judgment does not suffer from any patent error of law. It is quite in consonance with the decision reported in 1967 R.D. p. 4, 1970 R.D. 508 and 1975 R.D. p. 274. 7. He has also submitted that the bar of Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act was rightly applied to the facts and circumstances of the present case in view of 1970 A.W.R. p. 123 and A.W.R. p. 40. He has also submitted that the question of remarriage has not been proved. Therefore the impugned judgment is sustainable and should not be interfered with. 8. He has also submitted that the question of remarriage has not been proved. Therefore the impugned judgment is sustainable and should not be interfered with. 8. I have considered the contentions raised on behalf of the parties and I have gone through the impugned judgment of the second appellate court. It appears that the second appellate court has non-suited the plaintiff-petitioner due to bar of Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. It is note-worthy that in a declaratory suit there is recurring cause of action. In the present case the contesting opposite party has denied that the plaintiff petitioner was not son of Mewa Ram but on the findings of all the courts below the petitioner is son of Mewa Ram. Therefore, he is real brother of the contesting opposite party Beni Ram. From a bare perusal of the judgment of the second appellate court it is not clear as to what was the real cause of action for the suit and when it arose. If the cause of action arose after the consolidation operation, i.e. the difference between the petitioner and the contesting opposite party regarding the disputed land arose after the close of the consolidation operation, no question of bar of Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act would arise. Moreover, the first appellate court has indicated that the contesting opposite party Beni Ram succeeded in obtaining entries during the consolidation operation fraudulently. The appellate court has expressed itself as below :- "..........Smt. Javitri Saharanpur chali gai aur apne sath Gopal Singh ko le gai aur usi nabaligi tatha anupasthiti ka labh uthakar Chakbandi Adhikariyon ko dhokha dekar Beni ne vivadit bhumi par apna naam akele chadhva liya." 9. If Beni Ram succeeded in obtaining entries in the consolidation records due to exercise of fraud upon the authorities, it is difficult to hold that the suit of the plaintiff shall stand barred by the provisions of Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. It is a different thing whether the revenue court can examine the question of fraud or the Civil Court but the question of bar of Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act would not arise where the entries before the consolidation authorities were obtained by fraud. It is a different thing whether the revenue court can examine the question of fraud or the Civil Court but the question of bar of Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act would not arise where the entries before the consolidation authorities were obtained by fraud. This aspect of the matter has escaped the notice of the second appellate court altogether, hence I think that the impugned judgment suffers from patent error of law and deserves to be quashed. 10. The second appellate court should also examine the applicability of bar of Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act in the light of the allegations in the plaint. If the cause of action has arisen after the close of the consolidation operation in the village no question of bar of Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act would arise to such cases. 11. In view of the above discussion it is not necessary to deal with the various cases dated at the bar. Rather, the parties are permitted to rake up all legal points before the second appellate court which shall examine the question of applicability of Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act to the facts and circumstances of the case in the light of the observation made by me above. 12. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and the impugned judgment of the second appellate court dated 7-8-1978 is hereby quashed and the second appellate court is directed to re-examine the claims of the parties in the light of the observations made by me above. Parties are directed to bear their own costs.