ORDER K.P. Singh, J. - This is a defendant's writ petition arising out of a suit under serial Nos. 15 and 21 of I Schedule of Kumaun Tenancy Rules. 1918 2. In short the plaintiff-opposite party had claimed tenancy right in the disputed land and had asserted that the defendant had trespassed over the disputed land and had put materials for a construction over a portion of the disputed land, hence the suit for possession, injunction and damages (see Annex 1' attached with the writ petition). 3. The defence in the suit was that the disputed land was never sold by the defendant to the plaintiff and that the plaintiff has got his name wrongly mutated over the disputed land and that the plaintiff's suit was not maintainable and that the Revenue Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit and that the suit was had for want of notice under S. 80. C.P.C. and that the deed executed by the defendant did not confer any title on the plaintiff and various other pleas were taken by the defendant-petitioner to negative the claim of the plaintiff-opposite party (see Annex 2' attached with the writ petition). 4. All the revenue Courts have given judgments against the defendant-petitioner. Aggrieved by their judgments the defendant-petitioner has approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended before me that the suit was not maintainable as it was filed after the repeal of the Kumaun Tenancy Rules, 1918. The learned counsel for the petitioner invited my attention to the provisions of S. 1 of U.P. Act No. 17 of 1960 and various provisions of U.P. Act No. 12 of 1965 and tried to contend that the suit filed on 31-8-1965 was not maintainable as the Kumaun Tenancy Rules had been abolished. 6. The second contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that the relief of injunction claimed in the suit could not be granted by the Revenue Courts, hence the suit was not maintainable and the revenue Courts have patently erred in decreeing the plaintiff's suit. 7. The third contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that in view of the reliefs claimed in the suit the Revenue Courts had no jurisdiction to try the suit, yet they have granted decree to the plaintiff-opposite party. hence their judgments and decrees should be quashed. 8. 7. The third contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that in view of the reliefs claimed in the suit the Revenue Courts had no jurisdiction to try the suit, yet they have granted decree to the plaintiff-opposite party. hence their judgments and decrees should be quashed. 8. The fourth contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that the learned Member has drawn on imagination and has taken into account irrelevant considerations and has decided the revision petition with a biased mind against the defendant -petitioner, hence his judgment needs be quashed. Since he 'has failed to record categorical findings regarding the claims of the parties in the disputed land yet he has maintained the judgments and decrees passed by the subordinate Courts, his judgment suffers from patent error of law and deserves to be quashed. 9. The fifth contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that the State of U.P. was a necessary party which was neither impleaded nor notice under S. 80, C.P.C. was served upon the State of U.P. hence the decrees passed by the revenue Courts need be quashed. 10. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite party has supported the impugned judgment and has refuted the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner. He has submitted in brief that the provisions of U.P. Zamindari :abolition and Land Reforms Act have not been applied to the land in suit and that the Suit was tightly instituted under the provisions Of Kumaun Tenancy Rules, 191S and that the reliefs claimed in the suit were cognizable by the Revenue Courts in view of the provisions of serial Nos. 15 and 21 or I Schedule of Kumaun Tenancy Rules, 1911. and that the question of jurisdiction was decided by the trial Court and the defendant petitioner did not challenge the findings, hence at this stage the question of jurisdiction should not assume importance and the impugned judgments should be upheld. According to him the State of U.P. is not a necessary party nor the suit can be termed as bad for want of notice under S. 80 of the Civil Procedure Code 11. 1 have considered the contentions raised on behalf of the parties. 12. According to him the State of U.P. is not a necessary party nor the suit can be termed as bad for want of notice under S. 80 of the Civil Procedure Code 11. 1 have considered the contentions raised on behalf of the parties. 12. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding non -maintainability of the suit after repeal of Kumaun Tenancy Rules, 19 IN by U.P. Act No. 17 of 196( and U.P. Act No. 12 of I96. appeared a little attractive but on closer examination the contentions were found wholly misconceived and inapplicable to the facts and circumstances of the case. Admittedly, the disputed land is a part of Garhwal Bhavar Government Estate. According to S 2(a) of both the Acts viz. U.P. Act No. 17 of 196t) and U.P. Act No. 12 of 1')65 the provisions of Kumaun Laid Uttarkhand Zamindari Abolition and Lind Reforms Act were not made applicable to the land in dispute. The aforesaid section reads as below, : "The State Government may. by notification in the official gazette, apply the whole or any provisions of this Act subject to such exceptions or modifications not effecting, 'the substance as it may consider necessary to (a) any estate or part thereof owned by the Central Government, State Government or any local authority or Cantonment Board.." 13. The learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to invite my attention to any of the notifications in the official gazette under the aforesaid sections of both the Acts hence I see no force in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the suit was not maintainable on the (late of the institution as Kumaun Tenancy Rules 1918 had been repealed. Though the learned counsel for the petitioner took much time to elaborate his contention, but ultimately he had to concede that the disputed land is part of the Estate owned by the State Government. Therefore. it is clear that the provisions of Kumaun Tenancy Rules, 1918 held the field and the plaintiff-opposite party rightly took shelter under serial Nos. 15 and 21 of they I Schedule of Kumaun Tenancy Rules 1918. Thus. the first contention raised on behalf of the petitioner fails. and is hereby repelled. 14. As regards the second contention it is noteworthy that serial Nos. 15 and 21 of they I Schedule of Kumaun Tenancy Rules 1918. Thus. the first contention raised on behalf of the petitioner fails. and is hereby repelled. 14. As regards the second contention it is noteworthy that serial Nos. 15 and 21 of the I Schedule of Kumaun Tenancy Rules, 1918 make provision for it suit by a tenant against another tenant or person claiming to be a tenant in respect of any matter relating to a holding and also for determination of (a) the name and description of the tenant of the holding. (b) the class to which the tenant belongs, (c) the situation, area. number of plots, or boundaries of the holding. (d) the rent payable in respect of the holding whether payable in cash or kind, (e) any other incident of tenancy. 15. In this connection the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that the relief of injunction was claimed by the plaintiff in the suit giving rise to the present writ petition, hence it was not maintainable in Revenue Courts. 16. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite party has replied that in view of the provisions of serial Nos. 21(e) of I Schedule to Kumaun Tenancy Rules, 1918 the relief of injunction can also he granted to the plaintiff because it would be included in any other incident of tenancy mentioned in serial No. 211 a) of the I Schedule. 17. 1 have my own doubts. However, in AIR 1939 All 301 Gusain Singh v. Puran Singh, the learned Single Judge of this Court has observed that the relief for injunction restraining the defendants from cultivating could he granted by the Revenue Court under the provisions of Rules and Orders of Kumaun Division. Moreover, the question of jurisdiction was decided by the Trial Court and that finding was not challenged by the defendant -petitioner and that on merits the defendant-petitioner has not been able to establish his claim to the disputed land. In the circumstances of the present case I am not inclined to characterise the impugned judgments and decrees without jurisdiction. Even if the Revenue Courts have committed an error in granting relief of injunction to the plaintiff-opposite party at least have advanced substantial justice between the parties. Therefore, in my, )pinion, this contention also fails. 18. In the circumstances of the present case I am not inclined to characterise the impugned judgments and decrees without jurisdiction. Even if the Revenue Courts have committed an error in granting relief of injunction to the plaintiff-opposite party at least have advanced substantial justice between the parties. Therefore, in my, )pinion, this contention also fails. 18. As regards the third contention in view of the above discussions and my own conclusions the impugned judgments and decrees are not without jurisdiction in the circumstances of the present case and as they have advanced substantial justice between the parties the defendant -petitioner cannot successfully challenge the decrees in Writ jurisdiction. It is well known that even if the judgments and decrees are without jurisdiction and when a petitioner does not suffer manifest injustice on merits, no interference should be made with such judgments or decrees in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. 19. As regards the fourth contention no doubt the learned member has indulged in surmises and conjectures and has made observation against the defendant -petitioner. To my mind the fault lies upon the shoulder of the counsel for the petitioner before the revisional Court. He invited the trouble by raising the question. I must say that the learned Mi member has also gone wrong in making some observations in paras 10 to 11 of the impugned judgment. Experiences indicate that at times statements in the Trial Court do no bear necessary certificate it this State. Therefore, the learned Member has unnecessarily em harked upon that question and has made observation against the revisionist and official of the Court. To my mind it is not necessary that an enquiry regarding tampering official record should be pursued or public time may he wasted on that score. Any observation made by the learned Member in this connection against the appellant in revision would also lose its importance 20. Bereft of this mistake on the cart of the learned Member I find that his judgment is sustainable on merits and I do not agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned judgment suffers from patent error of law warranting interference in writ jurisdiction. 21. The fifth contention raised on behalf of the petitioner has no relevancy to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 21. The fifth contention raised on behalf of the petitioner has no relevancy to the facts and circumstances of the present case. The State of U.P. is neither ai necessary party nor there was any necessity to serve any notice under S. 80 o the Civil Procedure Code upon the State of U.P. in a suit contemplated by Serial No. 15 read with serial No. 21 of this Kumaun Tenancy Rules, 1918. To my mind the contention was raised in view of the rulings of this Court or, the provisions of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act which are not at all applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 22. Before parting with the case I thank it proper to mention that the defendant -petitioner had pocketed a sums of Rs. 4.000/- in lieu of the dispute and and had given possession over the disputed land to the plaintiff whose tenancy has been regularised by the Government on the basis of a G. 0. and thereafter the defendant-petitioner trespassed over the land belonging to the plaintiff opposite party I think that the conduct of the defendant petitioner such that he cannot get any equitable relief from this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the contradictory findings were recorded by the Revenue Courts on the question of possession and the relief granted by the Revenue Courts regarding possession is untenable cannot be accepted by me in the circumstances of the present case.. If the judgments are read carefully it is evident that the defendant -petitioner trespassed over the disputed land in the year 1965 hence the Trial Court was fully justified in decreeing the plaintiff's suit in the terms it has done. I do not find that the petitioner has suffered any manifest injustice in the case, hence the writ petition is devoid of merit. 23. In the result the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. Parties are directed to bear their own costs.