JUDGMENT M. Wahajuddin, J. - The plaintiff who brought this Second appeal preferred a suit for specific performance of contract. The plaintiffs case was that the defendant-respondent contracted to sell his ?th share in the property for Rs. 1000/-. The defendant maintained that the sale consideration agreed upon was Rs. 3000/-, The trial court found that the defendant did agree to sell the property but further held that the sale consideration agreed upon was Rs. 3000/- and not Rs. 1000/-, The trial court further found that the suit was not bad for joinder. It also held that the court has jurisdiction. It decreed the suit for specific performance subject to payment of Rs. 3000/- as sale consideration besides registration expenses etc. within three months. The defendant preferred an appeal. The appellate court observed that the trial court framed incomplete issue in as much as it did not frame issue about plaintiffs readiness at the material time to get the sale deed executed and also about repudiation of the contract by the plaintiff and consequently it having become void under Section 29 of the Contract Act. The appellate court during hearing of the appeal framed an issue about plaintiffs readiness and remitted the same to the trial court for finding. The trial court gave a finding that the plaintiff got ready to get the sale deed executed for Rs. 3000/- only after the filing of the suit but before the institution of the suit he was not ready to get the sale deed executed for Rs. 3000/-. Neither of the parties filed any objection against such finding. The appellate court framed further two issues (i) having become void under Section 29 of the Contract Act. Opportunity was afforded to both the sides for adducing evidence on the new issues but no evidence was led. The appellate court observed that the finding of the trial court on the issue remitted to it has not been assailed by filing objection and this would mean that the plaintiff was not willing to get the sale deed executed on the agreed consideration before filing of the suit. The appellate court observed that the finding of the trial court on the issue remitted to it has not been assailed by filing objection and this would mean that the plaintiff was not willing to get the sale deed executed on the agreed consideration before filing of the suit. The appellate court further referred to Section 16-C of the Specific Relief Act and observed that in view of such provisions specific performance of contract will not be granted if the plaintiff has not averred that he was ready and willing to perform essential terms of the contract, nor proved it. The appellate court further observed that as plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform her part of the contract by agreeing to pay Rs. 3000/- the suit for specific performance could not be decreed. Regarding jurisdiction and matter of non-joinder the appellate courts finding was in favour of the present plaintiff appellant and it upheld the findings of the trial court on those issues. The appellate court further held that as per new issue framed by it thus setting up of lesser amount of consideration amounted to repudiation of the contract. It at the same time held that in the sale contract there was no vagueness and it will not be unenforceable on account of vagueness of contract. The appellate court further found that the plaintiff did not come with clean hands and there relief of specific performance is discretionary and discretion will not be exercised in plaintiffs favour. It therefore allowed the appeal and setting aside the decree of the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs suit with costs. That finding is challenged on the ground that actually the sale consideration was Rs. 1000/- and the failure of the plaintiff to file first appeal would not debar the plaintiff from raising this issue as the respondent can support the decree of the trial court on any grounds other than those in the judgment even without filing any appeal or cross-objection. Reliance was placed upon the case of Virdhachalam Pillai v. Chaldean Syrie an Bank, ( AIR 1964 SC 1425 ) in support of such argument. What has been laid down in paragraph 32 of this point was that the respondent is entitled to canvas on correctness of findings against it in order to support the decree that has been passed against the appellant. What has been laid down in paragraph 32 of this point was that the respondent is entitled to canvas on correctness of findings against it in order to support the decree that has been passed against the appellant. It would appear that the respondent which was a Bank before the Supreme Court filed a suit. That suit was decreed by the trial court, against the father, namely the first defendant, and there was no appeal against that. The trial Judge held that the Bank has no right to obtain a mortgage decree against the appellant and he has half share in the family property but on appeal by the Bank the learned Judge allowed the appeal and modified the decree by passing a mortgaged decree against the appellant qua his share. This variation was challenged in the appeal before toe supreme Court. The Supreme Court in paragraph 32 observed that the plea of the Bank in the second appeal that amount of Rs. 80,000/- covered by Exs. A and B went for the discharge of antecedent debts is open, notwithstanding that the Bank did not appeal against the finding that the balance of Rs. 80,000/- had not gone in the discharge of an antecedent debt. It was laid down that this point could be raised to support the decree as such. The observations were made in the context of the facts of that case. Actually the party raising the plea was supporting the decree in its favour. In the present case the implication of the trial court decree was that the agreed consideration was Rs. 3000/- and not Rs. 1000/- and the decree was also to the effect that the specific performance is directed on payment of Rs. 3000/-. This virtually amounted to passing a decree which was partly against the present appellant, namely, the plaintiff in as much as specific performance was allowed on payment of Rs. 3000/- only and not Rs. 1000/- It the plaintiff's stand was that it should be allowed on payment of Rs. 1000/- only there should have been a cross-appeal or cross-objection. 3000/-. This virtually amounted to passing a decree which was partly against the present appellant, namely, the plaintiff in as much as specific performance was allowed on payment of Rs. 3000/- only and not Rs. 1000/- It the plaintiff's stand was that it should be allowed on payment of Rs. 1000/- only there should have been a cross-appeal or cross-objection. Apart from that even if it is held that the plea is open there is a finding of the trial court about the quantum of consideration which has been upheld by the first appellate court and in second appeal this court will not enter into a question of fact as to disturb that finding. I may also mention that the trial court gave cogent reasons for rejecting the draft sale deed unsigned by the defendant in which consideration was shown as Rs. 1000/-. Oral evidence of both sides was appreciated and after detailed discussion the trial court found that the sale consideration was Rs. 3000/-. In fact, there are no good reasons to disturb that finding and this Court will not hold by interfering with findings of fact that the agreed sale consideration was Rs. 1000/-. 2. When that is the position the next question that arises for consideration is whether the plaintiff has been ready and willing to perform this contract upto he time of the institution of that suit. The plaintiffs stand although was that he consideration agreed upon was Rs. 1000/-, thus upto the date of the institution of the suit he was neither ready nor willing to pay Rs. 3000/- which was agreed consideration, it is a settled law that a party who seeks equitable relief of specific performance should be contract at all stages. This is not the position and consequently the suit for specific performance could not be decreed. It was urged in the grounds of appeal that there was no issue on readiness and willingness of the appellant who performed the contract. Interference in second appeal would not be made on the appellate court did frame a issue about readiness of the plaintiff and if sent it to the trial court for finding and the finding was to the effect that upto the date of the institution of the suit she was not ready to get sale deed for a consideration of Rs. 3000/-. 3000/-. Even any objection against such finding was not filed before the first appellate court. The appellate court has not committed any illegalities, error or procedural error as to call for any interference in the second appeal. Its view that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform her part of the contract by paying Rs. 3000/- as consideration upto the date of the institution of the suit is a sound one and it is again a finding of fact. The legal aspect involved is whether specific performance can be passed in favour of such a party. The provisions of Section 16-C of the Specific Relief Act quoted by the first appellate court are very clear and express. Such a party cannot have a decree for specific performance and the court would not grant equitable relief for specific performance when contract of the party is such. The mere willingness to pay Rs. 3000/- later after the suit was instituted would neither weigh nor help. The plaintiff should have been willing to pay that amount although. I have approached this appeal from every angle and I do not find any force in it. The appeal is dismissed with costs to respondent.