P. S. POTI, J. ( 1 ) THOUGH we have heard this application along with some others wherein also the same question arises all the cases having been referred to a Full Bench because of the importance of the question raised we are disposing of by this judgment only this application though we have heard counsel in all the other cases on the constitutional question arising in this case. This is because the other cases require consideration on the merits too and reply affidavits have not been filed in those cases yet. We hence delink those cases from this case and remit them to be disposed of by the Division Bench normally hearing such applications by a separate order. On the question of the constitutional validity of the sections impugned in this case the decision rendered by us in this petition would give sufficient guidance to the Division Bench. ( 2 ) IN this country there have been various preventive detention laws enacted by the Parliament from time to time. Persons who are security risks to the State are to be detained under the provisions of some of such enactments. Under some enactments persons who are found to be anti-social and are likely to sabotage the economic and social order in this country are to be held under preventive detention. It is the great risk involved in allowing such persons to move about freely and with the same amount of liberty enjoyed by the ordinary citizens of the land that justifies preventive detention in their cases. It is the apprehension of very grave consequences if they are allowed to be free and on their own that justifies invocation of provisions relating to preventive detention against them. Otherwise detention can only be punitive. A person subjected to preventive detention gets the benefit of many safeguards and more than anything else that of a regular trial according to recognised canons of criminal jurisprudence and also the benefit of adjudication by a traditional court with the in-built safeguard of hierarchy of appeals and revisions. Though every citizen is entitled to enjoy personal liberty and freedom encroachment is made thereto in exceptional and extraordinary cases these cases being that of grave and serious repercussions either on the safety and security of the State or on that of the economic order of this country. Though every citizen is entitled to enjoy personal liberty and freedom encroachment is made thereto in exceptional and extraordinary cases these cases being that of grave and serious repercussions either on the safety and security of the State or on that of the economic order of this country. All the same the provisions of law relating to preventive detention which apply to them assure them several safeguards safeguards which could be tested in the light of the constitutional guarantees particularly those in Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India. At the other end of the spectrum there are petty criminals in this country who might either have committed crime at some time of their lives or may be persons described by the Police generally as undesirable characters understood by the people by the ordinary connotation of village goondas. There are statutes in India to deal with them not by way of preventive detention but by allied measures such as externment which have the consequence of keeping such people outside their own as well as neighbouring districts and away from their families for fairly long periods. Considering the station in life to which they belong the consequences to them may be as bad as if not worse than that of preventive detention. Should the law relating to such externments satisfy the test of Article 21 of the Constitution and should those persons have at least the same privileges and right to consideration of their cases as those to whom the law of preventive detention is applied ? By reason of the mere assumption by the Police that a person against whom they take action for externment belongs to an undesirable class in society should the person against whom such action is taken fall into a different class and be denied all normal rights ? Since such action is taken by the Officers of Police can it be said they are not likely to misuse the power ? We are tempted to ask the question which Justice Krishna Iyer asked in PREM CHAND V. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS ( AIR 1981 SC 613 ) who will police the police ? ( 3 ) SECS. 56 and 59 of the Bombay Police Act 1951 (Bombay Act No. XXII of 1951) are under attack in the petition before us. These provisions enable the Commissioner of Police. ( 3 ) SECS. 56 and 59 of the Bombay Police Act 1951 (Bombay Act No. XXII of 1951) are under attack in the petition before us. These provisions enable the Commissioner of Police. in an area where such Commissioner has been appointed under sec. 7 of the Act and the District Magistrate or the Sub Divisional Magistrate empowered in that behalf in the other areas to take action concerning movements or acts of any person causing or calculated to cause alarm danger or harm to person or property or in cases where there are reasonable grounds for believing that such person is engaged or is about to be engaged in the commission of an offence involving force or violence or an offence punishable under Chapter XII XVI or XVII of the Indian Penal Code or in the abetment of any such offence. There is a further requirement in order to enable such officer to invoke sec. 56 and that is that in the opinion of such officer witnesses are not willing to come forward to give evidence in public against such person by reason of apprehension on their part as regards the safety of their person or property. We are referring to only that part of sec. 56 which is relevant for the purpose of this case. The satisfaction to be reached by the officer concerned is that such person concerned is informed in writing of the general nature of the material allegations against him. This is to give him a reasonable opportunity of tendering an explanation regarding the material allegations. Such person is free to examine any witness produced by him except in cases where the officer feels that such motion is made for the purpose of vexation or delay. The person concerned is entitled to appear before the officer in person or through advocate. Thereafter the officer passes the final order. The order may be one directing the person concerned to remove himself outside the area within the local limits of his jurisdiction or area and any district or districts or any part thereof contiguous thereto. these Provisions are attacked in this case for various reasons. Thereafter the officer passes the final order. The order may be one directing the person concerned to remove himself outside the area within the local limits of his jurisdiction or area and any district or districts or any part thereof contiguous thereto. these Provisions are attacked in this case for various reasons. In substance these mainly amount to a plea that the procedure prescribed is a make believe for an opportunity to be given and there is in substance no fairness in the procedure adopted by the authority or officer concerned in passing the final order of externment. Elaborating this the petitioner here as well as the petitioners in the other similar petitions contend that no specific instances or event based on which action is proposed is being made known to them the general allegations referred to in sec. 56 are merely general statements which do not enable them to give a specific answer or reply to any matter which the authority or officer may have in his mind they are never confronted with such material at any time it is never brought to their notice no evidence is adduced for the externing authority and in the circumstances giving an opportunity to them to examine witnesses or to appear through advocate is of no consequence at all for that would serve no purpose by way of explaining away the case against them. We must mention here that it is agreed that the common characteristics of all the cases which were before us are (a) no reference to any specific incident or event is made in the general allegations made known to the petitioners (b) no reference is made to any material as evidence in support of the general allegations (c) no witness is examined to prove the general allegations or pinpoint any case against the petitioner (d) no specific reference is made at any time to any material and (c) it is only stated in all these cases that no witness is available to depose against the petitioners and (f) in the externment order as well as in the order in appeal in all these cases passed under sec. 60 of the Act no reasons are indicated. It is therefore said that neither the opportunity given by the authority or the officer under sec. 56 read with sec. 60 of the Act no reasons are indicated. It is therefore said that neither the opportunity given by the authority or the officer under sec. 56 read with sec. 59 nor the right of appeal to the Government is of any consequence and that these are illusory. There is no minimum protection to the petitioners by way of an opportunity to explain what may be against them. The protection by way of a procedure to secure a reasonable opportunity to defend may vary from case to case from the safeguard of a trial in a regular court to that of merely giving an opportunity to explain the case against a person. This is a wide range and the appropriateness of adopting the procedure in any given case must depend upon the class to which the case belongs. Even so it is said that no civilised approach will countenance a situation where a person is deprived of his liberty without the minimum procedure of telling him what is against him and giving him an opportunity to answer that even though he may not he given an opportunity to substantiate his answer by evidence and there are no further safeguards such as appeal and revision. The complaint of the petitioner is that the provisions with regard to furnishing the general nature of the material allegations serve absolutely no purpose as such communication is not capable of any effective answer and in that context the examination of witnesses by the petitioner also makes no sense. If the matter were res integra this plea would have called for a closer examination but we are afraid the questions are answered by decisions of this Court as well as that of the Supreme Court and we are not in a position to go into the matter independent of these decisions. But there is one aspect of the case which calls for closer examination. It is said by counsel appearing for the petitioner in the case before us as also the counsel in the other cases which have been delinked that on earlier occasions when courts have pronounced on the validity of secs. 56 arid 59 as also on sec. But there is one aspect of the case which calls for closer examination. It is said by counsel appearing for the petitioner in the case before us as also the counsel in the other cases which have been delinked that on earlier occasions when courts have pronounced on the validity of secs. 56 arid 59 as also on sec. 57 there was no opportunity to examine the fairness of the procedure prescribed by these sections in the light of the guarantee under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and in the light of the principles governing Article 22 of the Constitution and now that the Supreme Court has spoken categorically on the need for fairness of procedure in the light of Article 21 of the Constitution the matter calls for a fresh approach. It is urged that tested in the light of the ratio in Maneka Gandhis case and the later decisions of the Supreme Court secs. 56 and 59 must fail the test of reasonableness of procedure and for that reason must be struck down. We will examine whether it is at all open to this Court to go into the availability of another approach to reach a result different from that reached by the Supreme Court on the validity of the three sections. If that is not available to us that aspect also cannot be examined by us. Appropriately that is a matter which could be urged before the Supreme Court by those aggrieved. ( 4 ) WE will refer in brief to decisions in which the question of validity of secs. 56 and 59 and the scope of sec. 60 have been considered by courts. Secs. 56 57 59 and 60 read as follows :56 Whenever it shall appear in areas for which a Commissioner has been appointed under sec. ( 4 ) WE will refer in brief to decisions in which the question of validity of secs. 56 and 59 and the scope of sec. 60 have been considered by courts. Secs. 56 57 59 and 60 read as follows :56 Whenever it shall appear in areas for which a Commissioner has been appointed under sec. 7 to the Commissioner and in other area or ares to which State Government may by notification in the Official Gazette extend the provisions of this section to the District Magistrate or the Sub-Divisional magistrate empowered by the State Government in that behalf (a) that the movements or acts or any person are causing or calculated to cause alarm danger or harm to person or property or (b) that there are reasonable grounds for believing that such person is engaged or is about to be engaged in the commission of an offence involving force or violence or an offence punishable under Chapter XII XVI or XVII of the Indian Penal Code or in the abetment of any such offence and when in the opinion of such officer witnesses are not willing to come forward to give evidence in public against such person by reason of apprehension on their part as regard the safety of their person or property or (c) that an outbreak of epidemic disease is likely to result from the continued residence of an immigrant the said officer may by an order in writing duly served on him or by beat of drum or otherwise as he thinks fit direct such person or immigrant so to conduct himself as shall seem necessary in order to prevent violence and alarm or the outbreak or spread of such disease or to remove himself outside the areas within the local limits of his jurisdiction or such area and any district or districts or any part thereof contiguous thereto by such route and within such time as the said officer may prescribe and not to enter or return to the said area or thee area and such contiguous districts or part thereof as the case may be from which he was directed to remove himself. 57 If a person has been convicted - (a) of an offence under Chapter XII XVI or XVII of the Indian Penal Code or (b) twice of an offence- (i) under sec. 57 If a person has been convicted - (a) of an offence under Chapter XII XVI or XVII of the Indian Penal Code or (b) twice of an offence- (i) under sec. 9 of the Bombay Beggars Act 1945 or under the Bombay Prevention of Prostitution Act 1923 or the Saurashtra Prevention of Prostitution Act 1952 the Hyderabad Suppression of immoral Traffic Act 1952 the Madhya pradesh Suppression of Immoral Traffic Act 1953 or the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act 1956 or (ii) within a period of three years under sec. 65 or 68 of the Bombay Prohibition Act 1949 or (c) thrice of an offence within a period of three years under any of the provision of the Bombay Prohibition Act 1949 or under sec. 4 or 12 A of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act 1887 or under sec. 4 or 12 A of the Act as in force in the Saurashtra area or the Kutch area of the State of Bombay or under sec. 4 of the Gambling Act or sec. 3 of the Public Gambling Act 1867 as in force in the Vidarbha region of the State of Bombay. The Commissioner the District Magistrate or the Sub-Divisional Magistrate empowered by the State Government in this behalf if he has reason to believe that such person is likely again to engage himself in the commission of an offence similar to that for which he was convicted may direct such person to remove himself outside the area within the local limits of his jurisdiction or such area and ny district or districts or any part thereof contiguous thereto by such route and within such time as the said officer may prescribe and not to enter or return to the area or the area and such contiguous districts or part thereof as the case may be from which he was directed to remove himself. EXPLANATION.- Fro the purpose of this section an offence similar to that for which a person was convictedshall mean- (i) in the case of a person convicted of an offence mentioned in clause (a) an offence falling under any of the Chapter of the Indian Penal Code mentioned in that clause and (ii) in the case of a person convicted of an offence mentioned in clauses (b) and (c) an offence falling under the provisions of the Acts mentioned respectively in the said clauses. 59 (1) Before an order under sec. 55 56 or 57 is passed against any person the officer acting under any of the said sections or any officer above the rank of an Inspector authorised by that officer shall inform the person in writing of the general nature of the material allegations against him and give him a reasonable opportunity of tendering an explanation regarding them. If such person makes an application for the examination of any witness produced by him the authority or officer concerned shall grant such application; and examine such witness unless for reasons to be recorded in writing the authority of officer is of opinion that such application is made for the purpose of vexation or delay. Any written statement put in by such person shall be filled with the record of the case. Such person shall be entitled to appear before the officer proceeding under this section by an advocate or attorney for the purpose of tendering his explanation and examining the witnesses produced by him. (2) The authority or officer proceeding under sub-sec. (1) may for the purpose of securing the attendance of any person against whom any order is proposed to be made under sec. 55 56 or 57 require such person to appear before him and to pass a security bond with or without sureties for such attendance during the inquiry. If the person fails to pass the security bond as required or fails to appear before the officer or authority during the inquiry it shall be lawful to the officer or authority to proceed with the inquiry and thereupon such order as was proposed to be passed against him may be passed. 60 3 (1) Any person aggrieved by an order made under sec. 55 56 or 57 may appeal to the State Government within thirty days from the date of such order. 60 3 (1) Any person aggrieved by an order made under sec. 55 56 or 57 may appeal to the State Government within thirty days from the date of such order. 4 (2) An appeal under this section shall be preferred in duplicate in the form of a memorandum setting forth concisely the grounds of objections to the order appealed against and shall be accompanied by that order or a certified copy thereof. (3) On receipt of such appeal the State Government may after giving a reasonable opportunity to the appellant to be heard either personally or by a pleader advocate or attorney and after such further inquiry if any as it may deem necessary confirm vary or cancel or set aside the order appealed against and make its order accordingly provided that the order appealed against shall remain in force pending the disposal of the appeal unless the State Government otherwise directs. (4) In calculating the period of thirty days provided for an appeal under this section the time taken for granting a certified copy of the order appealed against shall be excluded. ( 5 ) WE are not concerned with S. 57 in this case but we have referred to it for the reason that it is an allied section with the difference that the class of persons who are treated under that section are persons who have already been convicted of certain offences. It is once in respect of certain offences twice in respect of certain other offences and thrice in respect of certain other offences. Against such class of persons preventive action by way of externment is contemplated under S. 57. Persons who are dealt with under S. 56 must necessarily be treated with less severity for they are not persons against whom there is any case of past criminal record or action being taken on that basis. They are persons against whom merely for the reason that there is suspicision of their causing or calculated to cause alarm danger or harm to person or property or of being engaged in or about to be engaged in the commission of offence action is being taken. There is no question of any public order or public safety or security of the State in the concept of action under S. 56. This is quite important. There is no question of any public order or public safety or security of the State in the concept of action under S. 56. This is quite important. The procedure under S. 59 applies both to action taken under S. 5g and also action taken under S. 57 and the ultimate consequence in both the cases are also similar. ( 6 ) GURBACHAN Singhs case ( AIR 1952 SC 221 ) was perhaps one of the earliest cases where a challenge similar to that made in this case was urged before the Supreme Court. There the sections challenged were sec. 27 (1) (a) of the City of Bombay Police Act corresponding to S. 56 and S. 27 (4) of that Act corresponding to S. 59 of the Bombay Police Act 1951 These sections were challenged as infringing the freedom guaranteed to the citizen under Article 19 (1) (d) and (e) as well 15 Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court expressed the view that it was difficult to say that the provision in S. 27 (1) (a) was unreasonable. It is to be noticed that the only point urged in that case by way of challenge to that provision was that there was no right of cross-examination of witnesses and the Court was of the view that this by itself will not vitiate the provision. Answering the charge of infringing of Article 14 it was mentioned that the power to take action vested in a very high responsible officer. How far such an approach would be true of the present day three decades after the decision in that case is a matter which according to the petitioners counsel calls for fresh consideration. ( 7 ) THE case before the Supreme Court in HARI KHEMU GAWALI V. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF POLICE BOMBAY AND ANOTHER ( AIR 1956 SC 559 ) was one concerning the validity of S. 57 of the Bombay Police Act. Construing the provision in S. 57 of the Act the court took the view that the power to remove a person out of certain limits was intended to break up criminal gangs and the section is plainly meant to prevent a person who has been proved to be a criminal from acting in repetition of his criminal propensities. Construing the provision in S. 57 of the Act the court took the view that the power to remove a person out of certain limits was intended to break up criminal gangs and the section is plainly meant to prevent a person who has been proved to be a criminal from acting in repetition of his criminal propensities. Evidently the approach the question under S. 57 may not be as such applicable to a case under S. 56. ( 8 ) IN Bhagubhais case ( AIR 1956 SC 585 ) it was not contended. as seen from paragraph 10 of the judgment that the petitioners have not been given the opportunity contemplated by sec. 59 of the Act. The only grievance sought to be made out was that particulars of the evidence against the petitioners and of their alleged activities had not been given to them. The Court did not decide that question in that case but only referred to the judgment in HARI KHEMU GAWALI V. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF POLICE BOMBAY AND ANOTHER ( AIR 1956 SC 559 ) as having decided that question. ( 9 ) ONE significant fact is that in both these cases Jagannadhadas J. had expressed his views by independent judgments a concurring judgment in Bhagubhais case and a dissenting judgment in Hari Khemu Gawalis case. In the concurring judgment the learned Judge expressed the view that if the matter were res integra he should have felt difficulty in upholding the validity of sec. 56 in so far as it did not demarcate the application of the section to the more serious classes of offences falling within the specified Chapters. The learned Judge further observed observed :i should also have felt difficulty in holding a provision to be reasonable which clothes the executive officers with an authority to extern a person for so long a period as two years. In the dissenting judgment in the case where sec. 57 of the Act was under attack HARI KHEMU GAWALI V. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF POLICE BOMBAY AND ANOTHER ( AIR 1956 SC 559 ) the learned Judge expressed the view that the provision prima facie infringes the fundamental right of a citizen under Article 19 (1) (d) and (e) of the Constitution. 57 of the Act was under attack HARI KHEMU GAWALI V. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF POLICE BOMBAY AND ANOTHER ( AIR 1956 SC 559 ) the learned Judge expressed the view that the provision prima facie infringes the fundamental right of a citizen under Article 19 (1) (d) and (e) of the Constitution. The learned Judge in the course of the judgment observed:the fact that our Constitution which declares fundamental rights also permits a law of preventive detention under very limited safeguards and that such laws have taken the pattern of the exercise of power by the Government or by its officers for specified purposes on the basis of their subjective satisfaction has made us prone to reconcile ourselves to other kinds of restrictive laws affection personal liberty though based on the subjective satisfaction of executive officers if only they provide for certain minimum safeguards such as supply of grounds right of representation and the scope for review by a superior authority or by an advisory body. In the same dissenting judgment Justice Jagannadhadas at the end of paragraph 14 of the judgment observed:while of course abuse of power is not to be assumed to less its reasonableness neither is a power given in wide terms and prima facie unreasonable to be considered reasonable on an assumption of its proper use. ( 10 ) A Full Bench of this Court had occasion to consider in SANDHI MAMAD KALA V. STATE OF GUJARAT (XIV 1973 GLR 384 ) whether in passing an order of externment under sec. 56 of the Bombay Police Act 1951 and the State Government in disposing of an appeal against an externment order under sec. 60 are bound to give reasons in support of the orders respectively made by them or in other words there is any obligation to make speaking orders. After a fairly elaborate discussion of the law the Court look the view that the decision made by the authority could hardly be a subject matter for judicial review and the functions discharged by the externing authority is administrative and not in the exercise of quasi judicial function. It is evident that to a considerable extent this view was based on the decision of the Supreme Court in HARI KHEMU GAWALI V. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF POLICE BOMBAY AND ANOTHER ( AIR 1956 SC 559 ) to which we have already adverted. It is evident that to a considerable extent this view was based on the decision of the Supreme Court in HARI KHEMU GAWALI V. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF POLICE BOMBAY AND ANOTHER ( AIR 1956 SC 559 ) to which we have already adverted. ( 11 ) THE case before us is more or loss on all fours with the case in the STATE OF GUJARAT AND ANOTHER V. MEHBUBKHAN ( AIR 1968 SC 1468 ). As contended in this case it was contended therein also that the notice given did not specify the particulars. Nevertheless the Court speaking through Vaidialingam J. reversing the judgment of the Gujarat High Court held the notice to be good enough. We may refer to the following passage in that judgment. Without attempting to be exhaustive we may state that when a person is stated to be a thief that allegation is vague. Again when it is said that A stole a watch from X on a particular day and at a particular place the allegation can be said to be particular. Again when it is stated that X is seen at crowded bus stands and he picks pockets it is of a general nature of a material allegation. Under the last illustration given above. will come the allegations which according to the Gujarat High Court suffer from being too general or vague. Considering it from the point of view of the party against whom an order of externment is proposed to be passed it must be emphasized that when he has to tender an explanation to a notice under sec. 59 he can only give an explanation which can be of a general nature. It may be open to him to take a defence of the action being taken due to mala fides malice or mistaken identity or he may be able to tender proof of his general good conduct or alibi during the period covered by the notice and the like. The allegations made in the notices issued under sec. 59 as against the respective respondents in our opinion. contain the general nature of the material allegations made against each of them in respect of which the respondents had been given a reasonable opportunity of tendering an explanation regarding them. Therefore it follows that the view of the Gujarat High Court that the notices. under sec. 59 as against the respective respondents in our opinion. contain the general nature of the material allegations made against each of them in respect of which the respondents had been given a reasonable opportunity of tendering an explanation regarding them. Therefore it follows that the view of the Gujarat High Court that the notices. under sec. 59 and the orders of externment passed under sec. 56 are invalid cannot be sustained. We may refer to one more decision in this context that is in PANDHARINATH V. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA ( AIR 1973 SC 630 ). The provision in sec. 56 was examined in that case and the Court observed in paragraph 9:a full and complete disclosure of particulars such as is requisite in an open prosecution will frustrate the very purpose of an externment recording If the show-cause notice were to furnish to the proposed externee concrete date like specific dates of incidents or the names of persons involved in those incidents it would be easy enough to fix the identity of those who out of for of injury to their person or property are unwilling to depose in public. There is a brand of lawless element in society which it is impossible to bring to book by established methods of judicial trial because in such trials there can be no conviction without legal evidence The Court also dealt with the contention that the order of the Government being not a speaking order it should be held that the right of appeal is illusory. The Court negatived this contention and Chandrachud J. as he then was speaking for the Bench said:neither the externing authority nor the State Government in appeal can be asked to write reasoned order in the nature of a judgment. If those authorities were to discuss the evidence in the case it would be easy to fix the identity of witnesses who were unwilling to depose in public: against the proposed externee. ( 12 ) IN the background of the above discussion we have necessarily to hold that on the question of invalidity of the provisions in secs. 56 and 59 on the ground that these provisions infringe Articles 19 and (e) and 14 of the Constitution and also on the validity of sec. 60 on the ground that the right of appeal is illusory the matter is no longer open to consideration by this Court. 56 and 59 on the ground that these provisions infringe Articles 19 and (e) and 14 of the Constitution and also on the validity of sec. 60 on the ground that the right of appeal is illusory the matter is no longer open to consideration by this Court. The contention raised by learned counsel for the petitioner that the decision In STATE OF M. P. V. BALDEO PRASAD ( AIR 1961 SC 293 ) strikes a different note may not help the petitioner as that decision was rendered in the context of a different enactment. It is urged before us that merely because the Police state with an assumption that a person is an undesirable character he cannot fall into that class and lose all right which normally a citizen would have. In other words it is said that at no time was there any scope for determination of the question whether the person against whom action was commenced fell into any undesirable class and that could not be the case merely because action is taken against a person by the Police as if he falls in that class. It is said to be highly unfair. The decision just now adverted to deals with goondas and in that context the Supreme Court said that an opportunity had to be given. Even such an opportunity according to the petitioner is not made available to those persons against whom secs. 56 and 59 of the Bombay Police Act are invoked. That again is not a question which is open to us to examine. ( 13 ) NOW we come to the further contention by the counsel in this case that a law not found to infringe Article 19 or Article 14 of the Consultation may still be bad if it operates to deprive a person of his liberty and the procedure for such deprivation is not under a law which is fair just and reasonable. Evidently the question was not considered in the earlier cases because the content of Article 21 was understood differently until Maneka Gandhis case ( AIR 1978 SC 597 ) revolutionised that aspect of the law. The contention of the petitioner in this regard may be summarised thus: secs. Evidently the question was not considered in the earlier cases because the content of Article 21 was understood differently until Maneka Gandhis case ( AIR 1978 SC 597 ) revolutionised that aspect of the law. The contention of the petitioner in this regard may be summarised thus: secs. 56 and 59 of the Act must pass also the test of fairness and reasonableness such fairness is to be determined from the perspective of the person whose liberty is affected. Tested on this approach any law which gives no opportunity whatsoever to a person before depriving him of his liberty would certainly be unfair the provision to in form the person concerned about the general nature of material allegations is as good as giving him no notice of the reasons for the action against him and an effective opportunity even to make a representation is denied to him let alone the examination of his case by a high power advisory body just as in the case of a preventive detention law under Article 22 of the Constitution. It is urged that for these reasons the law must fail as not passing the test of fairness in procedure leading to deprivation of liberty. ( 14 ) IT was in view of the importance of this approach and particularly in view of the contention that the earlier decisions had no occasion to examine this question in the light of the provisions of Article 21 of the Constitution that a Division Bench of this Court felt it proper to refer the case for decision by a Full Bench. In Maneka Gandhis case ( AIR 1978 SC 597 ) Justice Krishna Iyer concurring with Justice Bhagwati said:procedure established by law with its lethal potentiality will reduce life and liberty to a precarious play thing if we do not ex-necessitate import into those weighty words an adjectival rule of law civilised in its soul fair in its heart and fixing those imperatives of procedural protection absent which the processual tail will wag the substantive head. Can the sacred essence of the human right to secure which the struggle for liberation with do or die patriotism was launched be sapped by formalistic and pharisaic prescriptions regardless of essential standards. An enacted apparition is a constitutional illusion. Processual justice is writ patently on Art. 21. Can the sacred essence of the human right to secure which the struggle for liberation with do or die patriotism was launched be sapped by formalistic and pharisaic prescriptions regardless of essential standards. An enacted apparition is a constitutional illusion. Processual justice is writ patently on Art. 21. It is too grave to be circumvented by a black letter ritual processed through the legislature. 117 So I am convinced that to frustrate Art. 21 by relying on any formal adjectival statute however flimsy or fantastic its provisions be is to rob what the constitution treasures. Procedure which deals with the modalities of regulating restricting or even rejecting a fundamental right falling within Art. 21 has to be fair not foolish carefully designed to effectuate not to subvert the substantive right itself. Thus understood procedure must rule out anything arbitrary freakish or bizarre. A valuable constitutional right can be canalised only by civilised processes. You cannot claim that it is a legal procedure if the passport is granted or refused taking loss ordeal of fire or by other strange or mystical methods. Nor is it tenable if life is taken by a crude or summary process of enquiry. What is fundamental is life and liberty. What is procedural is the manner of its exercise. This quality of fairness in the process is emphasised by the strong word established which means settled firmly not wantonly or whimsically. If it is rooted in the legal consciousness of the community it becomes established procedure. And Law leaves little doubt that it is normal regarded as just since law is the means and justice is the end. The learned Judge followed it up by the observations:119 Procedural safeguards are the indispensable essence of liberty In fact the history of personal liberty is large the history of procedural safeguards and right to a hearing has a human-right ring In India because of poverty and illiteracy the people are unable to protect and defend their rights; observance of fundamental right is not regarded as good politics and their transgression as bad politics. I sometimes pensively respect that peoples militant awareness rights and duties is a surer constitutional assurance of governmental respect and response than the sound and fury of question hour and the slow and unsure delivery of court writ Community Consciousness and the Indian Constitution is a fascinating subject of sociological relevance in many areas. I sometimes pensively respect that peoples militant awareness rights and duties is a surer constitutional assurance of governmental respect and response than the sound and fury of question hour and the slow and unsure delivery of court writ Community Consciousness and the Indian Constitution is a fascinating subject of sociological relevance in many areas. The statement of the law in Maneka Gandhis case has been neatly summed up in Bachan Singhs case (AIR 1980 SC 899) in paragraphs 135 and 136 and we are extracting those paragraphs:135 In Maneka Gandhis case which was a decision by a Bench of seven learned Judges. it was held by Bhagwati J. in his concurring judgment that the expression personal liberty in Article 21 is of the widest amplitude and it covers a variety of sights which go to constitute the personal liberty of man and some of them have been raised to the status of distinct fundamental rights under Article 19. It was further observed that Articles 14 19 and 21 are not to be interpreted in water tight compartments and consequently a law depriving a person of personal liberty and prescribing a procedure for that purpose within the meaning of Article 21 has to stand the test of one or more of the fundamental rights conferred under Article 19 which may be applicable in a given situation ex-hypothesis it must also be liable to be tested with reference to Article 14. The principle of reasonableness pervades all the three Articles with the result that the procedure contemplated by Art. 21 must be right and just and fair and not arbitrary fanciful or oppressive otherwise it should be no procedure at all and the requirement of Article 21 would not be satisfied. 136 Article 21 reads as under: no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. If this Article is expanded in accordance with the interpretative principle indicated in Maneka Gandhi it will read as follows: no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to fair just and reasonable procedure established by valid law In the converse positive form the expanded Artical will read as below:a person may be deprived of his life or personal liberty in accordance with fair just and reasonable procedure established by valid law. Thus expanded and read for interpretative purposes Article 21 clearly brings out the implication that the Founding Fathers recognised the right of the State to deprive a person of his life or personal liberty in accordance with fair just and reasonable procedure established by valid law. there are several other indications also in the Constitution which show that the Constitution-makers were fully cognizant of the existence of death penalty for murder and certain other offences in the Indian Penal Code. Entries 1 and 2 in List III- Concurrent list- of the Seventh Schedule specifically refer to the Indian Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure as in force at the commencement of the Constitution. Article 72 specifically invests the President with power to suspend remit or commute the sentence of any person convicted of any offence and also in all cases where the sentence is a sentence of death. Likewise under Article 161 the Governor of a State has been given power to suspend remit or commute inter alia the sentence of death of any person convicted of murder or other capital offence relating to a matter to which the executive power of the State extends. Article 134 in terms gives a right of appeal to the Supreme Court to a person who on appeal is sentenced to death by the High Court after reversal of his acquittal by the trial Court. Under the successive Criminal Procedure Codes which have been in force for about 100 years a sentence of death is to be carried out by hanging. In view of the aforesaid constitutional postulates by no stretch of imagination can it be said that death penalty under sec. 302 Penal Code either per se or because of its execution by hanging constitutes an unreasonable cruel or unusual punishment. By reason of the same constitutional postulates it cannot be said that the framers of the Constitution considered death sentence for murder or the prescribed traditional mode of its execution as a degrading punishment which would defile the dignity of the individual within the contemplation of the Preamble to the Constitution. On parity of reasoning it cannot be said that death penalty for the offence of murder violates the basic structure of the Constitution. On parity of reasoning it cannot be said that death penalty for the offence of murder violates the basic structure of the Constitution. ( 15 ) IT may be of interest here to refer to the case of an order of externment and surveillance under the Delhi Police Act which arose before the Supreme Court in PREM CHAND V. UNION OF INDIA ( AIR 1981 SC 613 ) after the decision in MANEKA GANDHIS CASE. Secs. 47 and 50 of the Delhi Police Act clothe the Commissioner of Police with externment powers necessary for keeping the capital city crime-free. That includes the power to remove of persons about to commit offences. In exercise of this power the Deputy Commissioner of Police Delhi took up proceedings against the petitioner in that case and directed him to show cause why he should not be externed from the Union Territory of Delhi. The case for externment attempted to be made out was on the basis of allegations which were vague statements as to the activities of the petitioner as causing and as calculated to cause harm alarm and danger to the residents of certain localities. In that case the Supreme Court did not have to decide the case on the merits as it was represented for the State that no further action would be taken against the petitioner. Even so because of the importance of the question raised Krishna Iyer J. speaking for the Bench observed:but fundamental rights are fundamental and personal liberty cannot be rut at the mercy of the Police Therefore sec. 47 and 50 have to be read strictly Any police apprehension is not enough. Some ground or other is not adequate. There must be a clear and present danger based upon credible meterial which makes the movements and acts of the person in question alarming or dangerous or fraught with violence. 47 and 50 have to be read strictly Any police apprehension is not enough. Some ground or other is not adequate. There must be a clear and present danger based upon credible meterial which makes the movements and acts of the person in question alarming or dangerous or fraught with violence. Likewise there must be sufficient reason to believe that the person proceeded against is so desperate and dangerous that his mere presence in Delhi or any part thereof is hazardous to the community and its safety We are clear that the easy possibility of abuse of this power to the detriment of the fundamental freedoms of the citizen persuades us to insist that a stringent test must be applied We are further clear that natural justice must be fairly complied with and vague allegations and secret hearings are gross violations of Articles 14 19 and 21 of the Constitution as expounded by this Court in Maneka Gandhi (1978) 1 SCC 248 : ( AIR 1978 SC 597 ). The learned Judges also cautioned:by this judgment what we mean is not to tell the Police to fold up their hands and remain inactive when anti-social elements suddenly grow in wealth but to be activist and intelligent enough to track down those who hold the notions health wealth peace and security in jeopardy. The only insistence is that the means must also be as good as the ends. ( 16 ) OUR attention has been drawn by the learned Advocate General appearing for the State to a recent decision of the High Court of Bombay reported in Criminal Law Reporter in BANAS DOMNIC MIRANDA V. A. K. ANKOLA and OTHERS (CRI. L. R. (MAH.) 1983 AT PAGE 58) in support of the contention of the State that Maneka Gandhis case should make no difference to the view taken on the validity of secs. 56 and 59. In paragraph 11 of the Report the Court said:the law is an extraordinary one and has been enacted to meet exceptional cases. Reasonableness or justness of the procedure will have to be tested in this back ground and if so tested it will have to be held that the procedure prescribed provides sufficient safeguards to an innocent person to protect himself and is otherwise reasonable fair and just. Reasonableness or justness of the procedure will have to be tested in this back ground and if so tested it will have to be held that the procedure prescribed provides sufficient safeguards to an innocent person to protect himself and is otherwise reasonable fair and just. Once such a finding is recorded then even on the basis of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhis case ( AIR 1978 SC 597 ) it cannot be said that any of the provisions and particularly provisions of secs. 56 and 59 of the Bombay Police Act are in any way ultra vires of the petitioners fundamental right to liberty as authorised in Article 21 of the Constitution. Further the law laid down. by the Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhis case will have to be understood in the context of the provisions of the Passport Act. It is well settled that the rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. The doctrine of natural justice cannot be imprisoned within the strait-jacket of a rigid formula and its application must also depend upon framework of law under which enquiry is held. So considered in our opinion the procedure prescribed by secs. 56 and S9 and other relevant provisions of the Bombay Police Act cannot be termed to be unjust or unreasonable having regard to the object sought to be achieved and the mischief or the defect with which the Legislature wanted to deal with. If the relevant provisions of the Bombay Police-Act are tested in this background then it will have to be held that the procedure prescribed is not violative of article 21 read with article 14 of the Constitution of India. Had the matter been open to examination by us we would have gone into this question and perhaps we might have been persuaded consider whether a different approach should not be made to the validity of secs. 56 and 59. Mr. Takwani appearing for the petitioner in one of the cases delinked referred to the decision in A. K. ROY V. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER ( AIR 1982 SC 710 ) wherein there was an attack to the provisions of National Security Act. According to the learned counsel that Act was upheld only because that there were safeguards provided in the Act itself in regard to procedure. According to the learned counsel that Act was upheld only because that there were safeguards provided in the Act itself in regard to procedure. The learned counsel asked the question whether the class of people who are to receive treatment under sec. 56 are worse than those class of people who are treated under the National Security Act and If so whether they are not entitled at least to those safeguards ? ( 17 ) MAY be that at one time it was expected that sec. 56 of the Act would be used with considerable circumspection and that approach might have influenced in upholding the validity of the Act despite the fact that unlike in statutes relating to preventive detention there is no guarantee of minimum safeguards of procedure in the impugned sections safeguards which will assure an effective opportunity to a person against whom for reasons best known to the Police action is initiated. Our attention has been drawn by the counsel for the petitioner in this case to instances where sec. 56 of the Bombay Police Act has been invoked even against practising advocates. Particular reference has been made to Spl. Cri. Application No. 192 of 1980 challenging action under sec. 56 of the Bombay Police Act taken up against a practising advocate who was an elected member of the Balsar Panchayat and was also a labour leader. It is said that the assumption that the Act is not capable of misuse particularly when the Police might very often be influenced by extraneous force may not be warranted and on the mere assumption that the provision is not likely to be misused the Court will not be justified in refusing to go into the fairness in the approach made by the enactment particularly in view of the decision in Maneka Gandhis case. ( 18 ) HOWEVER much we are tempted to go into this question by the very persuasive arguments of Mr. H. L. Patel appearing for the petitioner in this case and Mr. Takwani and others supporting him we think it is not open to this Court to go into this plea since the Supreme Court has spoken on the validity of the section and that is law under Article 141 of the Constitution. H. L. Patel appearing for the petitioner in this case and Mr. Takwani and others supporting him we think it is not open to this Court to go into this plea since the Supreme Court has spoken on the validity of the section and that is law under Article 141 of the Constitution. That cannot be overlooked by this Court on the ground that the Supreme Court had no occasion to test the validity of the sections impugned in the light of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. In a case which arose under the C. P. and Berar Municipalities Act the right of a municipality governed by that Act to levy a tax on bales of cotton ginned at the prescribed rate under sec. 66 (1) (b) was challenged by a tax payer. The Supreme Court held in that case. BHARAT KALA BHANDAR V. MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE OF DHAMANOAM ( AIR 1966 SC 249 ) that levy of tax on cotton ginned by the tax payer in excess of the amount prescribed by Article 276 of the Constitution was invalid and a suit for refund of excess tax was maintainable. Despite that decision the High Court in a subsequent case proceeded to deal with the question before it as if the decision would not he applicable and the justification shown was that relevant provisions were not brought to the notice of the Supreme Court. In dealing with this the Supreme Court in the decision in B. M. LAKHANI V. MALKAPUR MUNICIPALITY ( AIR 1970 SC 1002 ) observed that the decision was binding on the High Court and the High Court could not ignore it because they thought that the relevant provisions were not brought to the notice of the Court. In this view we having stated the case of the petitioners as presented to us as they desired us to do do not propose to go into the question since we hold that the challenge to vires of secs. 56 and 59 of the Bombay Police Act would not be permissible in this Court in view of the matter having been considered by the Supreme Court on earlier occasions as a result of which consideration the sections have been held to be valid. 56 and 59 of the Bombay Police Act would not be permissible in this Court in view of the matter having been considered by the Supreme Court on earlier occasions as a result of which consideration the sections have been held to be valid. A new ground of challenge even on the basis of approach made in later decisions of the Supreme Court may not be available before this Court to the petitioner in this case. Hence we find against the petitioner on the question of validity of the impugned sections. ( 19 ) NOW we will go into the merits. The main contentions raised on the merits will have to be answered against the petitioner on the basis of the decisions adverted to. As we have already indicated the plea that the notice issued was vague and the general allegations do not give any notice of specific events or incidents is a matter which we do not propose to deal with in view of what we have already said. So is the contention that the order by the externing authority and the order in appeal are not speaking orders. The decisions which we have adverted to cover that point also and in the light of those decisions we have to hold that these are not infirmities in the proceedings. It is urged that the notice issued to the petitioner filed as Annexure `a prior to the passing of the externment order mentions that victims were not coming forward to give evidence while the externment order Annexure B mentions that witnesses are not coming forward and therefore the order is beyond the scope of the notice issued. The notice refers not to victims but to witnesses who are victims and therefore we do not find any divergence between the notice and the order. Further it is contended that in the externment order Annexure B reference is made only to ground mentioned in sec. 56 (b) whereas the appellate order makes reference to the grounds covered by sec. 56 (a) and (b) and therefore the appellate order is not properly directed. The appellate order makes reference to allegations falling under sec. 56 (a) and (b) as made in the notice. The notice Annexure `a contains allegations which fall under sec. 56 (a) as well as (b ). Hence there is no scope for this plea also. 56 (a) and (b) and therefore the appellate order is not properly directed. The appellate order makes reference to allegations falling under sec. 56 (a) and (b) as made in the notice. The notice Annexure `a contains allegations which fall under sec. 56 (a) as well as (b ). Hence there is no scope for this plea also. It is further said that one of the allegations in the notice Annexure `a issued prior to the externment order does not fall within the scope of sec. 56. Reference there is to the sale of liquor by the petitioner and his associates and it is said that the sale of liquor causes disorder evidently referring to ground (a) of causing alarm. We do not think that this too is any reason to hold the externment order bad. Consequently in the light of the approach made to the contention raised by the petitioner we do not think that there is any case for interference. The petition has to be dismissed on the merits and the rule discharged. We do so. ( 20 ) THE fact that we have not vacated the order of externment in this case and have upheld the validity of the sections need not necessarily mean that the externing authority should continue passing orders adopting the same procedure and in the same fashion. Considering the very disastrous consequences of an externment order the financial situation of the class of people against whom such orders are being usually passed and the help-lessness of persons who are subjected to such orders it will be worthwhile for the authorities concerned to exercise considerable self-restraint in passing such orders. It is also advisable for them to attempt to make a very judicial approach remembering that the consequences of their order is the deprivation of the freedom of movement of the person who is subjected to that order quite often unsettling him and keeping him away from his home. It is not likely that such externees could rehabilitate themselves in another district of the State particularly with the background of their externment and there is every likelihood of such persons getting involved deeper in the criminal life of the area to which they are externed. It is not likely that such externees could rehabilitate themselves in another district of the State particularly with the background of their externment and there is every likelihood of such persons getting involved deeper in the criminal life of the area to which they are externed. The power conferred on the externing authority should not be exercised with a penal content or with a punitive direction and should be exercised with due regard for human rights. We felt that which dismissing the petition now before us and adopting a course which may perhaps result in the dismissal of other petitions too a word of caution would not be out of place. we hope that this will be taken in the right spirit. 3/03/1984 . ( 21 ) THE counsel for the petitioner makes an oral application under Article 134 (1) (c) read with Article 134a of the Constitution for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of India. We find that there is a substantial question of law of general importance calling for decision by the Supreme Court arising in this case. We need not reiterate the reasons why we have been persuaded to grant the leave as the judgment itself indicates why we consider that the matter requires examination by the Supreme Court and that the contentions raised before us can appropriately be noticed only by the Supreme Court. Hence leave to appeal to the Supreme Court granted. Petition dismissed: Leave to appeal granted. .