Judgment Ratnavel Pandian, J.: The petitioner Mrs. Mrignaini Kanwar has moved this Court under Art.226 of the Constitution of India for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus setting at liberty her husband Ashok Kumar, the detenu herein, who has been detained in the Central Prison, Madras, in pursuance of an order of detention under Section 3(1), Cls.(ii), (iii) & (iv), of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as the COFEPOSA Act) passed by the first respondent herein on 7-9-1983. 2. The grounds on which the impugned order has been made are as follows: The Customs Intelligence Officers at Madras Airport, on information, intercepted on 20-8-1983 three Nigerian nationals, viz., one Mr. Anthoni Umunnokwe Ikechi, one Mrs. Mary Williams Udondem and one Mr. Azubike Augustine Nwangwa (two males and one female). These three persons arrived from Singapore by the Air India Flight on that night. They paid for their packages on oral declarations without payment of duty, opting to go through the Green Channel of the Customs Enclosures, and had gone out of the Customs Hall, where Mr. Nwangwa was received by the detenu who was waiting with a white-coloured Ambassador car bearing Regn No. TMR. 4860. Mr. Nwangwa kept his two suit cases in the dicky of the abovesaid car. The other two passengers were about to load their cleared packages into the car. At this stage, the Customs Officers intercepted the three passengers, the detenu and the driver of the car along with the cleared packages for detailed examination in the presence of witnesses on the basis of some information to the effect that they were carrying wrist watches in large quantities. The detenu gave his name as Ashok Kumar. The examination of the package of Anthoni U. Ikechi resulted in the recovery of 1630 Nos. of “Royal LCD Quartz” wrist watches made in Hong-Kong, 3750 Nos. of watch batteries and some documents. These contrabands were found concealed inside the false bottom sides of the suitcases. The watch batteries in 25 packets were recovered on a search of the person of Mr. Anthoni U. Ikechi. All the goods were valued at Rs.56,400/- C.I.F. and Rs. 1,41,000/- market value. The package of Mrs. of watch batteries and some documents. These contrabands were found concealed inside the false bottom sides of the suitcases. The watch batteries in 25 packets were recovered on a search of the person of Mr. Anthoni U. Ikechi. All the goods were valued at Rs.56,400/- C.I.F. and Rs. 1,41,000/- market value. The package of Mrs. Mary Williams, who is the wife of A.U. Ikechi, was found to be unusually heavy, fitted with false bottoms, which, when removed, was found to contain 910 Royal LCD Quartz wrist watches made in Hong Kong. The search of the hand-bag belonging to Mary Williams resulted in the recovery of 50 packages of brown adhesive tape, each packet containing 150 Nos. of button cells (watch batteries) totalling 7,500 numbers. These goods were valued at Rs. 42,300/- C.I.F., and Rs. 1,05,750/- market value. The package of Augustine Nwangwa consisted of two suit-cases. On examination of the one white in colour, it was found that 910 Nos. of wrist watches were kept concealed under a false bottom of the suit cases and all the watches were Rotal LCD Quartz wrist watches. The other gray-coloured suit-case was opened and there were 715 Nos. of the same brand wrist watches kept under a false bottom, all made in Hong Kong. Another set of 745 wrist watches of the same brand were also found kept, all totalling 2,370 watches, all made in Hong Kong. On a personal search, 35 brown paper pads were found kept inside the socks worn by him. When examined, they were found to contain button cells watch batteries (150 Nos. in each pad, totalling 5,250). Besides, some documents were also recovered from this person. The aforesaid two suit-cases belonging to this passenger Augustine Nwangwa had been kept in the dicky of the Ambassador car as stated above. The goods recovered from this person were valued at Rs. 81,600/- C.I.F., and Rs. 2,04,000/- market value, and the Ambassador car at Rs. 40,000/-. All these goods recovered from these three passengers as well as the Ambassador car were seized under three separate mahazars. The total C.I.F., value of the goods seized from the three persons is Rs.1,80,300/- and the market value of the same is Rs. 4,50,750/-. 3. Statements were recorded by the Customs Officials on 21-8-1983 from all the abovesaid three Nigerians, from whom the contrabands were seized. The total C.I.F., value of the goods seized from the three persons is Rs.1,80,300/- and the market value of the same is Rs. 4,50,750/-. 3. Statements were recorded by the Customs Officials on 21-8-1983 from all the abovesaid three Nigerians, from whom the contrabands were seized. All of them had admitted their involvement with the present transaction and also implicated the detenu herein in the smuggling in question. According to A.U. Ikechi, he was taken to the house of the detenu at No.2275, Gali Gardia Kucha Challam Daryagang, New Delhi - 110 006, by one of his country-men, Frank alias Kochies and it was then only Ikechi came to know that the detenu an Frank were business partners in smuggled goods. The detenue had asked for his help in getting wrist watches from Hong-kong where the detenu's brother Rakesh Kumar was doing business and the detenu told him that he would purchase air ticket from Delhi to Bangkok, Hong-kong and back to Bombay and that Anthoni Ikechi would have to bring watches given by the detenu's brother at Hong-kong by concealing them in his suit-cases, for which he would pay him Rs. 10,000/- Ikechi would further state that the detenue gave the phone No. J. 721-7793 of his brother Rakesh Kumar at Hon-Kong and told him that he would phone up his brother in Hong-kong about Ikechi's arrival and asked Ikechi to leave for Hong-kong on 28-6-1983 and bring the suit-cases with the concealed watches that would be handed over to him by his brother Rakesh Kumar. Accordingly, he left for Hong-kong on 28-6-1983 and landed in Bombay on 1-7-1983. Once again, he went to from Delhi to Hong-kong with his wife with the tickets purchased by the detenue for the to-and from journeys and brought two boxes containing watches given by Rakesh Kumar and landed in Bombay Airport on Ikechi and his wife left India through Delhi on 31-7-1983 and brought two suitcases on 3-8-1983 with wrist watches concealed therein, and then again, at the instance of the detenue, Ikechi and his wife, along with his cousin Augustine Nwangwa left Delhi on 17-8-1983 with the tickets purchased by the detenue and brought five suitcases containing the contrabands concerned in this case given by Rakesh Kumar at Hong Kong and landed at the Madras Airport on 20-3-1983 from Singapore. At the Madras Airport, they all declared that the boxes contained only used personal effects and after the Customs clearance they came out of the arrival hall with the suitcases. Augustine kept his suitcases in. the Ambassador Car TMR. 4860 after being received by the detenue. Ikechi and his wife Mary Williams were just following him. At that time, the Customs Officers intercepted all the three Nigerians along with the detenue and the driver of the car and took all of them and their boxes to the Customs Hall where they were examined in the presence of witnesses which examination revealed the recovery of the watches and battery cells above-mentioned, besides the recovery of six incriminating documents from Ikechi and that none of them have any valid import licence or permit to import them to India. Therefore, the Customs Officers seized all of them, Mary Williams and Augustine, in their respective statements, admitted the transactions as mentioned by Ikechi. All of them have uniformity admitted that they knew that it was an offence to import these goods without a valid licence and moreover to do so without declaring to the Customs and keeping them concealed. The detenu, in his separate statement, has ‘admitted that his brother Rakesh Kumar is at present in Hong-kong and that he, after leaving his earlier vacation as a broker venture in dealing in Indian goods and thereafter used to purchase foreign goo-is and sell them for small, profit and then, with the help of his brother Rakesh Kumar at Hongkong he Indulged in smuggling activities. According to the detenue, he came to Madras by air from Delhi and stayed at Savers Hotel and en the night at about 8 p.m., he went to the Madras Airport to receive Anthoni and two others by taking a tourist taxi TMR. 4860 and received Augustine and took him to the car and Augustine placed his two suit cases in the car and the other two followed him to the car and it was at that time the Customs Officials took ail of them and the boxes and examined them, resulting in the recovery of the smuggled watches and the battery cells. 4860 and received Augustine and took him to the car and Augustine placed his two suit cases in the car and the other two followed him to the car and it was at that time the Customs Officials took ail of them and the boxes and examined them, resulting in the recovery of the smuggled watches and the battery cells. After the seizure of the contrabands, the detenue and the three Nigerians were arrested at 4 p.m., on 21-8-1983 and produced at 8 p.m., before the Additional Metropolitan Magistrate (B.O.I.) who directed all the arrested persons to be kept in the Customs House over-night and produced in the morning. Accordingly, they were produced before the Magistrate at about 12-05 p.m., on 22-8-1983. The detenue, Anthoni and Augustine complained before the Magistrate that they were beaten by the departmental officials and their statements were recorded by the Court. 4. The department has denied the allegation that they were beaten. The Court did not find any visible injury on any one of them. Besides, all the four stated before the Court that the statements obtained by the department were not voluntary. Then, all of them were remanded to judicial custody till 3-9-1983. 5. Further investigations are in progress. Ail the goods seized in this case are liable to confiscation as (i) they were imported to India without a valid licence from the import Trade Control Authorities, (ii) they were brought concealed if the packages and (iii) they were not declared before the Customs Officers at any stage. The Ambassador car is also liable to confiscation as it was used in the carriage of smuggled goods. The three Nigerians are liable to penalties under Section 112 of the Customs Act for involvement in the smuggling activities and they are admittedly guilty of smuggling goods repeatedly to India as stated in the grounds of detention. Further, they have also admittedly abetted the smuggling of goods. The detenu, as the grounds road, has admitted having abetted the smuggling of goods though the abovesaid three Nigerians and also transported, kept and dealt in the smuggled goods repeatedly, it was on the basis of the above materials, the detaining authority, after arriving at the subjective satisfaction, has passed the impugned order. 6. The detenu, as the grounds road, has admitted having abetted the smuggling of goods though the abovesaid three Nigerians and also transported, kept and dealt in the smuggled goods repeatedly, it was on the basis of the above materials, the detaining authority, after arriving at the subjective satisfaction, has passed the impugned order. 6. The Writ Petitioner submits that the order of detention is invalid and illegal for various reasons, viz., (1) the non-furnishing of the statement of the driver of the taxi, (ii) the non-consideration and non-application of mind by the detaining authority to the retraction made by the detenu in his bail application from his earlier statement, (3) the non-furnishing of the statements recorded by the Magistrate in Court at the time of the remand and also the copy of the bail application in which the statement has been retracted, (iv) the non-furnishing of the copy of the retraction letter dated 1-9-1983 sent by the detenue, (v) the non-consideration of the material fact, viz., the factum of the detenu's release on conditional bail on 31-8-1983 and (vi) the non-application of mind by the detaining authority while passing order of detention for various categories of offence falling under Section 3 of the COFEPOSA ACT, as can be seen from the use of the disjunctive word ‘or’ instead of the conjunctive word ‘and’ etc. 7. The first respondent has filed a counter through its Joint Secretary, Public Department, mentioning the circumstances leading to and the reasons warranting, the passing of the impugned order. He has denied the various allegations made by the petitioner in his affidavit. In the counter, the first respondent has given his reply by way of meeting the various submissions of the petitioner and ultimately stated that the order does not suffer from any vice or illegality. 8. The second respondent has filed a formal counter stating that the detenu is detained in the Central Prison at Madras consequent upon the impugned order passed by the first respondent. 9. Mr. G. Ramaswami, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, urged the following grounds against the validity of the order of detention: (1) The non-placing before the detaining authority, of the statement of the driver of the taxi TMR. 9. Mr. G. Ramaswami, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, urged the following grounds against the validity of the order of detention: (1) The non-placing before the detaining authority, of the statement of the driver of the taxi TMR. 4860, which is a vita¡ material for consideration while drawing the subjective satisfaction for passing the impugned order, and the non-furnishing of the letter of retraction sent by the detenu to the Collector of Customs Madras, on 1-9-1983, vitiate the order of detention. (2) The impugned order of detention is bad since it does not specify the categories of the offence in respect of which the said order was passed, but merely repeats only Clauses (ii), (iii) and (iv) of Sub- section (1)of Section 3 of the Act, by using the disjunctive word ‘or’ which would mean that the detaining authority was not certain whether he had reached his subjective satisfaction as to the necessity of exercising his power of detention on the ground of the detenu having committed any particular offence falling within any one of the said three Clauses mentioned above. (3) The non-furnishing to the detenu of the copy of the Court proceedings of the detenu and the three Nigerians, recording that the detenu and the three Nigerians stated to the Court that their statements before the departmental officials were not voluntary; the complaints of the detenu, Ikechi and Augustine that they were beaten by the departmental officials and the denial statement of the Department referred to in paragraph - X of the Grounds of Detention, and the non-furnishing of the copies of the six documents referred to in the grounds of detention, render the order of detention quite illegal, as it is violative of Art.22(5) of the Constitution of India, in that the detenu has been deprived of the opportunity of making an effective representation before the Government. 10. Now, let us examine the above contentions seriatim and examine whether the impugned order suffers from any illegality. 11. Contention No.1: As regards the grievance of the petitioner with regard to the non-placing of the statement of the driver of the taxi TMR. 10. Now, let us examine the above contentions seriatim and examine whether the impugned order suffers from any illegality. 11. Contention No.1: As regards the grievance of the petitioner with regard to the non-placing of the statement of the driver of the taxi TMR. 4860, if is submitted by the first respondent in his counter affidavit that the driver's statement was recorded only for ascertaining his responsibility as the person in charge of the carrier and as he has denied any connection with the contrabands seized, this document was not a material document and as such it was not placed before the detaining authority. 12. As regards the non-placing of the letter of retraction dated 1-9-1983 sent by the detenu, addressed to the Collector of Customs, Madras, it is pointed out that the said letter was received by the Customs House only on 7-9-1983, the date “on which the detention order was issued. A photostat copy of the said letter is annexed to the counter of the first respondent. In the said letter, the detenu has-complained that the statements from him and from the three Nigerians were obtained under compulsion on physical torture and that they were not voluntary, which allegation, according to the first respondent, was similar to the allegation made before the Magistrate on 22-8-1983 when the detenu and others were produced for remand, and hence it cannot be contended that the sponsoring authorities have failed to place this document before the detaining authority before he passed the impugned order. 13. Mr. G. Ramaswami would strenuously contend that if the statement of the driver is inculpatory in nature, that statement would exclude the criminal liability of the detenu, that if it is exculpatory in nature it may incriminate the detenu and that therefore that document is a vital document which ought to have been placed before the detaining authority, because, had it been placed before him, it might have influenced the mind of the detaining authority in favour of the detenu in case that statement had been an inculpatory one completely excluding the liability of the detenu. This argument cannot be accepted for the following reasons, viz., (1) there were vital and material documents inclusive of the statements of the three Nigerians incriminating the detenu with the smuggling of the contrabands as well as the statement of the detenu himself, implicating himself with the smuggling activity in question, from which materials the detaining authority had drawn his subjective satisfaction that the circumstances warranted the passing of the order of detention against the detenu; (2) the detenu himself has admitted in his statement that that he engaged and took the tourist taxi to the Airport and received the Nigerians, and thereby he not only implicated himself and the Nigerians alone with the smuggling activities, but also excluded the involvement of the taxi driver in any part of the activity of smuggling of the contraband seized, and (3) it was the detenu who received all the three Nigerians and brought them to the taxi and in the said circumstances the statement of the driver is not relevant at all for drawing the subjective satisfaction, as there were abundant vital document as and basic materials placed before the detaining authority for drawing his requisite subjective satisfaction. 14. As rightly pointed out in the counter affidavit, the question of placing the letter dated 1-9-1983 does not arise in this case, because that letter was received by the office of the Collector of Customs only on 7-9-1983, on which date the order of detention was passed. Therefore, there is no substance in the first contention. 15. Contention No.2: Under Section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA ACT, an order of detention can be passed by the competent authority on his being satisfied with respect to any person (including a foreigner) with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the conservation or augmentation of foreign exchange or with a view to preventing him from- (i) smuggling goods, or (ii) abetting the smuggling of goods, or (iii) engaging in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods, or (iv) dealing in smuggled goods otherwise than by engaging in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods, or (v) harbouring persons engaged in smuggling goods or in keeping the smuggling of goods. These five heads are broad and are capable of taking in innumerable activities prejudicial to the conservation or augmentation of foreign exchange. 16. Mr. These five heads are broad and are capable of taking in innumerable activities prejudicial to the conservation or augmentation of foreign exchange. 16. Mr. G. Ramaswami, pointed out that the language employed in paragraph 2 of the grounds of detention spells out that the detaining authority was satisfied that the detenue has indulged in abetting the smuggling of goods, engaging in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods and dealing in smuggled goods otherwise than by engaging in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods”, has submitted that the satisfaction of the detaining authority was on the disjunctive and not the conjunctive grounds, which means that the detaining authority was not certain whether he had reached his subjective satisfaction as to the necessity of exercising his power of detention oh the ground of any one of the specific and particularised acts enumerated in Clauses (ii) to (iv) of Section 3(1) of the Act. He would add that as the order stands, it would appear either that the detaining authority was not certain whether the alleged activities of the detenu related to any one of the acts falling under the abovesaid Clauses or that he did not seriously apply his mind on the question whether the said alleged activities fell under one head or the other and merely reproduced mechanically the language of Section 3(1), Clauses (ii) to (iv), and that when such equivocal language is used in an order and the detenu is not specifically told whether his alleged activities set out in the grounds of detention fell under one head or the other or all, the order would be bad in law on the ground of non-application of mind by the detaining authority. 17. The relevant paragraph 2 of the Grounds of Detention, reads thus: “From the above materials, the State Government is satisfied that you have indulged in abetting the smuggling of goods, engaging in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods and dealing in smuggled goods otherwise than by engaging in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods”. True, in the abovesaid paragraph, the disjunctive ‘or’ is used with reference to Clause (iii) presumably copying down the exact words used in the said clause. True, in the abovesaid paragraph, the disjunctive ‘or’ is used with reference to Clause (iii) presumably copying down the exact words used in the said clause. The question for consideration is whether the use of the disjunctive ‘or’ instead of the conjunctive ‘and’ would in this case spell out that the detaining authority had not at all applied his mind with regard to the specific activity or activities of the detenu, in respect of which the detenu was sought to be prevented, but mechanically used the language rendering the preventive order bad. 18. Mr. G. Ramaswami, in support of his contention, placed reliance on the decision in Kishori Mohan v. State of West Bengal Kishori Mohan v. State of West Bengal (1973) S.C.C. (Crl.) 30: A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1749. In that case, the impugned order was under Section 3 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971. The grounds of detention served on the petitioner therein revealed that the detaining authority was satisfied of the necessity of the petitioner's detention to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to “the maintenance of public order or the security of the State”. This order was challenged contending that the use of the disjunctive expression ‘or’ indicated that the detaining authority had not applied his mind on the question whether the said alleged activities fell under one head or the other and merely reproduced mechanically the language employed in Section 3(1)(a)(ii) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act. Having regard to the facts of the case, the Supreme Court made the following observation: “It is, therefore, clear that before the authority invokes its power under Section 3, it must be satisfied and must expressly say in its order that the alleged activities of the person concerned were such that they endangered or were likely to endanger either the security of the State or Public order or both. If the activities are of such potentiality or impact so as to affect both of them, the conjunctive ‘and’ and not the disjunctive ‘or’ would be the appropriate word. There is, therefore, considerable force in the argument that the language in which the impugned order is couched demonstrates an element of casualness with which it was made”. The above decision was reached following the observations made in Dr. Lohia v. State of Bihar Dr. Lohia v. State of Bihar (1966)2 S.C.J. 549: (1966) MLJ. There is, therefore, considerable force in the argument that the language in which the impugned order is couched demonstrates an element of casualness with which it was made”. The above decision was reached following the observations made in Dr. Lohia v. State of Bihar Dr. Lohia v. State of Bihar (1966)2 S.C.J. 549: (1966) MLJ. (Crl.) 642: A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 740 which, according to their Lordships in (1973) S.C.C. (Crl.) 30, have clearly brought out the distinction between each of the three concepts and the three imaginary concentric circles helped to delineate the respective areas of the three concepts. It was further held in (1973) S.C.C. (Crl.) 30, that the true test is not the kind but the potentiality of the act in question and that one act may affect only individuals while the other, though of a similar kind, may have such an impact that it would disturb the even tempo of the life the community, and added that this does not mean that there can be no overlapping in the sence that an act cannot fall under two concepts at the same time. 19. In our view, this decision will not be of much assistance to the detenu in this case, because the objectives coming under the two concepts viz., ‘public order’ and ‘the security of the State’ are distinct and separate operating on different fields, whereas in the case on hand, the activities mentioned in the various clauses of Section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act are activities which are so inter-related and inter-connected with each other that they often overlap and could be carried out in the course of the same transaction. In this connection, reference can be made to the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Ismail, J., as he then was, and Nainar Sundaram, J., in H. Askaran Gulecha v. Union of India and others (W.P. 774/78 of this Court order dated 3.4.1978) wherein the Bench had an occasion to examine a similar contention raised with reference to Section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act. In the said case, the Bench distinguished the decision in (1973) S.C.C. (Crl.) 30: A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1749, making the following observations: “Thus, it will be seen from Section 3(1) of the Act (COFEPOSA IN1974COFE01) that the various activities which are particularised therein constitute interrelated or linked activities and not independent activities, concerned with a single concept, namely, smuggling of goods or the smuggled goods. This smuggling of goods or the smuggled goods is the common thread that runs through and binds and links the various activities particularised in different clauses of Section 3(1) of the Act. In view of this special feature present in Section 3(1) of the Act, we are unable to hold that the principle underlying the decision of the Supreme Court with regard to clauses contained in Section 3(1)(a) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act of 1971 will apply to the act in question”. We are also in respectful agreement with the view expressed by the earlier Bench of this Court in Askaran Gulecha's Case (W.P.No. 774/78 dt. 3.4.1978) and hold that the various activities particularised in Section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act constitute inter-related or linked activities flowing from the same fountain. 20. Then, Mr. G. Ramaswami cited Rekha Ben v. State of Gujarat Rekha Ben v. State of Gujarat (1979) Crl.L.J. 212: A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 456. After going through this decision, we are of the view that the principle laid down therein will not go in aid of the case of the writ petitioner. 21. The learned Public Prosecutor relied upon the judgment of this Court in Askaran Gulecha's Case (W.P.No. 774/78 dt. 3.4.1978) referred to above and the decision of the Supreme Court in Narendra v. V.B. Gujrat Narendra v. V.B. Gujrat (1979) Crl L.J. 469: A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 420 and submits that in the impugned order the disjunctive ‘or’ has been used only with reference to the three activities mentioned in Clause (iii), but not between one another of Clauses (ii), (iii) and (iv), but on the other hand only the conjunctive ‘and’ is used while connecting the said clauses. In fact, in ground No.4 of the grounds of detention, it is specifically stated: “The State Government, therefore, consider that it is necessary to detain you under Section 3(1)(ii), (iii) and (iv) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act……” Therefore, it is clear that a close reading of paragraphs 2 and 4of the grounds of detention would show that the disjunctive ‘or’ is used only while connecting the three activities mentioned in Clause (iii) along but not while connecting the different Clauses (ii), (iii) and (iv), but on the other hand the conjunctive ‘and’ is used. Therefore, the use of the word ‘or’ in the order of detention in the lines of Section 3(1)(iii) cannot be said to vitiate the order of detention. This is the view expressed by the Bench in Askaran Gulecha's case, W.P. No. 774/78 dt. 3.4.1978 of this Court, after observing that “as a matter of fact in the present case the word ‘and’ has been conjunctively used as between Clauses (iii) and (iv) and the disjunctive ‘or’ is used only with reference to the three activities mentioned in Clause (iii) alone”. 22. In (1979) Crl.L.J. 469: A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 420, the Supreme Court observed as follows: “There is, no doubt, a distinction between an act of smuggling and abetting the smuggling of goods for purposes of preventive detention under Section 3(1) of the Act. Nonetheless, the term ‘smuggling’ and defined in Section 2(e) of the Act has the same meaning as in Section 3(39) of the Customs Act, 1962, which, when read with Section 1(11) of that Act, is wide enough to include and make liable not only the actual smuggler, but also persons abetting the smuggling of contraband goods as well as all persons dealing in such goods etc. Though the provisions of Cls. (i) and (ii) of sub- section (1) of Section 3 of the Act may operate on different fields, which may sometimes, as here, overlap, still a wider meaning is given to the term ‘smuggling’ in Section 2(e) of the Act, with a view to broaden the scope of preventive detention. Sub-sec.(1) of Section 3 of the Act provides for different grounds of detention. Sub-sec.(1) of Section 3 of the Act provides for different grounds of detention. Cl.(i) relates to smuggling of goods, Cl.(ii) relates to abetting the smuggling of goods, Cl.(iii) relates to engaging in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods, Cl.(v) relates to harbouring persons engaged in smuggling goods or in abetting smuggling of goods. It must, therefore, be assumed that the intention of the legislature was to treat the smuggling of goods and abetting the smuggling of goods as grounds separate and distinct and both are separate grounds for detention, i.e., to take in all such activities which results in accomplishment of smuggling of contraband goods.” The facts of the case on hand show that there was widespread network in which the detenu was involved. As per the grounds of detention, the detenu has not only abetted the smuggling of goods through the Nigorians but also engaged in the activities mentioned in Clauses (iii) and (iv) of Section 3(1). The activities may overlap; but the materials placed before the detaining authority do show, according to the learned Public Prosecutor, that the detenu had engaged himself in the linked activities mentioned in Clauses (ii) to (iv) of Section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act, which were carried on in the course of the same transaction. 23. In view of the discussions made above, we are of the view that the use of the disjunctive ‘or’ will not lead to any inference that the detaining authority, without applying his mind, his passed the impugned order with an element of casualness by mechanically reproducing the language used in the various Clauses of Section 3(1) of the Act. Therefore, the second contention also has to fail. 24. Contention No.3: Mr. G. Ramaswami, learned counsel for the petitioner, stating that the detenu herein, along with the three foreigners, was produced before the Magistrate on 21-8-1983, at about 8.10 P.M., and thereafter, under the directions of the Court, they all were produced on the next day, i.e., on 22.8. Therefore, the second contention also has to fail. 24. Contention No.3: Mr. G. Ramaswami, learned counsel for the petitioner, stating that the detenu herein, along with the three foreigners, was produced before the Magistrate on 21-8-1983, at about 8.10 P.M., and thereafter, under the directions of the Court, they all were produced on the next day, i.e., on 22.8. 1983 at about 12.05 P.M., on which occasion all the four persons complained that they were beaten by the departmental officials and the statements obtained from them by the said officials were not voluntary, and that the detenu was ordered to be released on conditional bail on 31.8.1983 with the condition that he should report before the Assistant Collector of Customs every day, submits that the fact of the release of the detenu on conditional bail has not been brought to the notice of the detaining authority and that the copies of the Court proceedings recording the retraction of the detenu and others at the time of remand and the copies of six documents, all referred to in the grounds of detention, have not been furnished to the detenu. Though in the grounds of detention it is mentioned that the department has denied the allegation of torture, it is not clear as to whether this denial was made in the form of any statement either before the Magistrate or before the detaining authority and if such a statement was available, the non-furnishing of that statement also would affect the validity of the order of detention. 25. Before adverting to this argument, we feel that it has become imperative to consider, in the light of the various decisions of the Supreme Court, as to what are the vital and material particulars and documents, which form the foundation of the order of detention, which must be furnished to the detenu by the detaining authority in compliance with Art. 22(5) of the Constitution of India. 26. 26. Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India, around which this question revolves, reads as follows: “When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order.” Section 3(3) of the COFEPOSA ACT provides thus: “For’ the purposes of Clauses (5) of Article 22 of the Constitution, the communication to a person detained in pursuance of a detention order of the grounds on which the order has been made shall be made as soon as may be after the detention, but ordinarily not later than five days, and in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing, not later than fifteen days, from the date of detention.” The above Article of the Constitution has come up for consideration and has been analysed in a large number of cases by the Supreme Court, and it is clear from the decided cases that this Article provides for various safeguards calculated to protect the personal liberty of a citizen against arbitrary restraint without trial. It has been pointed out in Khudiram Das v. State of West Bengal Khudiram Das v. State of West Bengal (1975) Crl.L.J. 446: A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 550 thus: “These safeguards cannot be regarded as substantial. They re-essentially procedural in character and their efficacy depends on the care and caution and the sense of responsibility with which they are regarded by the detaining authority. “Two of these safeguards, which relate to the observance of the principle of natural justice and which A FORTORI are intended to act as a check on arbitrary exercise of power, are to be found in this Article, which introduces two procedural requirements embodying the rule of Audi Altram Partem to a limited but a crucial and compulsive extent.” The constitutional imperatives enacted in this Article are two-fold: (1) the detaining authority must, as soon as may be, that is, as soon as practicable, after the detention, indicate to the detenu the grounds on which the order of detention has been made; and (2) the detaining authority must afford the detenu the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention. These are the barest minimum safeguards which must be observed before an executive authority can be permitted to preventively detain a person and thereby drown his right of personal liberty in the name of public good or social security; vide Khudiram Das v. State of West Bengal Khudiram Das v. State of West Bengal (1975) Crl L.J. 446: A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 550 and Ganga v. Government of Maharashtra Ganga v. Government of Maharashtra (1980) Crl L.J. 1263: A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1744. 27. One of the earliest judgments of the Supreme Court on the interpretation of this Article, is Dr. Ramakrishnan Bhardwaj v. State of Delhi Dr. Ramakrishnan Bhardwaj v. State of Delhi (1953) S.C.J. 444: A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 318: (1953) S.C.R. 708 in which it has been observed that under Art.22(5) of the Constitution, the detenu has the right to be furnished with particulars of the grounds of his detention ‘sufficient to enable him to make a representation which, on being considered, may give relief to him.” 28. The question that follows is: What does the word “grounds” mean? Does it mean only the final conclusions reached by the detaining authority, on which alone the order of detention can be made, or does it include the basic facts and materials from which the conclusions justifying the order of detention are drawn by the detaining authority? As observed by the Supreme Court in (1975) Crl.L.J. 446, the answer to these questions does not present any serious difficulty if only we consider the reason why the grounds are required to be communicated to the detenu has soon as may be after the detention. As observed by the Supreme Court in (1975) Crl.L.J. 446, the answer to these questions does not present any serious difficulty if only we consider the reason why the grounds are required to be communicated to the detenu has soon as may be after the detention. The reasons are two-fold: (1) The requirement of communication of the grounds of detention acts and serves as a check against arbitrary, whimsical and capricious exercise of power, because there must be grounds for making an order of detention and those grounds must be communicated to the detenu so that not only the detenu may know what are the facts and materials before the detaining authority on the basis of which the detenu is being deprived of his personal liberty, but he can also invoke the power of judicial review, however limited or peripheral it may be (2) The detenu has to be afforded an opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention on the strength of which he is detained without a trial, because without the communication of the grounds of detention, the opportunity of making a representation would be rendered illusory. So, the communication of the grounds of detention is also intended to sub-serve the purpose of enabling the detenu to make an effective representation. For the abovesaid two reasons, the grounds on which the order of detention is made should be communicated to the detenu and it is obvious that the ‘grounds’ mean all the basic facts and materials which have been into account by the detaining authority in making the order of detention, that is, on which the order of detention is based. 29. In Golam v. State of West Bengal Golam v. State of West Bengal (1975)2 S.C.C. 4 : A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 754 the meaning of the term ‘grounds’ occurring in Art.22(5) and in Section 8 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, has been given as follows: “‘Grounds’ does not merely mean a recital or reproduction of a ground of satisfaction of the authority of in the language of Section 3 of the Act; nor is its connotation restricted to a bare statement of conclusions of fact. It means something more. That ‘something’ is the factual constituent of the ‘grounds’ on which the subjective satisfaction of the authority is based. It means something more. That ‘something’ is the factual constituent of the ‘grounds’ on which the subjective satisfaction of the authority is based. The basic facts and material particulars, therefore, which are the foundation of the order of detention, will also be covered by ‘grounds’ within the contemplation of Article 22(5) and Section 8 and are required to be communicated to the detenu unless their disclosure is considered by the authority to be against the public interest.” It has been pointed out in Shamrao Vishnu Parulekar v. The District Magistrate, Thana Shamrao Vishnu Parulekar v. The District Magistrate, Thana (1957) S.C.J, 710: (1957) MLJ. (Crl.)23: (1956) S.C.R.644: A.I.R.1957 S.C.23, while considering the order has been made’ in their natural and ordinary sense, thus: “…. they would include any information or material on which the order was based. The Oxford Concise Dictionary gives the following meanings to the word ‘ground’: ‘base’, foundation, motive, valid reason’. On this definition, the materials on which the District Magistrate considered that an order of detention should be made could properly be described as grounds therefor”. See also State of Bombay v. Atmaram Sridhar Vaidya State of Bombay v. Atmaram Sridhar Vaidya (1951) S.C.J. 208: A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 157; Naresh Chandra Ganguli and Narayan Das Indurkhya v. State of Madhya Pradesh Narayan Das Indurkhya v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1973)1 S.C.R. 392 : (1972) Crl.L.J. 1323: A.l.R. 1972 S.C. 2086. 30. The Supreme Court in Khudiram Das v. State of West Bengal Khudiram Das v. State of West Bengal (1975) Crl. L.J. 446: (1975)2 S.C.C. 81 : A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 550 after making a survey of the decisions bearing on the question of the obligation of the detaining authority to communicate to the detenu the grounds on which the order of detention has been made, has concluded thus: “It is, therefore, clear that nothing less than all the basic facts and materials which influence the detaining authority in making the order of detention, must be communicated to the detenu. That is the plain requirement of the first safeguard in Art.22 (5). The second safeguard in Art.22(5) requires that the detenu shall be afforded the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention. That is the plain requirement of the first safeguard in Art.22 (5). The second safeguard in Art.22(5) requires that the detenu shall be afforded the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention. No avoidable delay, no short-fall in the materials communicated, shall stand in the way of the detenu in making an early, yet comprehensive and effective representation in regard to all basic facts and materials which may have influenced the detaining authority in making the order of detention depriving him of his freedom. These are the legal bulwarks enacted by the Constitution-makers against arbitrary or improper exercise of the vast powers of preventive detention which may be vested in the executive by a law of preventive detention such as the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971”. 31. In Mohammad Yousuf Ravuthar v. State of Jammu and Kashmir Mohammad Yousuf Ravuthar v. State of Jammu and Kashmir (1979)4 S.C.C. 370 : (1980) 1 S.C.R. 258 : (1979) S.C.C. (Crl.) 999: A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1925, his Lordship Chinnappa Reddy, J., in a concurring judgment, dealt with the implication of Art.22(5) of the Constitution, thus: “The extent and the content of Art.22(5) have been the subject-matter of repeated pronouncements by this Court. (Vide: State of Bombay v. Atmaram State of Bombay v. Atmaram (1951) S.C.J. 208: (1951) S.C.R. 167; Dr. Ramakrishnan Bhardwaj The interpretation of Art. 22(5), consistently adopted by this Court, is, perhaps, one of the outstanding contributions of the Court in the cause of Human Rights. The law is well-settled that a detenu has two rights under Art.22(5) of the Constitution: (1) to be informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds on which the order of detention is based, that is, the ground which led to the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority, and (2) to be afforded the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention, that is, to be furnished with sufficient particulars to enable him to make a representation which on being considered may obtain relief to him”. Mr. Mr. G. Ramaswami, learned counsel appearing for the writ-petitioner, and Mr.P. Rajamanickam, learned Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the respondent, led us through a number of decisions of the Supreme Court in support of their legal submissions with regard to the material documents to be communicated to the detenu by the detaining authority enabling the detenu to make an effective representation. 32. Krishna Iyer, J., in Sasthi Keot v. State of West Bengal Sasthi Keot v. State of West Bengal (1974)4 S.C.C. 131 :(1974) Crl.L.J. 464: A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 525 quashed the order of detention as violative of Art. 22(5) , holding that every desperate or dangerous man cannot be run down under Section 3 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, especially when vital yet injurious dossier about the person has not been communicated to him and opportunity afforded for making a proper representation contra. 33. In Bhutnath v. State of West Bengal Bhutnath v. State of West Bengal (1974)1 S.C.C. 645 : (1974) Crl.L.J. 690: A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 806 it has been ruled that the fundamental constitutional mandates are that the authority shall communicate to the detenu all the material grounds on which the order has been made and which create that satisfaction in the authority which spells suspension of the citizen's liberty. 34. In Dektar Mudi v. State of West Bengal Dektar Mudi v. Stateof West Bengal (1974) Crl.L.J. 1389: A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 2086 the Supreme Court, while examining the question of furnishing the essential documents to the detenu, has made the following observation: “In such circumstances, whether the other materials on record had any effect on the mind of the detaining authority cannot be accepted solely on his statement, because to admit that he alone has such a right would be to accept that the mere ipsi dixit of the detaining authority would be sufficient and cannot be looked into. There is a possibility that certain materials on record would disclose that the activities of the detenu are of a serious nature having a nexus with the object of the Act (Maintenance of Internal Security Act), namely, the prevention of prejudicial acts affecting the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community, and having proximity with the time when the subjective satisfaction forming the basis of the detention order had been arrived at. If these elements exist, then the Court would be justified in taking the view that these must have influenced the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority and the omission to indicate those materials to the detenu would prejudice him in making an effective representation. If so, the detention order on that account would be illegal. It may be that the record and bio-data of the detenu may disclose materials, which have no nexus or proximity or are vague or having regard to their nature or magnitude, are not such as would have been considered by the detaining authority as essential for his subjective satisfaction, in which case it will have no effect upon the validity of the detention order”. The above judgment of the Supreme Court makes it clear that the materials having any proximity or nexus with the object of the detention in question or having regard to the nature of the activities, should be communicated to the detenu, enabling him to make an effective representation, and the omission to furnish to the detenu the other materials which do not have such proximity or nexus with the object of the detention will not vitiate the order of detention. 35. In Bablu Das v. State of West Bengal Bablu Das v. State of West Bengal (1975)4 S.C.C. 108 : (1975) Crl.L.J. 1327: A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1513 the copy of the history-sheet of the detenu showing various other circumstances about the criminal antecedents of the detenu, which were placed before the detaining authority, was not communicated to him. The Supreme Court held that the order was violative of Art.22(3) on the ground that all the grounds on which the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority is based must be disclosed; otherwise the order of detention would be bad. 36. Strong reliance was placed by Mr. The Supreme Court held that the order was violative of Art.22(3) on the ground that all the grounds on which the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority is based must be disclosed; otherwise the order of detention would be bad. 36. Strong reliance was placed by Mr. G. Ramaswami on the principles laid down by their Lordships Bhagwati and Venkataramaiah, JJ., of the Supreme Court in Icchudevi v. Union of India Icchudevi v. Union of India A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1983 wherein the following observations with regard to the supply of the grounds of detention have been made: “Now it is obvious that when Clause (5) of Art. 22 and sub- section (3) of Section 3 of the COFEPOSA ACT provide that the grounds of detention should be communicated to the detenu within five or fifteen days, as the case may be, what is meant is that the grounds of detention in their entirety must be furnished to the detenu. If there are any documents, statements or other materials relied upon in the grounds of detention, they must also be communicated to the detenu, because, being incorporated in the grounds of detention, they form part of the grounds and the grounds furnished to the detenu cannot be said to be complete without them. It would not therefore be sufficient to communicate to the detenu a bare recital of the grounds of detention, but copies of the documents, statements and other materials relied upon in the grounds of detention must also be furnished to the detenu within the prescribed time subject, of course, to Clause 6 of Art. 22, and Section 3, sub- section (3), of the COFEPOSA Act. One of the primary objects of communicating the grounds of detention to the detenu is to enable the detenu at the earliest opportunity to make a representation against his detention and it is difficult to see how the detenu can possibly make an effective representation unless he is also furnished copies of the documents, statements and other materials relied upon in the grounds of detention.” It would be pertinent to note in the said decision the Supreme Court has laid down the rule that the burden of showing that the detention is in accordance with the procedure established by law is always on the detaining authority because Art.21 of the Constitution provides in clear and explicit terms that no one shall be deprived of his life and personal liberty except in accordance with the procedure established by law. 37. In S.Gurdip Singh v. Union of India S.Gurdip Singh v. Union of India (1981) S.C.C. (Crl.) 168: (1981)1 S.C.C. 419 : (1981) Crl.L.J. 2: A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 362 the Supreme Court, after referring to the decision in A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1983, observed that on proper construction of Art.22(5) of the Constitution, a service of the grounds of detention on the detenu can be completed only if they are accompanied by the documents or materials on which the order of detention is based. 38. Having referred to the principles laid down in A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 550, and A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1983, on this question of law, the Supreme Court in Shalini Soni v. Union of India Shalini Soni v. Union of India (1980)4 S.C.C. 544 : (1981) S.C.C. (Crl.) 38: (1981)1 S.C.R. 962 : (1980) Crl.L.J. 1487:A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 431 has held: “….it is clear that ‘grounds’ in Art.22(5) do not mean mere factual inferences but mean factual inferences plus factual material which led to such factual inferences. Grounds must be self-sufficient and self-explanatory. In our view, the copies of documents to which reference is made in the ‘grounds’ must be supplied to the detenu as part of the grounds.” 39. Grounds must be self-sufficient and self-explanatory. In our view, the copies of documents to which reference is made in the ‘grounds’ must be supplied to the detenu as part of the grounds.” 39. The Supreme Court, reiterating the principles laid down in a series of decisions rendered by it, has observed in M.M. Patel v. State of Maharashtra M.M. Patel v. State of Maharashtra (1980)4 S.C.C. 470 : (1981) S.C.C. (Crl.) 49: (1981) 1 S.C.R. 852 : (1981) Crl.L.J. 331: A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 510, that - “there can therefore be no doubt that on a proper construction of Clause 5 of Art.22 read with Section 3, sub-section (3) of the COFEPOSA Act, it is necessary for the valid continuance of detention that subject to Clause 6 of Art.22, copies of the documents, statements and other materials relied upon in the grounds of detention should be furnished to the detenu along with the grounds of detention…..”. In the said decision, their Lordships, after having referred to Ramachandra A. Kamath v. Union of India Ramachandra A. Kamath v. Union of India (1980)2 S.C.C. 270 : A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 765: (1980) S.C.C. (Crl.) 414 has pointed out that the rationale of the said decision is that unless the right of the detenu to be supplied with copies of the documents, statements and other materials relied upon in the grounds of detention without any undue delay is available, the right conferred on the detenu to be afforded the earliest opportunity of making a representation cannot be meaningfully exercised. See also Lallubhai Jogibhai v. Union of India Lallubhai Jogibhai v. Union of India (1981)2 S.C.J. 37: (1981) MLJ. (Crl.) 350: (1981) Crl L.J. 288: A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 728, Kamala and Wasi Uddin Ahmed v. District Magistrate, Aligarh Wasi Uddin Ahmed v. District Magistrate, Aligarh A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 2166. 40. See also Lallubhai Jogibhai v. Union of India Lallubhai Jogibhai v. Union of India (1981)2 S.C.J. 37: (1981) MLJ. (Crl.) 350: (1981) Crl L.J. 288: A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 728, Kamala and Wasi Uddin Ahmed v. District Magistrate, Aligarh Wasi Uddin Ahmed v. District Magistrate, Aligarh A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 2166. 40. Explaining the expressions, ‘referred to’, ‘relied on’ etc., the Supreme Court, in Krish Kumar Chemonlal Kundalya v. State of Gujarat Krish Kumar Chemonlal Kundalya v. State of Gujarat (1981)2 S.C.C.436: A.I.R. 1981 S.C.1621 has stated that once the documents are referred to in the grounds of detention, it becomes the bounded duty of the detaining authority to supply the same to the detenu as part of the grounds of pari passu the grounds of detention and there is no particular charm in the expressions ‘relied on’, ‘referred to’ or ‘based on’, because, ultimately all these expressions signify one thing, viz., that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority has been arrived at on the documents mentioned in the grounds of detention. Further, it has been said that the question whether the grounds have been referred to, relied on or based on, is merely a matter of describing the nature of the grounds. 41. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in a recent decision, viz., State of Punjab v. J.S. Talwandi State of Punjab v. J.S. Talwandi (1983(2 Scale 943 has elaborately dealt with the constitutional right of a detenu for the entitlement to have all the material particulars for making a full and effective representation against the order of detention, and while doing so, the Supreme Court has referred to various decisions touching on this point. Ultimately, referring to the observations made in (1975) 2 S.C.R. 832 : (1975)2 S.C.C. 81 : (1975) Crl L.J. 446: A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 550, the Supreme Court has held as follows: “These observations cannot be construed as meaning that the evidence which was collected by the detaining authority must also be furnished to the detenu. Ultimately, referring to the observations made in (1975) 2 S.C.R. 832 : (1975)2 S.C.C. 81 : (1975) Crl L.J. 446: A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 550, the Supreme Court has held as follows: “These observations cannot be construed as meaning that the evidence which was collected by the detaining authority must also be furnished to the detenu. As the very same paragraph of the judgment at Page 839 of the report shows, what was meant was that the basic facts and the material particulars which formed the foundation of the order of detention must be furnished to the detenu since, in the true sense, they form part of the grounds of detention and without being appraised of the same the detenu cannot possibly make an effective representation.” In that case, a contention was raised that the State Government had not supplied to the detenu therein the supporting material on which ground No.1 of the grounds of detention was based. But, having regard to the facts of the case, the Supreme Court rejected the contention, pointing out that – his right is to receive any material particular without which a full and effective representation cannot be made.” However, the Supreme Court, reiterated the principle laid down in A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1983, that if the order of detention refers to or relies upon any document, statement or other material, copies thereof have, of course, to be supplied to the detenu. 42. On the observations made in Talwandi's case, (1983)2 Scale 943, much argument was advanced by Mr. G. Ramaswami, submitting that as the principle laid down in A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1983, has been reiterated in (1983)2 Scale 943,. the argument of the learned Public Prosecutor that only the basic facts and material particulars which have entered into and influenced the mind of the detaining authority in coming to its subjective satisfaction for passing the detention order, should be supplied and not the other materials passingly referred to, Cannot be accepted. According to Mr. the argument of the learned Public Prosecutor that only the basic facts and material particulars which have entered into and influenced the mind of the detaining authority in coming to its subjective satisfaction for passing the detention order, should be supplied and not the other materials passingly referred to, Cannot be accepted. According to Mr. G. Ramaswami, even the materials passingly referred to might influence the mind of the detaining authority and hence within the principles laid down in A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1983, as recognized in (1983)2 Scale 943, copies of all the documents, statements and materials referred to or relied upon in the grounds of detention should be communicated to the detenu within the time prescribed under Section 3(3) of the COFEPOSA Act and without this the right to make representation cannot be meaningfully exercised. The learned Public Prosecutor would counter this argument drawing the attention of this Court to Ibrahim Ahmed v. State of Gujarat Ibrahim Ahmed v. State of Gujarat A.I.R.1982 S.C. 1500, in which the Supreme Court had examined the principle enunciated in (1980)2 S.C.C. 270 : A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 765, (1981)1 S.C.J. 250: (1981) MLJ. (Crl.) 172: A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 28, and (1981) Crl.L.J. 889: A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1191, none of which retracts from or affects the validity of the principle enunciated in A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1983, and confirmed in (1980)4 S.C.C. 544 : (1980) Crl L.J. 1487: A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 431, and in (1983)2 Scale 942 . (Crl.) 172: A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 28, and (1981) Crl.L.J. 889: A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1191, none of which retracts from or affects the validity of the principle enunciated in A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1983, and confirmed in (1980)4 S.C.C. 544 : (1980) Crl L.J. 1487: A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 431, and in (1983)2 Scale 942 . In A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1500, the Supreme Court after deeply examining the principles laid down in each of the cases with regard to the supply of copies of documents relied upon in the grounds of detention, has pointed out the principle laid down in A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1983, in the following words: “The principle clearly enunciated in A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1983, is that copies of all documents, statements and materials referred to or relied upon in the grounds of detention (meaning thereby those which have influenced the mind of the detaining authority in arriving at its subjective satisfaction about the necessity to detain the detenu) must be communicated to the detenu within the time prescribed under Section 3(3) of the COFEPOSA and that without this the right to make representation cannot be meaningfully exercised.” Laying emphasis on the observations with regard to the meaning of the principle, made by the Supreme Court in the above cases, P. Rajamanickam, the Public Prosecutor, would submit that only the copies of those documents, statements and materials which have influenced the mind of the detaining authority in arriving at its subjective satisfaction about the necessity to detain the detenu should be communicated. Then reliance was placed by the learned Public Prosecutor on (1981) Crl.L.J. 889: (1981)3 S.C.C. 317 : A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1191, wherein the Supreme Court, after having referred to A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1983, and A.I.R. 1975 S.C.550, has made the following observations: “It is, therefore, clear that every failure to furnish copy of a document to which reference is made in the grounds oft detention is not an infringement of Art.22(5) fatal to the order of detention. It is only failure to furnish copies of such documents as were relied upon by the detaining authority making it difficult for the detenu to make an effective representation, that amounts to a violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Art.22(5). It is only failure to furnish copies of such documents as were relied upon by the detaining authority making it difficult for the detenu to make an effective representation, that amounts to a violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Art.22(5). In our view, it is unnecessary to furnish copies of documents to which casual or passing reference may be made in the course of narration of facts and which are not relied upon by the detaining authority in making the order of detention”. He further cited A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 2166, where in it has been said in paragraph 15 that “it is, however, not necessary to furnish copies and documents to which casual or passing reference may be made in the course of the narration of events and which are not relied upon by the detaining authority………..” Elaborating this principle, it has been submitted by the learned Public Prosecutor that (1983)2 Scale 942 , has once again reiterated the principle that only basic facts and material particulars which form the foundation of the order of detention and without which the detenu cannot possibly make an effective representation, must be furnished to him and not copies of materials referred to casually or in passing. 43. After carefully going through all the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above, it is clear that the detaining authority must, as soon as practicable, that is to say, within the specified period as prescribed in the respective preventive Acts, communicate the grounds on which the order of detention has been made as contemplated under Art.22(5) of the Constitution of India, but, of course, subject to Clause (6) of the said Article, that is, unless their disclosure is considered by the authority to be against the public interest. In other words, all the copies of all the documents, statements and other materials which formed the basic facts and influenced the mind of the detaining authority for drawing the requisite subjective satisfaction to pass the order of detention, must be communicated to the detenu since one of the primary objects of communicating the grounds of detention to the detenu is to enable the detenue at the earliest opportunity to make a representation against his detention. The non-furnishing of materials which have no nexus or proximity and are not essential in drawing the subjective satisfaction, will have no effect upon the validity of the detention order. The non-furnishing of materials which have no nexus or proximity and are not essential in drawing the subjective satisfaction, will have no effect upon the validity of the detention order. But, even if there is a possibility that certain materials on record would disclose that the activities of the detenu are having a nexus with the object of the preventive order, the Court would be justified in taking the view that those materials must have influenced the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority and the omission to furnish those materials to the detenu would prejudice him in making an effective representation and on that account the detention order would be illegal. The burden of showing that the detention is in accordance with the procedure established by law is always on the detaining authority, because Art.21 of the Constitution provides in clear and explicit terms that no one shall be deprived of his life and personal liberty except in accordance with the procedure established by law. 44. However, the Court cannot lay down any hard and fast rule by listing out the kinds of documents which are essential to be supplied to the detenu, because the question as to whether a particular document is materially essential or relevant or has any nexus or proximity to the object of the order of detention or has been referred to casually or in passing etc., has to be determined with reference to the facts and circumstances of each case. 45. Now, in the light of the above principles of law, we have to see whether the non-furnishing of the copy of the endorsement made by the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate on 22-8-1983 and the denial statement of the Department referred to in paragraph 10 of the Grounds of Detention and the alleged non-furnishing of the copies of the six documents referred to in the grounds, would vitiate the order. The endorsement dated 22-9-1983 made by the Magistrate at the time of remand on the complaints made by the detenu and the other three Nigerians, reads thus: “A1 to A4 produced to-day at 12-05 p.m. When questioned, A2 to A 4 say that they were beaten by the Dept. Officials. No visible injuries found on their person. A1 to A4 say that their statements obtained by the department officials are not voluntary. Remanded to judicial custody till 3-9-83”. Officials. No visible injuries found on their person. A1 to A4 say that their statements obtained by the department officials are not voluntary. Remanded to judicial custody till 3-9-83”. According to the learned Public Prosecutor since the essence of the endorsement including the denial of the detenu and others about the voluntary nature of the statements given to the department officials, has been taken into consideration as mentioned in paragraph 10 of the detention order, the contention of the detenu that non-furnishing of this endorsement dated 22.8.83 vitiates the detention order is not correct. Further, he would submit that the sentence found in para-10 of the grounds of detention within brackets reading “this was denied by the department” means that the department had denied the allegation of the alleged beating by the department officials. He would add that the above facts mentioned in para-10 of the grounds of detention are not based on any document, but have been taken only from the covering letter sent by the sponsors to the detaining authority. It is true that the detaining authority has not specifically mentioned that the copy of the endorsement was placed before it. We also, in order to find out the actual position, went through the entire file and found that this is taken from the covering letter sent by the sponsors. Similarly, the sentence “this was denied by the department” is also a reproduction from the covering letter. This covering letter was shown to the counsel for the petitioner. What Mr. G. Ramaswami would insist is that inasmuch as the detaining authority has placed reliance on the earlier statements of the detenu and the other three Nigerians, obviously rejecting their subsequent plea before the Magistrate that those statements were obtained from them under to ture, on the basis of the denial statement of the department, the non-furnishing of any denial statement made by the department, if any, or at least the copy of the covering letter showing the denial, would definitely invalidate the order, because what the nature of the statement of denial is and by whom it was made are not known. As rightly pointed out by the learned Public Prosecutor, the learned Magistrate has not found any visible injury on the person of any one of the accused inclusive of the detenu. As rightly pointed out by the learned Public Prosecutor, the learned Magistrate has not found any visible injury on the person of any one of the accused inclusive of the detenu. Leaving apart the question whether the statement of denial was made even before the Magistrate or only before the detaining authority, the fact remains that the detaining authority had taken into consideration the statements of the detenu and the order three Nigerians made before the Magistrate. The detaining authority seems to have rejected the plea of the extraction of their earlier statements under torture, not only on the basis of the denial by the department but also on the basis of the endorsement made by the Magistrate that he found no visible injury on their persons. Had the detaining authority not taken into consideration this denial of the detenu and others made before the Magistrate, we could see some force in the submission made by Mr. G. Ramaswami. But, inasmuch as the detaining authority had been appraised of the complaint of the detenu and others, which had been taken into consideration while passing the impugned order, the non-furnishing of the endorsement made by the Magistrate, which was recorded only on the representation of the detenu and others, cannot, in our view, be said to be a material omission affecting the validity of the order. Similarly, having regard to the facts of this case, the non-furnishing of the note of the department denying the allegation about the beating in the covering letter, also would not invalidate the order, since the copies of the basic facts and materials, which have entered into and influenced the mind of the detaining authority in arriving at a subjective satisfaction, have been furnished to the detenu. In this connection, the learned Public Prosecutor would submit that the denial of the department is not in the form of a document, but is referred to by the detaining authority only in passing and not relied upon by the said authority, is a material entering into and influencing its mind in drawing the subjective satisfaction for passing the order and hence the non-supply of this denial statement cannot be said to be in contravention of the constitutional mandate under Art.22(5). 46. 46. Now, coming to the complaint about the non-furnishing of the six incriminating documents referred to in para-6 of the detention order, it is submitted by the learned Public Prosecutor that the documents are nothing but only a diary, an identity card, a luggage slip and some tickets as noted in the mahazarnama the copies of which admittedly were furnished, except the copy of the boarding card. The furnishing of these documents is admitted and there are also endorsements by the detenu himself for receipt of these documents except the copy of the boarding card which” is not at all a relevant or material document. Therefore, the complaint that there was non-furnishing of the documents referred to in para-6 of the grounds of detention is not factually correct. 47. Finally, Mr. G. Ramaswami advances fresh argument that the request made by the detenu in his representation to furnish him certain material documents so that he could make an effective representation has not been complied with and, therefore, there is an infringement of the constitutional right. No doubt, there is a plethora of decisions that if the detenu asks for a document referred to in the grounds of detention or other necessary particulars of basic facts pertaining to the passing of the order, for enabling him to make an effective representation, he should be furnished with the said particulars and documents with reasonable expedition: See Hansmukh. v. State of Gujarat Hansmukh. v. State of Gujarat (1981) MLJ. (Crl.) 172: (1981)1 S.C.J. 250: (1980) Crl.L.J. 1286: (1981)2 S.C.C. 175 : (1981) S.C.C. (Crl.) 387: (1981)1 S.C.R. 353 : A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 28.In the present case, it is seen from the copy of the representation furnished to this Court that there is only a vague statement pleading, “all the material records on which the detaining authority had relied upon were not furnished to him”. By this representation, the detenu had not asked for any further particulars. According to the prosecution, all the material records on which the detaining authority placed reliance have been furnished. From the above representation, we are unable to spell out that the detenu called for any specific document or particulars for making his representation and that the detaining authority had failed to comply with that request. The allegation is only a general one, complaining that the material records have not been furnished to him. From the above representation, we are unable to spell out that the detenu called for any specific document or particulars for making his representation and that the detaining authority had failed to comply with that request. The allegation is only a general one, complaining that the material records have not been furnished to him. Therefore, this argument of the learned counsel is without force. 48. For all the reasons stated above, we hold that all the contentions raised by the learned counsel in challenging the validity of the order of detention have to fail and we do not find any constitutional infringement or illegality involved in the impugned order of detention. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed. R.S.R ----- Writ Petition dismissed.