JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THE present civil revision filed under section 23-E of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the act) read with section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure raises an important question about the scope of the proviso appearing immediately after clause (b) of section 23-A of the Act. ( 2. ) THE non-applicant filed a suit for ejectment of the applicant claiming that the suit premises in occupation of the applicant was required by him bona fide for his residential needs, and hence the applicant was liable to be ejected under section 23-A of the Act. The applicant on being noticed, raised an objection to the maintainability of the proceedings on the ground that the non-applicant has acquired the suit property on 15-6-1983 and was not entitled to make an application for eviction unless a period of one year has elapsed from that date. The fact that the property was acquired by the non-applicant on 15-6-1983 and proceedings for ejectment were started on 23-12-1983 is admitted. The Rent Controlling Authority was of the view that proviso to section 23-A of the Act governs proceedings in relation to non-residential accommodation and not to residential accommodation and since the case related to residential accommodation, the proceedings were maintainable. It is this order which is challenged in the present revision. ( 3. The Rent Controlling Authority was of the view that proviso to section 23-A of the Act governs proceedings in relation to non-residential accommodation and not to residential accommodation and since the case related to residential accommodation, the proceedings were maintainable. It is this order which is challenged in the present revision. ( 3. ) SECTION 23-A which is the subject matter of this revision, reads as under :- "special provision for eviction of tenant on ground of bona fide requirement.-Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or contract to the contrary, a landlord may submit an application signed and verified in a manner provided in Rules 14 and 15 of Order VI of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908) as if it were a plaint to the Rent Controlling Authority on one or more of the following grounds for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the accommodation namely : -" (a) that the accommodation let for residential purposes is required "bona fide" by the landlord for occupation as residence for himself or for any member of his family or for any person for whose benefit, the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation of his own in bis occupation in the city or town concerned. Explanation.- For the purposes of this clause, "accommodation let for residential purposes" includes- (i) Any accommodation which having been let for use as a residence is without the express consent of the landlord, used wholly or partly for any non-residential purpose; (ii) any accommodation which has not been let under an express provision of contract for non-residential purpose; (b) that the accommodation let for non-residential purposes is required "bona fide" by the landlord for the purpose of continuing or starting his business or that of any of his major sons or unmarried daughters, if he is the owner thereof or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned: provided that where a person who is a landlord has acquired any accommodation or any interest therein by transfer, no application for eviction of tenant of such accommodation shall be maintainable at the instance of such person unless a period of one year has elapsed from the date of such acquisition. " , a plain reading of this section is that it is a special provision for eviction of tenant on the ground of bona fide requirement and covers residential and non-residential accommodation. The section is intended to provide a forum for determination of disputes without delay. The first part of the section provides that an application for the purpose may be filed before the Rent controlling Authority as if it were a plaint on one of the grounds contained in clauses (a) and (b) of the section. Clause (b) deals with residential accommodation required by the landlord bona fide for residential purpose for himself or for any member of his family or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held. Clause (b) provides a similar ground in relation to non-residential accommodation. The proviso appearing at the end of the section prohibits a landlord who has acquired accommodation or any interest therein by transfer from making an application for eviction of tenant before one year of the date of acquisition. The proviso speaks of "any accommodation" and prohibits making of "an application for eviction. " The question for consideration is whether the words "any accommodation" appearing in the proviso mean non-residential accommodation dealt with in sub-clause (b) of the section ? The proviso speaks of "any accommodation" and prohibits making of "an application for eviction. " The question for consideration is whether the words "any accommodation" appearing in the proviso mean non-residential accommodation dealt with in sub-clause (b) of the section ? ( 4. ) THE law relating to interpretation of a proviso is no longer in doubt. A proviso is added to a principal clause primarily with the object of taking out of the scope of that principal clause what is included in it and what the legislature desires should be excluded. Sales-tax Officer, Jabalpur v. Hanuman Prasad. , 1967 MPLJ 138 (Para. 5.) As such it must be construed with reference to the language used and the scheme of the section, while so interpreting, the Court must see that the relationship of the proviso with the principal matter is not destroyed. It may even be taken to be the settled rule of construction that the proviso must prima facie be read and considered in relation to the principal matter to which it is a proviso. Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarka Das Saraj, 1976 1 SCC 128 , and Ram Narain Sons Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax. , AIR 1955 S C 765 at p 769. It is, therefore, clear that the proviso under consideration will have to be read in the context of principal matter dealt with in the section with the object of "taking out of the scope of that principal clause what is included in it and what the legislature desires should be,excluded. " ( 5. ) WHAT is, then, the "principal matter" to which the proviso is related ? As stated earlier, section 23-A of the Act provides a new forum for filing applications for ejectment of a tenant in substitution of existing forum i. e. Civil Court if accommodation is required for bona fide personal need. Clauses (a) and (b) deal with grounds on which the accommodation may be made available to a landlord making such an application. Proviso, prohibits making such an application in cases where the landlord has acquired the accommodation within one year. Clearly,. therefore, the proviso is intended to exclude some application from being filed, which could otherwise have been filed under the main section before the Rent Controlling authority. Considered in this manner, the proviso does not seem to have any connection with clause (b) of the section. Clearly,. therefore, the proviso is intended to exclude some application from being filed, which could otherwise have been filed under the main section before the Rent Controlling authority. Considered in this manner, the proviso does not seem to have any connection with clause (b) of the section. It must, therefore, be held that the "principal matter" to which the proviso is related is contained in the opening part of the section. As such the nature and scope of the proviso will necessarily be governed by the nature and scope of applications which are intended to be excluded from the main section. Main section or the opening part of the section deals with all cases where accommodation is required for bona fide requirement and is not limited to non-residential accommodation only. Since the proviso serves as an exception to this principal matter it cannot be read in any other manner except dealing with applications covering both residential and non-residential accommodation as in the main section. In this view of the matter, there is no scope for the submission that the proviso is limited to the non-residential accommodation only. ( 6. ) THE aforesaid interpretation clearly gives full meaning and effect to the intention of the legislature. A referen:e to statement of objects and reasons indicates that the legislature did not intend to make any change in existing law except to provide a new forum for deciding these cases effectively and with delay. Section 12 (4) of the original Act contained such a provision and specifically covered residential and non-residential accommodation. The present proviso contains the repealed section 12 (4) of the act. Indeed, all other sections of original section 12 are re-enacted in chapter III-A by the Amending Act, 1983. In case the legislature intended to depart from the existing law in any manner, it would have clearly stated so while writing the statement of objects and reasons. Though there is some difference about the admissibility of the objects and reasons for construing the section, reference to the statement of objects and reasons is permissible to understanding the background, the antecedents, state of affairs, the surrounding circumstances in relation to the statute and the evil which the statute was sought to remedy. Sanghvi Jeervaj v. M. C. G. and K. M. W. Union AIR 1969 S C 530, at p. 543. Sanghvi Jeervaj v. M. C. G. and K. M. W. Union AIR 1969 S C 530, at p. 543. , V. R. Sutaria v. N. P. Bhanvadia AIR 1979 S C 767. , Hiralal Ratanlal v. S. T. O. S. III, Kanpur, AIR 1973 SC 1034 , Udayan Chinubha v. R. C Bali, AIR 1977 SC 2319 . and Organa chemical Industries v. Union of India, AIR 1979 S C 1803, at p. 1816. In fact statements of objects and reasons have been freely used by Courts in this country while determining the true meaning and scope of a particular statute. Indeed, I am not using the statement of objects and reasons as an aid to construction but the use is limited to ascertaining if the conclusion reached by me by applying the accepted aid to construction of statute is in line with legislative thinking and advances the purpose for which the statute has been enacted. ( 7. ) THE same conclusion can be reached on the basis of the language used in the proviso. It uses the word "any" as an adjective to accommodation or interest acquired by transfer and mandates that "no application" shall be maintainable in relation to "such" accommodation under specified circumstances. The word "any" enlarges the amplitude of the word "accommodation" and would include every type of "accommodation. " If this natural and grammatical meaning of the words "any accommodation" is accepted the. proviso will necessarily cover residential and non-residential accommodation. It is true that in case the proviso is taken to be attached to Clause (b) only, the word "any" will require a narrow construction. The narrow construction will, however, not fit in the context of Clause (b)and the word "any" will lose not only its meaning but significance as well. The narrow construction will also contradict its natural and ordinary meaning. On the contrary, if the proviso is read in the context of main section, as I have done, the word "any" will receive its full meaning and will carry out the purpose of the enactment. Then clause (b) does not deal with application but contains the ground for making an application which has to be filed under the main section. On the contrary, if the proviso is read in the context of main section, as I have done, the word "any" will receive its full meaning and will carry out the purpose of the enactment. Then clause (b) does not deal with application but contains the ground for making an application which has to be filed under the main section. Proviso, however, deals with "applications" and as such it cannot be read as an exception to Clause (b) but must be read as an exception to the main or opening part of the section. If it has to be read with clause (b), it will have to be read as an independent provision, which obviously it is not. Under the circumstances, the language of the proviso itself indicates that it is intended to cut down the scope of main section which provides for making applications for eviction and hence deals with both, residential and non-residential accommodation. ( 8. ) LEARNED counsel for the non-applicant, however, drew my attention to the semi-colon appearing at the end of clause (b) and submitted that it indicates continuity of the idea. It is difficult to accept the submission, particularly when the language of the proviso and the purpose thereof point to the contrary. In fact, punctuation marks have not been accepted by our law Courts as an aid to construction of a statute. In aswini Kumar v. Arbinda Bose, AIR 1952 SC 369 . the Supreme Court was of the opinion that punctuation may have its uses in some cases but it cannot certainly be regarded as a controlling element and cannot be allowed to control the plain meaning of a text. Since the meaning of the proviso is clear by reading the same with established and accepted aid of construction, not much reliance can be placed on the punctuation marks. ( 9. ) IN view of the discussion aforesaid, it is not possible to sustain the impugned order of the Rent Controlling Authority. The revision consequently succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order, dated 27-8-1984 is quashed. As a necessary consequence the proceedings before the Rent controlling Authority are held not maintainable. No orders as to costs. Revision allowed.