Raj Kishore Saxena v. Union of India — 1984 DIGILAW 712 (ALL)

JUDGMENT Kamleshwar Nath, J. - The petitioner Raj Kishore Saxena, was a motor driver in Shahjahanpur Division of the Narcotics Department there and was dismissed from service by order dated 14-2-80 passed by Deputy Narcotics Commissioner, opposite party No. 3, contained in Annexure 4 to the writ petition. The petitioner preferred an appeal on 27-2-1980 against the order of dismissal. The appeal was partly allowed and the penalty of dismissal was reduced to a penalty of removal from service by the Narcotics Commissioner, opposite party No. 2: the order of reduction in penalty was communicated to the petitioner by the Assistant Narcotics Commissioner's order dated 30-6-1980 contained in Annexure-5 to the writ petition. 2. This petition has been filed for a writ of Certiorari to quash both the above orders dated 14-2-1980 (Annexure-4) and 28-6-1980 (Annexure-5). There is also a prayer for Writ of Mandamus to treat the petitioner as continuing in service as a motor driver with all connected privileges and benefits etc. 3. Disciplinary enquiry proceedings were instituted against the petitioner on the charge of having assaulted Sri H.C. Punshi, Inspector (P) of Bareilly Division while on tour to Shahjahanpur Division on (sic) and thereby the petitioner was alleged to have committed gross misconduct and a contravention of certain provisions of Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964. On a charge-sheet having been served upon him. he denied the allegations. One Sri A.P. Mathur, Divisional Opium Officer, Barabanki I division, was appointed Enquiry Officer. His report was considered by the Deputy Narcotics Commissioner, who held in his order dated 9-8-1977 that the charge was not fully established; consequently he exonerated the petitioner, vide Annexure-l to the writ petition. 4. On 9-1-1978 the Narcotics Commissioner passed an order, contained in Annexure-2 to the writ petition, recording that in exercise of the powers vested in him under R. 29 of The Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965 (For short, Rules) he "proposed to review the order dated 9-8-1977" referred to above. Rule 29 provides for review of any order made under those Rules. Rule 29 provides for review of any order made under those Rules. The final order of review was passed on 10-3-1978, Annexure C-2, observed, inter alia, that the petitioner had been exonerated under the order dated 9-8-77 on the ground that the order permitting Sri Brij Mohan Lal, Upper Division clerk, to act as the defence counsel of the driver, was conveyed to the latter on 15-1-1977 whereas the Enquiry Officer had started the enquiry on 29-12-76 and further that there was no eye witness of the incident or any other direct and corroborative evidence. The Narcotics Commissioner observed that in his opinion the Disciplinary Authority (who passed the order dated 9-8-1977) had totally failed to appreciate the gravity of the charge and that inasmuch as there was a technical flaw regarding the representation of the petitioner in the course of the enquiry by Sri Brij Mohan Lai, and further that the petitioner in his reply to the second show cause notice had himself requested for holding of a fresh enquiry in the interests of justice and having regard to the fact that the case could not be treated lightly and disposed of on a technical flaw he considered it appropriate to set aside the order dated 9-8-1977 in the interest of justice and to direct a de novo enquiry. Consequently, he set aside the order dated 9-8-1977 and directed the holding of a de novo enquiry by an officer, other than Sri A.P. Mathur, who was the original Enquiry Officer. This order was communicated to the Deputy Narcotics Commissioner by letter dated 20-3-1978 contained in Annexure C-3. 5. In due course, one Sri R. P. Nanda, District Opium Officer of Lucknow, was appointed as an Enquiry Officer for holding the de novo enquiry. Sri R.P. Nanda submitted his report dated 20-9-1979, Annexure A-III, holding that the petitioner had assaulted Sri H.C. Punshi as charged. He mentioned that witnesses for the prosecution as well as for the petitioner had been examined by him at Lucknow, Bareilly and Shahjahanpur; that the petitioner was examined on 14-2-1979, and that on a consideration of the evidence on the either side he found the charge proved. 6. He mentioned that witnesses for the prosecution as well as for the petitioner had been examined by him at Lucknow, Bareilly and Shahjahanpur; that the petitioner was examined on 14-2-1979, and that on a consideration of the evidence on the either side he found the charge proved. 6. The report Annexure, A-III was considered by the Deputy Narcotics Commissioner, who considered the material contained in the enquiry proceedings and held that he agreed with the findings recorded by Sri R.P. Nanda and held that the petitioner had inflicted the injury in question on Sri H. C. Punshi and was thus guilty of contravening the concerned rule of The Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964, as set out in the charge. He noticed that the petitioner belonged to a uniformed service and had inflicted injury on an officer senior to him and that too within the office premises which constituted an act of indiscipline in the extreme form in which physical violence was used. He held that exemplary punishment was warranted. Consequently, he passed the impugned order, contained in Annexure-4, dated 14-2-1980, dismissing the petitioner from service. As already indicated, the Narcotics Commissioner reduced the punishment of dismissal to removal from service by the other impugned order dated 28-6-1980, Annexure-5 to the writ petition. 7. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the order to review the proceedings was barred by limitation. He referred to R. 29(l)(v) of the Rules and contends that the Narcotics Commissioner should have reviewed the order only within 6 months from 9-8-1977. The proposal to review, contained in Annexure-2, was recorded on 9-1-1978; the review order, contained in Annexure C-2, was passed on 10-3-1978 by which de novo enquiry was ordered. The relevant portion of R, 29 is as follows : - "29( 1) Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules : - (i) the President, or (ii) the Comptroller and Auditor-General, or (iii) the Member, Administration, the Posts and Telegraphs Board............., or. The relevant portion of R, 29 is as follows : - "29( 1) Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules : - (i) the President, or (ii) the Comptroller and Auditor-General, or (iii) the Member, Administration, the Posts and Telegraphs Board............., or. (iv) the head of department directly under the Central Government................, or (v) the appellate authority, within six months of the order proposed to be reviewed, or (vi) any other authority specified in this behalf by the President by a general or special order, and within such time as may be prescribed in such general or special order, may at any time, either on his or its own motion or otherwise call for the records of any inquiry and review any order made under these rules.... and may- (a) confirm, modify or set aside the order, or (b) confirm, reduce, enhance or set aside the penalty imposed by the order, or impose any penalty where no penalty has been imposed, or (c) remit the case to the authority which made the order or to any other authority directing such authority to make such further inquiry as it may consider proper in the circumstances of the case; or (d) pass such orders as it may deem fit: Provided that no order imposing or enhancing any penalty shall be made by any reviewing authority unless the Government servant concerned has been given a reasonable opportunity of making a representation against the penalty proposed.............: (2) No proceeding for review shall be commenced until after- (i) the expiry of the period of limitation for an appeal, or (ii) the disposal of the appeal, where any such appeal has been preferred. (3) An application for review shall be dealt with in the same manner as if it were an appeal under these rules." Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the appellate authority is bound to review the order in question within 6 months of the date of the order. He says that the expression contained in Cl. (v) of R. 29(1) setting forth that the appellate authority "within six months of the date of the order proposed to be reviewed" may "at any time, either on his or its own motion or otherwise call for the records of any inquiry and review any order made", covers the period both for initiation and conclusion of the review proceedings. (v) of R. 29(1) setting forth that the appellate authority "within six months of the date of the order proposed to be reviewed" may "at any time, either on his or its own motion or otherwise call for the records of any inquiry and review any order made", covers the period both for initiation and conclusion of the review proceedings. This construction would be contrary to the very object of the rule, because there may be cases where review proceedings may be initiated within 6 months of the order in question, but may not be concluded within that period. The record may not be available; the order in question may itself come to the notice of the appellate authority so late that passing of a final order within a period of six months from the date of the order may not be possible. In a case where the appellate authority may consider it desirable to hear the delinquent Government servant, before passing the review order, the notice may not be served on the Government servant within the she months' period. There may be so many contingencies in which the proceedings may not be concluded within sue months from the date of the order in question. Sub-rule (2) expressly bars commencement of review proceedings within the period of limitation prescribed for filing an appeal, or during which an appeal remains pending. The time prescribed under Cls. (v) and (vi), thus, is not wholly inflexible. 8. It is also noticeable that clauses (i) to (iv) of R. 29(1) of the Rules do not prescribe any period of time either for initiation of the proceedings or for passing of final orders by the authorities referred to in those clauses; the constraint of time is prescribed only in respect of the appellate authority under Cl. (v) and `any other authority' specified in this behalf by the President under cl. (vi). All these clauses define the authorities which may review an order; the power to review is set forth after enumeration of the authorities by those clauses. The upshot is that while the order of review may be passed at any time, the initiation of proceedings for review by the authorities in cl. (v) has to be done within 6 months, or in cl. (vi) within the time prescribed; the rest of the authorities are competent to initiate the proceedings at any time. The upshot is that while the order of review may be passed at any time, the initiation of proceedings for review by the authorities in cl. (v) has to be done within 6 months, or in cl. (vi) within the time prescribed; the rest of the authorities are competent to initiate the proceedings at any time. Indeed, the decision in the case of Shoukata Khan v. Director of Postal Services, Andhra Circle, Hyderabad, 1972 Serv. LR 875 : 1973 Lab IC 246 (Andh Pra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner on another point, lays down that once an initiation of the proceedings is done, within six months of the date of passing of the order in question, it is within the competence of the appellate authority to review it even after the expiry of six months time from that date. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner then urged that in any case the proceedings cannot be said to have been initiated within six months of 9-8-1977. He contends that order dated 9-1-1978 by the Narcotics Commissioner, proposing to review the order dated 9-8-1977, cannot be said to be an order initiating the review proceedings. Learned counsel, however, has not been able to indicate when the proceedings of review should be taken to have been commenced by the Narcotics Commissioner. He says that ultimately the order, reviewing the order in question, was passed on 10-3-1978 (Annexure C-2) which is beyond six months and, therefore, the review proceedings are hit by the provisions of R. 29(l)(v). In this regard he has laid emphasis on the case of Shoukata Khan v. Director of Postal Services, Andhra Circle, Hyderabad (supra). 10. In the case of Shoukata Khan (1973 Lab IC 246) (A P) (supra) an order reducing salary was passed on 31-12-1968 and implemented with effect from Jan. 1969. On 17-9-1969 the Director of Postal Services issued a notice to the appellant calling upon time to show cause why he should not be removed from service. This notice was challenged before the High Court. 1969. On 17-9-1969 the Director of Postal Services issued a notice to the appellant calling upon time to show cause why he should not be removed from service. This notice was challenged before the High Court. It was urged before the High Court that the proceedings were initiated within the prescribed time as the appellate authority had called for the record within the period of six months, though the notice calling upon the appellant to show cause why the penalty may not be enhanced was issued only after the expiry of six months' period. 11. Repelling this contention, the Court observed as follows (at p. 248 of Lab IC):- "The words "call for the records of any inquiry and review any order made under these rules" would clearly show that the object of calling for the records is only to examine afresh the whole case where it is considered or felt necessary. If after calling for records, the authority concerned should come to the conclusion that there is no need to review the order and drops the matter, it can certainly not be said that that step alone of his would constitute commencement or initiation of proceedings for review as there would be no question of reviewing the order of the disciplinary authority in such cases. So, the mere act of calling for records without anything more can certainly not be equated with initiation of a proceeding for review. It is only when the authority competent to review decides upon proceeding further, and issues a notice to the delinquent officer calling upon him to show cause why the punishment meted out to him should not be enhanced that proceedings for review can reasonable be said to have been commenced." The view seems to be that only when the competent authority decides upon proceeding further and issues a notice to the delinquent officer, calling upon him to show cause for enhancement of punishment, that the proceedings for review could be said to have been commenced. This aspect does not take into account those cases of review, contained in R. 29 of the Rules, in which notice is not required to be issued to the concerned Government servant. The power to review is exercisable both on the motion by a party and suo motu. This aspect does not take into account those cases of review, contained in R. 29 of the Rules, in which notice is not required to be issued to the concerned Government servant. The power to review is exercisable both on the motion by a party and suo motu. The consideration of review in a suo motu proceeding does not require a notice to be issued to the concerned Government servant except in the contingency provided for in the proviso set forth above. The requirement of issuing a notice, according to the proviso, is confined only to those cases where the appellate authority, in consequence of the review of the order in question, proposes to impose or enhance any penalty and would not extend to a case where the reviewing authority decides only to remit the case for de novo enquiry under cl. (c) of R. 29(1) of the Rules in Shoukata Khan's case, (1973 Lab IC 246) (A.P.) (supra) there was a proposal to enhance the penalty and for that reason the Court seems to have thought that the proceeding for review should be considered to have commenced when the show cause notice was issued. The decision does not deal with a question where only the order in question is set aside and de novo enquiry is directed. 12. There is another aspect of the matter which concerns the basic concept of a review. The Rules do not define what review means; but a close attention to R. 29 itself would indicate that two stages are contemplated; (i) the consideration of motion for review, and (ii) a re-hearing of the original case after the motion for review has been accepted. R. 29( 1) is drafted into two distinct portions. The first portion defines the various authorities in els. (i) to (vi) who are competent to review, and then goes on to say that such authority "may at any time, either on his own or otherwise call for the records of any inquiry and review any order made under these rules." This portion authorises making of a review. Further on is the second portion of the rule jointed to the first portion by the word `and' and proceeds to say that the concerned authority `may' pass the final orders of the nature set forth in clauses (a) to (d). 13. Further on is the second portion of the rule jointed to the first portion by the word `and' and proceeds to say that the concerned authority `may' pass the final orders of the nature set forth in clauses (a) to (d). 13. Analogy may be also drawn from the provisions of O. 47, C.P.C. O. 47 R. 1 C.P.C., prescribes that any person considering himself aggrieved by the concerned order may apply for review of the judgment. O.47 R. 4(1) C.P.C., prescribes that where it appears to the Court that there is not sufficient ground for a review, it shall reject the application; and sub-rule (2) prescribes that where the Court is of opinion that the application for review should be granted it shall grant the same. O. 47 R. 8 C.P.C. says that when an application for review is granted, the Court may at once rehear the case or make such order in regard to the rehearing as it thinks fit. 14. The true concept of review, therefore, is that in the first instancel there is a consideration of the question whether or not the order in question should be set aside or modified. This itself implies a consideration of the review petition and the very institution of the proceedings for review should be deemed to be its initiation. When the motion for review is allowed, the original order, sought to be reviewed, is set aside. It is after this stage that the stage for rehearing of the original case comes. The final order which will govern the case would be the order which is passed on that rehearing. In short, the proceedings for review commence as soon as the first step for the purpose is taken. If it is by an application, it would commence on the presentation of the application, if it is suo motu, it would commence on the decision of the competent authority to propose to review the order in question. The proceedings for review would continue till the final order, regarding reconsideration of the order in question, is passed. If the order in question is considered to be fit for modification or annulment, the motion for review succeeds; if the order in question is considered not fit to be interfered with, the motion for review fails. The proceedings for review would continue till the final order, regarding reconsideration of the order in question, is passed. If the order in question is considered to be fit for modification or annulment, the motion for review succeeds; if the order in question is considered not fit to be interfered with, the motion for review fails. In either case, it is a review and the material is considered by the court to adopt a view one way or the other. We do not think that an order rejecting the review application cannot be deemed to be an order passed in proceedings for review. It is a different matter that in practice some courts pass a composite order of review of the judgment in question and rehearing of the original case. Strictly speaking, it is an irregularity; but since the two proceedings are capable of being split up, the irregularity has not been considered to amount to an illegality. The cases of Mallikar Junappa Kalyanshetti v. Rudrasetti Sangasetti Patil Mahagamkar, AIR 1959 Andh Pra 305 and Maji Mohan Kanwar v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1967 Raj 264 may be seen in this connection. 15. Where the competent authority reviews the order in question, the subsequent hearing is a rehearing of the original case. It cannot, therefore, be said that the issue of notice with the object of enhancing' the punishment under the proviso to R. 29(1) of the Rules constitutes the commencement of the review proceedings; in our opinion, that would be at a stage beyond the stage of review. The appellate Authority, which is also a reviewing authority, is competent both to review the order in question, and to pass a final order on the merits. If such authority does not pass an independent order of review, but passes a composite order of review as well as of hearing in the case, the final order, in law, is not merely an order of review, it is also a final order of appellate Authority (under cl. (v)) though exercising powers of a reviewing authority. In our opinion, when the Narcotics Commissioner passed the order dated 9-1-1978, contained in Annexure-2, he commenced- the proceedings for review; the final order of review was passed on 10-3-1978, contained in Annexure C-2. Since the proceedings were commenced on 9-1-1978, they were within the period of six months as contemplated by R. 29(l)(v) of the Rules. In our opinion, when the Narcotics Commissioner passed the order dated 9-1-1978, contained in Annexure-2, he commenced- the proceedings for review; the final order of review was passed on 10-3-1978, contained in Annexure C-2. Since the proceedings were commenced on 9-1-1978, they were within the period of six months as contemplated by R. 29(l)(v) of the Rules. 16. The observations made above also dispose of the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the order dated 9-8-1977, exonerating the petitioner, could not be reviewed without a prior opportunity of hearing by the reviewing authority. We have already indicated that notice is required to be issued by the reviewing authority only in those cases where the authority proposes to impose or enhance any penalty as laid down in the proviso to R. 29(1). By necessary implication, notice is not required to be issued in other cases, and rules of natural justice cannot be invoked in j this matter in view of the said position flowing from the Rule itself. The learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to the case of Abdul Rashid Qadri v. State of Jammu & Kashmir, 1973 Serv LJ 503 (J.&K.) Where the petitioner was holding the post of Superintendent of Police temporarily on promotion from the post of Deputy Superintendent of Police. The Inspector General of Police, exercising his powers of review, set aside the promotion on the ground that promotion had been granted on mistaken view of his seniority; the petitioner was further reverted to the post of Deputy Superintendent of Police. No opportunity of hearing had been given. The court found that while the petitioner was reverted, certain officers junior to him, even according to the revised seniority list, continued to hold the post of Superintendent of Police. The court held that the reversion was punishment, which could not be done by review of the mistake without complying with the principles of natural justice which required that the petitioner should have been informed of the grounds on which the earlier order of promotion was proposed to be reviewed, and his objections considered before his reversion was made. The decision is of no help to the petitioner because the impugned order of review in the present case did not impose any punishment upon him. The decision is of no help to the petitioner because the impugned order of review in the present case did not impose any punishment upon him. It only reopened the enquiry which, incidentally, was one of the prayers made by the petitioner himself during the enquiry proceedings. 17. The other cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner do not deal with law regarding review. In the case of State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei, AIR 1967 SC 1269 , the respondent's date of birth having been initially accepted at the time of appointment was revised without holding enquiry and declaring her to have superannuated on the basis of revised date. The revision of the date of birth and consequent superannuation was held to be void, being in violation of the principles of natural justice. It appears that there were no rules of procedure for revising the date of birth. The law laid down in the case is of no application to the facts of the present case where the review order was passed on the basis of R. 29 of the Rules. 18. Thecaseof A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 150 similarly has no application to the present case. The case of Mahesh Kumar v. State of U.P., 1984 All LR 26 deals with the law relating to `bias' not with review. 19. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the Enquiry Officer did not consider the defence evidence at all and referred to the case of Union of India v. H.C. Goel, AIR 1964 SC 364 holding that while the High Court is not competent to consider sufficiency or adequacy of evidence in support of a conclusion, the court is competent to consider whether the ultimate decision of the Government is based on "no evidence". Although the decision does not deal with a case where defence evidence is not considered at all, there is no doubt that if an Enquiry Officer does not consider defence evidence at all, the ultimate order would be vitiated. However, a perusal of the enquiry report, Annexure A-III, (particularly Para 8 and pages 7 and 8) would show that the defence evidence was considered by the Enquiry Officer; even the Disciplinary Authority considered the defence evidence in Paras 8 and 9 of the final order contained in Annexure-4. 20. However, a perusal of the enquiry report, Annexure A-III, (particularly Para 8 and pages 7 and 8) would show that the defence evidence was considered by the Enquiry Officer; even the Disciplinary Authority considered the defence evidence in Paras 8 and 9 of the final order contained in Annexure-4. 20. In this connection, it may also be mentioned that if the petitioner was aggrieved by the order of review, his remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would have been to challenge the order dated 10-3-1978, contained in Annexure C-2. It is not said that this order did not come to the notice of the petitioner to enable him to file a writ petition within a reasonable time for challenging it. Indeed, in the proceedings of de novo enquiry, the petitioner appeared and adduced his own evidence. Even in this petition, the review order dated 10-3-1978, contained in Annexure C-2, has not been challenged. If he were to challenge it, he would have been faced with the doctrine of laches. However, we refrain from saying anything more in this context. In the ultimate result, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the review proceedings were barred by time fails. 21. Learned counsel for the petitioner then urged that there was no necessity of reviewing the order. That was entirely a matter for the appellate authority to consider. The Narcotics Commissioner had noticed that the disciplinary authority had totally failed to appreciate the gravity of the charge and had also ignored a technical flaw in the proceedings on the question of representation of the petitioner during the proceedings. He also noticed that the petitioner himself had invited a fresh enquiry. If, in these circumstances, he thought that it would be appropriate to direct a de novo enquiry, it cannot be said that he acted without material. 22. Learned counsel for the petitioner, lastly, urged that the petitioner had not been served with a copy of the report, Annexure A-III, dated 20-9-1979, of Sri R.P. Nanda on conclusion of de novo enquiry, nor had he been given a show cause notice before passing the dismissal order contained in Annexure IV. 22. Learned counsel for the petitioner, lastly, urged that the petitioner had not been served with a copy of the report, Annexure A-III, dated 20-9-1979, of Sri R.P. Nanda on conclusion of de novo enquiry, nor had he been given a show cause notice before passing the dismissal order contained in Annexure IV. Learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to the cases of State of Gujarat v. R.G. Teredesai, AIR 1969 SC 1294 : 1969 Lab IC 1547, U.P. Government v. Sabir Hussain, AIR 1975 SC 2045 : 1975 Lab IC 1493, Chhabba Lal v. State of U. P., 1980 Luck. LJ 155 : 1981 Lab IC NOC 173 and Raj Bahadur Singh v. Sub-Divisional Officer, Malihabad, 1975 Lab IC 682 (All). The view expressed in these decisions that, in substance, a copy of the enquiry report, along with recommendations of the Enquiry Officer regarding proposed punishment, must be furnished to the delinquent Government servant with an opportunity to show cause against proposed punishment, is no more applicable since the amendment of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India by the Constitution 42nd Amendment Act 1976 with effect from 3-1-1977. The amended Proviso to Article 311 (2) runs as follows : - "Provided that where it is proposed after such inquiry to impose upon him any such penalty, such penalty may be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it shall not be necessary to give such person any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed". It is clear that, with effect from the date of amendment, it is no more necessary to give any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed. It will be seen that while the provisions of Article 311, are not controlled by the provisions of Article 309 of the Constitution, the latter are controlled by the former. The result is that any service rule requiring an opportunity to be given for making a representation against a proposed punishment stands abrogated. It will be seen that while the provisions of Article 311, are not controlled by the provisions of Article 309 of the Constitution, the latter are controlled by the former. The result is that any service rule requiring an opportunity to be given for making a representation against a proposed punishment stands abrogated. Indeed in this particular case R. 15(4) of the Rules clearly says that if the disciplinary authority, having regard to its findings on the material, is of the opinion that if the major penalties (including dismissal) should be imposed on the Government servant, "it shall make an order imposing such penalty and it shall not be, necessary to give the Government servant any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed to be imposed." The right of an opportunity of hearing is confined to the de novo enquiry. After the report of de novo enquiry had been completed, in which he had the requisite opportunity, adequately availed by him, he was no more entitled to a second show cause notice along with which he could ask for a copy of the enquiry report and a notice of proposed punishment. 23. These are all the points in this writ petition which, therefore, fails. 24. The writ petition is dismissed with costs. S.C. Mathur, J. :- 25. I have gone through the judgment prepared by my learned brother Kamleshwar Nath, J., and I agree with the conclusions arrived at by him. However, I would like to add a few words of my own. 26. Rule29(l) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 has already been reproduced in the judgment of my learned brother. This Rule is divisible into four broad parts. In the first part the authorities who are competent to review the order are prescribed; in the second part the nature of the order that may be passed on review has been indicated; the third part prescribes the condition precedent which must be observed before passing certain types of orders; and the fourth part deals with the question of limitation within which action may be taken under the Rules. The authorities which may review an order are mentioned in cls. (i) to (vi). In clauses (a) to (d) the nature of the order that may be passed on review has been indicated. The authorities which may review an order are mentioned in cls. (i) to (vi). In clauses (a) to (d) the nature of the order that may be passed on review has been indicated. According to these clauses the reviewing authority may confirm, modify or set aside the original order or it may reduce or enhance the penalty imposed by the lower authority. Under cl (c) the reviewing authority is entitled to remit the case to the authority which made the order or to any other authority directing such authority to make such further inquiry as it may consider proper in the circumstances of the case. Under cl. (d) the reviewing authority is entitled to pass such order as it may deem fit. Under the proviso the reviewing authority cannot pass an order imposing or enhancing any penalty unless reasonable opportunity has been given to the Government servant of making representation against the proposed penalty. So far as the period within which action may be taken, one period has been prescribed in cl. (v) and this is six months computed from the date on which the order proposed to be reviewed was passed. Thereafter immediately after cl. (vi) is mentioned "may at any time". This provision read with cl. (v) would indicate that if action is taken by the appellate authority it must be taken within six months of the order proposed to be reviewed but if the action is taken by an authority other than the appellate authority it may be taken at any time; i.e. there is no period of limitation within which the authorities specified in els. (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) and (vi) may take action. In the present case the review of the original order was made by the appellate authority and, therefore, cl. (v) would be attracted and the limitation of six months would be applicable. 27. In respect of review the Rule contemplates two actions by the reviewing authority; the first action is to call for the record of the enquiry and the second action is to pass order after perusal of the record. The question for consideration is whether the period of limitation prescribed in cl. (v) is applicable only to first action which the reviewing authority has to take or to both the actions. The question for consideration is whether the period of limitation prescribed in cl. (v) is applicable only to first action which the reviewing authority has to take or to both the actions. Omitting those parts of the Rule which are not relevant for the purposes of the present case, the Rule would read thus : - "Notwithstanding anything contained in these Rules the appellate authority, within six months of the order sought to be reviewed, either on his or its own motion, or otherwise call for the records of any enquiry and review any order made under these Rules and may remit the case to the authority which made the order or to any other authority directing such authority to make such further enquiry as it may consider proper in the circumstances of the case." The clause "within sue months" precedes immediately the clause "call for the records of any enquiry" and, therefore, in my opinion the period of limitation will govern only the requirement of calling for the record of the enquiry. The Rule does not reflect any intention of the rule maker that the period of limitation shall apply to the stage following the calling for of the record. Now it has to be seen when the order calling for the record of the enquiry was passed. 28. Annexure C-l to the counter-affidavit dated 28-9-1983 is the order of the Narcotics Commissioner of India who was admittedly the appellate authority of the petitioner. This order is dated 9-1-1978. The first part of the order says : - " ........ the undersigned proposes to review the order ...... " This part contains the decision of the appellate authority to examine the record of the disciplinary proceeding and see whether the order passed therein deserved to be confirmed or otherwise dealt with. Below this there is an endorsement which shows that a copy of the order was sent to the Deputy Narcotics Commissioner for serving the same upon the petitioner. In this very endorsement it is stated: `The records pertaining to the said disciplinary case of Sri Raj Kishore may also please be sent to this office." This shows that on 9-1-1978 itself the records of the enquiry were also called for. Admittedly the order of exoneration was passed on 9-8-1977. The date 9-1-1978 falls within sue months of this date. Admittedly the order of exoneration was passed on 9-8-1977. The date 9-1-1978 falls within sue months of this date. Therefore, the step for which the period of six months has been prescribed in the Rules had been taken within the prescribed period and therefore the order passed on review cannot be said to be barred by time. For the discussion herein I am unable to agree with the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the limitation of sue months applies not only to the calling for of the record but also to passing the order on review. 29. Apart from the above I have nothing further to add to the judgment of my learned brother.