JUDGMENT T.S. Misra, J. - This is an appeal by the defendant arising out of a suit filed against him by the respondent for ejectment from the premises in question and for recovery of arrears of rent and damages. The defendant-appellant was a tenant of a Karkhana of which the plaintiff-respondent is the owner. The plaintiff after letting out the Karkhana to the defendant replaced the old saw machines and Karkhana by a new saw machine and new Kolhuse. The plaintiff had also constructed a cinema building close to the Karkhana which was running film shows in the year 1957. It was alleged that the plaintiff and the defendant had agreed that he would not run saw machine and Karkhana during the time the film was exhibited. The defendant committed default in making the payment of Electricity Bill for the period commencing from May 13, 1963 onwards and the plaintiff had to pay the Bill for the month of May, 1963, hence the electricity connection was disconnected. The defendant, it was further alleged, had damaged the building and the machinery. In connection with this default the correspondence ensued between the plaintiff and the defendant through the counsel for the respective parties. The counsel for the defendant Sri Kazi Zulfiqar Ali sent a notice to the plaintiff dated 21st August. 1963 which was served on him on 27th August, 1963. The plaintiff sent a reply to that notice to the defendant through Sri Zulfiqar Ali the counsel for the defendant. A copy of that notice dated 30th August 1963 is Ext. 2. By the notice the plaintiff also determined the tenancy of the defendant and called upon the defendant to vacate the Karkhana in question and deliver possession of the same to him. Since the defendant failed to comply with the notice the plaintiff filed a suit which has given rise to this appeal. 2. The suit was contested by the defendant on a variety of grounds. In his written statement the defendant admitted the receipt of the said notice but stated that it was incorrect notice. He also admitted that he had sent a correct reply thereto. In para 11 of his written statement the defendant pleaded that the notice of ejectment was incorrect and against law and that he was not liable to be ejected. In his written statement the defendant admitted the receipt of the said notice but stated that it was incorrect notice. He also admitted that he had sent a correct reply thereto. In para 11 of his written statement the defendant pleaded that the notice of ejectment was incorrect and against law and that he was not liable to be ejected. The defendant also pleaded thar he was not liable to pay any damages as claimed in the suit. On those pleadings the trial court framed a number of issues. Issue No. 1 related to the claim for damages whereas issues No. 3 and 4 related to the service of the notice dated 30th August, 1963 and the validity thereof. With regard to damages the trial court held that the defendant was not liable to pay the same and decided the issue against the defendant The finding of the trial court on issue No. 3 which related to the service of the notice was that the said notice dated 30th August, 1963 bad been served on the defendant. The trial court, however, held that the notice was not valid. On these findings the suit was dismissed. Against that decision the plaintiff preferred an appeal. The appellate-court below on an appraisal of the evidence on record found that the provisions of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act did not apply to the premises in question, hence the permission of the District Magistrate was not required to file a suit for ejectment of the defendant. It also held that the service of notice of ejectment on the defendant was proved and that the said notice was valid. It further held that the defendant was liable to pay damages for the damage caused to the building and Machinery installed in the factory. On these findings the appeal was allowed and the suit of the plaintiff for possession over the factory in question as also for the recovery of damages and rent was decreed with costs. Aggrieved, the defendant has now come upto this Court in second appeal. 3. For the appellant it was urged that inasmuch as the notice dated 30th August, 1963 had not been sent to the defendant, the requirement of Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act had not been complied with and, therefore, the suit ejectment was not maintainable. I find no merits in this contention. 3. For the appellant it was urged that inasmuch as the notice dated 30th August, 1963 had not been sent to the defendant, the requirement of Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act had not been complied with and, therefore, the suit ejectment was not maintainable. I find no merits in this contention. In paragraph 9 of the plaint the plaintiff had averred that he had served a notice dated 30th August, 1963 on the defendant determining his tenancy and asked him to vacate the Karkhana and deliver vacant possession thereof. Paragraph 1 of the written statement contained no specific details of the defendants averment. In paragraph 9 of the written statement the defendant admitted to have received the said notice and stated to have given correct reply thereto. Thus there was categorical admission of the defendant that he had received the notice dated 30th August, 1963 which was given by the plaintiff and further he had given a reply to that notice. Again in paragraph 11 of the written statement it was stated that the averment made in the notice was against law and the defendant was not liable to be evicted from the Karkhana. The defendant thus challenged the validity of the notice. A copy of that notice was filed by the plaintiff being Ext. 2 on the record. Its formal proof was dispensed with by the defendant. The plaintiff had deposed that he had sent this notice by the registered acknowledgment due post vide postal Ext. 7 and acknowledgment receipt Ext 3. It appears that the formal proof of both these documents was also dispensed with There is also an endorsement of admission on the back of these two documents. The plaintiff had thus proved to have sent that notice by post. The said notice was addressed to the defendant through his counsel Kazi Zulfikar Ali Vakil and was actually served on the said counsel. The defendant admits to have received that notice. He had also stated that he had given a reply to that notice. The service of that notice on the defendant was thus amply proved. The said notice was addressed to the defendant through his counsel Kazi Zulfikar Ali Vakil and was actually served on the said counsel. The defendant admits to have received that notice. He had also stated that he had given a reply to that notice. The service of that notice on the defendant was thus amply proved. To say that the compliance of the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act had not been made inasmuch as the notice was not sent directly to the defendant but was sent to his counsel and then delivered to him would be too technical on the fact of this case. The purport of second paragraph of Section 106 of the Transfer of property Act seems to be that the tenant, should be served with the notice. The various modes of serving the notice are mentioned in that paragraph One of the modes is to send the notice by post to the party who is intended to be bound by it. The plaintiff in the instant case sent the notice by post Ext. 2 shows that the notice was addressed to Sri Dildar Khan defendant through Sri Kazi Zulfiqar All Vakil. The notice was thus sent by plaintiff to Dildar Khan who was intended to be bound by it. Since Dildar Khan had sent the notice earlier dated 21st August, 1963, through his counsel Kazi Zulfiqar Ali to the plaintiff, the latter sent its reply to the defendant through Kazi Zulfiqar Ali. It is in this reply that the plaintiff determined the tenancy of the defendant. Thus the notice was, in my view, sent to the defendant in accordance with the mode prescribed by Section 106 of toe Transfer of Property Act. In view of the clear admission of the defendant in his written statement it did not lie in his month to contend that the notice was not sent to him in the manner laid down by Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The fact remains that the said notice had actually been received by the defendant and he had given a reply also to the same. There is, therefore, no substance in the contention that the suit for ejectment would not be maintainable inasmuch as the notice had not been sent to the defendant in accordance with Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. 4. There is, therefore, no substance in the contention that the suit for ejectment would not be maintainable inasmuch as the notice had not been sent to the defendant in accordance with Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. 4. It was next urged that the plaintiff was not entitled to the damages claimed by him. The appellate court below, has on an appraisal of the evidence on record recorded a finding that the plaintiff had suffered damages claimed by him and was entitled to recovery of the same. This is a finding of fact which is not open to be assailed in second appeal. It has not been shown that the finding is based on no evidence or that a mistake in law has been committed in arriving at that finding. No other plea was pressed or urged. 5. In the result, the appeal Tails and is accordingly dismissed with costs.