JUDGMENT S.K. Dhaon, J. - This is a defendant's appeal. It arises out of an order of remand passed by the lower appellate court in an appeal preferred by the plaintiff-respondent. In the suit the relief claimed was that a decree for the specific performance of an agreement to sell a certain property should be passed. 2. The plaintiff came out with the usual case that there was an agreement to sell within a certain period and during the subsistence of such an agreement the vendor sold the property in dispute to the appellant, that there was a breach of the contract on the part of the vendor and, therefore, the plaintiff was entitled to the relief claimed in the suit. The defence taken by the appellant was, inter alia, that he was a bonafide purchaser for valuable consideration without any notice of the earlier agreement to sell between the plaintiff and the vendor. The trial court dismissed the suit by recording the findings that the plaintiff had failed to prove that in pursuance of the agreement to sell he had been put in possession of the property in dispute by the vendor and the appellant was a bonafide purchaser for valuable consideration without notice. Feeling aggrieved, the plaintiff - respondent preferred an appeal which came up for hearing before the learned 5th Additional District Judge, Bareilly. 3. In the appeal, it appears, the appellant tried to support the decree of the trial court by raising a new plea that the plaintiff was bound to fail as he had failed to comply with the provisions contained in Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, in so far as he had failed to make the necessary averments as contemplated by those provisions. To counteract this plea, the plaintiff then and there made an application seeking an amendment of the plaint. By the amendment the plaintiff tried to fill in the lacuna and insert the necessary averments as required by the provisions contained in Section 16(c). This amendment was allowed and after doing so the learned lower appellate court remanded the suit for being retired by the trial court. 4. By the amendment the plaintiff tried to fill in the lacuna and insert the necessary averments as required by the provisions contained in Section 16(c). This amendment was allowed and after doing so the learned lower appellate court remanded the suit for being retired by the trial court. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that admittedly the application for the amendment was made sometime in December, 1975 and admittedly the limitation for instituting the suit expired sometime in September 1974, as the agreement itself, which was the foundation of the suit, had been entered into on 11th August 1971. He, therefore, contended that the court had no jurisdiction to allow the amendment sought for by the plaintiff. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent has not been able to controvert the fact that the application for the amendment of the plaint was made after the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for instituting the suit. The question, therefore, is : Whether the court had the jurisdiction to exercise its power under order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure by allowing such an amendment at such a belated stage ? This controversy is not res-integra. This Court in a number of cases has taken the view that the specific requirement of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act is the immediate cause or the cause of action for the institution of a suit seeking the relief of specific performance. This Court, therefore, has taken the view that since by such an amendment the cause of action is changed and since such an amendment deprives a litigant of a valuable plea of limitation, the Court will be exceeding its jurisdiction if it permits such an amendment to be made in the plaint. In Mahmood Khan and another v. Ayub Khan AIR 1978 Allahabad 463, a Division Bench of this Court has taken the view that amendment in the plaint in a situation of the kind with which we are concerned cannot be allowed for two reasons. First, because a valuable right has accrued to the defendant and secondly, because the amendment seeks to bring out a cause of action in the plaint which was conspicuously absent in the plaint as originally filed. First, because a valuable right has accrued to the defendant and secondly, because the amendment seeks to bring out a cause of action in the plaint which was conspicuously absent in the plaint as originally filed. In Narendra Bahadur Singh v. Baijnath Singh AIR 1981 Allahabad 410, a Division Bench of this Court took the view that since by the time the application for amendant was made, a fresh suit for specific performance had become barred by time and a valuable right had acreed in favour of the defendant by afflux of time, he could not be deprived of that right by allowing the amendment in exercise of the powers under order VI Rule 17 of the Code. I am bound by the aforementioned decisions of this court. The result is that I cannot have any hesitation in holding that the lower appellate court acted illegally in permitting the amendment of the plaint. 5. Learned counsel for the respondent tried to support the impugned judgment of the lower appellate court by pointing out that in fact the amendment application had been made by way of abundant caution as the necessary averments were already there in the plaint. I am not inclined to go into this question here at this stage. It will be open to the plaintiff to contend before the lower appellant court that the requirements of section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act had been amply fulfilled by the averments already existing in the plaint. If such a plea is taken the court will go into the question and decide the same on merits and in accordance with law. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant also contended that so long as the finding of the trial court that the appellant was a bonafide purchaser for valuable consideration without any notice of the earlier agreement stood intact the plaintiff was bound to fail in the suit. No exception can be taken to the proposition stated by the learned counsel. The matter is still at large before the appellate court and has to be finally adjudicated upon by if after re-examining and re-appreciating the evidence on record. This being a mixed question of law and fact or basically a question of fact, the lower appellate court, which has been constituted as the last court of fact and law, will examine this plea and decide the same on merits. This being a mixed question of law and fact or basically a question of fact, the lower appellate court, which has been constituted as the last court of fact and law, will examine this plea and decide the same on merits. I am, therefore, refraining from making any observations on this aspect of the case as well. 7. This appeal succeeds. The Judgment dated 12th December, 1975 passed by the Vth Additional District Judge, Bareilly, is set aside. The learned Judge is directed to register the Civil Appeal No. 87 of 1974 afresh and dispose of the same on merits and in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs.